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Synopsis	
 The	 purpose	 of	 this	 dissertation	 is	 to	 provide	 an	 account	 of	 the	metaphysical	status	of	mathematical	entities	in	Aristotle.	Aristotle	endorses	a	form	of	realism	about	mathematical	entities:	 for	him	as	well	as	 for	Platonists,	anti–realism,	 the	view	 that	mathematical	 objects	 do	 not	 exist,	 is	 not	 a	 viable	 option.	 The	 thesis	consists	 of	 two	main	 parts:	 a	 part	 dedicated	 to	 the	 objects	 of	 geometry,	 and	 a	part	 dedicated	 to	 numbers.	 Furthermore,	 I	 have	 included	 an	 introductory	chapter	about	a	passage	in	the	second	chapter	of	Book	B	of	the	Physics	(193b31-194a7)	 where	 Aristotle	 endorses	 a	 form	 of	 naïve	 realism	 with	 regard	 to	mathematical	entities.			Many	 of	 the	 passages	 that	 give	 us	 an	 insight	 into	 Aristotle’s	 philosophy	 of	mathematics	are	to	be	found	in	the	third	chapter	of	Book	M	of	the	Metaphysics.	Aristotle’s	primary	 concern	 there,	however,	 is	not	 so	much	 to	present	his	own	positive	account	as	 to	provide	answers	 to	a	 series	of	 (not	 so	obvious)	Platonic	arguments.	In	the	second	chapter	of	my	thesis,	I	discuss	some	of	those	arguments	and	highlight	their	role	in	Aristotle’s	own	position	about	the	metaphysical	status	of	geometrical	entities.	In	a	passage	that	is	of	crucial	 importance	to	understand	Aristotle’s	views	regarding	the	mode	of	existence	of	the	objects	of	mathematics	(Meta.	M.3,	1078a25-31),	Aristotle	 allows	 for	 the	potential	 existence	of	 them.	 I		argue	 that	 Aristotle’s	 sketchy	 remarks	 in	Meta.	M.3	 point	 towards	 a	 geometry	based	 on	 the	 commonsensical	 notion	 of	 the	 solid.	 This	 account	 can	 be	 further	developed	 if	 we	 take	 into	 consideration	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 preceding	 chapter	M.2:	 to	 refute	Platonic	 arguments	 that	 attribute	 greater	metaphysical	 status	 to	‘limit	entities’	(entities	bounding	and	within	a	physical	body),	 that	 is,	 to	points,	lines,	 and	 surfaces.	 According	 to	 Aristotle,	 such	 ‘limit	 entities’	 have	 only	 a	potential	existence–what	does	this	claim	amount	to?	To	answer	this	question,	 I	will	explore	a	more	traditional	reading	of	this	claim	and	I	will	also	put	forward	a	more	 radical	 one:	 from	 a	 contemporary	 perspective,	 this	 reading	 makes	
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Aristotelian	 geometry	 a	 distant	 cousin	 of	 modern	 Whiteheadian	 or	 Tarskian	geometries.			Providing	 an	 account	 of	 the	metaphysical	 status	 of	 number	 in	 Aristotle	 poses	quite	 a	 few	 challenges.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 scarcity	 of	 the	 evidence	 forces	commentators	 to	 rely	 on	 a	 few	 scattered	 remarks	 (primarily	 from	 the	Physics)	and	to	extract	Aristotle’s	own	views	from	heavily	polemical	contexts	(such	as	the	convoluted	arguments	that	occupy	much	of	books	M	and	N	of	the	Metaphysics).	On	the	other	hand,	the	Fregean	tradition	casts	a	great	shadow	upon	the	majority	of	 the	 interpretations;	 indeed,	 a	 great	 amount	 of	 the	 relevant	 scholarship	 is	dominated	by	Fregean	 tendencies:	 it	 is,	 for	example,	widely	held	 that	numbers	for	Aristotle		are	not	supposed	to	be	properties	of	objects,	much	like	colour,	say,	or	shape,	but	second-order	properties	(properties–of–properties)	of	objects.	The	scope	of	the	third	chapter	 is	to	critically	examine	some	of	the	Fregean-inspired	arguments	 that	have	 led	 to	 a	 thoroughly	Fregean	depiction	of	Aristotle,	 and	 to	lay	the	foundations	for	an	alternative	reading	of	the	crucial	texts.		 	
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Chapter	1:		Aristotle’s	realism	about	mathematicals	in	Physics	B.2		
	
[1.1]	Introduction		In	the	following	lines	from	the	second	chapter	of	Book	B	of	the	Physics	Aristotle	endorses	a	form	of	naïve	realism	with	regard	to	mathematical	entities:	
For natural bodies have planes, solids, lengths, and points, about which the mathematician 
carries out his investigations.1 [Physics B.2, 193b23–25; Charlton’s trans. mod.] Why	do	 I	 label	Aristotle’s	 realism	 as	 a	 ‘naïve’	 one?	The	main	 reasons	 are	 two:	One,	the	above	lines	do	not	tell	us	much	about	the	metaphysical	status	of	lower-dimensional	 entities,	 that	 is,	 of	 points,	 lengths,	 planes.	 Things	 get	 better	 a	 few	lines	below,	where	Aristotle	says	that	 ‘the	mathematician,	 too,	deals	with	these	things,	but	he	does	not	consider	each	of	them	as	boundary	of	natural	bodies’	(περὶ 
τούτων µὲν οὖν πραγµατεύεται καὶ ὁ µαθηµατικός, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ᾗ φυσικοῦ σώµατος 
πέρας ἕκαστον, 193b31-32;	Chartlon’s	trans.	mod.,	italics	mine).	It	is	safe,	then,	to	assume	 that	 Aristotle	 is	 considering	 mathematical	 entities	 in	 this	 context	(surfaces,	 lengths,	 and	 points)	 as	 limit	 entities,	 entities	 bounding	 or	 limiting	natural	bodies	or	some	continuous	magnitude.	The	solid	extensions	of	bodies	as	well	 as	 limit	 entities	 (πέρατα)–points,	 surfaces,	 and	 lines–that	 bound	 or	demarcate	 a	 continuous	 magnitude,	 constitute	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 the	mathematicians	 and	 are	 ‘objectively	 there’,	 a	 real	 feature	 of	 the	natural	world.	There	arises	a	certain	need,	 then,	 to	better	understand	the	nature	of	such	 limit	entities.	According	to	the	following	passage	 limit	entities	do	not	enjoy	separate	existence	 from	 the	 bodies	 they	 bound;	 a	 limit	 must	 always	 be	 the	 limit	 of	something:			
There are some people who think that there must be entities of this sort, because the point 
is the limit and extreme of the line, the line of the plane, and the plane of the solid. We 
must therefore have a look at this argument too, and see whether it is not extremely feeble. 
Extremes are not real objects; they are all rather limits. (Even walking, and movement in 
general, has a sort of limit; so this would be an individual and a real object which is 																																																								
1 καὶ γὰρ ἐπίπεδα καὶ στερεὰ ἔχει τὰ φυσικὰ σώµατα καὶ µήκη καὶ στιγµάς, περὶ ὧν σκοπεῖ ὁ 
µαθηµατικός. 
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absurd.) But even if they are, they will all belong to the particular perceptible things (it 
was to these that the argument applied); so why should they be separate?2 [Meta. N.3, 
1090b5–1090b13; Annas’ trans.; italics mine] Henry	Mendell	greatly	expands	on	Aristotle’s	realism	in	Physics	B.2:		
On this view mathematical theorems will be true, because they are true about solids, 
surfaces of solids, and edges of surfaces. Whatever the shapes of physical bodies may be, 
it is still true that they each have per se some shape. These need not even be shapes which 
are easy to analyse. The question, sometimes raised, whether Aristotle thinks there are 
geometricals is, from this perspective, easy to resolve. In a sense, there must be. That is, 
all bodies have volume with shape, surface with shape, and so forth. The objects of 
mathematics are in a way established. [Mendell (1986), p.78] 	My	second	reason	for	labeling	Aristotle’s	realism	as	‘naïve’	has	to	do	with	the	so-called	 precision	problem:	 Are	 the	 shapes	 of	 the	 bodies	we	 have	 around	 us	 the	shapes	that	the	geometers	actually	study–for	example,	are	the	bodies	around	us	perfectly	spherical	or	perfectly	planar	and	so	on?	Aristotle	does	not	fully	address	the	precision	problem	in	this	passage	of	the	Physics.	Does	he	address	it	explicitly	somewhere	else?	For	a	better	understanding	of	the	issue	and	its	implications	we	will	 have	 to	 wait	 until	 we	 discuss	 the	 crucial	 passages	 in	 Book	 M	 of	 the	
Metaphysics	in	the	second	chapter	of	this	work.		 	
																																																								
2 εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ ἐκ τοῦ πέρατα εἶναι καὶ ἔσχατα τὴν στιγµὴν µὲν γραµµῆς, ταύτην δ’ ἐπιπέδου, τοῦτο 
δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ, οἴονται εἶναι ἀνάγκην τοιαύτας φύσεις εἶναι. δεῖ δὴ καὶ τοῦτον ὁρᾶν τὸν λόγον, µὴ 
λίαν ᾖ µαλακός. οὔτε γὰρ οὐσίαι εἰσὶ τὰ ἔσχατα ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον πάντα ταῦτα πέρατα (ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς 
βαδίσεως καὶ ὅλως κινήσεως ἔστι τι πέρας· τοῦτ’ οὖν ἔσται τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία τις· ἀλλ’ ἄτοπον)· —οὐ 
µὴν ἀλλὰ εἰ καὶ εἰσί, τῶνδε τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔσονται πάντα (ἐπὶ τούτων γὰρ ὁ λόγος εἴρηκεν)· διὰ τί οὖν 
χωριστὰ ἔσται; 
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[1.2]	A	discussion	of	the	Physics	B.2	passage		Nevertheless,	the	second	chapter	of	Book	B	of	the	Physics	gives	us	a	first	glimpse	of	Aristotle’s	position	regarding	the	metaphysical	status	of	mathematicals.	Let	us	examine	closely	the	following	important	passage	from	that	chapter:		
Both the student of nature and the mathematician deal with these things; but the 
mathematician does not consider them as boundaries of natural bodies. Nor does he 
consider things which supervene as supervening on such bodies. That is why he separates 
them; for they are separable in thought from change, and it makes no difference; no error 
results. Those who talk about ideas do not notice that they too are doing this: they separate 
physical things though they are less separable than the objects of mathematics. That 
becomes clear if you try to define the objects and the things which supervene in each class. 
Odd and even, straight and curved, number, line, and shape, can be defined without 
change but flesh, bone, and man cannot. They are like snub nose, not like curved. The 
point is clear also from those branches of mathematics which come nearest to the study of 
nature, like optics, harmonics, and astronomy. They are in a way the reverse of geometry. 
Geometry considers natural lines, but not as natural; optics treats of mathematical lines, 
but considers them not as mathematical but as natural.3 [Physics B.2, 193b31-194a7; 
Charlton’s trans.]  Mathematicians	 study	 the	 very	 same	 natural	 points,	 lines,	 etc.	 which	 are	 the	limits	 of	 natural	 bodies,	 yet	 they	 do	 not	 study	 them	 as	 the	 limits	 of	 natural	bodies.	Nor	do	they	examine	their	attributes	as	attributes	that	belong	to	natural	bodies	(193b31–3).	Rather,	mathematical	entities	are	regarded	in	a	special	way:	as	 separate	 from	 matter	 or	 change:	 Aristotle	 is	 emphasising	 that	 the	mathematician	makes	use	of	a	special	sort	of	cognitive	separation	in	his	study	of																																																									
3 περὶ τούτων µὲν οὖν πραγµατεύεται καὶ ὁ µαθηµατικός, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ᾗ φυσικοῦ σώµατος πέρας ἕκαστον· 
οὐδὲ τὰ συµβεβηκότα θεωρεῖ ᾗ τοιούτοις οὖσι συµβέβηκεν· διὸ καὶ χωρίζει· χωριστὰ γὰρ τῇ νοήσει 
κινήσεώς ἐστι, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει, οὐδὲ γίγνεται ψεῦδος χωριζόντων. λανθάνουσι δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες 
καὶ οἱ τὰς ἰδέας λέγοντες· τὰ γὰρ φυσικὰ χωρίζουσιν ἧττον ὄντα χωριστὰ τῶν µαθηµατικῶν. γίγνοιτο 
δ’ ἂν τοῦτο δῆλον, εἴ τις ἑκατέρων πειρῷτο λέγειν τοὺς ὅρους, καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συµβεβηκότων. τὸ 
µὲν γὰρ περιττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καµπύλον, ἔτι δὲ ἀριθµὸς καὶ γραµµὴ καὶ 
σχῆµα, ἄνευ κινήσεως, σὰρξ δὲ καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐκέτι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ ῥὶς σιµὴ ἀλλ’ οὐχ 
ὡς τὸ καµπύλον λέγεται. 
		
13	
mathematical	 entities.	 It	 is	 not	 completely	 clear	 how	 one	 should	 conceive	 this	cognitive	separation:	is	it	to	be	understood	as	a	way	of	grasping	what	is	already	there?	 Or	 does	 it	 involve	 something	 more–perhaps	 some	 sort	 of	 mental	construction?	 Aristotle	 is	 adamant	 that	 ‘no	 error	 results’	 in	 employing	 it.	 It	 is	reasonable	to	suppose	that	the	cognitive	separation	Aristotle	has	in	mind	in	this	passage	 is	 what	 most	 commentators	 call	 ‘abstraction’;	 simply	 on	 the	 basis	 of	etymological	 considerations,	 there	 is	 more	 or	 less	 a	 consensus	 among	commentators	regarding	the	fundamental	characteristics	of	abstraction,	which	is	to	be	understood	as			
… an elimination or prescinding from irrelevant features of the physical and sensible 
world…The resulting picture, I believe, is one in which the mathematical features 
‘remaining’ after the abstraction process were actually there in the sensible and physical 
realm all along. Abstraction is simply a means of focusing one's attention, as it were, on 
those features by eliminating from consideration other features not germane to one's 
present mathematical investigations. [White (1993), p.176; my emphasis]4  No	 error	 arises	 	 in	 one’s	 mathematical	 reasoning	 because	 abstraction,	understood	in	this	way,		does	not	involve	any	distortion	or	misrepresentation	of	how	the	physical	world	is.	The	following	passage	gives	us	an	insight	into	this	sort	of	abstraction:			
And since, as the mathematician investigates abstractions (for in his investigation he 
eliminates all the sensible qualities, e.g. weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, 
and also heat and cold and the other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative 
and continuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, sometimes in three dimensions, and 
the attributes of things qua quantitative and continuous, and does not consider them in any 
other respect, and examines the relative positions of some and the consequences of these, 
and the commensurability and incommensurability of others, and the ratios of others; but 																																																								4	An	extensive	discussion	of		the	passages	in	the	Aristotelian	corpus	where	the	term	‘abstraction’	occurs	 can	 be	 found	 in	 [Cleary	 (1985)].	 The	 gist	 of	 his	 analysis	 as	 well	 as	 the	 relation	 of	abstraction	with	the	qua	locution	are	examined	in	the	second	chapter	of	my	thesis,	in	the	context	of	the	Meta.	M.3	discussion;	it	seems	that	Aristotle	employs	a	more	enhanced	version	of	cognitive	separation	 in	M.3,	one	 that	 is	not	merely	a	way	of	grasping	what	 is	already	 there,	but	 involves	some	sort	of	mental	construction.	
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yet we say there is one and the same science of all these things—geometry), the same is 
true with regard to being.5 [Meta. K.3, 1061a28-b4; Ross’ trans.; his emphasis] 	The	mathematician	 theorises	 (τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται,	 1061a29;	 θεωρεῖ,	 1061a30)	about	 ‘abstractions’	 (τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως,	 1061a29).	 When	 the	 mathematician	abstracts,	he	omits	(περιαιρέει,	1061a29)	the	features	that	are	not	relevant	to	his	present	concern	(1061a29-32).	He	leaves	only	quantity	and	what	 is	continuous	(τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές,	 1061a32),	 that	 is,	 he	 focuses	 his	 attention	 on	 the	mathematical	features	of	natural	bodies:	on	their	solid	extensions,	their	surfaces,	and	delineations	(τῶν µὲν ἐφ’ ἓν τῶν δ’ ἐπὶ δύο τῶν δ’ ἐπὶ τρία).	Besides	‘isolating’	mathematical	entities	that	are	found	in	the	sensible	world	(solids,	planes,	 lines,	etc.),	 the	mathematician	also	considers	their	properties	(the	ratios	of	some,	the	relative	positions	of	others,	etc.).	The	following	passage	is	also	pertinent	to	our	discussion:		
The so-called ‘abstract objects’ <the mind thinks> in the following way: if <one> had 
thought of the snub as snub <one would have thought of it> not <abstractly>; whereas <if 
one> had thought of <the snub> qua concave one would have thought of it abstractly, 
<that is>, qua concave, <one> would have thought of it without the flesh; in this sense the 
mathematicals, though not separate, <the mind> considers them as separate when it thinks 
them. In general, the mind is identical with its objects.6 [De Anima III.7, 431b12-19; my 
trans.] 
 Metaphysically,	 mathematicals	 cannot	 exist	 in	 separation	 (οὐ κεχωρισµένα,	431b16)	from	the	objects	of	natural	world;	concavity	is	always	the	concavity	of																																																									
5 καθάπερ δ’ ὁ µαθηµατικὸς περὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται (περιελὼν γὰρ πάντα τὰ 
αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ, οἷον βάρος καὶ κουφότητα καὶ σκληρότητα καὶ τοὐναντίον, ἔτι δὲ καὶ θερµότητα καὶ 
ψυχρότητα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθητὰς ἐναντιώσεις, µόνον δὲ καταλείπει τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές, τῶν µὲν 
ἐφ’ ἓν τῶν δ’ ἐπὶ δύο τῶν δ’ ἐπὶ τρία, καὶ τὰ πάθη τὰ τούτων ᾗ ποσά ἐστι καὶ συνεχῆ, καὶ οὐ καθ’ 
ἕτερόν τι θεωρεῖ, καὶ τῶν µὲν τὰς πρὸς ἄλληλα θέσεις σκοπεῖ καὶ τὰ ταύταις ὑπάρχοντα, τῶν δὲ τὰς 
συµµετρίας καὶ ἀσυµµετρίας, τῶν δὲ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ’ ὅµως µίαν πάντων καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τίθεµεν 
ἐπιστήµην τὴν γεωµετρικήν), τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὸ ὄν. 6	Translating	 the	 following	 version	 of	 the	 (tortuous)	 text:	 τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόµενα <νοεῖ> 
ὥσπερ, εἴ <τις> τὸ σιµὸν ᾗ µὲν σιµὸν οὔ, κεχωρισµένως δὲ ᾗ κοῖλον <εἴ τις> ἐνόει, ἄνευ τῆς σαρκὸς ἂν 
ἐνόει ἐν ᾗ τὸ κοῖλον—οὕτω τὰ µαθηµατικά, οὐ κεχωρισµένα <ὄντα>, ὡς κεχωρισµένα νοεῖ, ὅταν νοῇ 
<ᾗ> ἐκεῖνα. ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν, ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, τὰ πράγµατα.	
		
15	
some	 thing.	 The	 mathematician,	 however,	 is	 able	 to	 isolate	 mathematical	features	 (in	 this	 case,	 concavity)	 in	 thought;	 interested	 as	 he	 is	 only	 in	 the	essential	 characteristics	 of	 concavity	 (since	 it	 is	 not	 part	 of	 the	 essence	 of	concavity	 whether	 it	 is	 the	 concavity	 of	 this	 or	 that	 nose),	 he	 proceeds	 to	examine	concavity	as	such.	On	the	other	hand,	as	the	Physics	passage	has	made	clear,	 if	 one	 were	 to	 consider	 the	 snub	 qua	 snub,	 one	 would	 not	 think	 of	 it	irrespectively	of	matter,	since	to	be	snub	is	to	be	concave	in	a	special	way,	to	be	nasally	 concave.	 A	 similar	 discussion	 takes	 place	 at	 the	 end	 of	 	De	 Anima	 I.1,	where	 Aristotle	 emphasises	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 affections	 of	 the	 soul	 are	inseparable:		
We have said that the affections of the soul are not separate from the physical matter of 
living beings in the way in which anger and fear are not separate, and not in the way in 
which line and plane are.7 [De Anima I.1, 403bl7-19; mod. Charles’ translation] How	are	we	to	compare	the	affections	of	the	soul	(τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς,	 like	anger	and	fear)	with	lines	and	planes?	In	what	way	the	former	are	not	like	the	latter?	To	answer	this	question	we	have	to	go	back	a	few	lines:	
<The attributes> which are not separate, and which are not treated as attributes of such and 
such a body but in abstraction, <are studied by> the mathematician.8 [De Anima I.1, 
403b14-15; my trans.]  Mathematicals	are	not	separate	from	physical	matter	but	they	can	be	treated	in	abstraction	from	it;	affections	of	the	soul,	are	by	contrast,	neither	separable	(in	thought	or	in	definition)	from	matter	nor	separate	in	existence	from	such	matter.	As	D.	Charles	points	out:	‘if	one	does	not	think	of	fear	and	anger	as	enmattered	in	certain	types	of	perceptual	matter,	one	will	(in	his	view)	make	mistakes	in	one's	reasoning	about	 those	affections.	One	will	 fail,	 for	example,	 to	know	when	and	why	 they	 occur.’9	In	 lines	 403a25-27,	 Aristotle	 offers	 an	 example	 of	 how	 an	affection	of	the	soul	(like	anger)	ought	to	be	properly	defined:	‘To	be	angry	is	a																																																									
7 ἐλέγοµεν δὴ ὅτι τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζῴων, ᾗ γε τοιαῦθ’ 
ὑπάρχει <οἷα> θυµὸς καὶ φόβος, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γραµµὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον. 8	τῶν δὲ µὴ χωριστῶν µέν, ᾗ δὲ µὴ τοιούτου σώµατος πάθη καὶ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὁ µαθηµατικός.	9	In	[Charles	(2009),	p.5]. 
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process	of	this	type	of	body	or	part	or	capacity	of	such	a	body	caused	in	this	way	for	the	sake	of	such	and	such	a	goal.	(Charles’	trans.:	τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ 
τοιουδὶ σώµατος ἢ µέρους ἢ δυνάµεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε).			Further	justification	for	understanding	‘separation’	as	‘abstraction’	may	be	found	in	Philoponus’	and	Simplicius’	commentaries	of	the	Physics	passage:		
The mathematician discusses the shapes and their accompanying features without further 
thinking of whatever sort of matter these belong in, but separating them in thought from 
all matter he studies in this way their accompanying features; the natural scientist, 
however, thinking of the shape and the rest of the attributes studies them as being in 
matter.10 [Philoponus: On Aristotle ‘Physics’ 2, 219.28-33; Lacey’s trans. mod.] 
The mathematician differs from the natural scientist in the first instance in that the natural 
scientist talks not only about the properties of natural bodies but also about their matter, 
while the mathematician is in no way concerned with the matter.11 [Simplicius: On 
Aristotle ‘Physics’ 2, 290.27-29; Fleet’s trans.] Mathematical	 entities	 then,	 though	 inseparable	 in	 reality	 from	physical	matter,	they	 can	 be	 separated	 in	 thought,	 and	 the	 mathematicians	 are	 doing	 nothing	wrong	 in	 separating	 away	 perceptible	 matter	 from	 them	 and	 defining	 them	(λέγειν τοὺς ὅρους)	without	mentioning	any	such	matter.	To	 illustrate	his	point,	Aristotle	 draws	 a	 comparison	 between	 mathematical	 entities	 and	 their	attributes–which	 can	 be	 correctly	 defined	 without	 appealing	 to	 matter	 or	change–and	natural	forms–which	cannot	be	defined	in	that	way	(194a2-6).12	We	can	 point	 to	 Simplicius’	 commentary	 of	 the	 passage,	where	 the	 latter	 suggests	that	the	Physics	B.2	passage	offers	a	general	criterion	to	determine	what	can	and	what	cannot	be	mentally	separated:																																																										10 	‘Ο µὲν µαθηµατικὸς διαλέγεται περὶ τῶν σχηµάτων καὶ τῶν συµβαινόντων αὐτοῖς µηδὲν 
προσεπινοῶν ἐν ὁποιᾳδηποτοῦν ὕλῃ ταῦτα ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ χωρίσας αὐτὰ πάσης ὕλης τῇ διανοίᾳ οὕτω 
τὰ συµβαίνοντα αὐτοῖς θεωρεῖ, ὁ µέντοι φυσικὸς ἐπινοῶν τὸ σχῆµα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν παθῶν, ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ 
αὐτὰ θεωρεῖ.	11	Διαφέρει δὲ ὁ µαθηµατικὸς τοῦ φυσικοῦ πρῶτον µὲν ὅτι ὁ φυσικὸς οὐ περὶ τῶν συµβεβηκότων 
µόνον τοῖς φυσικοῖς σώµασι λέγει, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς ὕλης, τοῦ µαθηµατικοῦ µηδὲν περὶ ὕλης 
πολυπραγµονοῦντος. 	12	Following	[Peramatzis	(2011),	p.75].	
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He offers a general rule to determine what can and what cannot be mentally separated. 
When, in defining what we are separating, we do not include in the definition the entity 
from which we are separating it, and do not carry it along in our conception, but instead 
define and conceive it as something per se, it is then that we say such a thing is separable 
in definition and thought (for example, when defining the mathematical body we talk 
about that which has three dimensions without in any way carrying along the matter or the 
movement of the natural body; in defining the plane surface we talk about that which has 
nothing more than length and breadth; and it is the same in the case of numbers). But when 
the original entities appear inevitably as part and parcel of the definition which we seek to 
give, together with the properties which we are separating, which cannot even be thought 
of without them, then we say that such entities cannot be separated even in concept and 
thought. Such entities are flesh, bone and man.13 [Simplicius: On Aristotle ‘Physics’ 2, 
293.29-294.5; Fleet’s trans.] The	 criterion	 is	 to	 examine	 whether	 any	 error	 occurs	 in	 the	 mathematician’s	reasoning	 if	 mathematicals	 are	 to	 be	 thought	 of	 independently	 of	 physical	matter.14	The	application	of	this	criterion	in	the	case	of	mathematical	and	natural	forms	 allows	 Aristotle	 to	 show	 the	 error	 in	 the	 ways	 of	 the	 Platonists.	 As	Simplicius	argues,	no	error	arises	 if	one	thinks	of	 the	solid	body	as	 ‘that	which	has	three	 dimensions	 without	 in	 any	 way	 carrying	 along	 the	 matter	 or	 the	movement	of	the	natural	body’	(293.32-34).	In	this,	mathematical	entities	differ	from	entities	such	as	flesh,	bone,	and	man;	for	not	only	is	each	of	these	natural	and	 essentially	 enmattered,	 but	 each	 cannot	 be	 thought	 of	 without	 matter	(294.3-5).	 	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	Physics	 passage,	 Aristotle	 compares	mathematics																																																									
13 καὶ παραδίδωσι κανόνα τῶν τε τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ δυναµένων χωρίζεσθαι καὶ τῶν µή. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν µὲν 
ταῦτα ἃ χωρίζοµεν ὁριζόµενοι µὴ παραλαµβάνωµεν ἐν τῷ ὁρισµῷ ἐκεῖνα, ὧν χωρίζοµεν αὐτά, µηδὲ τῇ 
ἐννοίᾳ συναναφέρωµεν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ ὁριζώµεθα καὶ ἐννοῶµεν (ὡς τὸ µαθηµατικὸν σῶµα 
ὁριζόµενοι λέγοµεν τὸ τὰς τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις οὐδαµοῦ τὴν ὕλην ἢ τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ φυσικοῦ 
σώµατος συναναφέροντες καὶ τὸ ἐπίπεδον τὸ µῆκος καὶ πλάτος µόνον ἔχον καὶ ἐπὶ ἀριθµῶν ὁµοίως), 
τότε χωριστὰ λόγῳ καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοµεν εἶναι. ὅταν δὲ βουλοµένοις ὁρίσασθαι τὰ 
χωριζόµενα συνεµφαίνηται πάντως ἐκεῖνα, ὧν χωρίζεται, καὶ µηδὲ δύνηται χωρὶς ἐκείνων νοεῖσθαι, 
τότε καὶ τῇ νοήσει καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀχώριστα λέγοµεν. τοιαῦτα δὲ σὰρξ καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ 
ἄνθρωπος. 14	So	Peramatzis	 (2011),	p.72.	Consult	 [Charles	 (2009),	p.5]	 and	especially	 [Peramatzis	 (2011),	pp.71-73]		for	a	discussion	of	the	criterion.			
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with	‘those	branches	of	mathematics	which	come	nearest	to	the	study	of	nature’	(τὰ φυσικώτερα τῶν µαθηµάτων):		
The point is clear also from those branches of mathematics which come nearest to the 
study of nature, like optics, harmonics, and astronomy. They are in a way the reverse of 
geometry. Geometry considers natural lines, but not as natural; optics treats of 
mathematical lines, but considers them not as mathematical but as natural. [Physics B.2, 
194a7-12; Charlton’s trans.]	The	geometer	is	investigating	natural	lines	‘not	as	natural’	(οὐχ ᾗ φυσική).	Thus,	the	 mathematician	 studies	 the	 essence	 of	 concavity	 or	 curvature	 and	 its	properties:	 the	 mathematician	 can	 mentally	 separate/cognitively	 isolate	curvature	 from	 its	 instantiations	 and	 study	 its	 properties	 without	 any	 error	arising	from	this	process.	On	the	other	hand,	the	subject	matter	of	astronomy	is	not	merely	sphericity	and	its	properties,	but	the	sphericity	of	planets,	and	other	celestial	bodies.	But	the	astronomer	does	not	study	just	that;	he	also	takes	into	account	 the	 motion	 of	 the	 celestial	 bodies,	 that	 is,	 he	 studies	 those	 bodies	 as	moving	 spheres.	 It	 would	 be	 a	 mistake	 for	 the	 astronomer	 to	 consider	 the	sphericity	 of	 the	planets	 in	 isolation	 from	 their	motion.	 For	 that	would	 reduce	astronomy	to	a	geometry	of	spheres;	and	how	could	astronomy	then	explain	the	apparent	motions	of	the	stars	and	other	celestial	bodies?	The	point	that	Aristotle	is	 trying	to	make	here	 is	 that	an	applied	mathematician	such	as	an	astronomer	merely	studies	a	conjunction	of	properties	(such	as	the	sphericity	of	the	celestial	bodies	 and	 their	 motions);	 in	 other	 words	 astronomy	 studies	 the	 heavenly	bodies		qua	(moving	and	having	magnitude).	Aristotle’s	claim	that	astronomy	is	in	a	way	the	reverse	of	geometry	can	be	understood	as	implying	that		the	former	involves	 an	 addition,	 since	 it	 takes	 the	 shapes	 from	 the	 superordinate	 science	and	studies	them	in	conjunction	with	the	motion	of	the	celestial	bodies,	whereas	the	latter	 involves	an	abstraction	(in	the	sense	of	subtraction)	 in	that	 it	studies	only	shapes	themselves	and	their	essential	properties.15																																																										15	Cf.	 the	 discussion	 in	Post.	An.	 A.13	 (78b36–79a11),	where	 Aristotle	 argues	 that	 subordinate	sciences	 ‘make	 use	 of	 <mathematical>	 forms’	 (κέχρηται τοῖς εἴδεσιν,	 79a7).	 I	 do	 not	 mean,	 of	course,	that	Aristotle	postulates	conjunctive	properties	in	addition	to	the	conjuncts:	 if	a	celestial	body	has	the	property	of	being	spherical	(S)	and	the	property	of	being	in	motion	(M),	then	it	has	
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Especially	 illuminating	about	 the	contrast	between	astronomy	and	geometry	 is	the	 commentary	 of	 Philoponus	 (220.1-5):	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 Philoponus	 cites	Theodosius	(a	mathematician	and	astronomer	of	the	second	century	BC)	and	his	work	On	Spheres,	as	a	paradigmatic	case	of	a	geometer	that	studies	the	attributes	of	 the	 sphere,	 without	 taking	 into	 account	 any	matter;	 instead,	 he	 focuses	 his	attention	on	the	spherical	shape	and	whatever	holds	true	of	spheres,	e.g.	that	if	a	sphere	 is	cut	by	a	plane	a	circle	comes	about	and	so	on.16	Philoponus	contrasts	that	 case	with	 the	 case	 of	Autolycus	 (an	 astronomer	of	 the	 fourth	 century	BC)	and	his	work	On	Moving	Sphere,	where	 the	 latter	writes	about	moving	 spheres	and	what	holds	true	of	them,	and	thus	he	is	a	concerned	with	a	more	particular	kind	of	 subject	 than	Theodosius,	 and	he	 is	 closer	 to	 the	natural	philosopher	 in	that	he	also	takes	into	account	motion	(he	examines	a	combination	of	shape	and	motion).17	(220.4-9)	This	helpful	comment	can	be	examined	alongside	Aristotle’s																																																																																																																																																															the	conjunctive	property	of	being	spherical	and	being	in	motion	(S&M);	this	is	not	to	say	that	it	has	three	distinct	properties	S,	M	and	S&M.	(Following	[Armstrong	(1978),		p.30ff]).		What	does	it	mean	 that	 the	optician	 studies	 the	mathematical	 lines	not	qua	mathematical	 but	qua	physical?	Drawing	an	analogue	with	the	investigations	of	the	astronomer	(where	we	saw	that	the	subject	matter	of	astronomers	is	not	merely	geometrical	aspects	of	the	heavenly	bodies	(e.g.	their	shape)	but	 also	 properties	 such	 as	 being	 in	motion),	we	 can	 argue	 similarly	 for	 the	 subject	matter	 of	optics:	it	is	not	merely	the	geometrical	aspects	of	visual	rays	(properties	such	as	being	straight	or	circular	and	so	on)	but	also	other,	physical	properties,	the	nature	of	which	has	to	be	determined.	Now	McKirahan	 in	 his	 article	 ‘Aristotle’s	 Subordinate	 Sciences’	 points	 to	 Euclid’s	Optics	 as	 the	paradigmatic	case	that	will	offer	some	illumination	on	the	subject	matter	of	optics.	This	approach	is	partially	correct:	Euclid’s	Optics	studies	only	the	geometrical	aspect	of	visual	rays	and	does	not	make	any	reference	to	further	physical	properties	that	those	lines	might	have;	it	does	not	study	properties	such	as	their	being	in	motion	(since	those	rays	travel	outwards	from	the	eye/the	light	object),	 as	well	 as	 their	 strength	 and	weakness.	 (Burnyeat	 also	makes	 this	 point	 in	 [Burnyeat	(2005),	 pp.36-37]).	 One	 need	 only	 look	 at	 Aristotle’s	 Meteorologica	 and	 the	 explanation	 of	phenomena	such	as	the	reflection	of	the	visual	rays,	to	get	an	understanding	of	the	importance	of	properties	 such	 as	 the	 weakness	 of	 the	 visual	 rays	 in	 our	 analysis	 of	 them.	 (For	 extensive	discussion	consult	[Wilson	(2013)]	esp.	ch.12).	
16  ὁ γοῦν Θεοδόσιος ἐν τοῖς Σφαιρικοῖς διδάσκων τὰ συµβαίνοντα πάθη τῇ σφαίρᾳ οὐδὲν 
προσλογίζεται ὕλην, ἀλλὰ χωρίσας πάσης οὐσίας τὸ σφαιρικὸν σχῆµα οὕτω τὰ συµβαίνοντα αὐτῷ 
ἐπισκέπτεται, ὅτι ἐὰν σφαῖρα ἐπιπέδῳ τµηθῇ κύκλον ποιεῖ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα.  
17  ὁ δὲ Αὐτόλυκος Περὶ κινουµένης σφαίρας γράψας καὶ ὅσα συµβαίνει τῇ κινουµένῃ 
σφαίρᾳ, µερικώτερός ἐστι τοῦ Θεοδοσίου καὶ µᾶλλον τῷ φυσικῷ προσεγγίζων (ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ἐγγύς 
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own	remarks	about	astronomy	in		Meta.	M.3,	1077b22-30,	where	he	claims	that	the	subject	matter	of	 the	 latter	 is	 just	moving	solids	etc.	and	not	some	peculiar	intermediate	entities	as	some	Platonists	suppose.		
 
[1.3]	The	question	of	idealisation		All	the	above		discussion,	however,	presupposes	one	thing:	that	there	are	perfect	instantiations	of	the	various	geometrical	entities	in	the	physical	world.	Provided	that	those	entities	are	exemplified	in	the	physical	world,	no	misrepresentation	of	the	reality	around	us	results	when	the	mathematicians	cognitively	isolate	those	entities	 from	 all	 those	 irrelevant,	 extra-mathematical	 elements	 that	 do	 not	pertain	to	their	investigations.	For,	it	is	easy	to	see	that	when	astronomers	study	the	 celestial	 bodies	 qua	 spheres	 no	 misrepresentation	 of	 their	 reality	 results	
given	that	they	are	perfect	spheres;	 or	 consider	Simplicius’	 example	of	 the	 solid	body:		
For not even is the solid assumed by him to be natural <body>, but only something with 
three dimensions as if such things existed per se; for the mathematician concerns himself 
with the features that can be mentally separated.18 [Simplicius: On Aristotle ‘Physics’ 2, 
290.34-291.2; Fleet’s trans.] 	One	might	 claim,	 however,	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	 geometry,	 there	 is	 a	margin	 for	approximation:	the	surface	of	my	desk	is	unlikely	to	be	perfectly	planar	and	my	basketball	is	not	a	perfect	sphere.	One	then	might	argue	that	just	because	some	of	 the	 minutial	 aberrations	 and	 irregularities	 (such	 as	 the	 unevenness	 on	 the	surface	of	my	desk)	are	omitted	this	does	not	mean	that	our	definitions	are	not	representative	of	 reality.	We	 cannot,	 of	 course,	 talk	of	 abstraction	 in	 the	 sense	described	previously:	this	is	not	a	mere	elimination	from	consideration	anymore	but	something	more,	namely	idealisation.19	According	to	this	alternative	reading,																																																																																																																																																															
πως ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας)· εἰ γὰρ καὶ µὴ ἐπινοεῖ οὐσίαν τινὰ ἐν τῇ κινουµένῃ σφαίρᾳ, ἀλλ’ οὖν σύνθεσίν 
τινα λαµβάνει τοῦ σχήµατος καὶ τῆς κινήσεως, καὶ ταύτῃ ἐγγύς πως ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας. 
18 οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ στερεὸν αὐτῷ φυσικὸν ὑπόκειται, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο µόνον τὸ τριχῇ διεστώς. ὡς εἰ καὶ 
καθ’ἑαυτὰ ἦν τοιαῦτα· περὶ γὰρ τὰ τῇ νοήσει χωριστὰ καταγίνονται. 19	In	a	similar	discussion,	Mendell	calls	it	‘ideal	abstraction’	in	[Mendell		(1986),	pp.73-75].	
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there	 is	no	error	when	 the	geometers	 are	 thinking	of	 their	objects	 as	 separate	from	change/perceptible	matter	because	those	objects	are	the	idealised	versions	of	 everyday	 ones.	 One	 may	 retort	 that	 any	 talk	 of	 idealisation	 is	 dangerous,	inasmuch	as	it	leads	us	away	from	the	realism	Aristotle	espouses	in	that	passage.	A	 first	 response	 would	 be	 to	 limit	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 idealisation:	 not	 every	geometrical	object	needs	 to	be	considered	as	an	 idealised	version	of	a	sensible	one;	furthermore,	the	issue	of	idealisation	is	 limited	in	geometry	–one	does	not	talk	of	idealisation	in	the	case	of	arithmetic.	Does	Aristotle	allow	for	idealisation	in	his	discussion	of	 the	metaphysical	 status	of	mathematicals	 in	Metaphysics	M	and	N?	And	is	the	picture	there	consistent	with	his	naïve	realism	in	the	Physics	passage?	 Answers	 to	 questions	 like	 the	 above	will	 have	 to	wait	 until	 a	 proper	examination	of	the	relevant	passages.			 	
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Chapter	2:		Aristotle	on	the	metaphysical	status	of	geometricals	
 
[2.1]	(Not	really)	a	tetrachotomy			The	 following	passage	 from	the	 first	chapter	of	Book	M	of	 the	Metaphysics	 lists	several	options	for	the	mode	of	existence	of	mathematicals:		
If the objects of mathematics exist, then (i) they must exist either in sensible objects, as 
some say, or (ii) separate from sensible objects (and this also is said by some), or if they 
exist in neither of these ways, either (iii) they do not exist, or (iv) they exist in some other 
way. So that the subject of our discussion will be not whether they exist but how they 
exist.20 [Meta. M.1, 1076a32-37; Ross’ trans.] Aristotle’s	 primary	 interest,	 as	 the	 last	 sentence	 of	 this	 passage	 makes	 clear	(ὥσθ’ ἡ ἀµφισβήτησις ἡµῖν ἔσται οὐ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ τρόπου, 1076a36-
37),	lies	in	the	specific	mode	of	existence	of	the	objects	of	mathematics.	The	third	option,	however,	the	option	of	their	non-existence,	is	not	stated	here	merely	for	the	sake	of	completeness.	For	Aristotle	as	well	as	for	Platonists,	anti-realism,	the	view	 that	 mathematical	 objects	 do	 not	 exist,	 does	 not	 merit	 serious	consideration.	If	the	propositions	of	mathematics	are	true,	then	they	are	true	of	things	that	exist;	Aristotle	and	the	Platonists	surely	think	that	the	propositions	of	mathematics	 are	 true.	 One	 then	 should	 not	 overemphasise	 the	 extent	 of	disagreement	 between	 Aristotle	 and	 the	 Platonists	 with	 regard	 to	 their	respective	 philosophies	 of	mathematics	 as,	 for	 example,	 Julia	 Annas	 does.21	As	Myles	 Burnyeat	 explains,	 any	 discussion	 about	 the	 metaphysical	 status	 of	mathematical	 entities	 that	 purports	 to	 be	 an	 accurate	 reflection	 of	 the	 Greek	philosophy	of	mathematics	has	to	presuppose	(or	at	least	to	be	largely	based	on)	a	realist	conception	of	mathematical	truth:																																																										
20 ἀνάγκη δ’, εἴπερ ἔστι τὰ µαθηµατικά, (i) ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἶναι αὐτὰ καθάπερ λέγουσί τινες, (ii) ἢ 
κεχωρισµένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν (λέγουσι δὲ καὶ οὕτω τινές)· ἢ εἰ µηδετέρως, (iii) ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἢ (iv) ἄλλον 
τρόπον εἰσίν· ὥσθ’ ἡ ἀµφισβήτησις ἡµῖν ἔσται οὐ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ τρόπου. 21 	Annas	 claims	 that	 what	 distinguishes	 Aristotle	 from	 Plato	 is	 ‘the	 question	 whether	mathematical	objects	exist’.	In	[Annas	(1976),	pp.	26-27].		
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No-one in this debate thinks to explain mathematical truth as theorem-hood (derivability 
from the axioms). No one has the idea that mathematical truth could be internal to 
mathematical statements in the manner of analytic statements like ‘Bachelors are 
unmarried.’ No one suggests it would be enough to regard mathematical theorems as 
approximately true of the physical world . . . Here, as elsewhere in Greek philosophy, the 
discussion is constrained by a heavily realist concept of truth. [Burnyeat (1987), p.224; 
italics mine] Burnyeat	rightly	cautions	against	ascribing	to	Aristotle	a	notion	of	mathematical	truth	as	theorem-hood	(=derivability	from	the	axioms,	also	known	as	if-thenism),	for	the	simple	reason	that	this	notion	implies	that	mathematical	statements	can	be	devoid	of	content:22		
Now the entities referred to in a given science are entities whose existence is necessary for 
the theorems of the science to be true. That is why option (iii) in the tetrachotomy of M.1 
has no takers and receives no discussion. It would mean that mathematics was not true. All 
parties to the debate agree that mathematics is true. All parties are therefore committed to 																																																								22	Hilary	 Putnam	 in	 his	 article	 'The	 Thesis	 that	Mathematics	 is	 Logic’	 attributes	 to	 Russell	 the	following	 philosophy	 of	 mathematics:	 ‘Mathematicians	 are	 in	 the	 business	 of	 showing	 that	 if	there	 is	 any	 structure	which	 satisfies	 such-and-such	 axioms	 (e.g.,	 the	 axioms	of	 group	 theory),	
then	that	structure	satisfies	such-and-such	 further	statements	 (some	 theorems	of	group	 theory	or	other).’	[Putnam	(1967),	p.281;	italics	mine].	Putnam	himself	also	adopted	this	philosophy	of	mathematics	 in	 this	same	article.	There	 is,	however,	a	danger	of	vacuity	 that	 lurks	underneath;	Dale	Jacquette	offers	the	following	critique	of	if-thenism:	‘The	inferences	invoked	in	Putnam’s	if-thenism	.	.	.	when	their	content	is	universally	reduced	to	conditional	deductive	form,	appear	to	be	
altogether	 vacuous	 of	 specific	mathematical	 content.’	 [Jacquette	 (2004),	 p.320;	 italics	 mine].	 If-
thenism,	 however,	 has	 roots	 that	 go	 back	 at	 least	 to	 the	 Ockhamist	 tradition	 and	 the	 debate	between	 indivisibilists	 and	 anti-indivisbilists;	 the	 following	 is	 a	 passage	 from	 an	 anonymous	disciple	of	Ockham	who	gives	us	a	glimpse	of	Ockham’s	interpretation	of	Aristotle’s	philosophy	of	mathematics:	 ‘According	 to	 the	 preceding	 principle	 he	 [i.e.	 Ockham]	 posits	 that	 one	must	 not	admit	indivisibles	such	as	those	commonly	conceded,	such	as	points,	lines,	surfaces,	and	things	of	that	 kind.	 In	 fact,	 neither	 reason,	 nor	 experience,	 nor	 authority	 prohibit	 us	 from	 doing	 so.	 He	states	that	the	texts	authorised	by	Aristotle	should	be	interpreted	conditionally.	When	Aristotle	asserts,	 for	 example,	 that	 the	 circle	 is	 a	 shape	 such	 that	 the	 lines	 from	 its	 center	 to	 its	circumference	are	all	equal,	he	states	that	it	must	be	understood	thus:	the	circle	is	a	shape	such	that,	if	a	point	existed,	the	lines	from	this	point	to	its	circumference	will	be	equal.	That	is	how	one	ought	to	explain	all	the	postulates	and	conclusions	relative	to	indivisibles.’	(Contained	in	[Duhem	(1985),	p.21];	underlining	mine).	
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accepting that mathematicals exist. The dispute, as M.1 was bound to conclude (1076a36–
37), is about their manner of existence.23 [Burnyeat (1987), p.221; italics mine] The	discussion	that	follows	Aristotle’s	listing	of	the	possible	views	regarding	the	mode	of	existence	 for	mathematicals	 can	be	 summarised	as	 follows:	Aristotle’s	first	 target	 is	 the	 people	who	 endorse	 a	 view	of	 immanent	 Platonism	 (i.e.	 that	mathematicals	 somehow	 exist	 in	 the	 sensibles)	 (M.2,	 1076a38-b11);	 he	 then	argues	against	 	 a	more	 traditional	view	of	Platonism	(i.e.	 against	 the	view	 that	mathematicals	 enjoy	 separate	 existence	 from	 the	 sensibles)	 (M.2,	 1076b11-1077b14).	He	concludes	the	discussion	by	asking	whether	mathematicals	do	not	exist	 at	 all,	 or	 exist	 in	 some	 other	 way	 (M.2,	 1077b14-17). Then,	 in	 M.3	(1077b17-1078a31)	 he	 explains	 (albeit	 in	 a	 cryptic	 way)	 the	 special	 mode	 of	existence	that	mathematical	objects	do	have.	
  
																																																								23	As	 it	 can	be	seen	 from	the	 first	of	Burnyeat’s	passages,	he	makes	 the	stronger	claim	 that	we	
cannot	even	regard	mathematical	theorems	as	approximately	true	of	the	physical	world.	I	am	not	so	 sure	 that	 Aristotle	would	 agree	with	 such	 a	 claim.	 In	 any	 case	 Burnyeat’s	 argument	 in	 the	passage	quoted	 could	be	 substantially	 strengthened	 if	we	 invoke,	 as	Cleary	 rightfully	does,	 the	
argument	 from	 the	 sciences.	 As	 Cleary	 notes,	 the	 argument	 is	 based	 on	 the	 ‘fundamental	assumption	is	that	any	genuine	science	must	have	a	real	or	existent	object.	Since	Aristotle	shares	[with	the	Platonists]	that	epistemological	assumption,	he	cannot	accept	the	non-existence	of	the	objects	 of	mathematics	 as	 that	would	 leave	 his	 paradigmatic	 sciences	without	 foundations.’	 In	[Cleary	(1995),	p.280].	
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[2.2]	The	notion	of	priority	and	its	role	in	the	M.2	discussion		
[2.2.1]	The	multifaceted	notion	of	priority		Aristotle’s	 general	 strategy	 consists	 in	 showing	 that	 the	 Platonists'	 arguments	can,	at	best,	account	for	the	priority	in	account	or	definition	of	mathematicals	to	sensible	 objects–those	 arguments	 cannot	 establish	 the	 priority	 in	 substance	 of	mathematicals	 to	 sensible	 objects.	Much	 of	 the	 discussion	 is	 framed	 around	 a	conception	of	mathematicals	as	boundaries	and	their	priorities	to	the	solids	they	bound.24 Aristotle’s	criticism	of	 the	view	that	mathematicals	exist	 in	separation	from	the	sensibles	begins	as	follows:		
But, again, it is not possible that such entities should exist separately. For if besides the 
sensible solids there are to be other solids which are separate from them and prior to the 
sensible solids, it is plain that besides the planes also there must be other and separate 
planes and points and lines; for consistency requires this.25 [Meta. M.2., 1076b11-16; 
Ross’ trans.]  One	of	the	main	tenets	of	(what	can	be	called	the	orthodox)	Platonic	philosophy	of	mathematics	 is	 that	mathematical	entities	enjoy	separate	 existence	over	and	above	sensible	substances;	the	above	passage	highlights	a	further	aspect	of	this	philosophy:	 that	 such	mathematicals	 are	 somehow	 prior	 (πρότερα)	 to	 sensible	substances.	 The	 following	 brief	 excursus	 intends	 to	 shed	 some	 light	 on	 the	multifaceted	 notion	 of	 priority,	 a	 concept	 that	 plays	 such	 an	 important	 role	 in	Aristotle’s	discussion	of	the	metaphysical	status	of	mathematical	objects.		Aristotle’s	 notion	 of	 separation	 is	 sometimes	 tied	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 priority	 in	
substance:	 in	Meta.	 Δ.11,	 1019a1-4,	 for	 instance,	 Aristotle	 says	 that	 things	 are	called	 prior	 (πρότερα)	 in	 virtue	 of	 their	 nature	 and	 substance	 (κατὰ φύσιν καὶ 
οὐσίαν)	when	it	is	possible	for	them	to	exist	without	other	things	(ἐνδέχεται εἶναι 																																																								24	Stephen	Menn	is	one	of	the	few	scholars	who	have	highlighted	the	fact	that	Aristotle	actually	spends	a	 large	part	of	the	second	chapter	of	Book	M	of	the	Metaphysics	responding	to	Platonist	arguments	framed	in	terms	of	priority	rather	than	separation.	In	[Menn,	‘Iγ3’,	p.19].		
25 ἀλλὰ µὴν οὐδὲ κεχωρισµένας γ’ εἶναι φύσεις τοιαύτας δυνατόν. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται στερεὰ παρὰ τὰ 
αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισµένα τούτων ἕτερα καὶ πρότερα τῶν αἰσθητῶν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἐπίπεδα ἕτερα 
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπίπεδα κεχωρισµένα καὶ στιγµὰς καὶ γραµµάς (τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ λόγου)· 
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ἄνευ ἄλλων),	whereas	those	other	things	cannot	exist	without	them;	this	division,	according	 to	 Aristotle,	 was	 used	 by	 Plato	 (τὰ µὲν δὴ οὕτω λέγεται πρότερα καὶ 
ὕστερα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἄνευ 
ἐκείνων µή· ᾗ διαιρέσει ἐχρήσατο Πλάτων,	1019a1-4).	Furthermore,	 in	Meta.	Z.1,	1028a31-b2,	 Aristotle	 says	 that	 substance	 is	 prior	 (πρῶτον)	 in	 three	 ways,	 in	definition,	 in	 knowledge	 and	 in	 nature	 (λόγῳ καὶ γνώσει καὶ φύσει).	 That	substance	is	prior	in	nature	is	then	explained	in	terms	of	separation:	none	of	the	other	 predicates	 is	 separate	 but	 only	 substance	 (τῶν µὲν γὰρ ἄλλων 
κατηγορηµάτων οὐθὲν χωριστόν, αὕτη δὲ µόνη):			
Now we speak of what is primary in many ways, but substance is primary in every way-in 
definition, in knowledge and in nature. For none of the other predicates is separate but this 
alone; and in definition too this is primary, since in the definition of everything there must 
occur the definition of a substance; and we think we know a thing most fully when we 
know what the man is, or the fire, rather than when we know its quality or quantity or 
place-since it is also true that each of these themselves we know only when we know what 
that quantity or quality is. [Meta. Z.1, 1028a31-b2; Bostock’s trans. mod.]  	From	 the	Meta.	 Δ.11	 passage	we	may	 infer	 that	A	 is	 separate	 from	B	 iff	 A	 can	exist	 without	 B	 (ὅσα ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων),	 or,	 equivalently,	 iff	 A	 exists	independently	of	B.	We	may	also	infer	an	association	of	separation	with	priority:	if	A	 can	exist	without	B,	 but	B	 cannot	 exist	without	A	 (ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἄνευ ἐκείνων),	then	A	 is	 not	 only	 separate	 from	but	 also	 prior	 in	 substance	 to	B.26	Priority	 in	substance,	 then,	 is	 understood	as	 follows:	A	 is	prior	 in	 substance	 to	B	 if	A	 can	exist	apart	from	B,	but	B	cannot	exist	apart	from	A.			Another	sense	of	separation	is	separation	in	account	or	in	definition.	An	item,	A,	is	separate	in	definition	(or	in	account)	from	another	item,	B,	 if	and	only	if	A	is	(or	 can	be)	defined	without	 reference	 to	B.	 For	 example,	white	 can	be	defined	apart	 from	 man	 but	 female	 cannot	 be	 defined	 apart	 from	 animal	 (ὥσπερ τὸ 
λευκὸν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐνδέχεται ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ θῆλυ ἄνευ τοῦ ζῴου,	1030b25-26).  
																																																								26	For	extensive	discussion	on	the	matter	see	[Fine	(1984)].		
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However,	instead	of	definitional	separation,	Aristotle	often	speaks	of	definitional	
priority.	 Peramatzis 27 	lists	 several	 passages	 where	 Aristotle	 discusses	definitional	priority:			
1) For with respect to the account the former are defined in terms of the latter, and the 
latter are prior in that they are without the former. [Meta. Z.10, 1034b30-2; Bostock’s 
trans.]  
 
2) The parts of the formula, into which the formula is divided, are prior – some of them or 
all of them; and the formula of the right angle is not divided into the formula of the acute, 
but that of the acute into that of the right; for one who defines the acute uses the right 
angle; for the acute is less than the right. And, similarly, in the case of the circle and the 
semicircle; for the semicircle is defined through the circle and the finger through the 
whole; for finger is such-and-such a part of man. [Meta. Z.10, 1035b4–11; Bostock’s 
trans.] 	
3) <Things are prior> in definition to those things whose definitions are compounded from 
definitions of them. [Meta. M.2, 1077b3–4; Annas’ trans.]  
 
4) And in definition, too, this [i.e. substance] is primary (for it is necessary that in each 
thing’s definition there should occur the definition of a substance). [Meta. Z.1, 1028a34–6; 
Bostock’s trans.]  	It	seems	then	that	definitional	priority	involves	as	a	necessary	part	the	concept	of	 separation	 in	 definition.28	Consider	 the	 second	 passage	 listed	 above	 (Meta.	Z.10,	1035b4–11):	the	account	of	the	right	angle	does	not	include	the	account	of	the	 acute	but	 the	 converse	 is	 true	 (ὁ δὲ τῆς ὀρθῆς λόγος οὐ διαιρεῖται εἰς ὀξείας 
λόγον, ἀλλ’ <ὁ> τῆς ὀξείας εἰς ὀρθήν,	1035b6–7).	One	defines	 the	acute	angle	 in	terms	of	the	right	angle	but	not	conversely	(χρῆται γὰρ ὁ ὁριζόµενος τὴν ὀξεῖαν τῇ 
ὀρθῇ· “ἐλάττων” γὰρ “ὀρθῆς” ἡ ὀξεῖα,	 1036b7–8). Priority	 in	 account	 then	 is	understood	as	follows:	A	is	prior	in	account	to	B	if,	in	giving	an	account	of	B,	we	formulate	it	in	terms	of	A,	whereas	in	giving	an	account	of	A	we	need	not	appeal	to	B.	
																																																								27	See	[Peramatzis	(2011),	p.24	ff.]	for	extensive	discussion.	28	So	[Peramatzis	(2011),	p.25].		
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	The	following	passage	from	the	Metaphysics	Z.13	introduces	yet	another	sense	of	priority:			
Further, it is absurd and impossible that a this and a substance, if it is composed of 
anything, should be composed not of substances, nor of a this, but of a quality. For then 
the quality, which is not a substance, will be prior to substance and the this. And this is 
impossible; for attributes cannot be prior to substance either in formula or in time or in 
generation, since if they were they would also be separable. [Meta. Z.13, 1038b23-29; 
Bostock’s trans.]  
 The	 passage	 introduces	 priority	 in	 generation	 or	 ‘coming-to-be’:	 A	 is	 prior	 in	generation	to	B	 if	B	 is	 further	ahead	 in	a	process	of	generation	than	A.	Priority	plays	also	an	important	role	in	Metaphysics	Θ,	where	Aristotle	discusses	actuality	and	potentiality:			
Since it has been determined in how many ways prior is said, it  is evident that actuality is 
prior to potentiality. And I mean by potentiality not only that defined kind which is called 
an origin of change in something else or in a thing qua something else, but generally all 
origins of change or remaining static. For nature too is in the same class as potentiality; for 
it is an origin of change, though not in something else but in a thing itself qua itself. Then 
actuality is prior to all potentiality of this sort both in account and in substance; and in 
time in one way it is and in another way it is not. [Meta. Θ.8, 1049b4-12; Makin’s trans.]  For	 Aristotle,	 actuality	 is	 prior	 to	 potentiality	 1)	 in	 account	 (an	 account	 of	 a	potential	thing	A	will	necessarily	be	formulated	in	terms	of	an	actual	thing	B)	and	2)	in	substance	(an	actual	thing	A	can	exist	without	a	potential	thing	B,	but	the	reverse	does	not	hold).	 In	 time,	however,	 actuality	 is	 in	one	 sense	prior	but	 in	another	sense	 it	 is	not:	one	can	claim,	 for	 instance,	 that	 the	chicken	temporally	precedes	 the	 egg;	 but	 one	 might	 also	 claim	 that	 an	 actually-existing	 egg	 does	temporally	 precede	 the	 potentially	 existing	 chicken.	 Aristotle	 also	 holds	 that	what	 is	 posterior	 in	 generation	 is	 prior	 in	 substance	 and	 in	 form	 (τῇ γενέσει 
ὕστερα τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα):		
But indeed actuality is prior in substance too, first because things posterior in coming to be 
are prior in form and in substance (for example, adult to boy and man to seed; for the one 
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already has the form, the other does not).29 [Meta. Θ.8, 1050a4-7; Makin’s trans.] This	point	will	be	of	crucial	importance	in	Aristotle's	criticisms	of	Platonic	views	in	Metaphysics	M.2	as	we	shall	see	shortly.				
[2.2.2]	 Aristotle’s	 arguments	 against	 the	 metaphysical	 priority	 of	 lower-
dimensional	entities		The	 context	 of	 aporia	 #12	 in	 Book	 B	 of	 the	 Metaphysics	 is	 one	 of	 crucial	importance	for	our	understanding	of	the	M.2	discussion.30	The	aporia	is	stated	as	follows:		
A question connected with these is whether numbers and bodies and planes and points are 
substances or not. If they are not, it baffles us to say what being is and what the substances 
of things are.31 [Meta. B.5, 1001b26-29; Ross’ trans.] In	 the	 discussion	 that	 ensues	 Aristotle	 considers	 a	 Platonist	 argument	 that	ascribes	greater	metaphysical	status	not	to	three-dimensional	bodies,	but	rather	to	the	lower-dimensional	quantities	that	determine	or	bound	them:		
And as to the things which might seem most of all to indicate substance, water and earth 
and fire and air, of which composite bodies consist, heat and cold and the like are 
modifications of these, not substances, and the body which is thus modified alone persists 
as something real and as a substance. But, on the other hand, a body is surely less of a 
substance than a surface, and a surface less than a line, and a line less than a unit and a 
point. For a body is bounded by these; and they are thought to be capable of existing 
without body, but a body cannot exist without these.32 [Meta. B.5, 1001b26-1002a8; Ross’ 																																																								
29 Ἀλλὰ µὴν καὶ οὐσίᾳ γε, πρῶτον µὲν ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα (οἷον 
ἀνὴρ παιδὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος σπέρµατος· τὸ µὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ δ’ οὔ). 30	Following	the	division	of	aporiae	in	[Crubellier	&	Laks	(2009),	pp.1-2].	
31 Τούτων δ’ ἐχοµένη ἀπορία πότερον οἱ ἀριθµοὶ καὶ τὰ σώµατα καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα καὶ αἱ στιγµαὶ οὐσίαι 
τινές εἰσιν ἢ οὔ. εἰ µὲν γὰρ µή εἰσιν, διαφεύγει τί τὸ ὂν καὶ τίνες αἱ οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων· 
32 ἃ δὲ µάλιστ’ ἂν δόξειε σηµαίνειν οὐσίαν, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ σύνθετα σώµατα 
συνέστηκε, τούτων θερµότητες µὲν καὶ ψυχρότητες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη, οὐκ οὐσίαι, τὸ δὲ σῶµα τὸ 
ταῦτα πεπονθὸς µόνον ὑποµένει ὡς ὄν τι καὶ οὐσία τις οὖσα. ἀλλὰ µὴν τό γε σῶµα ἧττον οὐσία τῆς 
ἐπιφανείας, καὶ αὕτη τῆς γραµµῆς, καὶ αὕτη τῆς µονάδος καὶ τῆς στιγµῆς· τούτοις γὰρ ὥρισται τὸ 
σῶµα, καὶ τὰ µὲν ἄνευ σώµατος ἐνδέχεσθαι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ σῶµα ἄνευ τούτων ἀδύνατον. 
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trans.] According	to	a	certain	Platonist	line	of	thought,	the	fundamental	elements	of	the	world	(earth,	air,	 fire	and	water)	have	a	better	claim	to	be	substances	than	the	things	 composed	 out	 of	 them.33	Furthermore, the	 Platonists	 seem	 to	 argue	 for	the	 substantial	 priority	 of	 the	 boundaries	 of	 things	 to	 the	 things	 they	 bound;	more	specifically,	Platonists	argue	not	only	that	surfaces	are	prior	to	bodies,	but	also	 that	 lines	 are	 prior	 to	 surfaces,	 points	 to	 lines	 and	 that	 units	 are	 prior	 to	points.	But	why	do	Platonists	suppose	that	lower-dimensional	entities	are	prior	in	substance	to	higher-dimensional	ones?	One	answer	is	provided	by	the	passage	above:	if	B	is	delimited	(or	defined,	ὥρισται)	by	A,	then	A	is	more	substantial	than	B;	for	example,	a	triangle	is	bounded	by	three	straight	lines,	therefore,	the	lines	are	 more	 substantial	 than	 the	 triangle	 itself. 34 	This	 conforms	 well	 with	Alexander’s	commentary	of	the	passage:		
The things by which something is defined and given its form are substance to a higher 
degree than that which is defined by them. . . For it is not possible to conceive of body 
without a surface, or of surface without a line, or of line without a point - for these items 
are included in the definitions of those things: body is said to be that which has length, 
breadth and depth; surface that which has length and breadth; and line that which has 
length without breadth, and points as limits - but a point is conceived of even apart from a 
line, and a line apart from a plane, and a plane without body.35 [Alexander: Comm. on 
																																																								33	A	parallel	passage	can	be	found	in	Meta.	Z.2	where	Aristotle	reports	that	‘some	think	that	the	limits	of	a	body–i.e.	surfaces,	lines,	points,	and	units–are	substances,	and	more	so	than	the	body	and	the	solid.’	In	[Meta.	Z.2,	1028b16–18;	Bostock’s	trans.].		34	Stephen	Menn	offers	 an	 extensive	discussion	of	 aporia	#12	 in	 [Menn,	 ‘Ιβ3᾽,	 pp.29-32].	Menn	traces	the	origins	of	such	a	Platonist	argument	to	the	Timaeus:	 ‘Aristotle	is	thinking	here	of	the	kind	of	argument	that	the	Timaeus	makes,	after	reducing	the	nature	of	things	to	body	and	thus	to	‘depth’:	 ‘depth	 is	 always	 necessarily	 circumscribed	 by	 surface,	 and	 the	 plane	 base-surface	 is	constituted	out	of	triangles’	(53c6-8),	and	so	on.	.	.	.	Aristotle	is	calling	attention	to	one	important	feature	of	Plato's	 strategy	of	argument,	namely	 that	 it	argues	 that	 the	boundaries	of	 things	are	prior	to	the	things.’	In	[Menn,	‘Ιβ3᾽,	p.29].	
35 οἷς ὁρίζεταί τι καὶ εἰδοποιεῖται, ἐκεῖνα τοῦ ὁριζοµένου ὑπ’ αὐτῶν µᾶλλον οὐσία· . . . σῶµα µὲν γὰρ 
ἄνευ ἐπιφανείας οὐχ οἷόν τε νοηθῆναι, οὐδ’ αὖ ἐπιφάνειαν ἄνευ γραµµῆς, οὐδὲ ταύτην χωρὶς σηµείου. 
ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὁρισµοῖς αὐτῶν συµπαραλαµβάνεται κἀκεῖνα· σῶµα µὲν γὰρ λέγεται εἶναι τὸ µῆκος καὶ 
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Meta. Book B, 229.22-230.7; Madigan’s trans.] Yet	another	reason	the	Platonists	attribute		greater	metaphysical	status	to	lower-dimensional	 entities	 is	 supplied	 from	 the	 following	 passages	 from	Metaphysics	M.2:	 
And, in general, conclusions contrary alike to the truth and to the usual views follow, if 
one supposes the objects of mathematics to exist thus as separate entities. For if they exist 
thus they must be prior to sensible spatial magnitudes, but in truth they must be posterior; 
for the incomplete spatial magnitude is in the order of generation prior, but in the order of 
substance posterior, as the lifeless is to the living.36 [Meta. M.2, 1077a14-21; Ross’ trans.] 
Again, the modes of generation of the objects of mathematics show that we are right. For 
the dimension first generated is length, then comes breadth, lastly depth, and the process is 
complete. If, then, that which is posterior in the order of generation is prior in the order of 
substance, body will be prior to the plane and the line. And in this way also it is more 
complete and more whole, because it can become animate. How, on the other hand, could 
a line or a plane be animate? The supposition passes the power of our senses.37 [Meta. 
M.2,1077a24-31; Ross’ trans.] The	 examination	 of	 the	 passages	 reveals	 that	 that	 Platonists	 invoke	 a	 certain	process	of	generation	for	geometrical	entities.	A	(moving)	point	generates	a	line,	a	 (moving)	 line	 generates	 a	 plane,	 and	 a	 (moving)	 plane	 generates	 a	 solid.38																																																																																																																																																															
πλάτος καὶ βάθος ἔχον, ἐπιφάνεια δὲ ὃ µῆκος καὶ πλάτος ἔχει, γραµµὴ δὲ µῆκος ἀπλατές, ἧς πέρατα 
σηµεῖα· σηµεῖον δὲ νοεῖται καὶ χωρὶς γραµµῆς, καὶ αὕτη χωρὶς ἐπιπέδου, καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἄνευ σώµατος. 
36  ὅλως δὲ τοὐναντίον συµβαίνει καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ εἰωθότος ὑπολαµβάνεσθαι, εἴ τις 
θήσει οὕτως εἶναι τὰ µαθηµατικὰ ὡς κεχωρισµένας τινὰς φύσεις. ἀνάγκη γὰρ διὰ τὸ µὲν οὕτως εἶναι 
αὐτὰς προτέρας εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν µεγεθῶν, κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς δὲ ὑστέρας· τὸ γὰρ ἀτελὲς µέγεθος 
γενέσει µὲν πρότερόν ἐστι, τῇ οὐσίᾳ δ’ ὕστερον, οἷον ἄψυχον ἐµψύχου. 
37 ἔτι αἱ γενέσεις δηλοῦσιν. πρῶτον µὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ µῆκος γίγνεται, εἶτα ἐπὶ πλάτος, τελευταῖον δ’ εἰς 
βάθος, καὶ τέλος ἔσχεν. εἰ οὖν τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερον, τὸ σῶµα πρότερον ἂν εἴη 
ἐπιπέδου καὶ µήκους· καὶ ταύτῃ καὶ τέλειον καὶ ὅλον µᾶλλον, ὅτι ἔµψυχον γίγνεται· γραµµὴ δὲ 
ἔµψυχος ἢ ἐπίπεδον πῶς ἂν εἴη; ὑπὲρ γὰρ τὰς αἰσθήσεις τὰς ἡµετέρας ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀξίωµα. 38	Cf.	 De	 Anima	 I.4,	 409a3-5:	 ἔτι δ’ἐπεί φασι κινηθεῖσαν γραµµὴν ἐπίπεδον ποιεῖν, στιγµὴν δὲ  
γραµµήν…	Cherniss	tentatively	attributes	this	view	of	generation	of	mathematicals	 from	lower-dimensional	ones	 to	Speusippus.	See	 [Cherniss	 (1944),	pp.396-397].	For	 the	view	 that	a	 line	 is	generated	by	 a	 flowing	point	 see	 also	 Sextus,	Against	the	Mathematicians,	 Book	9,	 section	380.	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	Sextus’	arguments	consult	[Betegh	(2015),	esp.	pp.154-165].	
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When	 this	 process	 of	 generation	 has	 reached	 the	 solid	 it	 has	 reached	 its	 end	(τέλος,	 1077a26).	 Proclus	 gives	 us	 a	 more	 detailed	 insight	 of	 this	 process	 of	generation	 when	 commenting	 on	 Euclid’s	 definition	 of	 the	 line	 (‘a	 line	 is	breadthless	length’):	
The line has also been defined in other ways. Some define it as the ‘flowing of a point’, 
others as ‘magnitude extended in one direction’. The latter definition indicates  perfectly 
the nature of the line, but that which calls it the flowing of a point appears to explain it in 
terms of its generative cause and sets before us not line in general, but the immaterial line. 
This line owns its being to the point, which, though without parts, is the cause of the 
existence of all divisible things; and the ‘flowing’ indicates the forthgoing of the point and 
its generative power that extends to every dimension without diminution and, remaining 
itself the same, provides existence to all divisible things. 39  [Proclus: A Commentary on 
The First Book of Euclid’s Elements, 97.6-17; Morrow’s trans. mod.]  It	seems	then	that	Platonists	ague	that	if	A	is	prior	in	generation	to	B,	then	A	is	prior	in	substance	to	B.	The	result	is	that	points	are	prior	in	substance	to	lines,	lines	are	prior	in	substance	to	surfaces,	surfaces	are	prior	in	substance	to	solids.	Aristotle’s	 response	 in	 lines	 1077a26-27	 makes	 use	 of	 his	 own	 principle,	established	 in	Meta.	 Θ.8,	 that	 what	 is	 posterior	 in	 generation	 is	 substantially	prior	 (εἰ οὖν τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερον).	 Even	 if	 one	 grants	 the	Platonists	 that	 solids	 are	 somehow	 generated	 from	 lower-dimensional	geometricals,	 solids	 are	more	 complete	 (καὶ ταύτῃ καὶ τέλειον καὶ ὅλον µᾶλλον,	1077a28)	than	what	 lies	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	process	of	generation:	 the	 line	and	the	plane,	for	example,	may	be	prior	in	generation	to	the	solid	but	the	solid	body (τὸ σῶµα) is	 prior	 in	 substance	 to	 them.	 In	 lines	 1077a28-29	 Aristotle	invokes	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 solid	 body	 for	 becoming	 animate	 (ἔµψυχον)	 as	 the	reason	that	makes	it	more	substantial	than	lower-dimensional	entities;	it	seems	
																																																								
39 Ἀφορίζονται δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ κατ’ ἄλλας µεθόδους, οἱ µὲν ῥύσιν σηµείου λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ µέγεθος ἐφ’ ἓν 
διαστατόν. ἀλλ’ οὗτος µὲν ὁ ὅρος τέλειός ἐστιν τὴν οὐσίαν σηµαίνων τῆς γραµµῆς, ὁ δὲ σηµείου ῥύσιν  
εἰπὼν ἔοικεν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτίας αὐτὴν τῆς γεννητικῆς δηλοῦν καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν γραµµὴν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄυλον 
παρίστησι· ταύτην γὰρ ὑφίστησι τὸ σηµεῖον ἀµερὲς ὑπάρχον, ὑπάρξεως δὲ τοῖς µεριστοῖς αἴτιον ὄν. ἡ 
δὲ ῥύσις τὴν πρόοδον ἐνδείκνυται καὶ τὴν γόνιµον δύναµιν, τὴν ἐπὶ πᾶσαν διάστασιν φθάνουσαν καὶ 
οὐκ ἐλαττουµένην, τὴν αὐτὴν µὲν ἑστῶσαν, πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς µεριστοῖς τὴν οὐσίαν παρεχοµένην. 	
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rather	bizarre	to	suggest	that	a	line	or	a	plane	can	become	animate.	At	this	point	Julia	Annas	claims	that	Aristotle	 is	guilty	of	confusing	mathematical	solids	with	physical	bodies:		
…Aristotle is thinking of a physical object as a solid object made up of planes, lines, etc., 
so the latter are ‘incomplete’ in that although there have to be planes, etc. to make up a 
solid, the solid is that via which the planes must be identified and not vice versa. The 
relation of planes, etc. to solids is compared with that of the earth that becomes a man. But 
if this is Aristotle’s arguments he is confusing a mathematician’s solid with a physical 
object; the latter is not made up of planes in the way the former is. [Annas (1976), p.145] 	Is	Aristotle	guilty	of	such	charge?	Annas	claims	that	a	physical	object	is	not	made	up	of	planes	in	the	way	a	mathematical	solid	is.	Annas	does	not	elaborate	on	the	supposed	difference	in	composition	between	a	mathematical	solid	and	a	sensible	one.	 In	 what	 way	 does	 Socrates’	 composition	 of	 planes	 differ	 from	 a	 cube’s	composition	of	 squares?	Does	a	 cube	consist	of	 infitely	many	squares	 in	a	way	that	 Socrates	does	not	 consist	 of	 infinitely	many	planes?	When	Aristotle	poses	(1077a33-34)	the	question	about	how	lines	can	be	substances,	one	of	the	options	provided	 is	 that	 they	might	be	 substances	as	 forms/shapes	or	 in	a	matter–like	way;	he	rejects	both	options:	
Again, body is a sort of substance; for it already has in a sense completeness. But how can 
lines be substances? Neither as a form or shape, as the soul perhaps is, nor as matter, like 
body; for we have no experience of anything that can be put together out of lines or planes 
or points, while if these had been a sort of material substance, we should have observed 
things which could be put together out of them.40	[Meta. M.2, 1077a31-36; Ross’ trans.]	 Aristotle	thinks	that	it	is	not	very	plausible	to	ascribe	a	process	of	generation	for	solids	 beginning	 from	 lower-dimensional	 entities,	 since	 nothing	 seems	 to	 be	capable	of	being	assembled	from	lines	and	planes	and	points.	Crucially,	however,	he	denies	 that	 lower-dimensional	 entities	 can	even	exist	 as	 forms	or	 shapes	of	the	 things	 they	bound	(contrary,	 for	example,	 to	 the	naïve	realism	espoused	 in																																																									
40 ἔτι τὸ µὲν σῶµα οὐσία τις (ἤδη γὰρ ἔχει πως τὸ τέλειον), αἱ δὲ γραµµαὶ πῶς οὐσίαι; οὔτε γὰρ ὡς 
εἶδος καὶ µορφή τις, οἷον εἰ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, οὔτε ὡς ἡ ὕλη, οἷον τὸ σῶµα· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐκ γραµµῶν 
οὐδ’ ἐπιπέδων οὐδὲ στιγµῶν φαίνεται συνίστασθαι δυνάµενον, εἰ δ’ ἦν οὐσία τις ὑλική, τοῦτ’ ἂν 
ἐφαίνετο δυνάµενα πάσχειν. 
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Physics	B.2).	What	does	this	claim	amount	to?	What	is	the	metaphysical	status	of	lower-dimensional	 entities?	An	 answer	 to	 those	question	will	 have	 to	wait	 the	examination	of	the	M.3	chapter	of	the	Metaphysics.41		
[2.2.3]	Mathematicals	as	prior	in	definition		What	 sense	 of	 priority	 does	 Aristotle	 allow	 for	 mathematicals?	 The	 following	passage	from	Metaphysics	M.2	might	shed	some	light	to	this	question:		
Let it be granted that <the mathematical objects> are prior in formula. Yet not everything 
which is prior in formula is also prior in substance. Things are prior in substance if more 
able to go on existing when separated from the latter, and prior in definition to things 
whose definitions are compounded from definitions of them. These do not apply together. 
For if there are no attributes distinct from real objects (e.g. a moving or a white) then 
white is prior in definition to white man, but not in substance, since it cannot exist 
separately but only together with the compound (by compound I mean the white man). So 
clearly the result of abstraction is not prior, nor the result of addition subsequent, for the 
expression ‘white man’ is the result of adding a determinant to ‘white’.42 [Meta. M.2, 
1077a36-b11, Ross’ trans. mod.]  This	passage	describes	two	notions	of	priority	discussed	earlier.	We	learn	that	A	is	 prior	 in	 substance	 (τῇ οὐσίᾳ)	 to	B	 if	A	 ‘is	more	 able	 to	 go	on	 existing’	when																																																									41	There	is	also	a	passage	in	De	Caelo	III.1,	where	Aristotle	 is	objecting	that	those	who	generate	bodies	out	of	planes	contradict	the	laws	of	mathematics:		
But this last theory which composes every body of planes is, as is seen at a glance, in many respects 
in plain contradiction with mathematics. It is, however, wrong to remove the foundations of a 
science unless you can replace them with others more convincing. And, secondly, the same theory 
which composes solids of planes clearly composes planes of lines and lines of points, so that a part 
of a line need not be a line. [De Caelo III.1, 299a2-9; Stock’s trans.] 
42 τῷ µὲν οὖν λόγῳ ἔστω πρότερα, ἀλλ’ οὐ πάντα ὅσα τῷ λόγῳ πρότερα καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα. τῇ µὲν 
γὰρ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα ὅσα χωριζόµενα τῷ εἶναι ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ ὅσων οἱ λόγοι ἐκ τῶν λόγων· 
ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ἅµα ὑπάρχει. εἰ γὰρ µὴ ἔστι τὰ πάθη παρὰ τὰς οὐσίας, οἷον κινούµενόν τι ἢ λευκόν, τοῦ 
λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ λευκὸν πρότερον κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται 
εἶναι κεχωρισµένον ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἅµα τῷ συνόλῳ ἐστίν (σύνολον δὲ λέγω τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν λευκόν), ὥστε 
φανερὸν ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως πρότερον οὔτε τὸ ἐκ προσθέσεως ὕστερον· ἐκ προσθέσεως γὰρ τῷ 
λευκῷ ὁ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος λέγεται. 
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separated	 from	 B,	 and	 that	 A	 is	 prior	 in	 definition	 (τῷ λόγῳ)	 to	 B	 when	 the	definition	of	the	latter	contains	the	definition	of	A	(ὅσων οἱ λόγοι ἐκ τῶν λόγων).	A	parallel	for	priority	in	account/definition	can	be	found	in	Meta.	Δ.11,	1018b34ff.	where	 the	 musical	 is	 said	 to	 be	 prior	 to	 the	 musical	 man	 in	 account,	 ‘for	 the	account	 cannot	 exist	 as	 a	 whole	 without	 the	 part’	 (Ross’	 trans)	 (καὶ κατὰ τὸν 
λόγον δὲ τὸ συµβεβηκὸς τοῦ ὅλου πρότερον, οἷον τὸ µουσικὸν τοῦ µουσικοῦ 
ἀνθρώπου· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ὁ λόγος ὅλος ἄνευ τοῦ µέρους·	1018b34-36).	Just	like	the	M.2	 passage,	 Aristotle	 cautions	 against	 thinking	 that	 this	 entails	 priority	 in	substance	since	it	is	not	possible	for	the	musical	to	exist	unless	there	is	someone	who	 is	 musical	 (καίτοι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται µουσικὸν εἶναι µὴ ὄντος µουσικοῦ τινός,	1018b36-37).	The	term	‘compound’	(σύνολον)	in	the	M.2	passage	seems	to	refer	to	the	combination	of	an	accident	like	white	with	a	substantial	subject	like	man.43	White,	 he	 says,	 is	 definitionally	 prior	 (πρότερον κατὰ τὸν λόγον)	 to	white	man,	since	the	definition	of	the	former	does	not	include	that	of	the	latter,	though	the	converse	 is	not	true.	But	white	 is	not	prior	 in	substance	to	white	man	(οὐ κατὰ 
τὴν οὐσίαν)	since	 it	 cannot	exist	without	 it	 (οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι κεχωρισµένον 
ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἅµα τῷ συνόλῳ ἐστίν).	 Presumably	 Aristotle	 does	 not	 wish	 to	 confine	himself	to	white	men	but	he	thinks	that	white	cannot	exist	without	some	white	things	(not	necessarily	men).	Likewise,	Aristotle	says,	mathematical	objects	are	prior	 in	 definition	 to	 sensible	 bodies	 (τῷ µὲν οὖν λόγῳ ἔστω πρότερα)	 but	 this	priority	does	not	entail	priority	in	substance.44	The	argument	ought	to	be	applied	to	 three-dimensional	 bodies	 and	 to	 the	 lower–dimensional	 quantities	 that	determine	or	bound	 them.	Aristotle	 sums	up	his	 refutation	of	 the	Platonists	as	follows: 	
It has, then, been sufficiently pointed out that the objects of mathematics are not 
substances in a higher sense than bodies are, and that they are not prior to sensibles in 																																																								43	So	Cleary	(1995),	p.303.	44	I,	 thus,	 find	myself	 in	disagreement	with	 Ian	Mueller	who	claims	 that	 the	context	of	 the	B.12	aporia	 is	 not	 in	 any	way	 connected	with	 the	 discussion	 in	M.2	 (‘it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 Aristotle	 is	conscious	 of	 a	 direct	 connection	 of	 	 M.2	 and	 3	 with	 aporia	 12’,	 in	 [Crubellier	 &	 Laks	 (2009),	p.190]).	That	Aristotle	grants	the	Platonists	that	mathematicals	are	only	prior	in	account	and	not	in	substance	is	precisely	his	response	to	Platonic	principles	such	as	the	one	in	that	aporia:	that	if	A	is	prior	in	account	to	B,	then	A	is	prior	in	substance	to	B.		
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being, but only in formula, and that they cannot in any way exist separately. But since they 
could not exist in sensibles either, it is plain that they either do not exist at all or exist in a 
special way and therefore do not exist without qualification. For ‘exist’ has many senses.45 
[Meta. M.2, 1077b12-17; Ross’ trans.] The	results	of	the	discussion	so	far:	mathematical	entities	(and	by	that	Aristotle	has	 in	mind	 lower-dimensional	or	 limit	 entities)	are	not	more	 substantial	 than	three-dimensional	bodies;	they	are	only	prior	in	formula	and	they	cannot	exist	in	separation	anywhere.	We	still	need,	however,	an	account	of	what	is	their	mode	of	existence.	 A	 careful	 reader	 will	 notice	 that	 Aristotle	 has	 already	 defused	 the	Protagorean	objection	that	mathematical	statements	do	not	refer	to	any	objects	that	exist.	For,	as	the	previous	discussion	has	made	clear,	Aristotle	already	points	to	a	philosophy	of	mathematics	based	on	the	readily	available	notion	of	the	solid;	his	 further	 investigations	 will	 amount	 to	 a	 clarification	 (if	 any)	 of	 the	metaphysical	status	of	lower-dimensional	entities	(points,	lines,	and	planes).		 	
																																																								
45 Ὅτι µὲν οὖν οὔτε οὐσίαι µᾶλλον τῶν σωµάτων εἰσὶν οὔτε πρότερα τῷ εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀλλὰ τῷ 
λόγῳ µόνον, οὔτε κεχωρισµένα που εἶναι δυνατόν, εἴρηται ἱκανῶς· ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐδ’ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς 
ἐνεδέχετο αὐτὰ εἶναι, φανερὸν ὅτι ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ τρόπον τινὰ ἔστι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἔστιν· 
πολλαχῶς γὰρ τὸ εἶναι λέγοµεν. 
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[2.3]	Mathematicals	in	sensible	things.	A	fanciful	doctrine?			
[2.3.1]	Arguments	against	 the	existence	of	 intermediate	mathematicals	 in	
the	sensibles		Let	 us	 closely	 examine	 Aristotle’s	 argument	 against	 the	 existence	 of	mathematicals	in	sensible	things:		
That it is impossible for mathematical objects to exist in sensible things and at the same 
time that the doctrine in question is a fabricated one, has been said already in our 
discussion of difficulties, –the reasons being that it is impossible for two solids to be in the 
same place, and that according to the same argument all the other powers and 
characteristics also should exist in sensible things, none of them existing separately. This 
we have said already. But, further, it is obvious that on this theory it is impossible for any 
body whatever to be divided; for it would have to be divided at a plane, and the plane at a 
line, and the line at a point, so that if the point cannot be divided, neither can the line, and 
if the line cannot, neither can the plane nor the solid. What difference then does it make 
whether sensible things are of this kind, or, without being so themselves, have such things 
in them? The result will be the same; if the sensible things are divided the others will be 
divided too, or else not even the sensible things can be divided.46 [Meta. M.2, 1076a38-
b11; Ross’ trans.] At	 the	 outset	 of	 his	 discussion,	 Aristotle	 summarily	 dismisses	 the	 doctrine	 of	mathematicals	 existing	 in	 the	 sensibles,	 pointing	 the	 reader	 to	 an	 earlier	treatment	 of	 the	 issue	 in	 Book	 B	 of	 the	 Metaphysics	 (εἴρηται µὲν καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
διαπορήµασιν);	the	relative	passage	is	located	in	Meta.	B.2:	
																																																								46	Ὅτι µὲν τοίνυν ἔν γε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἀδύνατον εἶναι καὶ ἅµα πλασµατίας ὁ λόγος, εἴρηται µὲν καὶ ἐν 
τοῖς διαπορήµασιν ὅτι δύο ἅµα στερεὰ εἶναι ἀδύνατον, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας 
δυνάµεις καὶ φύσεις ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἶναι καὶ µηδεµίαν κεχωρισµένην· —ταῦτα µὲν οὖν εἴρηται 
πρότερον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον διαιρεθῆναι ὁτιοῦν σῶµα· κατ’ ἐπίπεδον γὰρ 
διαιρεθήσεται, καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ γραµµὴν καὶ αὕτη κατὰ στιγµήν, ὥστ’ εἰ τὴν στιγµὴν διελεῖν ἀδύνατον, 
καὶ τὴν γραµµήν, εἰ δὲ ταύτην, καὶ τἆλλα. τί οὖν διαφέρει ἢ ταύτας εἶναι τοιαύτας φύσεις, ἢ αὐτὰς µὲν 
µή, εἶναι δ’ ἐν αὐταῖς τοιαύτας φύσεις; τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ συµβήσεται· διαιρουµένων γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν 
διαιρεθήσονται, ἢ οὐδὲ αἱ αἰσθηταί. 
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Now there are some who say that these so-called intermediates between the Forms and the 
perceptible things exist, not apart from the perceptible things, however, but in these; the 
impossible results of this view would take too long to enumerate, but it is enough to 
consider such points as the following:—It is not reasonable that this should be so only in 
the case of these intermediates, but clearly the Forms also might be in the perceptible 
things; for the same account applies to both. Further, it follows from this theory that there 
are two solids in the same place, and that the intermediates are not immovable, since they 
are in the moving perceptible things. And in general to what purpose would one suppose 
them to exist, but to exist in perceptible things? For the same paradoxical results will 
follow which we have already mentioned; there will be a heaven besides the heaven, only 
it will be not apart but in the same place; which is still more impossible.47 [Meta. B.2, 
998a7-19; Ross’ trans.] Aristotle	in	Meta.	B.2	is	considering	a	doctrine	according	to	which	mathematicals	are	metaphysically	between	(µεταξύ)	Platonic	Forms	and	sensibles;	according	to	a	particular	version	of	that	doctrine	(the	one	discussed	in	Meta.	B.2,	998a7-19),	intermediate	mathematicals	exist	not	apart	from	but	in	sensibles	(οὐ µὴν χωρίς γε 
τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀλλ’ ἐν τούτοις).	The	 following	brief	excursus	 is	 intended	 to	 shed	some	 light	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 intermediates	 with	 the	 specific	 intention	 of	highlighting	 their	 essential	 to	 our	 discussion	 features. 48 	Aristotle	 explicitly	attributes	 to	 Plato	 and	 his	 followers	 the	 doctrine	 that	 there	 are	 three	fundamental	 types	 of	 entities,	 the	 Forms,	 the	 intermediate	 objects	 of	mathematics	and	the	sensible	things,	 in	two	places.	The	first,	most	 informative,	passage	is	to	be	found	in	Aristotle's	account	of	Plato's	philosophy	in	Metaphysics	A.6:	
																																																								47	εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἵ φασιν εἶναι µὲν τὰ µεταξὺ ταῦτα λεγόµενα τῶν τε εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐ µὴν 
χωρίς γε τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀλλ’ ἐν τούτοις· οἷς τὰ συµβαίνοντα ἀδύνατα πάντα µὲν πλείονος λόγου 
διελθεῖν, ἱκανὸν δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα θεωρῆσαι. οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτω µόνον, ἀλλὰ 
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἂν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἶναι (τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἀµφότερα ταῦτά 
ἐστιν), ἔτι δὲ δύο στερεὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τόπῳ, καὶ µὴ εἶναι ἀκίνητα ἐν κινουµένοις γε 
ὄντα τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς. ὅλως δὲ τίνος ἕνεκ’ ἄν τις θείη εἶναι µὲν αὐτά, εἶναι δ’ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς; ταὐτὰ 
γὰρ συµβήσεται ἄτοπα τοῖς προειρηµένοις· ἔσται γὰρ οὐρανός τις παρὰ τὸν οὐρανόν, πλήν γ’ οὐ χωρὶς 
ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδυνατώτερον.	48	The	discussion	is	not	meant	to	be	exhaustive.	For	a	fuller	treatment	consult	Wedberg	(1955),	Brentlinger	(1963),	Annas	(	1975).			
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Further, besides sensible things and Forms he <i.e. Plato> says that there are the objects of 
mathematics, which occupy an intermediate position, differing from sensible things in 
being eternal and unchangeable, from Forms in that there are many alike, while the Form 
itself is in each case unique.49 [Meta. A.6, 987b14-18; Ross’ trans.] The	second	one	is	taken	from	Meta.	Z.2:	
Thus Plato held that the Forms and the objects of mathematics were two kinds of 
substance, perceptible bodies being the third kind.50 [Meta. Z.2, 1028b19-21; Bostock’s 
trans.] In	what	 sense	mathematical	objects	 are	between	 the	 sensibles	 and	 the	Forms?	The	 term	 µεταξύ	 serves	 as	 a	 straightforward	 indicator	 of	 their	 intermediate	ontological	status	with	respect	to	those	fundamental	Platonic	categories.	On	the	one	 hand,	 intermediates	 differ	 from	 physical	 objects	 in	 being	 eternal	 and	
unchangeable	 (διαφέροντα τῶν µὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι,	 987b16-17),	just	like	Forms	are;	one	the	other	hand,	they	are	dissimilar	to	Forms	in	that	there	are	many	of	the	same	kind,	while	each	Form	is	unique	([διαφέροντα]	τῶν δ’ 
εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ µὲν πόλλ’ ἄττα ὅµοια εἶναι τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἓν ἕκαστον µόνον,	987b17-18).	Commentators	more	or	less	agree	that	the	intermediates	serve	the	following	primary	purposes:	 1)	They	 address	 the	mathematician’s	need	 for	a	plurality	of	
entities	 in	 their	 statements,	 hence	 providing	 a	 direct	 solution	 to	 a	 specific	problem	 that	 plagues	 the	 mathematical	 Forms,	 the	 uniqueness	 problem.	 Thus,	Annas:		
A Form has to be unique of its kind, whereas mathematical statements seem to refer to a 
plurality of entities, and these cannot be identified either with Forms or with physical 
objects. Hence intermediates are posited to be the objects of such statements. [Annas 
(1975), p.151] 2)	Apart	 from	being	a	straightforward	solution	 to	 the	uniqueness	problem,	 the																																																									
49 ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ µαθηµατικὰ τῶν πραγµάτων εἶναί φησι µεταξύ, διαφέροντα 
τῶν µὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ’ εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ µὲν πόλλ’ ἄττα ὅµοια εἶναι τὸ δὲ 
εἶδος αὐτὸ ἓν ἕκαστον µόνον. 
50 ὥσπερ Πλάτων τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ µαθηµατικὰ δύο οὐσίας, τρίτην δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωµάτων 
οὐσίαν. 
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intermediates	serve	as	a	solution	to	the	perfection	problem;	their	existence	seems	indispensable	 to	 those	 who	 do	 advocate	 a	 realist	 conception	 of	 mathematical	truth,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 endorsing	 a	 skepticism	 about	 the	 adequacy	 of	sensible	objects	as	the	subject	matter	of	mathematics.	Aristotle	is	vehemently	opposed	to	the	theory	of	intermediates	in	the	sensibles.	In	 the	Meta.	B.2	passage	he	speaks	about	 the	 ‘impossible	consequences’	of	 this	theory,	 an	 exhaustive	 analysis	 of	 which	 would	 require	 a	 large	 account	 (οἷς τὰ 
συµβαίνοντα ἀδύνατα πάντα µὲν πλείονος λόγου διελθεῖν,	998a9-10);	 in	 the	Meta.	M.2	passage	he	speaks	about	this	doctrine	in	an	apparently	scornful	manner,	as	an	 utterly	 ‘fictitious’	 and	 ‘impossible’	 one	 (Ὅτι µὲν τοίνυν ἔν γε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς 
ἀδύνατον εἶναι καὶ ἅµα πλασµατίας ὁ λόγος,	 1077a38-39).	 In	 both	 passages,	 he	does	not	wish	to	provide	an	exhaustive	list	of	all	the	absurdities	that	stem	from	this	doctrine,	 focusing	his	attention	on	certain	major	ones.	The	very	 first	point	that	he	makes	 in	 the	B.2	passage	 is	 that–by	parity	of	 reasoning–the	Forms	 too	could	be	posited	 as	present	 in	 the	 sensibles	 (οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων εὔλογον ἔχειν 
οὕτω µόνον, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἂν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἶναι		(τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἀµφότερα ταῦτά ἐστιν,	998a11-13).	Aristotle’s	point	 is	 that	the	 people	 who	 claim	 that	 mathematicals	 are	 in	 the	 sensibles,	 also	 posit	 the	existence	of	 a	 separate	 realm	 for	Forms	not	in	the	sensibles;	 given	 that	 they	do	not	 provide	 sufficient	 justification	 for	 such	 a	 metaphysical	 distinction,	 why	cannot	one	claim	that	not	only	mathematicals	but	also	Forms	are	present	in	the	sensibles?51		This	sense	of	‘in–ness’	has	to	be	explained.	For	Aristotle,	something	is	said	to	be	in	another	in	many	ways:		
Next we must find in how many ways one thing is said to be in another. (1) In one way, as 
the finger is in the hand, and, generally, the part in the whole. (2) In another, as the whole 
is in the parts—the whole does not exist apart from the parts. (3) In another, as man is in 																																																								51	This	is	how	Alexander	understands	Aristotle’s	claim	here	(201.13-18).	Whose	view	is	this?	In	201.18-20	Alexander	attributes	a	version	of	this	view	to	Eudoxus	(this	is	probably	a	reference	to	the	 discussion	 in	Meta.	 A.9	 991a13-18)	 and	 he	 also	 points	 to	 the	 discussion	 in	Meta.	 Book	 N	(where	the	reference	is	probably	to	the	Pythagorean	doctrine	of	things	composed	out	of	numbers	discussed	in	1090a20-1090b5).	
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animal and, generally, species in genus. (4) In another, as the genus is in the species and, 
generally, the part of the species in the definition. (5) In another, as health is in hot and 
cold things, and, generally, as the form is in the matter. (6) In another, as the affairs of 
Greece are in the king [of Persia], and, generally, as things are in the first thing productive 
of change. (7) In another, as a thing is in its good, and, generally, in its end (that is, the 
that-for-the-sake-of-which). (8) And—most properly of all so called—as a thing is in a 
vessel, and, generally, in a place.52 [Physics Δ.3, 210a14-24; Morison’s trans.] The	passage	lists	eight	ways	something	is	said	to	be	in	another;	however,	I	think	it	 is	 the	 first	one	 that	 is	pertinent	 to	our	discussion	about	 the	 intermediates	 in	the	 sensibles:	 one	way	 (τρόπος)	 in	which	 something	 is	 said	 to	be	 in	 something	else	 is	 ‘as	 a	 finger	 is	 in	 the	 hand	 and	 generally	 the	 part	 in	 the	 whole’	 (ὡς ὁ 
δάκτυλος ἐν τῃ̑ χɛιρὶ καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῳ̑ ὅλῳ).	 Aristotle	 also	 tells	 us	 that	 one	 of	 the	ways	in	which	being	in	 is	said,	is	κυριώτατον	(‘most	properly	so	called’),	namely	the	eighth	way,	being	in	as	 in	a	place	 (πάντων δὲ κυριώτατον τὸ ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ καὶ 
ὅλως ἐν τόπῳ).53	Aristotle,	 in	 both	 passages	 (Meta.	 998a13-14,	 1076b1),	 raises	the	 following–seemingly	 straightforward–objection	 against	 metaphysically	locating	mathematicals	 in	 the	sensibles:	 if	we	 take	 the	 intermediate	solid	 to	be	
literally	in	 the	sensible	one,	 they	would	both	occupy	the	same	place	(at	the	same																																																									52	Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ληπτέον ποσαχῶς ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ λέγεται. (1) ἕνα µὲν δὴ τρόπον ὡς ὁ δάκτυλος ἐν τῇ 
χειρὶ καὶ ὅλως τὸ µέρος ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. (2) ἄλλον δὲ ὡς τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς µέρεσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστι παρὰ τὰ µέρη 
τὸ ὅλον. (3) ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ζῴῳ καὶ ὅλως εἶδος ἐν γένει. (4) ἄλλον δὲ ὡς τὸ γένος 
ἐν τῷ εἴδει καὶ ὅλως τὸ µέρος τοῦ εἴδους ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. (5) ἔτι ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια ἐν θερµοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ 
ὅλως τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ. (6) ἔτι ὡς ἐν βασιλεῖ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ. (7) ἔτι 
ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ τέλει· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. (8) πάντων δὲ κυριώτατον τὸ ὡς ἐν 
ἀγγείῳ καὶ ὅλως ἐν τόπῳ.	53	Morison	is	correct	in	acknowledging	a	close	connection	between	the	 locative	sense	of	being	in	and	 being	 in	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 parthood,	 though	 he	 does	 not	 elaborate	 on	 what	 this	 closeness	amounts	to:		
Aristotle says that the locative sense of ‘in’ is the primary one. Clearly, there is a close link between 
this way of being in and the way in which a part is in the whole (the first way)… [Morison (2002), 
p.74] Morison	 gives	 the	 following	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	 conditions	 under	 which	 parthood	 and	locative	‘in-ness’	occur:	
(Parthood): x is in y as a part is in its whole iff x is a part of y and y is a whole.  
(Locative ‘in-ness’): x is in y as something is in its place iff y is a place of x. See [Morison (2002), 
pp.73-74].	
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time),	something	absurd.	An	escape	option	for	the	Platonist	would	be	to	attribute	a	 difference	 in	 size	 between	 a	 bronze	 sphere,	 say,	 and	 a	 mathematical	 one	contained	in	the	former;	let	us	say,	for	instance,	that	a	bronze	sphere	contains	a	smaller	mathematical	sphere.	However,	the	Meta.	B.2	passage	provides	us	with	a	ready–made	 objection:	 how	 can	 something	 capable	 of	 change	 (the	 bronze	sphere)	contain	something	that	is	incapable	of	change	(a	mathematical	sphere)?	For,	if	the	bronze	sphere	is	susceptible	to	change	then	it	follows	that	every	part	of	 it	 is	 susceptible	 to	 change;	 hence,	 the	 smaller	 internal	 sphere	 will	 also	 be	susceptible	to	change.	It	follows	that	the	intermediates	will	not	be	immovable.54		
[2.3.2]	 Arguments	 against	 a	 conception	 of	 lower-dimensional	
mathematicals	as	constitutive	parts	of	bodies		The	absence	of	a	characterisation	of	mathematicals	 in	 the	Meta.	M2	passage	as	‘intermediates’	 –there	 is	 no	 occurrence	 of	 the	 term	 τὰ µεταξὺ	 in	 the	 passage–	might	 strike	 the	 reader	 as	 something	 peculiar,	 given	 that	 there	 is	 a	straightforward	 reference	 to	 a	 parallel	 passage	 in	 the	 second	 book	 of	 the	
Metaphysics	and	many	of	the	difficulties	of	the	doctrine	presented	there	are	also	part	of	the	M.2	analysis.	A	plausible	answer	to	this	oddity	may	be	provided	after	an	examination	of	the	last	part	of	the	passage	in	question:	
But, further, it is obvious that on this theory it is impossible for any body whatever to be 
divided; for it would have to be divided at a plane, and the plane at a line, and the line at a 																																																								54	As	Arthur	Madigan	points	out,	Aristotle’s	objection	can	be	formulated	in	terms	of	a	two-level	paradox,	i.e.	‘a	contradiction	between	a	predicate	that	belongs	to	an	intermediate	because	it	is	an	intermediate,	and	a	predicate	that	belongs	to	it	because	it	is	the	particular	intermediate	it	is.’54	In	[Madigan	 (1986),	 fn.13,	 p.154].	 One	 may	 argue	 like	 this:	 1)	 An	 intermediate	 sphere	 is	 not	susceptible	 to	 change.	 This	 is	 something	 that	 can	 be	 inferred	 from	 the	 essential	 nature	 of	intermediates	 as	 eternal,	 unchangeable	 entities.	 2)	 But,	 the	 intermediate	 sphere	 is	 part	 of	 a	sensible	 one	 (according	 to	 this	 particular	 doctrine	 of	 intermediates).	 Furthermore,	 3)	 Sensible	spheres	are	susceptible	to	change,	and	4)	if	something	is	susceptible	to	change,	any	part	of	it	 is	susceptible	 to	 change.	 Hence,	 5)	 the	 intermediate	 sphere	 is	 susceptible	 to	 change	 (contradicts	premise	 1).	 For	 the	 positions	 of	 Syrianus	 and	 Asclepius	 on	 the	 view	 of	 intermediates	 in	 the	sensibles	one	can	consult	[Madigan	(1986),	pp.165-169].	
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point, so that if the point cannot be divided, neither can the line, and if the line cannot, 
neither can the plane nor the solid. What difference then does it make whether sensible 
things are of this kind, or, without being so themselves, have such things in them? The 
result will be the same; if the sensible things are divided the others will be divided too, or 
else not even the sensible things can be divided. [Meta. M.2, 1076b4–11; Ross’ trans.]	Julia	Annas	labels	Aristotle’s	argumentative	strategy		a	‘bad’	one:	
This is not a good argument. Aristotle only obtains his conclusions by foisting implausibly 
crude conceptions on to his opponent, making him think of mathematical operations as if 
they were precisely analogous to physical operations, the sole difference being that they 
are performed on a more rarefied subject matter. [Annas (1976), p.139]55 What	 does	 Annas	 mean	 by	 ‘implausibly	 crude	 conceptions’?	 And	 what	 of	 the	disparity	 between	 mathematical	 operations	 and	 physical	 ones?	 Ian	 Mueller	offers	a	first	response	to	Annas’	criticism:	
It is certainly true that Aristotle’s argument looks very crude in the light of relatively 
modern ideas about continuity and divisibility, but the literature that has come down to us 
suggests that Aristotle himself was the first person to work out detailed ideas on these 
notions. And it is quite clear that Aristotle’s ideas involved assigning a special sense in 
which points are in lines, lines in planes, and planes in bodies by saying that one of these 
things is only potentially rather than actually in another. It is not unreasonable for him to 
insist that a person who lacks the potentiality–actuality distinction must think of, e.g., 
points as actually in lines.56  Annas	 correctly	 acknowledges	 the	 wider	 scope	 of	 Aristotle’s	 argument.	 She	seems,	 however,	 to	 have	 misunderstood	 the	 context	 of	 Aristotle’s	 argument	when	she	claims	that	it	‘is	not	limited	to	intermediates	but	applies	to	any	type	of	ideal	 mathematical	 object’. 57 	For,	 as	 commentators	 have	 argued,	 Aristotle’s	intended	 target	 is	 the	people	who	 think	of	mathematical	 objects	not	 simply	 as	
ideal	 (i.e.	objects	 that	perfectly	satisfy	the	mathematician’s	definitions)	parts	of																																																									55	Ross	also	expresses	some	skepticism:		‘<Aristotle>	treats	the	divisibility	of	the	line	at	a	point	as	implying	 the	 division	 of	 the	 point,	 and	 one	might	 be	 disposed	 to	 question	 this’.	 [Ross	 (1924),	vol.II,	p.412]	56	In	[Crubellier	&	Laks	(2009),	pp.199].	57	In	[Annas	(1976),	pp.138-139].		
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physical	 objects–illustrated	 by	my	 example	 of	 a	mathematical	 sphere	within	 a	sensible	 one–but	 as	 constitutive	 parts	 of	 those,	 i.e.	 those	 who	 conceive	 a	continuous	 magnitude	 of	 dimension	 n	 as	 being	 constituted	 out	 of	 lower	dimensional	entities	of	dimension	n–1,	 e.g.	a	 line	out	of	points,	a	surface	out	of	lines,	a	solid	out	of	planes.58	As	Michael	White	helpfully	remarks,		
The new argument strikes against any geometrically reasonable conception of 
surfaces/planes, lines, and points that posits them as actually metaphysically constitutive 
of or present in physical bodies because of the simple fact that any geometrically 
reasonable conception of a point must hold that it is indivisible. [White (1993), p.171]59  																																																								58	See	[Menn,	‘Iγ3’,	fn.59,	p.21]	and	[White	(1993),	pp.171-172].	59	White,	 however,	 misses	 the	 opportunity	 to	 designate	 the	 Atomists	 as	 (at	 least	 part	 of)	 the	intended	audience	of	Aristotle’s	argument.	Regarding	the	Atomists’	doctrine	of	the	composition	of	bodies	out	of	quanta	of	some	sort,	the	following	passage	is	illuminating:		
Democritus and Leucippus say that there are indivisible bodies out of which everything else is 
composed, infinite both in number and in variety of shape; and that compounds differ from each 
other in respect of these components, and in respect of the position and the arrangement of these 
components. [De Gen. et Cor. I.1, 314a20-24; Williams’ trans.] 	White,	however,	is	mistaken	in	his	reading	of	the	sentence	τί οὖν διαφέρει ἢ ταύτας εἶναι τοιαύτας 
φύσεις, ἢ αὐτὰς µὲν µή, εἶναι δ’ ἐν αὐταῖς τοιαύτας φύσεις.	He	takes	the	ταύτας	as	referring	to	the	limit	 entities	within	 sensible	 bodies,	 and	 his	 reading	 of	 the	 first	 disjunct	 ταύτας εἶναι τοιαύτας 
φύσεις	 is,	 ‘those	mathematical	features	are	of	such	nature	<that	is,	of	such	constitutive	nature>’.	He	then	reads	the	second	disjunct	αὐτὰς µὲν µή, εἶναι δ’ ἐν αὐταῖς τοιαύτας φύσεις	as	‘even	though	the	 <limit	 entities>	 are	 not	 <of	 such	 constitutive	 nature>,	 they	 nonetheless	 exist	 within	 such	bodies’:		
Two initial observations seem to be in order. The first pertains to Aristotle's comment, immediately 
following the argument, that it does not make any difference whether these mathematical features 
(in null, one, two, and three dimensions - that is, the στιγµαί, γραµµαί, ἐπίπεδα, and στερεά) are 
(constituents of) sensible, physical bodies or whether, although they are not thought of as 
constituting physical bodies, they exist in (ἐν) such bodies. This comment suggests, I believe, that 
Aristotle considers this argument not to be directed exclusively at 'partial platonism', to use Annas' 
term; that is, he does not consider it to be exclusively directed at a conception of µαθηµατικά as 
platonic forms or form-like οὐσίαι immanent in sensible, physical entities. [White (1993), p.171] But	then	what	happened	to	the	second	τοιαύτας φύσεις?	 	Surely	 it	must	have	the	same	sense	as	the	 previous	 one.	Would	 that	 sense	 be,	 according	 to	White,	 ‘of	 constitutive	 nature’?	 Then	 the	sentence	 becomes	 nonsensical:	 ‘There	 is	 no	 difference	 whether	 those	 mathematicals	 are	
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Let	us	now	return	to	the	Meta.	M.2	passage	under	examination.	It	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	sensible,	physical	things	can	be	subjected	to	change;	a	stone,	for	instance,	can	be	cut	into	two	parts.	Now,	let	us	further	assume,	as	the	upholder	of	this	theory	does,	that	mathematicals	are	constitutive	parts	of	physical	objects.	To	escape	the	unpleasant	consequences	of	his	analysis	being	paradoxical,	assuming	he	 subscribes	 to	 the	principle	 that	any	part	of	 something	 that	 is	 susceptible	 to	change	is	also	susceptible	to	change,	one	has	to	maintain	that	mathematicals	too	are	 divisible	 into	 parts.60	But	 what	 will	 happen	 when	 we	 reach	 the	 ultimate	constitutive	parts	 of	 physical	 objects	 (the	points,	 say),	 ultimate	 in	 the	 sense	of	being	incapable	of	further	division?	We	may	represent	Aristotle’s	reasoning,	semi-formally,	as	follows:	1)	B	->	(Bs	&	S),	if	a	physical	body	is	divisible,	then	the	body	is	divisible	along	a	surface	and	the	surface	is	itself	divisible;	2)	S	->	(SL	&	L),	 if	a	surface	is	divisible,	then	the	surface	is	divisible	along	a	line	and	the	line	is	itself	divisible;	3)	L	->	(LP	&	P),	if	a	line	is	divisible,	then	the	line	is	divisible	along	a	point	and	the	point	is	itself	divisible;																																																																																																																																																															constitutive	entities,	or	whether,	even	 though	 they	are	not	constitutive	of	sensible	bodies,	 they	exist	within	physical	bodies	as	constitutive	entities’.	I	think	it	makes	much	more	sense	to	take	the	
ταύτας,	 αὐτὰς,	 αὐταῖς,	 	 as	 referring	 to	 the	 same	 thing	 (as	 Ross	 does	 in	 his	 translation),	 i.e.	 to	physical	bodies	(τὰ αἰσθητά)	and	to	understand	the	τοιαύτας φύσεις	as	‘of	such	nature,	that	is,	not	susceptible	to	change’.	The	sentence	then	will	be	translated	as	‘What	difference	then	does	it	make	whether	 sensible	 things	 are	 unchangeable,	 or,	 without	 being	 so	 themselves,	 have	 such	unchangeable	things	(e.g.	surfaces,	lines,	points)	in	them?’	This	translation	can	make	sense	of	the	next	sentences	τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ συµβήσεται· διαιρουµένων γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν διαιρεθήσονται, ἢ οὐδὲ αἱ 
αἰσθηταί. ‘The	result	will	be	the	same;	if	the	sensible	things	are	divided	the	others	will	be	divided	too,	or	else	not	even	the	sensible	things	can	be	divided.’	As	Aristotle’s	example	shows,	even	if	one	were	 to	 claim	 that	 sensible,	 changeable,	 things	 have	 undivided	 things	 in	 themselves	 such	 as	points,	the	result	will	be	that	the	sensible	things	will	be	unchangeable	themselves.	60	In	a	way	Annas	is	right	about	complaining;	this	 is	not	a	convincing	argument.	Mr	Denyer	has	pointed	out	 to	me	 that	 even	 if	we	 assume	 that	 every	part	 of	 a	 changeable	 thing	must	 itself	 be	changeable,	 this	 still	wouldn’t	 imply	 that	 the	 part	must	 be	 changeable	 in	 the	 same	way	 as	 the	whole;	Mr	Denyer’s	example:	‘I	can	become	Prime	Minister,	my	toe	cannot.’	Yet	another	example	due	to	my	partner,	Stefania	Mataragka:	‘A	woman	can	become	pregnant,	her	hand	cannot.’	
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But	4)	~P,	for	a	point	is	not	divisible,	hence	5)	(~LP	or	~P),	by	the	usual	rules	for	introducing	a	disjunction;		6)	~(	P	&	LP),	by	the	de	morgan	laws;	Thus,		7)	~L,	from	3,	6	by	modus	tollens;	8)	(~L	or	~	SL),	by	the	usual	rules	for	introducing	a	disjunction;	9)	~(L	&	SL),	by	the	de	morgan	laws;	Thus,	10)	~S,	from	2,	10	by	modus	tollens;	11)	(~S	or	~Bs	),	by	the	usual	rules	for	introducing	a	disjunction;	12)	~(Bs	&	S),		by	the	de	morgan	laws;	Hence,	13)	~B,	from	1,12	by	modus	tollens.			Aristotle’s	treatment	of	this	version	of	immanent	mathematicals	shows	that	the	adherer	of	 this	view	cannot	produce	a	paradox-free	version	of	 this	 theory.	For,	either	 he	 has	 to	 claim	 that	 physical	 objects	 cannot	 be	 susceptible	 to	 change	 –	cannot	 be	 divided,	 for	 example	 –	 or	 he	 has	 to	 claim	 that	 there	 are	 ultimate	indivisible	immanent	mathematicals	such	as	points,	leading	him	also	to	the	same	paradoxical	result	that	a	physical	body	cannot	be	subjected	to	change.					 	
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[2.4]	Metaphysics	M.3	analysis	and	related	excursus		
	Some	of	 the	most	 interesting	passages	 that	pertain	 to	Aristotle’s	philosophy	of	mathematics	 are	 located	 in	 the	 third	 chapter	 of	 Book	 M	 of	 the	 Metaphysics.	Aristotle’s	primary	concern	 in	 that	chapter	 is	 to	provide	answers	 to	a	series	of	Platonic61	arguments.	 In	 what	 follows	 I	 will	 proceed	 to	 discuss	 some	 of	 those	arguments	 and	 highlight	 their	 role	 in	 Aristotle’s	 overall	 position	 about	 the	metaphysical	status	of	mathematicals.	
[2.4.1]	 The	 analogy	 from	 the	 universal	 propositions	 in	 mathematics	 and	
the	related	discussion–part	one		The	major	part	of	Meta.	M.3	(1077b17-1078a5)	is	reserved	for	the	discussion	of	three	 analogies	 that	 	 Aristotle	 uses	 to	 highlight	 the	 close	 ties	 between	mathematical	objects	and	the	actual	world.62	The	first	analogy	is	the	following:	
For just as universal propositions in mathematics are not about objects which exist 
separately from magnitudes and numbers, but are about these, only not as having 
magnitude or being divisible, clearly it is also possible for there to be statements and 
proofs about perceptible magnitudes, but not as perceptible but as being of a certain 
kind.63 [Meta. M.3, 1077b17-22; Lear’s trans. mod.] What	exactly	 is	 the	parallel	 that	Aristotle	draws	here?	To	answer	 this	question	properly	 let	 us	 first	 fix	 our	 attention	 to	 the	 things	 that	 Aristotle	 labels	 as	 ‘the	universal	propositions	in	mathematics’	(τὰ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς µαθήµασιν).64	Now	τὰ 
καθόλου ἐν τοῖς µαθήµασιν	could	indicate	either	general	mathematical	principles	that	apply	to	both	numbers	and	spatial	magnitudes	such	as	the	principle	that	 if	
we	 take	 equals	 from	 equals	 then	 equals	 should	 remain,	 principles	 gathered	elsewhere	under	the	label	τὰ κοινά (cf.	κοινὰ δὲ οἷον τὸ ἴσα ἀπὸ ἴσων ἂν ἀφέλῃ, ὅτι 																																																								61	Not	necessarily	Plato’s	own	but	of	the	wider	Academy.	62	See	[Hussey	(2011),	p.108].	
63 ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς µαθήµασιν οὐ περὶ κεχωρισµένων ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰ µεγέθη καὶ τοὺς 
ἀριθµοὺς ἀλλὰ περὶ τούτων µέν, οὐχ ᾗ δὲ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἔχειν µέγεθος ἢ εἶναι διαιρετά, δῆλον ὅτι 
ἐνδέχεται καὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν µεγεθῶν εἶναι καὶ λόγους καὶ ἀποδείξεις, µὴ ᾗ δὲ αἰσθητὰ ἀλλ’ ᾗ 
τοιαδί.  64	Universal	mathematics	is	mentioned	also	in	Meta.	E.1,	1026a25-27	and	in	K.7,	1064b8-9.	
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ἴσα τὰ λοιπά,	Post.	An.,	76a41),	or,	as	Jonathan	Lear	suggests, theorems	applicable	to	 both	numbers	 and	 spatial	magnitudes	 such	 as	 the	 theorem	 that	proportions	
alternate	(i.e.,	that	if	a:b::c:d,	then	a:c::b:d).65			In	a	related	passage	 from	Post.	An.	A.5,	Aristotle	reports	 that	 the	 theorem	 	 that	proportions	 alternate	 used	 to	 be	 proved	 separately	 (ἐδείκνυτό ποτε χωρίς)	 for	numbers,	 lines,	 solids,	 and	 times;	he	 cites	as	 reason	 for	 this	 the	 fact	 that	 there	was	no	name	comprehending	all	these	things	as	one	(διὰ τὸ µὴ εἶναι ὠνοµασµένον 
τι ταῦτα πάντα ἓν),	 things	 which	 differ	 in	 species	 from	 one	 another.	 However,	now–Aristotle	 reports–the	 theorem	 is	 proved	 universally	 (νῦν δὲ καθόλου 
δείκνυται),	 given	 that	 numbers,	 lines,	 solids,	 and	 times,	 presumably	 share	 a	common	character	(ὃ καθόλου ὑποτίθενται ὑπάρχειν):	they	are	all	quantities.	The	
τοδί	in	the	text	points	to	a	certain	universal	aspect	of	numbers,	lines,	planes,	etc.,	about	which	the	theorem	that	proportions	alternate	is	now	proved:66		
And <it might seem> that proportion alternates for things as numbers and as lines and as 
solids and as times-as once it used to be proved separately, though it is possible for be to 
be proved of all cases by a single demonstration. But because all these things–numbers, 
lengths, times, solids–do not constitute a single named item and differ in sort from one 
another, it used to be taken separately. But now it is proved universally; for it did not 
belong to things as lines or as numbers, but as this which they suppose to belong 
universally.67 [Post. An. A.5, 74a17-25; Barnes’ trans.] 																																																								65	In	 this	 Lear	 follows	 Ross	 in	 [Ross	 (1924),	 vol.II,	 p.413].	 Ross	 considers	 Eudoxus'	 theory	 of	proportion	as	the	most	characteristic	example	of	‘the	universal	propositions	in	mathematics’.	Ps.-Alexander	(729.23-25)	provides	an	example	from	the	general	theory	of	proportion	and	another	from	the	general	principles	of	equality:	οἷον διὰ τοῦ ἀπὸ ἴσων ἴσα ἂν ἀφέλῃς, τὰ καταλειπόµενα ἴσα 
ἐστί, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἂν τέσσαρά τινα ᾖ ἀνάλογον, τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄκρων ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν µέσων, καὶ 
ἄλλων πολλῶν τοιούτων.	Syrianus	(89.32-34)	also	offers	the	same	examples:	οἷον διὰ τοῦ ‘ἐὰν ἀπὸ 
ἴσων ἴσα ἀφέλῃς, τὰ καταλειπόµενά ἐστιν ἴσα’ καὶ διὰ τοῦ ‘ἐὰν τέτταρα ᾖ ἀνάλογον, τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄκρων 
ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν µέσων’ καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τοιούτων. 66	So	[Cleary	(1995),	p.311].	
67 καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον ὅτι καὶ ἐναλλάξ, ᾗ ἀριθµοὶ καὶ ᾗ γραµµαὶ καὶ ᾗ στερεὰ καὶ ᾗ χρόνοι, ὥσπερ 
ἐδείκνυτό ποτε χωρίς, ἐνδεχόµενόν γε κατὰ πάντων µιᾷ ἀποδείξει δειχθῆναι· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ µὴ εἶναι 
ὠνοµασµένον τι ταῦτα πάντα ἓν, ἀριθµοί µήκη χρόνοι στερεά, καὶ εἴδει διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων, χωρὶς 
ἐλαµβάνετο. νῦν δὲ καθόλου δείκνυται· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ γραµµαὶ ἢ ᾗ ἀριθµοὶ ὑπῆρχεν, ἀλλ’ ᾗ τοδί, ὃ καθόλου 
ὑποτίθενται ὑπάρχειν.  
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	The	above	passage	from	the	Analytics	is	part	of	a	series	of	Aristotle’s	examples	in	which	 he	 illustrates	 three	 cases	 where	 one	 might	 incorrectly	 think	 that	 has	proved	of	A	that	belongs	primitively	and	universally	to	B	(74a4	ff.).	Aristotle	says	that	we	may	fail	to	find	this	(most	general)	B	 in	the	following	cases:	a)	the	first	case	is	where	it	is	not	possible	to	grasp	a	more	general	kind	B	above	C	to	which	A	belongs,	so	that	we	think	that	C	is	the	most	general	one;	e.g.	if	the	only	triangles	we	 had	met	 with	 were	 isosceles,	 we	might	 think	 that	 having	 two	 right	 angles	belonged	universally	to	the	isosceles	triangle:	‘we	make	this	error	when	either	we	cannot	 grasp	 anything	 higher	 apart	 from	 the	 particular’	 (Barnes’	 trans.);	(ἀπατώµεθα δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἀπάτην, ὅταν ἢ µηδὲν ᾖ λαβεῖν ἀνώτερον παρὰ τὸ καθ’ 
ἕκαστον,	74a7-8,	with	the	aforementioned	example	at	74a16-17:	καὶ εἰ τρίγωνον 
µὴ ἦν ἄλλο ἢ ἰσοσκελές, ᾗ ἰσοσκελὲς ἂν ἐδόκει ὑπάρχειν);	 b)	 the	 second	 case	 is	when	we	can	grasp	something	higher	above	different	species	of	things	but	there	
is	no	name	for	it	(‘or	we	can	<	grasp	something	higher	apart	from	the	particular>	but	 it	 is	 nameless	 for	 objects	 different	 in	 sort’	 (Barnes’	 trans.);	 (ἢ ᾖ µέν, ἀλλ’ 
ἀνώνυµον ᾖ ἐπὶ διαφόροις εἴδει πράγµασιν,	74a8-9);	c)	the	third	case	is	when	that	of	which	we	prove	A	is	‘in	fact	a	partial	whole’	or	as	Barnes	explains:	‘C,	of	which	
A	 is	 proved,	 is	 actually	 a	 species	 of	 B,	 to	 which	 A	 belongs	 universally’;68	(ἢ 
τυγχάνῃ ὂν ὡς ἐν µέρει ὅλον ἐφ’ ᾧ δείκνυται,	 74a9-10),	 with	 an	 example69	at	74a13-16:	 ‘now	 if	 someone	would	 prove	 that	 right	 <angles>	 do	 not	meet,	 the	demonstration	 would	 seem	 to	 hold	 of	 this	 because	 of	 its	 holding	 of	 all	 right	<angles>’	(Barnes’	trans.);	(εἰ οὖν τις δείξειεν ὅτι αἱ ὀρθαὶ οὐ συµπίπτουσι, δόξειεν 
ἂν τούτου εἶναι ἡ ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πασῶν εἶναι τῶν ὀρθῶν).70		Aristotle	 says	 that	 the	 theorem	 	 that	 proportions	 alternate	 used	 to	 be	 proved	separately	 (ἐδείκνυτό ποτε χωρίς)	 for	 numbers,	 lines,	 solids,	 and	 times	 because																																																									68	In	[Barnes	(1975),	p.122].	69	The	 reference	 is	 to	 Euclid’s	Elem.	 I.28,	 that,	 ‘if	 a	 straight	 line	 intersecting	 two	 straight	 lines	makes	the	exterior	angle	equal	to	the	interior	and	opposite	angle	falling	on	the	same	side	of	it	.	.	.	the	two	straight	lines	will	be	parallel’	(Ross’	trans.).	In	[Ross	(1949),	p.525].	70	As	Ross	explains,	‘the	error	lies	in	supposing	that	the	parallelness	of	the	lines	follows	from	the	fact	that	the	exterior	and	the	 interior	and	opposite	angle	are	equal	by	being	both	of	 them	right	angles,	instead	of	following	merely	from	their	equality.’	In	[Ross	(1949),	p.525].	
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there	 was	 no	 name	 comprehending	 all	 these	 things	 as	 one	 (διὰ τὸ µὴ εἶναι 
ὠνοµασµένον τι ταῦτα πάντα ἓν).71	Thus,	 the	 Post.	 An.	 A.5	 74a17-25	 passage	 is	used	 by	 Aristotle	 to	 illustrate	 the	 second	 case	 above:	 There	 was	 no	 name	 for	something	over	lines,	numbers,	etc.	which	differ	in	species.	So	we	missed	the	fact	that	 	 those	 theorems	 can	 be	 proved	 for	 these	 universally.72	The	 phrase	 νῦν δὲ 																																																								71	Henry	 Mendell	 offers	 a	 helpful	 synopsis	 of	 the	 Post.	 An.	 A.5	 discussion	 and	 an	 extensive	discussion	of	the	problem	of	universal	science	in	Aristotle,	i.e.	whether	the	latter	held	a	science	of	universal	mathematicals,	a	 ‘posology’	to	use	Mendell’s	own	coinage.	Whereas	Mendell	concedes	that	 the	 universal	 propositions	 in	 mathematics	 are	 seemingly	 suitable	 candidates	 for	 the	constitution	of	a	universal	mathematical	science,	he	expresses	his	doubts	as	to	whether	Aristotle	really	accepted	such	a	science.	Mendell	highlights	the	fact	that	in	the	Post.	An.	passage	(and	in	the	passages	that	deal	with	universal	mathematicals	in	Meta.	M.2)	Aristotle	does	not	employ	his	own	term	ποσόν	to	name	this	more	general	subject.	In	[Mendell(1985),	pp.229-250].	John	Cleary	(who	also	offers	a	helpful	commentary	on	the	Analytics	passage	and	its	relation	with	the	M.3	parallel)	suggests	 that	 this	 is	 due	 to	 Academic	 infulence:	 points,	 lines,	 planes,	 and	 solids,	 constitute	 a	series	whose	members	are	related	as	prior	to	posterior.	He	points	to	a	certain	passage	from	the	
Nicomachean	 Ethics	where	 Aristotle	 tells	 us	 (1096al7-19)	 that	 the	 Platonists	 refused	 to	 posit	Forms	for	any	series	of	prior	and	posterior	elements.	This	Platonic	position	is	consistent,	Cleary	claims,	with	 ‘Aristotle's	 report	 (Post.	An.	A.5)	 that	 there	was	no	general	name	 for	quantity,	and	that	 proportions	were	 proved	 separately	 for	 each	 kind	 of	 quantity	 before	Eudoxus.’	 In	 [Cleary	(1995),	 fn.	 97;	 pp.310-311];	 for	 some	 useful	 discussion	 see	 also	 [Cleary(1995),	 pp.290-292	 &	307-312].	72	Cf.	Proclus,	392.22-27	(Morrow’s	trans.):	 ‘A	man	may	mistakenly	suppose,	Aristotle	says,	that	he	 is	proving	something	universally	when	he	 is	not,	because	 the	common	subject	 to	which	 the	character	primarily	belongs	has	no	name.	For	instance,	it	is	not	possible	to	say	what	the	common	element	 is	 in	 numbers,	magnitudes,	motions,	 and	 sounds,	 to	 all	 of	which	 the	 rule	 of	 alternate	proportion	applies.’	(λανθάνει δέ, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, τὸ µὴ καθόλου δεικνύς τις ὡς καθόλου διὰ τὸ 
εἶναι ἀνώνυµον τὸ κοινόν, ᾧ πρώτως ὑπάρχει τὸ σύµπτωµα. τί γὰρ κοινὸν ἀριθµοῖς καὶ µεγέθεσι καὶ 
κινήσεσι καὶ φθόγγοις, οἷς ἅπασιν ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐναλλάξ, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν.);	 Philoponus	 (77.6-9,	McKirahan’s	 trans.)	however	claims	that	 the	passage	falls	under	case	a)	above;	 for	he	says	that	the	reason	that	the	theorem	that	proportions	alternate	was	proved	separately	for	each	case	was	that	 we	 were	 not	 aware	 that	 there	 is	 a	 more	 general	 subject	 to	 which	 the	 various	 species	 of	quantity	belong:	‘He	means	that	it	was	demonstrated	rather	roughly	in	each	case	because	we	do	not	know	what	is	the	one	thing	predicated	in	common	in	all	these	cases,	whether	it	 is	quantity,	for	 example,	 or	 something	 else,	 in	 virtue	 of	which	 numbers,	magnitudes	 and	 times	 are	 one	 in	their	common	genus.’	(ἀπεδείκνυτο οὖν, φησίν, ὁλοσχερέστερον ἐφ’ ἑκάστου διὰ τὸ µὴ εἰδέναι ἡµᾶς 
τί ἐστι τὸ ἐπὶ πάντων τούτων ἓν κοινῶς κατηγορούµενον, οἷον εἴτε τὸ ποσὸν εἴτε ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο, καθὸ 
ἀριθµοί τε καὶ µεγέθη καὶ χρόνοι ἕν εἰσι τῷ κοινῷ αὐτῶν γένει.)	
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καθόλου δείκνυται,	as	Heath	suggests,73	is	a	reference	to	the	proof	forming	part	of	Eudoxus’	 new	 theory	 of	 proportion.	 According	 to	 Heath,	 the	 accuracy	 of	Aristotle’s	remark	may	be	verified	if	we	take	a	look	at	Euclid’s	Elements	Books	V	and	VII:	regarding	the	former	it	is	generally	accepted	that	contains	the	Eudoxean	theory	of	proportion	which	is	applicable	to	all	magnitudes	alike	(notice	the	use	of	the	 general	 term	 ‘magnitude’	 (µέγεθος)	 throughout	 this	 book,	 see	 for	 instance	V.16:	Ἐὰν τέσσαρα µεγέθη ἀνάλογον ᾖ, καὶ ἐναλλὰξ ἀνάλογον ἔσται);	 the	 latter	Book	contains	what	is	considered	to	be	an	older	theory	of	proportion	applicable	only	to	numbers	and	apparently	of	Pythagorean	origin.74		This	 first	 parallel	 of	 Meta.	 M.3	 cautions	 against	 the	 postulation	 of	 extra,	separately	 existing	 objects	 (οὐ περὶ κεχωρισµένων ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰ µεγέθη καὶ τοὺς 
ἀριθµούς,	1077b18-19)	that	satisfy	those	universal	propositions.	Such	a	Platonic	move	is	more	explicitly	suggested	in	a	passage	from	the	previous	chapter	of	Book	M	of	the	Metaphysics;	the	context	is	again	about	τὰ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς µαθήµασιν:		
Besides, there are some universal mathematical propositions, whose application extends 
beyond these substances. Here then we shall have another substance between, and separate 
from, the Ideas and the intermediates,—a substance which is neither number nor points 
nor spatial magnitude nor time. And if this is impossible, plainly it is also impossible that 
the former  should exist in separation from sensible things.75 [Meta. M.2, 1077a9-14; 
Ross’ trans. mod.] The	above	passage	forms	part	of	a	bigger	section	of	M.2	where	Aristotle	argues	against	 the	 view	 that	 mathematicals	 exist	 separately	 from	 the	 sensibles	 (M.2,	1076b11-1077b14)76.	As	we	have	already	seen,	in	mathematics	we	have	certain	universal	propositions	which	are	not	specifically	about	magnitudes	or	numbers	
																																																								73	In	[Heath	(1949),	p.223].	74	For	this	suggestion	and	some	further	discussion	see	[Heath(1949),	pp.43-44].	
75 ἔτι γράφεται ἔνια καθόλου ὑπὸ τῶν µαθηµατικῶν παρὰ ταύτας τὰς οὐσίας. ἔσται οὖν καὶ αὕτη τις 
ἄλλη οὐσία µεταξὺ κεχωρισµένη τῶν τ’ ἰδεῶν καὶ τῶν µεταξύ, ἣ οὔτε ἀριθµός ἐστιν οὔτε στιγµαὶ οὔτε 
µέγεθος οὔτε χρόνος. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, δῆλον ὅτι κἀκεῖνα ἀδύνατον εἶναι κεχωρισµένα τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν. 76	This	is	the	orthodox	Platonic	view;	Ross	attributes	this	view	to	Plato	and	Speusippus.	In	[Ross	(1924),	vol.II,	p.412].		
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(which,	as	the	passage	indicates,	the	Platonists	regard	as	separate	substances).	It	seems	 then	 that	 they	have	 to	postulate	some	other	substance	which	 is	 ‘neither	number	nor	points	nor	spatial	magnitude	nor	time’	and	is	separate	from	Forms	and	intermediates	(to	make	matters	worse	this	substance	must	also	be	between	Forms	 and	 intermediates).	 If	 this	 is	 impossible,	 then	 it	 is	 also	 impossible	 that	numbers,	lines,	points,	planes,	etc.	should	exist	in	separation	from	the	sensibles.	But	what	are	the	Platonist’s	reasons	behind	the	postulation	of	a	class	of	separate	
universal	mathematicals	that	satisfy	those	propositions?	(cf.	ps.–Alex.	:	ἕτερον γὰρ 
τούτων ἁπάντων ἔσται καθολικώτερον ὂν καὶ τῶν γραµµῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιπέδων καὶ 
χρόνων καὶ στερεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων,	 729.28-30).	 Now,	 it	 is	 not	immediately	 obvious	 why	 one	 would	 proceed	 to	 postulate	 separately	 existing	universal	mathematical	objects	or	why	one	would	identify	them	with	either	the	Forms	or	 the	 Intermediates	or,	 as	 in	 the	case	of	M.2,	1077a9-14,	add	 the	extra	claim	that	those	mathematicals	are	between	Forms	and	Intermediates	(ἔσται οὖν 
καὶ αὕτη τις ἄλλη οὐσία µεταξὺ κεχωρισµένη τῶν τ’ ἰδεῶν καὶ τῶν µεταξύ).			Part	 1077b17-20	 of	 the	 first	 parallel	 pertains	 to	 the	 postulation	 of	 separate	universal	 mathematicals,	 beginning	 from	 a	 universal	 treatment	 of	 different	species	of	quantity.	Let	us	try	to	uncover	the	Platonist	arguments	in	it;	I	believe	that	this	part	should	be	understood	primarily	within	the	context	of	the	one	over	
many	 argument. 77 	In	 Meta.	 A.9,	 Aristotle	 mentions	 five	 arguments	 for	 the	existence	of	Platonic	Forms:			
Further, of the ways in which we prove that the Forms exist, none is convincing; for from 
some no inference necessarily follows, and from some it follows that there are Forms of 
things of which we think there are no Forms. For according to the arguments from the 
sciences there will be Forms of all things of which there are sciences, and according to the 
one over many there will be Forms even of negations, and according to <the argument> 
that there is an object for thought even when the thing has perished, <there will be Forms> 
of perishable things; for there is an image of these. Further, of the more accurate 
arguments, some lead to Ideas of relations, of which we say there is no independent class, 
																																																								77	Stephen	Menn	also	remarks	in	passing	that	Aristotle	is	trying	to	respond	here	to	Platonically–inspired	one	over	many	arguments.	See	[Menn,	‘Ιγ3’,	p.22].	
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and others involve the difficulty of the ‘third man’.78 [Meta. A.9, 990b8 − 17 ; Ross’ trans. 
mod.; the passage is almost identical to that in M.4, 1079a4–13]  
 The	five	arguments	listed	in	the	passage:	the	arguments	from	the	sciences,	the	one	
over	many	argument,	the	object	of	thought	argument,	the	argument	from	relatives,	and	 the	 argument	 that	 introduces	 the	 third	 man.	 Those	 arguments	 were	discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 the	 first	 book	 of	 Aristotle’s	 work	 On	 Ideas,	 extensive	excerpts	of	which	are	preserved	by	Alexander	in	his	commentary	on	Meta.	A.9.79	Gail	 Fine	 offers	 the	 following	 description	 for	 the	 role	 of	 the	 one	 over	 many	argument:	 ‘According	 to	 the	 one	 over	 many	 agument	 there	 are	 separated,	everlasting	 Forms	 corresponding	 to	 every	 general	 term	 true	 of	 groups	 of	things’:80		
They use also the following argument to establish that there are ideas: If each of the many 
men is a man, and if each of the many animals is an animal, and the same applies in the 
other cases; and if in the case of each of these it is not that something is predicated of itself 																																																								
78 ἔτι δὲ καθ’ οὓς τρόπους δείκνυµεν ὅτι ἔστι τὰ εἴδη, κατ’ οὐθένα φαίνεται τούτων· ἐξ ἐνίων µὲν γὰρ 
οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι συλλογισµόν, ἐξ ἐνίων δὲ καὶ οὐχ ὧν οἰόµεθα τούτων εἴδη γίγνεται. κατά τε γὰρ 
τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστηµῶν εἴδη ἔσται πάντων ὅσων ἐπιστῆµαι εἰσί, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν 
καὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων, κατὰ δὲ τὸ νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος τῶν φθαρτῶν· φάντασµα γάρ τι τούτων ἔστιν. ἔτι 
δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων οἱ µὲν τῶν πρός τι ποιοῦσιν ἰδέας, ὧν οὔ φαµεν εἶναι καθ’αὑτὸ γένος, οἱ 
δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν. 79	The	 locus	classicus	 for	Aristotle’s	On	Ideas	 is	G.E.L.	Owen’s	 paper	 ‘A	Proof	 in	 the	Peri	 Idewn’,	where	he	discusses	mainly	the	argument	from	relatives.	Other	significant		scholarly	contributions	are	 those	 of	 Daniel	 H.	 Frank	 (in	 his	 book	The	Arguments	 ‘From	 the	 Sciences’	 in	 Aristotle’s	 Peri	
Idewn	he	discusses	 the	omonymous	arguments)	and	of	Gail	Fine	(her	work	On	Ideas:	Aristotle’s	
Criticism	of	Plato’s	Theory	of	Forms	offers	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	majority	of	the	arguments;	her	analysis	 relies	 heavily	 on	modern	 philosophers	 such	 as	 D.M.	 Armstrong	 and	 his	 conception	 of	realism).	Aristotle’s	On	Ideas	was	also	subjected	to	extensive	analysis	in	the	May	Week	Seminar	(Cambridge,	Summer	2018).	80	In	 [Fine(1993),	 p.103].	 I	 will	 not	 say	much	 about	 Plato’s	 own	 version	 of	 the	 one	 over	many	argument.	A	passage	commonly	asscociated	with	Plato’s	one	over	many	argument	is	that	of	Rep.	Book	 X,	 596a6-7:	 ‘Do	 you	 want	 us	 to	 begin	 our	 inquiry	 with	 the	 following	 point	 then,	 in	accordance	with	our	usual	method?	I	mean,	as	you	know,	we	usually	posit	some	one	particular	Form	in	 connection	 with	 each	 set	 of	 many	 things	 to	 which	 we	 apply	 the	 same	 name’(Reeve’s	trans.).	Another	passage	that	apparently	conveys	an	over	many	argument	 is	 that	of	Parmenides	132a1-4.	
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but that there is something which is predicated of all of them and which is not the same as 
any of them, then this is some being besides the particular beings which is separated from 
them and everlasting. For it is in every case predicated in the same way of all the 
numerically succesive <particulars>. And what is a one in addition to many, separated 
from them, and everlasting is an idea. Therefore there are ideas.81 [Alexander: Comm. on 
Meta., 80.8-15, Fine’s trans.] 	According	to	Fine’s	analysis82	the	argument	begins	 from	the	 following	premise:	Whenever	many	particular	things	are	F,	 they	are	F	in	virtue	of	having	some	one	thing,	the	F,	predicated	of	them.	What	is	the	nature	of	the	F	that	is	predicated	of	
Fs?	 Fine	 maintains	 that	 the	 two	 most	 plausible	 candidates	 are	 linguistic	
predicates	and	properties.83	If	F	were	a	linguistic	predicate,	the	following	reading	of	 the	 aforementioned	 premise	 occurs:	Whenever	 a	 group	 of	 particulars	 are	F,	they	are	F	in	virtue	of	having	some	one	predicate,	‘F’,	predicated	of	them.	But	this	would	mean-as	Fine	correctly	points	out-that	a	linguistic	predicate	such	as	‘man’	would	 be	 identified	 with	 the	 Form	 of	 man;	 something	 absurd.84	Thus,	 Fine	suggests	an	alternative	interpretation:	that	F	is	a	property.	The	premise	becomes	then:	Whenever	a	group	of	particulars	are	F,	 they	are	F	because	they	share	the	property	of	being	F.85	Now	let	us	recall	the	first	part	of	the	parallel	(1077b17-20)																																																									
81 Χρῶνται καὶ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ εἰς κατασκευὴν τῶν ἰδεῶν. εἰ ἕκαστος τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄνθρωπός 
ἐστι καὶ τῶν ζῴων ζῷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁµοίως, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ’ ἑκάστου αὐτῶν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ τι 
κατηγορούµενον, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τι ὃ καὶ πάντων αὐτῶν κατηγορεῖται οὐδενὶ αὐτῶν ταὐτὸν ὄν, εἴη ἄν τι 
τούτων παρὰ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα ὄντα ὂν κεχωρισµένον αὐτῶν ἀίδιον· ἀεὶ γὰρ ὁµοίως κατηγορεῖται 
πάντων τῶν κατ’ ἀριθµὸν ἀλλασσοµένων. ὃ δὲ ἕν ἐστιν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς κεχωρισµένον τε αὐτῶν καὶ ἀίδιον, 
τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἰδέα· εἰσὶν ἄρα ἰδέαι. 82	Fine	offers	the	following	reconstruction	of	the	argument:	‘(1)	Whenever	many	(πολλά)	Fs		are	
F,	they	are	F	in	virtue	of	having	some	one	thing,	the	F,	predicated	of	them.	(2)	No	particular	(καθ’	ἕκαστον)	F		is	F	in	virtue	of	itself.	(3)	The	F	is	in	every	case	(ἀεὶ)	predicated	in	the	same	way	of	all	the	 numerically	 successive	 Fs	 (τῶν	 κατ’	 ἀριθμὸν	 ἀλλασσομένων).	 (4)	 Therefore	 the	 F	 is	something	besides	 (παρὰ)	particular	Fs.	 (5)	Therefore	 the	F	 is	 separated	 from	(κεχωρισμένον)	particular	 Fs	 and	 is	 everlasting	 (ἀίδιον).	 (6)	 Whatever	 is	 a	 one	 over	 many,	 separated,	 and	everlasting	is	a	Form.	(7)	Therefore	the	F	is	a	Form.’	In	[Fine(1993),	p.104].	83	In	[Fine,	op.	cit.,	p.106].	84	ibid.	85	op.cit.,	pp.106-108.	Fine’s	properties	are	not	meant	to	be	distinguished	from	species	and	types:	‘I	use	'property'	more	broadly,	so	that	it	includes	all	these	types	of	entities.	[…]The	crucial	point	
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and	 the	 related	 discussion	 in	 Post.	 An.	 A.5,	 74a17-25.	 The	 subject	 matter	 of	universal	mathematical	propositions	are	numbers,	lines,	solids,	etc.,	i.e.	different	kinds	of	quantity.	Does	this	mean	that	we	have	to	postulate	a	peculiar	entity	(call	it	 ‘Quantity’),	 to	 which	 they	 are	 all	 related	 in	 the	 same	 way? It	 seems	 that	 a	consistent	application	of	the	one	over	many	argument	requires	the	Platonists	to	do	so.	In	the	original	one	over	many	argument	Fine	takes	καθ’ ἕκαστα	to	refer	to	particulars.86	It	is	true	that	when	Aristotle	speaks	of	καθ’ ἕκαστα	he	often	refers	to	particulars	(Socrates	as	contrasted	to	man);	however,	this	not	always	the	case,	as	 he	 frequently	 refers	 instead	 to	 kinds	 or	 species	 which	 may	 be	 said	 to	 be	particular	in	relation	to	something	more	universal	(man	in	contrast	to	animal).87	In	 the	 Post.	 An.	 discussion	 that	 pertains	 to	 the	 first	 part	 of	 our	 parallel	 καθ’ 
ἕκαστα	 clearly	 stand	 for	 (low-level)	 kinds;	 as	 Barnes	 comments,	 in	 a	 different	case	the	first	error	(i.e.		the	fact	that	is	not	possible	to	grasp	a	more	general	kind	
B	 above	 C	 to	 which	 attribute	 A	 belongs,	 so	 that	 we	 think	 that	 C	 is	 the	 most	general	subject)	would	remain	‘unillustrated’:88		
It must not escape our notice that it often happens that we make mistakes and that what is 
being proved does not belong primitively and universally in the way in which it seems to 
be being proved universally and primitively. We make this error when either we cannot 
grasp anything higher apart from the particular, or we can but it is nameless for objects 
																																																																																																																																																														for	our	purposes	is	that	on	the	realist	conception	universals	are	explanatory	entities	of	roughly	the	sort	that	properties	conceived	in	realist	fashion	have	been	taken	to	be.	I	shall	use	'property',	'explanatory	property',	and	'genuine	property'	interchangeably.’	In	[Fine	(1993),	p.247].	86	In	[Fine,	op.	cit.,	p.104].	87	John	Cooper	in	his	book	Reason	and	Human	Good	in	Aistotle	offers	an	extensive	list	of	passages	that	correspond	to	those	two	readings	of	καθ’ ἕκαστα:	for	καθ’ ἕκαστα	as	referring	to	particulars	he	cites	the	following	places:	Meta.	B.4	999b33;	Z.15	1039b28-31;	M.9	1086a32-34;	Λ.5	1071a27-29,	Cat.	2b3,	De	Int.	18a33,	Pr.	An.	A.27	43a27,	Post.	An.	B.19	100al6-18,	De	Gen.	An.	I.3	768al-2,	
N.E.	III.3	1112b33-l	113a2.	For	καθ’ ἕκαστα	as	referring	to	low-level	types	or	species	he	mentions	
Topics	I.12	105a13-14;	Cat.	15b1-2,	Hist.	An.	V.1	539bl5,	De	Gen.	An.	III.11	763bl5,	Post.	An.	Α.13	79a4-6,	Post.	An.	Β.13	97b28-31,	De	Part.	An.	I.4	644a28-33,	b6-7.	See	[Cooper(1975),	pp.28-29].	88	In	[Barnes	(1975),	p.122].	
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different in sort or that of which it is proved is in fact a partial whole.89 [Post. An. A.5, 
74a4-10, Barnes’ trans.]  
 There	 is	 however	 a	 ‘more	 accurate’	 argument	 that	 can	 accommodate	 a	 more	general	reading	of	καθ’ ἕκαστα.	In	Met.	A.	9	(990b15–17)	where	Aristotle	lists	the	arguments	 for	 the	existence	of	 the	Forms,	he	 tells	us	 that	of	 the	more	accurate	arguments	 (οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων)	 ‘some	 lead	 to	 Ideas	 of	 relations	 and	others	involve	the	difficulty	of	the	third	man’	(οἱ µὲν τῶν πρός τι ποιοῦσιν ἰδέας, ὧν 
οὔ φαµεν εἶναι καθ’αὑτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν).	 Fine	 argues	that	this	one	over	many	argument	is	different	from	the	one	presented	previously;	whereas	 in	 the	 previous	 one	 over	many	 argument	 the	 particulars	 in	 question	were	 sensible	 ones,	 this	 argument	 deals	with	 a	 plurality	 of	 things	 that	 are	 not	necessarily	sensible	particulars	(πλείονά τινα).90	But	why	is	this	a	more	accurate	argument?	The	 reason	 is,	 according	 to	 Fine,	 that	 this	 argument	 focuses	 on	 the	
similarity	of	the	things	of	which	F	is	predicated:	 
 
In Aristotle's view, that is, Plato uses a one over many argument not to 
explain particularity, but to explain similarity. The accurate one over many argument 
brings this out by focusing on the F–ness of F things, without restricting the relevant 
things to sensible particulars. Given Plato's belief that the form of F is also an F thing, 
though not an F sensible particular, this will turn out to be important <for the third man 
argument>. [Fine (1993), p.201] 	Fine	 traces	 this	 ‘more	 accurate’	 one	 over	many	 argument	 within	 the	 following	lines	from	Alexander’s	commentary:		
If what is predicated truly of some plurality of things is also <some> other thing besides 
the things of which it is predicated, being separated from them (for this is what those who 
posit the ideas think they prove; for this is why, according to them, there is such a thing as 
man‐itself, because the man is predicated truly of the particular men, these being a 
																																																								
89 Δεῖ δὲ µὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλάκις συµβαίνει διαµαρτάνειν καὶ µὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ δεικνύµενον πρῶτον 
καθόλου, ᾗ δοκεῖ δείκνυσθαι καθόλου πρῶτον. ἀπατώµεθα δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἀπάτην, ὅταν ἢ µηδὲν ᾖ 
λαβεῖν ἀνώτερον παρὰ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον, ἢ ᾖ µέν, ἀλλ’ ἀνώνυµον ᾖ ἐπὶ διαφόροις εἴδει πράγµασιν, ἢ 
τυγχάνῃ ὂν ὡς ἐν µέρει ὅλον ἐφ’ ᾧ δείκνυται· 90	In	[Fine,	op.	cit.	p.199].	
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plurality, and it is other than the particular men)—but if this is so, there will be a third 
man.91 [Alex. 84.22–7; Fine’s trans.] 	Thus	a	Platonist	ought	to	formulate	the	following	argument	for	the	existence	of	the	Form	of	Quantity:	We	have	 lines,	planes,	 solids,	numbers,	and	so	on,	which	are	all	quantities.	From	this	we	infer	that	there	is	a	separate	Form	of	Quantity	by	virtue	of	which	they	all	are	quantities.	How	do	we	infer	this?	We	are	relying	on	an	 one	 over	many	 principle	 that	 generates	 a	 separate	 Form	 for	 a	 collection	 of	things	that	all	have	something	in	common.			We	saw	 then	how	one	could	proceed	 to	postulate	 the	existence	of	 the	Form	of	Quantity	 based	 on	 a	 version	 of	 the	 one	 over	 many	 argument.	 According	 to	Alexander,	Aristotle’s	response	to	the	one	over	many	argument	is	as	follows:			
It is clear that this argument too does not validly deduce that there are ideas; rather, it too 
tends to prove that what is predicated in common is something other than the particulars of 
which it is predicated. 92 [Alex. 81.7-11, Fine’s trans.]  	It	seems	that	the	error	in	the	arguments	for	the	existence	of	the	Forms	lies	in	the	
separation	inference.	Why	 is	 this	problematic?	Well,	 it	may	be	 the	case	 that	 the	Form	ought	to	be	different	from	what	it	is	predicated	of	but	this	need	not	imply	separation.	 What	 can	 be	 said	 about	 the	 notion	 of	 separation	 that	 Aristotle	associates	with	Platonic	Forms?	As	I	have	already	pointed	out	in	this	chapter,	in	
Meta.	 Δ.	 11,	 1019a1-4,	 	 for	 instance,	 Aristotle	 says	 that	 things	 are	 called	 prior	(πρότερα)	in	virtue	of	their	nature	and	substance	(κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν)	when	it	is	 possible	 for	 them	 to	 exist	without	 other	 things	 (ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων),	whereas	those	other	things	cannot	exist	without	them;	this	division	was	used	by																																																									
91  εἰ τὸ κατηγορούµενόν τινων πλειόνων ἀληθῶς καὶ ἔστιν ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ ὧν κατηγορεῖται, 
κεχωρισµένον αὐτῶν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἡγοῦνται δεικνύναι οἱ τὰς ἰδέας τιθέµενοι· διὰ τοῦτο γάρ ἐστί 
τι αὐτοάνθρωπος κατ’ αὐτούς, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ἀνθρώπων πλειόνων ὄντων 
ἀληθῶς κατηγορεῖται καὶ ἄλλος τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν)—ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔσται τις τρίτος 
ἄνθρωπος. 
92 δῆλον δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἰδέας εἶναι συλλογίζεται, ἀλλὰ δεικνύναι βούλεται καὶ αὐτὸς ἄλλο 
εἶναι τὸ κοινῶς κατηγορούµενον τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ὧν κατηγορεῖται. 		
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Plato	(τὰ µὲν δὴ οὕτω λέγεται πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν, ὅσα 
ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἄνευ ἐκείνων µή· ᾗ διαιρέσει ἐχρήσατο 
Πλάτων.).	Therefore,	from	the	Δ.11	passage	we	may	infer	A	is	separate	from	B	iff	A	 can	 exist	 without	 B	 (ὅσα ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων),	 or,	 equivalently,	 iff	 A	exists	independently	of	B.	Fine	speaks	of	‘capacity	for	independent	existence’	for	this	particularly	important	notion	of	separation.93	Separation	defined	that	way	is	always	separation	from	something;	in	the	case	of	the	one	over	many	argument	it	is	 separation	 from	 particulars94	(παρὰ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα ὄντα ὂν κεχωρισµένον 
αὐτῶν, Alex.,	80.8-15).	Thus,	the	Platonic	Forms	are	separate	from	particulars	in	the	sense	that	they	can	exist	whether	or	not	particulars	exist	(Fine	actually	puts	this	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘instantiation’	 –	 the	 Platonic	 Forms	 (unlike	 their	 Aristotelian	counterparts)	can	exist	without	their	instances).			In	the	following	passages	from	the	Metaphysics	Aristotle	describes	the	origins	of	Plato's	theory	of	Forms	and	how	it	differs	from	the	Socratic	theory:		
The belief about the forms occurred to those who asserted it because they were convinced 
of the truth of the Heracleitean arguments that all sensibles are always flowing, so that if 
knowledge and wisdom are to be about anything, there must be some different and 
enduring natures, besides the sensible ones, for there is no knowledge of flowing things. 
Now Socrates was concerned with the moral virtues, and he was the first to seek universal 
definitions in connection with them . . . It was reasonable for Socrates to try to find what a 
thing is, because he was seeking to argue deductively, and the starting‐point of deductions 
is what a thing is . . . For there are just two things one might fairly ascribe to Socrates—
inductive arguments and universal definitions, both of which are concerned with the 
starting‐point of knowledge. But Socrates did not make universals or definitions separate, 
but they <the Platonists> separated them, and they called these sorts of beings ‘ideas'. 95 
[Meta. M.4, 1078b12–32; Fine’s trans.] 																																																								93	See	Fine(1984)	for	extensive	discussion.	94	ibid.	
95 συνέβη δ’ ἡ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν δόξα τοῖς εἰποῦσι διὰ τὸ πεισθῆναι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας τοῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις 
λόγοις ὡς πάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ῥεόντων, ὥστ’ εἴπερ ἐπιστήµη τινὸς ἔσται καὶ φρόνησις, 
ἑτέρας δεῖν τινὰς φύσεις εἶναι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς µενούσας· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τῶν ῥεόντων ἐπιστήµην. 
Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς πραγµατευοµένου καὶ περὶ τούτων ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου 
ζητοῦντος πρώτου … ἐκεῖνος δ’ εὐλόγως ἐζήτει τὸ τί ἐστιν· συλλογίζεσθαι γὰρ ἐζήτει, ἀρχὴ δὲ τῶν 
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	In	 the	second	passage,	which	contains	a	more	detailed	account	of	 the	origin	of	separate	Forms,	Aristotle	claims	that	the	Platonists	not	only	make	Forms	entirely	distinct	from	particulars,	but	they	also	consider	them	to	be	separate	substances.	Their	error,	however,	lies	in	that	no	universal	can	be	a	separate	substance:		
For they treat ideas both as universals and again, at the same time, as separate and as 
particulars. But it has been argued before that this is impossible. Those who said that the 
substances were universals combined these things <universality and particularity> in the 
same thing because they did not make them <the substances> the same as sensibles. They 
thought that the particulars in sensibles were flowing and that none of them endured, but 
that the universal is besides these things and is something different from them. Socrates 
motivated this <view>, as we were saying before, through definitions; but he did not 
separate <universals> from particulars. And he was right not to separate them. This is 
clear from the results. For it is not possible to acquire knowledge without the universal; 
but separating is the cause of the difficulties arising about the ideas. But they, on the 
assumption that any substances besides the sensible and flowing ones had to be separate, 
had no others, and so they set apart the substances spoken of universally, so that it 
followed that universal and particular <natures> were virtually the same natures. This in 
itself, then, would be one difficulty for the view discussed. 96  [Meta. M.9, 1086a32–b13; 
Fine’s trans.] 																																																																																																																																																															
συλλογισµῶν τὸ τί ἐστιν … δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἅ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τούς τ’ ἐπακτικοὺς 
λόγους καὶ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἄµφω περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήµης)· —ἀλλ’ ὁ µὲν 
Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὁρισµούς· οἱ δ’ ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν 
ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσαν. 
96 ἅµα γὰρ καθόλου τε ποιοῦσι τὰς ἰδέας καὶ πάλιν ὡς χωριστὰς καὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον. ταῦτα δ’ ὅτι 
οὐκ ἐνδέχεται διηπόρηται πρότερον. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ συνάψαι ταῦτα εἰς ταὐτὸν τοῖς λέγουσι τὰς οὐσίας 
καθόλου, ὅτι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὐ τὰς αὐτὰς [οὐσίας] ἐποίουν· τὰ µὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα 
ῥεῖν ἐνόµιζον καὶ µένειν οὐθὲν αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ καθόλου παρὰ ταῦτα εἶναί τε καὶ ἕτερόν τι εἶναι. τοῦτο δ’, 
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔµπροσθεν ἐλέγοµεν, ἐκίνησε µὲν Σωκράτης διὰ τοὺς ὁρισµούς, οὐ µὴν ἐχώρισέ γε τῶν 
καθ’ ἕκαστον· καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἐνόησεν οὐ χωρίσας. δηλοῖ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων· ἄνευ µὲν γὰρ τοῦ 
καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήµην λαβεῖν, τὸ δὲ χωρίζειν αἴτιον τῶν συµβαινόντων δυσχερῶν περὶ τὰς 
ἰδέας ἐστίν. οἱ δ’ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἔσονταί τινες οὐσίαι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς καὶ ῥεούσας, χωριστὰς 
εἶναι, ἄλλας µὲν οὐκ εἶχον ταύτας δὲ τὰς καθόλου λεγοµένας ἐξέθεσαν, ὥστε συµβαίνειν σχεδὸν τὰς 
αὐτὰς φύσεις εἶναι τὰς καθόλου καὶ τὰς καθ’ ἕκαστον. αὕτη µὲν οὖν αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν εἴη τις ἂν 
δυσχέρεια τῶν εἰρηµένων.
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	In	 both	 passages	 Aristotle	 is	 accusing	 Platonists	 of	 separating	 the	 universal.	More	specifically,	in	the	second	passage	above,	Aristotle	accuses	the	Platonists	of	a	 serious	 category	 mistake:	 that	 Platonists	 make	 forms	 both	 universals	 and	particulars.	That	sensibles	are	in	flux	(ῥεῖν)	is	the	reason	why	Plato	inferred	that	there	must	be	forms	conceived	as	the	basic	objects	of	knowledge	and	definition;	as	we	 can	 see	 in	 the	 previously	 cited	 passage	 from	Meta.	M.4,	 knowledge	 and	definition	require	the	existence	of	things	that	are	not	in	flux	(ὥστ’ εἴπερ ἐπιστήµη 
τινὸς ἔσται καὶ φρόνησις, ἑτέρας δεῖν τινὰς φύσεις εἶναι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς 
µενούσας· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τῶν ῥεόντων ἐπιστήµη).	 It	 seems	 that	 Aristotle	 is	 in	agreement	with	what	motivates	the	theory	of	forms,	namely	that	knowledge	and	definition	has	to	be	of	something	different	than	the		ever–changing	particulars.97	But	why	the	confusion	of	universals	with	particulars?	The	reasons	may	be	traced	in	 the	 last	 lines	of	 the	 second	passage:	Platonists’	 answer	 to	 the	 inadequacy	of	the	 sensibles	 is	 that	 there	must	 be	 some	 non–sensible	 substances	 besides	 the	sensible	 ones;	 but	 they	 did	 not	 have	 any	 other	 non-sensible	 substances	 apart	from	their	own	Forms	(ἄλλας µὲν οὐκ εἶχον);	so	they	posited	separate	Forms;	(καὶ 
πάλιν ὡς χωριστὰς καὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον,	 1086a33-34,	 χωριστὰς εἶναι, ἄλλας µὲν 
οὐκ εἶχον ταύτας δὲ τὰς καθόλου λεγοµένας ἐξέθεσαν, ὥστε συµβαίνειν σχεδὸν τὰς 
αὐτὰς φύσεις εἶναι τὰς καθόλου καὶ τὰς καθ’ ἕκαστον,	 1086b9-11),	 so	 Forms	 are	particulars	(as	well	as	universals).	But–Aristotle	complains–how	can	something	be	 a	 substance	 particular	 and	 a	 universal?	 According	 to	 Fine,	 the	 crucial	assumption	 is	 that	 separation	 implies	 particularity.	 Fine	 offers	 an	 account	 of	Aristotle’s	reasoning	in	terms	of	instantiation:			
But as I (following Aristotle) understand separation, the claim that forms—universals—
are separate is simply the claim that they can exist whether or not any corresponding 
sensible particulars exist. Why does Aristotle take this to show that forms are particulars? 
The answer is that he believes that universals exist when and only when they are 
instantiated; in his view, only substance particulars are separate (see e.g. Meta. 1028a33–
4). So he claims that if forms are separate they are (substance) particulars 
because he accepts the controversial view that universals cannot exist uninstantiated. He is 																																																								97	The	theme	that	knowledge	is	of	the	universal	whereas	perception	is	of	the	particulars	can	be	found	elsewhere	in	Aristotle	(e.g.	in	Meta.	B.6,	999a26-b3).	
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therefore not convicting Plato of internal inconsistency: he means that Plato's views do not 
square with the truth. He sees that Plato introduces forms simply to be universals; that they 
are particulars results only if we accept the controversial Aristotelian assumption, which 
Aristotle takes Plato to reject, that universals cannot exist uninstantiated. [Fine(1993), 
p.61] 
 The	first	part	of	our	parallel,	then,	can	be	viewed	as	a	very	condensed	criticism	of	Aristotle	 to	a	 (more	accurate)	one-over-many	argument	 that	would	 lead	 to	 the	postulation	of	a	Form	of	Quantity	that	enjoys	separate	existence	from	numbers	and	magnitudes.			
[2.4.2]	 The	 analogy	 from	 the	 universal	 propositions	 in	 mathematics	 and	
the	related	discussion–	part	two		The	 very	 best	 that	 can	 be	 extracted	 from	 the	 first	 part	 of	 our	 parallel	 is	 this:		what	 is	of	 importance	 in	 	 the	universal	propositions	of	mathematics	 is	 that	 the	objects	that	satisfy	them	share	a	common	feature.	But	in	M.2,	1077a9-14	(where	the	context	again	is	about	τὰ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς µαθήµασιν)	the	text	reads:	
Besides, there are some universal mathematical propositions, whose application extends 
beyond these substances. Here then we shall have another substance between, and separate 
from, the Ideas and the intermediates,—a substance which is neither number nor points 
nor spatial magnitude nor time. And if this is impossible, plainly it is also impossible that 
the former  should exist in separation from sensible things.98 [Meta. M.2, 1077a9-14; 
Ross’ trans. mod.] As	we	have	said	previously,	the	passage	is	part	of	Aristotle’s	arguments	against	mathematicals	 as	 separately	 existing	 entities.	 A	 few	 lines	 before	 (1077a9-14)		Aristotle	makes	 a	 reference	 to	 Book	 B	 of	 the	Metaphysics:	 ἔτι ἅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
ἀπορήµασιν…	 (1076b39-1077a1);	 this	 is	 a	 reference	 back	 to	 the	 fifth	 aporia	 in	that	Book.	A	formulation	of	the	fifth	aporia	may	be	found	in	lines	997a34-b3:		
Further, must we say that sensible substances alone exist, or that there are others besides 																																																								
98 ἔτι γράφεται ἔνια καθόλου ὑπὸ τῶν µαθηµατικῶν παρὰ ταύτας τὰς οὐσίας. ἔσται οὖν καὶ αὕτη τις 
ἄλλη οὐσία µεταξὺ κεχωρισµένη τῶν τ’ ἰδεῶν καὶ τῶν µεταξύ, ἣ οὔτε ἀριθµός ἐστιν οὔτε στιγµαὶ οὔτε 
µέγεθος οὔτε χρόνος. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, δῆλον ὅτι κἀκεῖνα ἀδύνατον εἶναι κεχωρισµένα τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν. 
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these? And are substances of one kind or are there several kinds of substances, as those 
say who assert the existence both of the Forms and of the intermediates with which they 
say the mathematical sciences deal? 99 [Meta. B.2, 997a34-b3; Ross’ trans.] Aristotle	in	the	beginning	of	the	first	chapter	of	Book	M	of	the	Metaphysics	gives	us	the	context	of	the	inquiry	that	will	follow:	
Now since our inquiry is whether there is or is not besides the sensible substances any 
which is immovable and eternal, and, if there is, what it is, …100 [Meta. M.1, 1076a10-12; 
Ross’ trans.] But	 why	 cannot	 sensible	 substances	 be	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 the	 sciences?	Among	the	five	arguments	for	the	existence	of	the	Forms	listed	previously,	there	are	some	that	pertain	to	sciences.	That	sensible	things	are	somehow	 inadequate	as	 proper	 objects	 of	 the	 sciences	 serves	 as	 a	 key	 premise	 of	 the	 so-called	‘arguments	 from	 sciences’	 in	 Aristotle’s	 work	 On	 Ideas.	 There	 are	 three	 such	arguments	in	the	On	Ideas;	let	us	examine	the	first	two:			
1) If every science performs its own function by referring to some one and the same thing, 
and not to any of the particulars, there would be, for each science, some other thing 
besides the sensibles, which is eternal and a model of the things that come in each science. 
And such is the Form.101 [Alex. 79.5-8; Frank’s trans. slightly mod.]  
2) Moreover, the things about which the sciences are concerned are. But the sciences are 
concerned with some other things besides the particulars; for <the particulars> are 
indefinite and indeterminate, whereas the things about which the sciences are concerned 
are determinate. Therefore, there are some things besides the particulars, and these things 
																																																								
99 ἔτι δὲ πότερον τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας µόνας εἶναι φατέον ἢ καὶ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλας, καὶ πότερον 
µοναχῶς ἢ πλείω γένη τετύχηκεν ὄντα τῶν οὐσιῶν, οἷον οἱ λέγοντες τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ µεταξύ, περὶ ἃ 
τὰς µαθηµατικὰς εἶναί φασιν ἐπιστήµας;  
100ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ σκέψις ἐστὶ πότερον ἔστι τις παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας ἀκίνητος καὶ ἀΐδιος ἢ οὐκ 
ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἔστι τίς ἐστι … 
101 εἰ πᾶσα ἐπιστήµη πρὸς ἕν τι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπαναφέρουσα ποιεῖ τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν 
καθ’ ἕκαστον, εἴη ἄν τι ἄλλο καθ’ ἑκάστην παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀίδιον καὶ παράδειγµα τῶν καθ’ ἑκάστην 
ἐπιστήµην γινοµένων. τοιοῦτον δὲ ἡ ἰδέα. 
		
63	
are the Forms.102 [Alex. 79.8-11; Frank’s trans. slightly mod.]  In	the	first	argument	we	have	the	specification	of	the	conditions	which	a	proper	object	of	a	science	must	fulfill.103	Thus	if	every	science	‘functions	with	reference	to	 some	 one	 and	 the	 same	 thing’	 (πρὸς ἕν τι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπαναφέρουσα)104	and	concerns	itself	with	‘none	of	the	particular	things’	(πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον),	then	there	would	be	for	each	science	some	other	thing	besides	the	particulars,	an	entity	which	is	‘everlasting	and	a	paradigm’	(ἀίδιον καὶ παράδειγµα)	of	the	things	that	come	to	be	within	that	science.	From	the	second	argument	we	further	infer	that	 sensible	 things	 (τὰ αἰσθητὰ)	 are	 inadequate	 as	 objects	 of	 the	 sciences	because	 they	 are	 somehow	 indefinite	 (ἄπειρα)	 and	 indeterminate	 (ἀόριστα),	whereas	 the	 objects	 of	 the	 sciences	 should	 be	 determinate	 (ὡρισµένα).	 Both	arguments	 conclude	 that,	 for	 each	 science,	 there	 should	 be	 a	 proper	 object	(eventually	identified	as	a	Form)	which	is	different	from	the	sensibles.	It	seems	that	 the	 καθ’ ἕκαστα here	 are	 sensible	 particulars and	 not	 low-level	 types	 or	properties. 105  Terms	 such	 as	 ἀόριστον	 and	 ἄπειρον connote	 two	 kinds	 of	indeterminacy,	qualitative	and	quantitative	one: 
The indeterminacy can be quantitative or qualitative. That is it can be indeterminate how 
many of something are dealing with – for example how many particulars instantiate a 
given universal, or how many properties a given thing has. (This second sort of 
quantitative indeterminacy shows that a single thing can be quantitatively indeterminate.) 
Or there can be some indeterminacy in the nature of, or in a given description of, some or 
all of a thing’s properties. If, for example, we say only that something is hot, or hotter than 
something else, it is indeterminate what degree of heat it has. [Fine (1993), p.71]  																																																								
102 ἔτι ὧν ἐπιστῆµαί εἰσι, ταῦτα ἔστιν· ἄλλων δέ τινων παρὰ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστά εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιστῆµαι· ταῦτα 
γὰρ ἄπειρά τε καὶ ἀόριστα, αἱ δὲ ἐπιστῆµαι ὡρισµένων· ἔστιν ἄρα τινὰ παρὰ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δὲ 
αἱ ἰδέαι 103	See	[Cleary	(2013),	p.337].	104	Frank	remarks:	‘this	does	not	mean	that	for	each	science	there	is	numerically	just	one	object	which	acts	as	the	object	of	the	scientist’s	concern.	<…>	In	the	third	argument	of	sciences	we	learn	that	the	geometer	concerns	himself	with	both	equal	simpliciter	and	commensurable	simpliciter.’	In	[Frank(1984),	p.128].	105	For	this	view	see	also	[Cleary,	op.	cit.,	p.338].	Frank	argues	that	the		καθ’ ἕκαστα	are	low-level	types	or	properties	[Frank(1984),	pp.22–23].	Fine	argues	that	we	should	opt	for	a	more	general	reading	of	the		καθ’ ἕκαστα	that	includes	both	senses	[Fine(1993),	p.79].		
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One	may	understand	qualitative	indeterminacy	with	regard	to	the	objects	of	the	mathematical	sciences,	as	 for	example	Burnyeat	does,	 that	 ‘when	mathematical	properties	are	attributed	to	sensible	things,	the	result	both	is	and	is	not	the	case’:	‘a	 tabletop	 or	 a	 diagram	 both	 is	 and	 is	 not	 square,	 a	 cow	 or	 a	 line	 drawn	 to	represent	 unity	 both	 is	 and	 is	 not	 one.’ 106 	One	 could	 also	 illuminate	 the	quantitative	indeterminacy	of	the	sensibles	by	pointing	to	Parmenides	(129c-d),	where	 Plato	 argues	 that	 Socrates	 is	 ‘one’,		 because	 he	 is	 one	 man	 among	 a	company	of	seven	men,	and	we	can	equally	say	that	he	is	‘many’	in	virtue	of	his	upper	and	 lower,	 front	and	back,	 and	 left	 and	right	parts.	Or,	we	can	go	 to	 the	
Republic	Book	VII	where	Plato	argues	that	the	‘ones’	and	the	‘numbers’	grasped	by	the	senses	are	not	truly	ones	and	numbers,	since	‘we	do	see	the	same	thing	as	one	and	as	an	unlimited	number	at	the	same	time’	(525a4-5).		Given	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 sensible	 objects	 then,	 one	might	 be	 tempted	 to	 posit	Forms	 as	 the	 proper	 objects	 of	 the	 sciences.	 A	 more	 suitable	 move,	 however,	would	 be	 to	 posit	 Intermediates	 as	 proper	 objects:	we	 have	 already	 seen	 that	they	 differ	 from	 sensible	 things	 in	 being	 eternal	 and	 unchangeable	 (ἀΐδια καὶ 
ἀκίνητα),	and	from	Forms	in	that	there	are	many	alike	(πόλλ’ ἄττα ὅµοια),	while	the	 Form	 itself	 is	 in	 each	 case	 unique	 (Meta.	 A.6,	 987b14-18).	 Given	 that	mathematical	 statements	 require	 things	 that	 are	many–per–type	 (the	 so-called	
uniqueness	problem),	one	may	modify	 the	original	argument	from	sciences	 so	as	to	postulate	Intermediates	instead	of	Forms:	1)The	theorems	of	mathematics	are	true.	2)The	theorems	of	mathematics	are	not	true	 about	 sensible	 things	 for	 the	 latter	 are	 indeterminate.	 3)The	 theorems	 of	
																																																								106	In	[Burnyeat	(1987),	pp.225-226].	Compare	also	the	following	passage	from	Meta.	Z.15:			
For this reason, also, there is neither definition nor demonstration of sensible individual substances, 
because they have matter whose nature is such that they are capable both of being and of not being; 
for which reason all the individual instances of them are destructible. If then demonstration is of 
necessary truths and definition involves knowledge, and if, just as knowledge cannot be sometimes 
knowledge and sometimes ignorance, but the state which varies thus is opinion, so too 
demonstration and definition can- not vary thus, but it is opinion that deals with that which can be 
otherwise than as it is, clearly there can neither be definition nor demonstration of sensible 
individuals. [Meta. Z.15, 1039b27-1042a2; Ross’ trans.; italics mine]  
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mathematics	are	true	of	intermediate	mathematicals.	The	 argument	 is	 a	 modification	 of	 similar	 arguments	 in	 [Burnyeat	 (1987),	pp.221-222]	 and	 in	 [Menn,‘Iγ3’,	 p.20]	 and	 is	 based	 on	 the	 following	 argument	from	Meta.	N.3:		 But	 those	 who	 make	 <number>	 separate	 assume	 that	 it	 exists	 and	 is	 separate	because	 the	 axioms	would	 not	 be	 true	 of	 sensible	 things,	while	 the	 statements	 <of	mathematics>	 are	 true	 and	 delight	 the	 soul;	 and	 similarly	 with	 the	 magnitudes	 of	mathematics.107	[Meta.	N.3	1090a35-b1;	Ross’	trans.	mod]			The	passage	is	about	anyone	who	accepts	that	numbers	exist	in	separation	from	the	 sensibles	 not	 merely	 about	 people	 who	 posit	 numbers	 as	 Forms	 (see	1090a15ff.).	 Premise	 2)	 in	 this	 Platonist	 argument	 illustrates	 the	 so-called	precision	problem,	the	fact	physical	objects	might	fail	to	have	the	mathematical	properties	we	study.	A	formulation	of	the	precision	problem	may	be	found	in	the	following	passage:			
For neither are perceptible lines such lines as the geometer speaks of (for no perceptible 
thing is straight or curved in this way; for a hoop touches a straight edge not at a point, but 
as Protagoras said it did, in his refutation of the geometers), nor are the movements and 
complex orbits in the heavens like those of which astronomy treats, 108  nor have 
																																																								
107 οἱ δὲ χωριστὸν ποιοῦντες, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἔσται τὰ ἀξιώµατα, ἀληθῆ δὲ τὰ λεγόµενα καὶ 
σαίνει τὴν ψυχήν, εἶναί τε ὑπολαµβάνουσι καὶ χωριστὰ εἶναι· ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ µεγέθη τὰ µαθηµατικά. 108	Cf.	passage	529c-d	from	Republic	Book	VII	where	Socrates	acknowledges	that	the	motions	of	the	 heavenly	 bodies	 are	 the	most	 beautiful	 and	most	 exact	 among	 those	 of	 sensible	 things;	 he	insists,	however,	that	those	motions	are	not	the	subject	matter	of	the	astronomers	because	they	fall	short	of	 the	true	motions	which	only	can	be	grasped	by	reason	and	thought	and	not	by	the	senses:		
[Socrates]:… these ornaments in the heavens, since they are ornaments in something visible, may 
certainly be regarded as having the most beautiful and most exact motions that such things can 
have. But these fall short of the true ones – those motions in which things that are really fast or 
really slow, as measured in true numbers and as forming all the true geometrical figures, are moved 
relative to one another, and that move the things that are in them. And these, of course, must be 
grasped by reason and thought, not by sight. Don’t you agree? [Glaucon]: Of course.  [529c7-d6; 
Reeve’s trans.] 
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geometrical points the same nature as the actual stars.109 [Meta. B.2, 997b34-998a6; Ross’ 
trans.]  	Lear	cautions	us	not	to	disregard	the	aporetic	context	of	the	above	passage:		
 
One should not consider this passage in isolation from the context in which it occurs. 
Metaphysics B.2 is a catalogue of philosophical problems (aporiai) presented from various 
points of view. None of it should be thought of as a presentation of Aristotle's considered 
view on the subject. It is rather a list of problems in response to which he will form his 
philosophical position. Immediately before the quoted passage Aristotle is putting forward 
the problem for the Platonists that the belief in Form-like intermediates involves many 
difficulties (997bl2-34). The quoted passage can thus be read as an imagined Platonist's 
response: ‘Yes, the belief in intermediates is problematic, but, on the other hand, giving 
them up involves difficulties, too.’ Here it is an imagined Platonist speaking, and not 
Aristotle. So Aristotle is not endorsing Protagoras' view; he is presenting it as one horn of 
a dilemma that must be resolved. [Lear (1982), p.176]110  
 The	dilemma	the	Platonist	presents	us	with	is,	according	to	Lear,	the	following:	either	we	have	 to	 endorse	a	 theory	of	 intermediate	mathematicals	or	 abandon	them	 altogether	 and	 face	 the	 problem	 of	 precision	 that	 tantalises	 the	 sensible	objects.	Lear	proposes	the	following	resolution	of	the	dilemma:		
 
We have already seen Aristotle's proposed resolution; and it is one that involves asserting 
that some physical objects perfectly possess geometrical properties. [Lear (1982), p.176] 
 I	agree	with	Lear	on	this	point.	My	disagreement	has	 to	do	with	 the	somewhat	wider	 scope	 of	 mathematical	 features	 Lear	 claims	 to	 be	 ‘exactly’	 (i.e.	mathematically	 precisely)	 physically	 instantiated.	 The	 question	 that	 naturally																																																									
109 (οὔτε γὰρ αἱ αἰσθηταὶ γραµµαὶ τοιαῦταί εἰσιν οἵας λέγει ὁ γεωµέτρης (οὐθὲν γὰρ εὐθὺ τῶν αἰσθητῶν 
οὕτως οὐδὲ στρογγύλον· ἅπτεται γὰρ τοῦ κανόνος οὐ κατὰ στιγµὴν ὁ κύκλος ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας 
ἔλεγεν ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωµέτρας), οὔθ’ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ ἕλικες τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὅµοιαι περὶ ὧν ἡ 
ἀστρολογία ποιεῖται τοὺς λόγους, οὔτε τὰ σηµεῖα τοῖς ἄστροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει φύσιν. 110	In	 this	 Lear	 probably	 follows	 Syrianus’	 commentary	 of	 the	 passage:	 ‘The	 argument	 is	 not	directed	 against	 those	who	 bring	 in	 several	 kinds	 of	 substance;	 it	 is	 rather	 in	 agreement	with	them’	[Syrianus:	Comm.	in	Meta.,	27.8-9;	Madigan’s	trans.].	Consult	[Madigan	(1986),	pp.162-165]	for	a	valuable	discussion	on	the	commentaries	of	Syrianus	and	Asclepius	in	this	passage.		
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arises,	 then,	 is	 the	 following:	Are	any	mathematical	 features	 ‘exactly’	physically	instantiated?	And,	 if	 so,	which	 features	are	 so	 instantiated?	 I	will	 return	 to	 the	problem	of	precision	later	in	my	essay.		Returning	to	the	M.2,	1077a9-14	passage,	why	would	certain	objects	lie	between	(µεταξύ)	 Intermediates	 and	 Forms?	 It	 is	 not	 immediately	 clear;	 ps–Alex.	complains	 that	 Aristotle	 is	 being	 a	 little	 vague	 there:	 ἔχει δέ τινα βραχεῖαν 
ἀσάφειαν ἡ λέξις ἡ ἔσται οὖν καὶ αὕτη τις ἄλλη οὐσία µεταξὺ κεχωρισµένη τῶν τε 
ἰδεῶν καὶ τῶν µεταξύ· λέγει δὲ ἰδέας µὲν τὸ αὐτοποσὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, µεταξὺ δὲ τὰ 
µαθηµατικά· µεταξὺ γὰρ τῶν τε ἰδεῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐτίθεντο τὰ µαθηµατικά. 
λέγει οὖν ὅτι ἔσται τις ἄλλη φύσις καθ’ αὑτὴν οὖσα µεταξὺ τῶν τε ἰδεῶν καὶ τῶν 
µεταξύ, τουτέστι τῶν µαθηµατικῶν	729.34-730.10).	A	 solution	might	be	 this:	We	have	 seen	 that,	 given	 the	 uniqueness	 problem,	 one	 may	 modify	 the	 original	
argument	from	sciences	so	as	to	postulate	Intermediates	instead	of	Forms.	Then	one	could	perhaps	formulate	an	one	over	many	argument	to	show	that	there	is	a	Form	of	Quantity.	And	one	 could	 invoke	a	 self-predication	 principle	 and	a	non-
identity	 one	 to	 formulate	a	 third	man	 argument:	We	have	a	 set	of	 intermediate	lines,	planes,	 solids,	numbers,	and	so	on	which	are	all	quantities.	From	this	we	infer	 that	 there	 is	 a	 separate	 Form	of	Quantity	 by	 virtue	 of	which	 they	 all	 are	quantities.	How	do	we	 infer	 this?	We	are	 relying	on	 a	one	over	many	 principle	that	postulates	a	Form	for	a	set	of	things	that	all	have	something	in	common.	But	we	can	proceed	even	further:	We	now	consider	together	the	items	discussed	in	the	first	step	(that	is,	all	the	intermediate	quantities)	and	Quantity,	the	Form	by	virtue	of	which	they	all	are	quantities.	In	order	to	do	so,	we	need	a	principle	that	tells	us	that	the	Form	of	Quantity	is	itself	a	quantity:	a	Form	ought	to	be	subject	to	self-predication.	From	this	via	the	one	over	many	principle	we	infer	that	there	is	 a	 separate	 Form	 of	 Quantity	 by	 virtue	 of	 which	 they	 (the	 members	 of	 the	previous	 set,	 the	 intermediate	 quantities	 and	 the	 Form	 of	 Quantity)	 all	 are	quantities.	 The	 Form	 introduced	 in	 this	 step	 is	 a	 second	 Form	 (Quantity2),	distinct	 from	the	original	Form	(Quantity1)	 introduced	earlier.	 In	order	to	 infer	this	we	need	a	non-identity	principle:	The	Form	by	virtue	of	which	a	set	of	things	are	 all	 quantities	is	 not	 itself	 a	 member	 of	 that	 set.	 And	 we	 can	 continue	 the	
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process	 ad	 infinitum.111	It	 seems	 then	 that	 Aristotle	must	 have	 something	 like	that	 on	his	mind	when	he	 claims	 that	 there	ought	 to	be	 some	other	 substance	between	the	ideas	and	the	mathematicals.	Let	us	conclude	the	analysis	of	the	first	parallel	(1077bl7-22)	by	offering	a	more	expanded	 version	 of	 it:	 Just	 as	 the	 universal	 propositions	 of	 mathematics	 are	about	kinds	of	quantity	(lines,	numbers,	etc.)	 insofar	as	they	are	quantities	and	not	 insofar	 as	 they	 are	 continuous	 or	 (in)divisible	 (οὐχ ᾗ δὲ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἔχειν 
µέγεθος ἢ εἶναι διαιρετά),	 and	 not	 about	 some	 special,	 separate	 entity	 called	‘quantity’,	similarly	geometry	is	about	sensible	magnitudes,	not	qua	sensible	but	qua	such	and	such	(ᾗ τοιαδί);	geometry	is	about	sensible	magnitudes	qua	solids	or	 qua	 planes	 or	 qua	 lines,	 and	 not	 (we	 may	 add)	 about	 separately	 existing	solids,	 planes,	 and	 lines. The	 very	 least	 that	 can	 be	 extracted	 from	 this	 first	parallel	is	that	the	link	between	mathematics	and	the	actual	world	should	not	be	severed	 by	 the	 postulation	 of	mathematicals	 that	 exist	 in	 separation	 from	 the	sensibles. 
[2.4.3]	The	analogy	from	physics/astronomy			The	second	parallel	(1077b22-30)	is	now	brought	forward	to	further	support	or	explain	the	first	one	(cf.	ps–Alex.:	πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ δι’ ἄλλου ὑποδείγµατος σαφηνίζει 
τὸ λεγόµενον λέγων ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ᾗ κινούµενα µόνον πολλοὶ λόγοι εἰσί,	 734.33-35):		
For just as there are many statements about things merely as moving, apart from the nature 
of each such thing and their incidental properties (and this does not mean that there has to 
be either some moving object separate from the perceptible objects, or some such entity 
marked off in them), so in the case of moving things there will be statements and branches 
of knowledge them about them, not as moving but merely as bodies, and again merely as 
planes and merely as lengths, as divisible, and indivisible but with position, and merely as 
indivisible.112 [Meta. M.3, 1077b22-30; Annas’ trans.] 
																																																								111	In	formulating	the	argument	I	am	relying	on	Cohen’s	analysis	in	[Cohen(1971)]	and	on	Fine’s	one	in	[Fine	(1993),	ch.15,	esp.pp.210-211].	
112 ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ᾗ κινούµενα µόνον πολλοὶ λόγοι εἰσί, χωρὶς τοῦ τί ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ 
τῶν συµβεβηκότων αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα ἢ κεχωρισµένον τι εἶναι κινούµενον τῶν 
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In	 this	 passage	 Aristotle	 states	 that	 there	 are	many	 statements	 (πολλοὶ λόγοι)	about	 things	only	 insofar	 as	 they	 are	moving	 (ᾗ κινούµενα µόνον),	without	 any	reference	to	the	essential	nature	of	such	things	or	to	their	attributes	(χωρὶς τοῦ τί 
ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ τῶν συµβεβηκότων αὐτοῖς).	Now	those	statements	could	 be	 either	 the	 propositions	 that	 physicists	 study	 (οἱ φυσικοὶ:	 ps–Alex.,	734.33ff.)	 or	 those	 of	 astronomers	 or	 more	 general	 motion	 principles;	 an	example	would	be:	things	that	move	at	an	equal	speed	cover	the	same	distance	in	
an	equal	time	 (ps–Alex.,	734.36-37,	τὰ ἰσοταχῶς κινούµενα ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ τὸ αὐτὸ 
διάστηµα διέξεισιν,	 and	 also	 Syrianus,	 95.19-20).	 In	 any	 case,	 although	 the	 ᾗ 
κινούµενα	 locution	 implies	 that	 the	 subject–matter	 of	 those	 statements	 are	not	sensible	 things	 themselves,	 but	 rather	 sensible	 things	 qua	 moving,	 it	 is	 not	necessary	to	postulate	special	‘moving	objects’	as	1)	separate	from	the	sensibles	or	2)	as	located	in	the	sesibles	(ἢ κεχωρισµένον τι εἶναι κινούµενον τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ 
ἐν τούτοις τινὰ φύσιν εἶναι ἀφωρισµένην).	The	aforementioned	disjunction	refers	to	 the	 two	 possible	 modes	 of	 existence	 for	 mathematical	 objects,	 initially	articulated	 in	 1076a32-34	 (ἀνάγκη δ’, εἴπερ ἔστι τὰ µαθηµατικά, ἢ ἐν τοῖς 
αἰσθητοῖς εἶναι αὐτὰ καθάπερ λέγουσί τινες, ἢ κεχωρισµένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν),	 and	refuted	 in	 M.2.	 The	 locution	 χωρὶς τοῦ τί ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ τῶν 
συµβεβηκότων αὐτοῖς	 explains	 what	 happens	 when	 someone	 studies	 sensibles	qua	moving;	the	commentary	of	ps–Alex.	(734.37-735.7)	is	especially	helpful:	 if	we	 consider	 the	 motion	 principle	 stated	 above,	 things	 that	 move	 at	 an	 equal	
speed	 cover	 the	 same	 distance	 in	 an	 equal	 time	 (τὰ ἰσοταχῶς κινούµενα ἐν ἴσῳ 
χρόνῳ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστηµα διέξεισιν),	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 nothing	 specific	 is	 required	about	the	nature	of	the	things	that	satisfy	this	principle,	but	what	matters	is	their	motion	and	its	essential	attributes	(οὐδὲν ἁπτόµενοι τῶν ὑποκειµένων πραγµάτων, 
ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν µόνης διαλεγόµεθα).	 Thus,	 as	 ps–Alex.	 comments,	physicists/astronomers	that	study	thigs	qua	moving	do	not	consider	whether	the	things	that	are	in	motion	are	men	or	the	heavens	and	they	do	not	study	men	or	the	heavens	as	such,	but	instead	they	study	the	very	nature	of	motion	and	what	holds	 true	 of	men	 and	 the	 heavens	 qua	 being	 in	motion	 (οἱ φυσικοὶ δεικνύουσι 																																																																																																																																																														
αἰσθητῶν ἢ ἐν τούτοις τινὰ φύσιν εἶναι ἀφωρισµένην, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κινουµένων ἔσονται λόγοι καὶ 
ἐπιστῆµαι, οὐχ ᾗ κινούµενα δὲ ἀλλ’ ᾗ σώµατα µόνον, καὶ πάλιν ᾗ ἐπίπεδα µόνον καὶ ᾗ µήκη µόνον, καὶ 
ᾗ διαιρετὰ καὶ ᾗ ἀδιαίρετα ἔχοντα δὲ θέσιν καὶ ᾗ ἀδιαίρετα µόνον.  
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πάντα τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ ταῖς κινήσεσι µὴ θεωροῦντες µηδὲ πολυπραγµονοῦντες τὰ 
ὑποκείµενα τίνα ἐστί, πότερον ἄνθρωποι ἢ οὐρανός, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τί συµβέβηκε τῷ 
ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τῷ οὐρανῷ θεωροῦσιν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν τὴν τῆς κινήσεως φύσιν 
καὶ τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐταῖς ἀνιχνεύουσί τε καὶ ἀποδεικνύουσι, ps–Alex.	734.37-735.7).		Aristotle	then,	 following	a	 line	of	 thought	similar	to	the	first	parallel	where	the	context	was	the	universal	propositions	of	mathematics,	reiterates	the	invalidity	of	any	Platonic	argument	that	establishes	either	the	separate	existence	of	some	Form	of	Motion	or	the	existence	of	Intermediate	moving	things.	Aristotle	in	this	second	 parallel	 seems	 to	 be	 particularly	 concerned	 with	 the	 objects	 of	astronomical	study	and	it	would	be	rather	useful	 to	offer	a	brief	analysis	of	his	discussion	 regarding	 the	 absurdities	 that	 stem	 from	 positing	 astronomical	Intermediates	in	Meta.	997b12-20:		
Further, if we are to posit besides the Forms and the sensibles the intermediates between 
them, we shall have many difficulties. For clearly on the same principle there will be lines 
besides the lines-in-themselves and the sensible lines, and so with each of the other classes 
of things; so that since astronomy is one of these mathematical sciences there will also be 
a heaven besides the sensible heaven, and a sun and a moon (and so with the other 
heavenly bodies) besides the sensible ones. Yet how are we to believe these things? It is 
not reasonable even to suppose these bodies immovable, but to suppose their moving is 
quite impossible.113 [Meta. B.2, 997b12-20; Ross’ trans.] Aristotle	 begins	 by	 asserting	 that	 those	who	 posit	 Intermediates	will	 run	 into	many	 absurdities;	 for	 he	 explains	 this	 means	 positing	 Intermediate	 lines	 in	addition	to	the	Form	line	and	to	the	sensible	ones;	and	likewise	for	every	other	kind	of	thing:	if	astronomy	is	a	science	of	Intermediates	there	will	be	a	heaven,	a	sun	 and	 moon	 and	 heavenly	 bodies	 over	 and	 above	 the	 sensible	 heaven.	Following	 Alexander,	 I	 understand	 that	 the	 γενῶν	 in	 ln.	 997b15	 refers	 to	 the																																																									
113 ἔτι δὲ εἴ τις παρὰ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τὰ µεταξὺ θήσεται, πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἕξει· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς 
ὁµοίως γραµµαί τε παρά τ’ αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς ἔσονται καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν· ὥστ’ 
ἐπείπερ ἡ ἀστρολογία µία τούτων ἐστίν, ἔσται τις καὶ οὐρανὸς παρὰ τὸν αἰσθητὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἥλιός 
τε καὶ σελήνη καὶ τἆλλα ὁµοίως τὰ κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν. καίτοι πῶς δεῖ πιστεῦσαι τούτοις; οὐδὲ γὰρ 
ἀκίνητον εὔλογον εἶναι, κινούµενον δὲ καὶ παντελῶς ἀδύνατον. 
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subject	 genera	 of	 the	 mathematical	 sciences	 which	 include	 astronomy114	(cf.	Alex.,	197.35-198.3:	ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ γραµµῆς ἔχει (ἔστι γάρ τις γραµµὴ κατ’ αὐτοὺς παρά 
τε τὴν αἰσθητὴν καὶ τὴν ἰδέαν ἡ µαθηµατική, περὶ ἣν ἡ γεωµετρία πραγµατεύεται), 
οὕτως ἕξει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, δηλονότι τῶν µαθηµατικῶν).	Thus,	Alexander	points	out	 that	 the	 τούτων	 in	 the	 next	 sentence	 could	 refer	 to	 those	 mathematical	sciences	 of	 which	 astronomy	 is	 part	 (cf.	 Alex.	 198.4-5:	 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς 
µαθηµατικαῖς καὶ ἡ ἀστρολογία).	 It	 is	 not	 plausible	 for	 the	 heavens	 to	 be	considered	as	immovable	mathematical	objects	(οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκίνητον εὔλογον εἶναι)	because	it	 is	their	very	nature	to	be	movable	(cf.	Alex.	198.8-11:	 	πῶς δὲ οἷόν τε 
εἶναι ἥλιόν τινα µαθηµατικὸν µὴ κινούµενον, ἢ κόσµον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἄστρων; ἡ γὰρ 
οὐσία καὶ ἡ φύσις τούτων µετὰ τῆς τοιᾶσδε κινήσεως).	So	a	Platonist	who	studies	the	 sensible	 heavens	 has	 two	 options:	 either	 to	 regard	 them	 as	 immovable	mathematical	 objects	 of	 intermediate	 nature,	 thereby	 disregarding	 certain	important	aspects	of	 them,	such	as	their	motion	(this	 treatment	of	 the	heavens	would	probably	classify	one	as	a	geometer	rather	than	as	an	astronomer)	or	to	regard	 them	 as	 movable	 mathematical	 objects	 again	 of	 intermediate	 nature,	something	impossible	for	objects	non-material	and	non-sensible	by	nature	such	as	the	Intermediates	(as	Alex.	explains	in	198.	11-14:	πολὺ δ’ ἔτι ἀλογώτερον τοῦ 
λέγειν κόσµον καὶ ἥλιον ἀκίνητα τὸ λέγειν εἶναι µὲν αὐτὰ κινούµενα, οὐκ αἰσθητὰ δὲ 
ἀλλὰ µαθηµατικά· ἀδύνατον γὰρ κινεῖσθαι τὸ µὴ ὂν ἔνυλον καὶ τῇ αὑτοῦ φύσει 
αἰσθητόν).115	
																																																								114	This	is	also	Cleary’s	reading	in	[Cleary	(1995),	p.250].	115	As	Madigan	points	 out,	Asclepius	 interprets	Aristotle’s	 argument	not	 as	 a	 dilemma	but	 as	 a	
two-level	 paradox,	 i.e.	 ‘a	 contradiction	 between	 a	 predicate	 that	 belongs	 to	 an	 intermediate	because	 it	 is	 an	 intermediate	 and	 a	 predicate	 that	 belongs	 to	 it	 because	 it	 is	 the	 particular	intermediate	 it	 is’.	 In	 [Madigan	 (1986),	 fn.13,	 p.154].	 Insofar	 as	 the	 intermediate	 heaven	 is	 a	heaven	it	must	be	in	motion;	insofar	as	it	is	an	intermediate	object	it	must	be	unmoved;	hence	it	will	be	both	in	motion	and	unmoved	which	is	 impossible	(καθὸ µὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐρανός, δεῖ αὐτὸν 
κινεῖσθαι, καθὸ δὲ διανοητός, ἔσται ἀκίνητος· ὥστε ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ κινούµενος καὶ ἀκίνητος, ὅπερ ἐστὶν 
ἀδύνατον,	168.28-31).	Madigan	informs	us	that	Asclepius	deals	with	the	paradox	by	distinguising	(168.31-169.1)	in	a	neo-Platonic	fashion	the	sensible	heaven	which	is	in	motion	(αἰσθητός ἐστιν 
οὐρανὸς ὁ φαινόµενος),	 the	 intelligible	heaven	 in	 the	Demiurge	 (νοητὸς οὐρανὸς ὁ λόγος ὁ ἐν τῷ 
δηµιουργῷ,	 presumably	 the	 Form-heaven),	 and	 the	 intermediate	 heaven	 that	 is	 the	 object	 of	reason	which	exists	 in	our	soul	and	 it	 is	unmoved	(διανοητὸς ὁ λόγος τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ 
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The	absurdities	that	stem	from	the	postulation	of	intermediate	heavens	is	part	of	
a	 more	 general	 Aristotelian	 argumentative	 strategy	 that	 can	 be	 outlined	 as	follows:	 If	 the	 Platonists	 try	 to	 respond	 to	 problems	 such	 as	 that	 of	 the	indeterminacy	of	the	sensibles	by	postulating	separately	existing	mathematicals,	then	 the	 same	 problems	 would	 require	 them	 to	 posit	 entities	 such	 as	 the	intermediate	heavens	and	so	on.116	The	case	becomes	especially	problematic	for	the	more	 ‘applied’	mathematical	 sciences	 (e.g.	 optics)	 since	 it	 leads	 to	peculiar	entities	such	as	intermediate	sensations	and	similarly	for	the	other	sciences.	This	seems	to	be	what	Aristotle	has	in	mind	in	the	following	passage:		
And similarly with the things of which optics and mathematical harmonics treat. For these 
also cannot exist apart from the sensible things, for the same reasons. For if there are 
sensible things and sensations intermediate between Form and individual, evidently there 
will also be animals intermediate between animals-in-themselves and the perishable 
animals. [Meta. B.2, 997b20-24; Ross’ trans.] But	 let	 us	 return	 to	 the	 discussion	 of	 this	 second	 parallel.	 Just	 as	 there	 are	theorems	 that	 are	 just	 about	 sensible	bodies,	 not	 qua	 sensible	bodies	but	 only	qua	 moving,	 so	 likewise,	 there	 can	 be	 theorems	 that	 are	 just	 about	 sensible	moving	 bodies	 (οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κινουµένων),	 not	 qua	 moving	 but	 only	 qua	bodies	 (οὐχ ᾗ κινούµενα δὲ ἀλλ’ ᾗ σώµατα µόνον),	 and	 again	 only	 qua	 surfaces	(πάλιν ᾗ ἐπίπεδα µόνον),	and	only	qua	lengths	(ᾗ µήκη µόνον);	and	qua	divisibles	(i.e.	 just	 as	 continuous	 quantities,	 ᾗ διαιρετὰ);	 and	 qua	 indivisibles	 having	position	 (i.e.	 just	 as	 points,	 ᾗ ἀδιαίρετα ἔχοντα δὲ θέσιν);	 and	 qua	 indivisibles	alone	(i.e.	just	as	units,	ᾗ ἀδιαίρετα µόνον). Aristotle’s	seemingly	straightforward	conclusion	 needs	 further	 analysis	 if	 we	 scrutinise	 it	 through	 the	 prism	 of	 the		precision	 problem:	 the	 fact	 that	 astronomy	 studies	 celestial	 bodies	 qua	 points	does	not	entail	that	those	bodies	are	actually	points,	only	that	they	are	regarded	as	being	indivisible	and	having	position;	and	what	happens	when	I	examine	my	
																																																																																																																																																														
ἡµῶν ὑπάρχων· οὗτος δὲ ἀκίνητός ἐστι λόγος ὑπάρχων.).	The	intermediate	heaven	then	is	not	both	moved	and	unmoved	but	 simply	unmoved,	and	 thus	 the	paradox	 is	solved.	 In	 [Madigan(1986),	pp.154-155].	116This	 is	 also	what	 Stephen	Menn	argues	 in	 [Menn,	 ‘Ιγ3’,	 p.22].	This	 also	 seems	 to	be	Cleary’s	conclusion.	See	[Cleary(1995),	pp.	250-259]	for	extensive	discussion.	
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desk	 qua	 plane?	 Does	 this	mean	 that	my	 desk	 has	 a	 perfectly	 planar	 surface?	These	are	also	objections	that	Syrianus	raises	against	Aristotle.	Syrianus	objects	that	 Aristotle’s	 analogy	 does	 not	 work	 properly;	 for	 there	 is	 no	 problem	 of	precision	with	 regard	 to	 the	 precise	 (uniform	 circular)	motion	 of	 the	 celestial	bodies–but	 one	 might	 wonder	 whether	 the	 same	 thing	 can	 be	 said	 about	 the	shapes	 of	 the	 objects	 around	 us;	 whether	 there	 are	 such	 things	 as	 perfect	spheres,	cubes	and	so	on:	‘For	he	who	does	not	wish	that	there	be	motion	outside	of	sensible	objects	does	not	conceive	of	some	more	exact	form	of	motion	in	the	immobile	 realm,	 whereas	 the	 geometer	 does	 conceive	 of	 other	 shapes	 more	exact	than	perceptible	ones.’117	In	[Com.	on	Meta.	M-N,	95.22-26,	trans.	by	Dillon	and	O’Meara].	
 
[2.4.4]	Conclusions	and	further	discussion		A	conclusion	then	is	drawn	in	lines	1077b31-4	based	on	the	above	two	parallels	is:	 just	 as	 it	 is	 true	 to	 say	ἁπλῶς	 that	 the	moving	 things	which	 are	 the	 subject	matter	of	physics/astronomy	exist,	so	 it	 is	 true	to	say	ἁπλῶς	 that	mathematical	objects	exist:	
So, since it is true to say without qualification not only that separate things exist but also 
non-separate things exist (e.g. that moving-things exist), it is also true to say, without 
qualification, that mathematical objects exist, and are as they are said to be.118 [Meta. M.3, 
1077b31-4; Annas’ trans. mod.] 	Aristotle	by	beginning	with	 ‘therefore,	since…’	(ὥστ’ ἐπεί)	states	 the	conclusion	of	 the	 previous	 argument,	 which	 is	 that	 non-separate	 objects	 in	 general,	 and	mathematical	 objects	 in	 particular,	 do	 exist.119	The	 expression	 ἁπλῶς	 modifies	
λέγειν	 and	 εἰπεῖν	 and	 not	 εἶναι.120	For,	 in	 Metaphysics	 M.2	 Aristotle	 explicitly																																																									
117 ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πρῶτον µὲν οὐχ ὅµοιόν ἐστι τὸ περὶ τὴν κίνησιν τοῖς σχήµασιν· ὁ µὲν γὰρ µὴ βουλόµ
ενος εἶναι κίνησιν ἔξω τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἐννοεῖ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις ἀκριβεστέραν, ὁ δὲ γεωµέτρης ἐ
πινοεῖ τῶν φαινοµένων σχηµάτων ἀκριβέστερα· 
118 ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ ἁπλῶς λέγειν ἀληθὲς µὴ µόνον τὰ χωριστὰ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ µὴ χωριστά (οἷον κινούµενα 
εἶναι), καὶ τὰ µαθηµατικὰ ὅτι ἔστιν ἁπλῶς ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τοιαῦτά γε οἷα λέγουσιν. 119	In	[Lear	(1982),	p.170].	120	In	agreement	with	[Lear,	ibid.]	and	[Cleary	(1995),	p.319].		
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states	 that	mathematical	 objects	 do	 not	 exist	 without	 qualification	 (οὐχ ἁπλῶς 
ἔστιν,	 1077b16).	 It	 seems	 that	 Cleary	 makes	 a	 plausible	 suggestion	 when	 he	points	out	 that	 the	distinction	 that	Aristotle	makes	between	separate	and	non-separate	 things	 corresponds	 to	 the	distinction	between	 independent	substances	and	 dependent	 attributes	 (he	 highlights	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 κινούµενα	 as	Aristotle’s	 example	 of	 such	 non-separate	 entities).121	Thus	 Cleary	 offers	 the	following	interpretation	of	the	passage:		
Since attributes can be truly said to exist (when one speaks simply or without 
qualification), the same is true of mathematical objects which 'are such as they are said to 
be' (1077b33-34). [Cleary (1995), p.319] One	 may	 supplement	 Cleary’s	 account	 by	 reminding	 the	 reader	 that	 when	Aristotle	 talks	 about	 τὰ µαθηµατικά	 he	 frequently	 means	 lower-dimensional	entities	 such	 as	 surfaces,	 lines	 and	 points,	 which	 according	 to	 him	 are	 limit	entites	and	do	not	enjoy	separate	existence	from	the	things	they	are	limits	of.	In	any	 case,	 the	 role	 of	 this	 passage	 is	 indicative	 of	 Aristotle’s	 realism	 towards	mathematicals:	they	do	exist,	albeit	in	a	dependent	manner.	In	the	third	analogy	(1077b34-1078a5)	a	parallelism	is	established	between	the	science	of	medicine	and	geometry:		
It is true to say of other branches of knowledge, without qualification, that they are about 
this or that-not what is incidental (e.g. not the white, even if the branch of knowledge deals 
with the healthy, and the healthy is white) but what each branch of knowledge is about, the 
healthy if <it studies its subject> as healthy, man if <it studies it> as man. And likewise 
with geometry.122 [Meta. M.3, 1077b34-1078a2; Annas’ trans.] Since	it	is	true	to	say	without	qualification	(ἁπλῶς ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν)	that	the	science	of	medicine	is	about	 ‘the	healthy’	(ὑγιεινόν)	and	not	about	something	incidental	(οὐχὶ τοῦ συµβεβηκότος)	 to	 it	 (e.g.	 ‘the	 white’,	 οἷον ὅτι λευκοῦ, εἰ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν 
λευκόν, ἡ δ’ ἔστιν ὑγιεινοῦ),	so	too	with	geometry.	It	may	be	the	case	that	every																																																									121	Cleary,	ibid.	
122 καὶ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήµας ἁπλῶς ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν τούτου εἶναι, οὐχὶ τοῦ συµβεβηκότος (οἷον 
ὅτι λευκοῦ, εἰ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν λευκόν, ἡ δ’ ἔστιν ὑγιεινοῦ) ἀλλ’ ἐκείνου οὗ ἐστὶν ἑκάστη, εἰ <ᾗ> ὑγιεινὸν 
ὑγιεινοῦ, εἰ δ’ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω καὶ τὴν γεωµετρίαν· 
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object	 that	has	geometrical	properties	 is	a	sensible	one;	 it	does	not	 follow	that	the	proper	objects	of	geometry	are	sensible	objects	as	such,	but	sensible	objects	qua	lines,	planes,	solids,	and	so	on.	Aristotle	once	again	is	quick	to	point	out	that	these	proper	objects	do	not	exist	 in	 separation	 from	 the	 sensible	ones.123	Thus	the	analogy	ends		as	follows:	
The mathematical branches of knowledge will not be about perceptible objects just because 
their objects happen to be perceptible, though not <studied> as perceptible; but nor will 
they be about separate objects over and above these.124 [Meta. M.3, 1078a2-5; Annas’ 
trans.] Concluding	 the	 presenation	 of	 these	 analogies,	 we	 may	 say	 that	 via	 them,	Aristotle	 wishes	 to	 highlight	 the	 fact	 that	 mathematics	 have	 close	 ties	 to	 the	natural	world.	And	this	is	only	natural,	for	otherwise	they	wouldn’t	be	applicable	to	the	world.125		However,	despite	these	close	ties,	they	do	not	treat	specifically	with	perceptible	objects,	but	have	some	other	proper	object,	its	existence	has	to	be	 accommodated	 within	 those	 ties.	 It	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 mathematics	 and	physics,	for	example,	deal	with	the	same	objects	but	in	a	different	manner,	as	J.	Annas	repeatedly	claims	in	her	commentary:	‘mathematics	is	distinguished	from	science	 not	 by	 its	 subject-matter	 but	 by	 its	 method’.126	Mathematics	 have	 a	proper	object,	namely	numbers	and	magnitudes;	Aristotle	acknowledges	that	in	the	beginning	of	chapter	M	as	we	have	already	seen:	οἷον ἀριθµοὺς καὶ γραµµὰς 																																																								123	Aristotle’s	discussion	mirrors	the	third	argument	from	the	sciences:		
Further, if medicine is the science not of this health but of health without qualification, there will be 
some health itself. And if geometry is the science not of this equal and of this commensurate but of 
equal without qualification and of commensurate without qualification, there will be some equal 
itself and some commensurate itself. And these things are the ideas. [Alex. in Meta., 79.3-15; Fine’s 
trans.] Aristotle	would	agree,	I	think,	with	the	Platonists	that	medicine	is	not	the	science	of	this	instance	of	 health	 (τῆσδε τῆς ὑγιείας)	 nor	 is	 geometry	 the	 science	 of	 this	 instance	 of	 equality	(τοῦδε τοῦ ἴσου).	Rather,	medicine	 is	 about	 ‘the	healthy’	 and	geometry	 is	 about	 ‘the	 equal’;	 and	these	do	not	exist	without	qualification	as	the	Platonists	assert,	but	in	some	οὐχ ἁπλῶς	sense.		
124 οὐκ εἰ συµβέβηκεν αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ὧν ἐστί, µὴ ἔστι δὲ ᾗ αἰσθητά, οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔσονται αἱ  
µαθηµατικαὶ ἐπιστῆµαι, οὐ µέντοι οὐδὲ παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλων κεχωρισµένων. 125	As	Lear	also	points	out	in	[Lear(1982),	p.81].	126	In	[Annas	(1976),	pp.29	&	148].		
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καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ τούτοις,	1076a18-19.	He	is	not	contesting	that	these	objects	exist	but	the	manner	 in	which	they	exist	(ὥσθ’ ἡ ἀµφισβήτησις ἡµῖν ἔσται οὐ περὶ τοῦ 
εἶναι ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ τρόπου,	1076a36-37).			Aristotle	continues	by	arguing	that	many	things	that	hold	of	sensibles	qua	planes	and	lengths:		
Many properties hold true of things in their own right as being, each of them, of a certain 
type – for instance there are attributes peculiar to animals as being male or as being female 
(yet there is no female or male separate from animals). So there are properties holding true 
of things merely as lengths or as planes.127 [Meta. M.3, 1078a5-9; Annas’ trans.] 	Aristotle appeals	to	πάθη	that	are		ἴδια	to	animals,	not	qua	animals,	but	qua	male	or female:	 the	 male	 animal	 is	 γεννητικόν	 and	 the	 female	 is	 ὑποδεκτικὸν τῶν 
σπερµάτων. 128 	When	 considered	 qua	 male,	 the	 male	 animal	 possesses	 his	
γεννητικόν καθ’ αὑτόν,	since	to	be	γεννητικόν	in	this	way	is	essential	to	his	being	a	male.	But	it	is	not	essential	to	his	being	an	animal	as	such.	We	can	then	establish	an	analogy	with	mathematicals	as	follows:	just	as	there	are	many	things	true	of	animals	qua	being	male	or	female,	so	too	in	the	case	of	geometry	there	are	many	things	true	of	things	qua	lines	or	planes.129		
																																																								
127 πολλὰ δὲ συµβέβηκε καθ’ αὑτὰ τοῖς πράγµασιν ᾗ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχει τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ᾗ θῆλυ τὸ 
ζῷον καὶ ᾗ ἄρρεν, ἴδια πάθη ἔστιν (καίτοι οὐκ ἔστι τι θῆλυ οὐδ’ ἄρρεν κεχωρισµένον τῶν ζῴων)· ὥστε 
καὶ ᾗ µήκη µόνον καὶ ᾗ ἐπίπεδα. 128	The	examples	are	taken	from	ps-Alex.,	737.9-10.	129	This	is	in	line	with	Syrianus’	reading	of	the	passage:	Ἐπειδὴ δὲ περὶ τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ τοῖς µεγέθεσιν 
ὑπάρχοντα πραγµατευοµένης τῆς γεωµετρίας φησὶν ὅτι δύναται, καὶ εἰ µὴ χωριστὰ εἴη τῶν αἰσθητῶν 
τὰ µεγέθη, περὶ τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς ἀχωρίστοις διατρίβειν (καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοις ἀχωρίστοις, φησί, 
καθ’ αὑτά τινα ὑπάρχει· τὸ γὰρ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ἀχώριστα µὲν τῶν ζῴων, ἴδια δέ τινα ἔχει πάθη, οἷον 
τὸ µέν ἐστι γεννητικόν, τὸ δὲ θρεπτικὸν καὶ ὑποδεκτικὸν τῶν σπερµατικῶν λόγων).	 ‘But	 since,	accepting	that	geometry	deals	with	essential	properties	of	magnitudes,	he	says	that	it	is	possible,	even	 if	 the	 magnitudes	 are	 not	 separate	 from	 sensible	 objects,	 for	 it	 to	 focus	 on	 essential	properties	 of	 inseparable	 entities	 (for	 after	 all,	 he	 says,	 things	 pertain	 essentially	 to	 other	inseparable	entities:	 ‘female’	and	‘male’,	 for	instance,	are	inseparable	from	living	things,	but	yet	have	 distinctive	 attributes,	 e.g.	 that	 the	 latter	 is	 generative,	 while	 the	 former	 is	 nutritive	 and	receptive	 of	 seminal	 reason-principles).’	 [Syrianus:	 Comm.	 in	 Meta.	 M-N,	 97.18–24;	 trans.	 by	Dillon	and	O’Meara]	
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The	 previous	 passage	 prompts	 us	 to	 examine	 a	 bit	 closer	 the	 role	 of	 the	 qua	locution	that	dominates	much	of	 the	M.3	discussion.	 J.J.	Cleary	understands	the	use	 of	 the	 qua	 locution	 as	 inextricably	 connected	 with	 a	 logical	 process	 of	abstraction	(or	subtraction)	developed	by	Aristotle	mainly	in	Post.	An.	A.5.130	In	a	difficult	passage,	Aristotle,	as	Barnes	says,	‘offers	a	recipe	for	discovering	to	what	subject	a	given	predicate	belongs	primitively’:131 	
So when do you not know universally, and when do you know simpliciter? Well, clearly 
<you could know simpliciter> if it were the same thing to be a triangle and to be 
equilateral (either for each or for all). But if it is not the same but different, and it belongs 
as triangle, you do not know. Does it belong as triangle or as isosceles? And when does it 
belong in virtue of this as primitive? And of what does the demonstration hold 
universally? Clearly whenever after abstraction it belongs primitively-e.g. two right angles 
will belong to bronze isosceles triangle, but also when being bronze and being isosceles 
have been abstracted. But not when figure or limit have been. But they are not the first. 
Then what is first? If triangle, it is in virtue of this that it also belongs to the others, and it 
is of this that the demonstration holds universally. [Post. An. A.5, 74a32-b4; Barnes’ 
trans.] 	Abstraction	(or	substraction)	is	then	for	Cleary	a	logical	procedure	which	allows	one	 to	 isolate	 the	 primary	 subject	 of	 a	 given	 attribute.	 Cleary	 outlines	 the	procedure	as	follows:		
Finding an answer through subtraction seems to presuppose a certain order in which 
aspects are taken away; e.g. the bronze aspect of the sensible triangle is subtracted before 
the isosceles aspect. After each step in the procedure, one can ask whether the attribute in 
question has been eliminated along with the particular aspect that has been conceptually 
subtracted. Attributes like ‘heavy’ and ‘light’, for instance, disappear along with the 
bronze aspect which is therefore their primary subject. Similarly, the attribute of having 
the sum of its internal angles equal to two right angles is eliminated when one subtracts 
the aspect of triangularity from this sensible figure. [Cleary (1995), p.313]  Similarly,	Lear	understands	 the	 ‘qua’	 locution	as	 indicating	a	predicate-filter	 in	the	 following	manner:	 If,	 for	 example,	b	 is	 a	 bronze	 isosceles	 triangle,	 then	 to																																																									130	For	discussion	see	[Cleary	(1995),	pp.312-318].	131	In	[Barnes(1975),	p.123].	
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consider	b	qua	triangle	is	to	apply	a	predicate	filter	that	filters	out	the	predicates	like	bronze	and	 isosceles	 that	happen	 to	be	 true	of	b,	 but	 are	 irrelevant	 to	 the	purposes	of	the	geometer:132		
Generalizing, one might say that Aristotle is introducing an as-operator, or qua-operator, 
which works as follows. Let b be an Aristotelian substance and let “b qua F” signify that b 
is being considered as an F. Then a property is said to be true of b qua F if and only if b is 
an F and its having that property follows of necessity from its being an F: G(b qua F) 
↔F(b) & (F(x) ⊢ G(x)). Thus to use the qua-operator is to place ourselves behind a veil of 
ignorance: we allow ourselves to know only that b is F and then determine on the basis of 
that knowledge alone what other properties must hold of it. If, for example, b is a bronze 
isosceles triangle–Br(b) & Is(b) & Tr(b) – then to consider b as a triangle–b qua Tr–is to 
apply a predicate filter: it filters out the predicates like Br and Is that happen to be true of 
b, but are irrelevant to our current concern. [Lear (1982), p.168] 	Lear’s	understanding	of	the	qua-operator	is	especially	restrictive.133	The	biscuit	box	in	my	desk	qua	solid	has	the	shape	of	a	cube.	Having	a	cubical	shape	is	not	a	property	that	follows	necessarily	from	my	biscuit	box’s	being	a	solid.	Hence	we	should	perhaps	weaken	Lear’s	 claim;	 as	we	 shall	 see	Aristotle	 tells	 us	 that	 the	geometer	 studies	 the	man	 qua	 solid:	 thus	 it	might	 be	 better	 to	 argue	 that	 the	geometer	studies	whatever	holds	true	for	Socrates	qua	solid.	Yet	another	reason	to	weaken	Lear’s	claim	is	that	it	is	not	always	the	case	that	something	is	precisely	F.	Suppose	that	I	am	treating	my	desk	qua	a	planar	surface;	this	does	not	mean	that	my	desk	 is	 a	planar	 surface.	Further	examples	 can	be	brought	 forward	by	the	applied	mathematical	sciences:	the	astronomer	treats	the	planets	qua	points	for	the	purposes	of	his	enquiry.	This	does	not	mean	that	the	celectial	bodies	are	actually	points.	Compare	Alexander’s	commentary	on	Meta.	B.2,	997b34-998a6:	
For the astronomer assumes lines, the spiral and the circle,which are lengths without 
breadth, and posits that motions occur in accord with these; but among sensible things 
there is no length without breadth. Further, they assume that the stars are certain points, 																																																								132	Lear’s	interpretation	is	more	general	in	that	it	does	not	presuppose	a	certain	order	of	filtered–out	predicates.		133	I	would	like	to	thank	Mr	Denyer	for	pointing	this	out	to	me.	A	similar	complaint	can	be	found	in	[Mendell	(1986),	pp.47-49].	
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and have the status of points in the heaven; but a point is something which has no parts, 
and none of the stars is such a thing.134 [Alexander: Comm. on Aristotle’s Meta. 200.23-
28; Madigan’s trans.] 
  
																																																								
134 γραµµὰς γὰρ λαµβάνει ὁ ἀστρολόγος καὶ τὴν ἕλικα καὶ τὸν κύκλον, ἅ ἐστι µήκη ἀπλατῆ, καὶ ἐπὶ 
τούτων τὰς κινήσεις ὑποτίθεται γίγνεσθαι· οὐδὲν δέ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς µῆκος ἄνευ πλάτους. ἔτι οἱ 
µὲν λαµβάνουσι τὰ ἄστρα σηµεῖά τινα καὶ σηµείων ἐπέχειν λόγον ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, τὸ δὲ σηµεῖόν ἐστιν 
οὗ µέρος οὐδέν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἄστρων τοιοῦτον. 
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[2.5]	The	crucial	M.3	passage	(1078a17-31)	
	 	So if one posits objects separate from what is incidental to them and studies them as such, 
one will not because of this speak falsely, any more than when one draws a line on the 
ground and calls it a foot long when it is not; for the error is not included in the premises. 
The best way to investigate each thing would be this: to separate and posit what is not 
separate, as the arithmetician does and the geometer. For man is, qua man, one and 
indivisible. But the <arithmetician> first posits an indivisible one, and then studies 
whether anything follows, qua indivisible, for man. While the geometer does not <study> 
qua man or qua indivisible but qua solid. For these which would belong to him even if in 
some way he was not indivisible - it is clear that they may also belong to him without 
them <= without the presuppositions ‘man’, ‘indivisible’>. So that, because of this, the 
geometers speak correctly, and they speak about beings, which really are; for being is 
double: 'entelechy'; and 'as matter'.	135 [Meta. M.3, 1078a17-31; Lear/Netz trans.]	
[2.5.1]	Untangling	a	highly	compressed	text		Let	us	examine	the	first	part	of	this	passage:		
So if one posits objects separate from what is incidental to them and studies them as such, 
one will not because of this speak falsely, any more than when one draws a line on the 
ground and calls it a foot long when it is not; for the error is not included in the premises. 
The best way to investigate each thing would be this: to separate and posit what is not 
separate, as the arithmetician does and the geometer. [Meta. M.3, 1078a17-23, Lear’s 
trans.] It	 seems	 that	 in	 this	passage	Aristotle	 is	primarily	concerned	with	 the	way	 the	mathematicians	deal	with	propositions	 that	 are	about	a	 geometrical	 individual.																																																									
135 ὥστ’ εἴ τις θέµενος κεχωρισµένα τῶν συµβεβηκότων σκοπεῖ τι περὶ τούτων ᾗ τοιαῦτα, οὐθὲν διὰ 
τοῦτο ψεῦδος ψεύσεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ὅταν ἐν τῇ γῇ γράφῃ καὶ ποδιαίαν φῇ τὴν µὴ ποδιαίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν 
ταῖς προτάσεσι τὸ ψεῦδος. ἄριστα δ’ ἂν οὕτω θεωρηθείη ἕκαστον, εἴ τις τὸ µὴ κεχωρισµένον θείη 
χωρίσας, ὅπερ ὁ ἀριθµητικὸς ποιεῖ καὶ ὁ γεωµέτρης. ἓν µὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀδιαίρετον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ᾗ 
ἄνθρωπος· ὁ δ’ ἔθετο ἓν ἀδιαίρετον, εἶτ’ ἐθεώρησεν εἴ τι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συµβέβηκεν ᾗ ἀδιαίρετος. ὁ δὲ 
γεωµέτρης οὔθ’ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος οὔθ’ ᾗ ἀδιαίρετος ἀλλ’ ᾗ στερεόν. ἃ γὰρ κἂν εἰ µή που ἦν ἀδιαίρετος 
ὑπῆρχεν αὐτῷ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τούτων ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν <τὸ δυνατόν>, ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο 
ὀρθῶς οἱ γεωµέτραι λέγουσι, καὶ περὶ ὄντων διαλέγονται, καὶ ὄντα ἐστίν· διττὸν γὰρ τὸ ὄν, τὸ µὲν 
ἐντελεχείᾳ τὸ δ’ ὑλικῶς. 
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That	much	can	be	extracted	from	Aristotle’s	examples:	we	have	a	line	considered	as	 one	 foot	 long,	 a	man	 considered	 as	 a	 unit	 for	 counting	 or	 as	 a	 solid	 for	 the	geometer’s	purposes.	Similar	discussion	can	be	found	in	the	following	passages		(two	from	the	Analytics	and	one		from	the	book	N	of	the	Metaphysics):	
One should not think that any absurdity results from setting something out. For we do not 
make use of it insofar as it is a particular thing; instead, it is like the geometer who calls 
this a foot-long line, this a straight line, and says that they are breadthless, though they 
are not, but does not use these things as though he were deducing from  them.136 [Pr. An. 
A.41, 49b33-37, Smith’s trans.]  
Nor does the geometer supposes falsehoods, as some have said, stating that one should not 
use a falsehood but that the geometer speaks falsely when he says that the <line> which is 
not a foot long is a foot long or that the drawn <line> which is not straight is straight. But 
the geometer  does not conclude anything from there being this line which he himself has 
described, but <from> what is made clear through them.137 [Post. An. A.10, 76b39-77a3; 
Barnes’ trans.]  
That is why it used to be said that you have to assume something false, like geometers 
when they assume a line to be a foot long when it is not a foot long. But this cannot be 
right. Geometers do not make any false assumptions (it is not a premise in their 
reasoning).138 [Meta. N.2, 1089a21-25; Annas’ trans.]  Now	what	Aristotle	 seems	 to	have	 in	mind	 is	 something	 taken	 from	 the	actual	practice	 of	 mathematicians,	 namely	 the	 ekthesis	 part	 of	 a	 typical	 geometrical	proof,	 the	 part	 that	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 consideration	 of	 an	 arbitrary	 instance.	Consider,	for	example,	the	first	proposition	of	Euclid’s	Elements	together	with	the																																																									
136 Οὐ δεῖ δ’ οἴεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἐκτίθεσθαί τι συµβαίνειν ἄτοπον· οὐδὲν γὰρ προσχρώµεθα τῷ τόδε τι 
εἶναι, ἀλλ’ὥσπερ ὁ γεωµέτρης τὴν ποδιαίαν καὶ εὐθεῖαν τήνδε καὶ ἀπλατῆ εἶναι λέγει οὐκ οὔσας, ἀλλ’ 
οὐχ οὕτως χρῆται ὡς ἐκ τούτων συλλογιζόµενος. 
137 οὐδ’ ὁ γεωµέτρης ψευδῆ ὑποτίθεται, ὥσπερ τινὲς ἔφασαν, λέγοντες ὡς οὐ δεῖ τῷ ψεύδει χρῆσθαι, 
τὸν δὲ γεωµέτρην ψεύδεσθαι λέγοντα ποδιαίαν τὴν οὐ ποδιαίαν ἢ εὐθεῖαν τὴν γεγραµµένην οὐκ 
εὐθεῖαν οὖσαν. ὁ δὲ γεωµέτρης οὐδὲν συµπεραίνεται τῷ τήνδε εἶναι γραµµὴν ἣν αὐτὸς ἔφθεγκται, 
ἀλλὰ τὰ διὰ τούτων δηλούµενα. 
138 διὸ καὶ ἐλέγετο ὅτι δεῖ ψεῦδός τι ὑποθέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ γεωµέτραι τὸ ποδιαίαν εἶναι τὴν µὴ 
ποδιαίαν· ἀδύνατον δὲ ταῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχειν, οὔτε γὰρ οἱ γεωµέτραι ψεῦδος οὐθὲν ὑποτίθενται (οὐ γὰρ ἐν 
τῷ συλλογισµῷ ἡ πρότασις). 
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customary	Greek	divisions	of	a	proposition	as	provided	by	Ian	Mueller:	
protasis: On a given finite straight line to construct an equilateral triangle. ekthesis: Let 
AB be the given finite straight line. diorismos: Thus it is required to construct an 
equilateral triangle on the straight line AB. kataskeue: With center A and distance AB let 
the circle BCD be described; again, with center B and distance BA let the circle ACE be 
described; and from the point C, in which the circles cut one another, to the points A, B let 
the straight lines CA, CB have been joined. apodeixis:  Now, since the point A is the center 
of the circle CDB, AC is equal to AB. Again, since the point B is the center of the circle 
CAE, BC is equal to BA. But CA was also proved equal to AB; therefore each of the 
straight lines CA, CB is equal to AB. And things which are equal to the same thing are also 
equal to one another; therefore CA is also equal to CB. Therefore the three straight lines 
CA, AB, BC are equal to one another. sumperasma: Therefore the triangle ABC is 
equilateral; and it has been constructed on the given finite straight line AB. Which was 
required to be done.139 [Mueller (1981), p.11] In	the	above	example,	the	ekthesis	part	is	when	Euclid	tells	us	‘let	AB	be	the	given	finite	 straight	 line’.	 Furthermore,	 a	 figure	 is	 normally	 assumed	 to	 be	 drawn	 in	connection	 with	 the	 Euclidean	 ekthesis.140	Now	 one	 can	 easily	 see	 that	 the	individual	 letters	 pick	 out	 geometrical	 points	 and	 that	 pairs	 of	 letters	 pick	 out	the	 lines	 bounded	 by	 the	 two	 points	 which	 the	 letters	 pick	 out.	 So	 in	 the																																																									139	Ἐπὶ τῆς δοθείσης εὐθείας πεπερασµένης τρίγωνον ἰσόπλευρον συστήσασθαι. Ἔστω ἡ δοθεῖσα 
εὐθεῖα πεπερασµένη ἡ ΑΒ. Δεῖ δὴ ἐπὶ τῆς ΑΒ εὐθείας τρίγωνον ἰσόπλευρον συστήσασθαι. Κέντρῳ µὲν 
τῷ Α διαστήµατι δὲ τῷ ΑΒ κύκλος γεγράφθω ὁ ΒΓΔ, καὶ πάλιν κέντρῳ µὲν τῷ Β διαστήµατι δὲ τῷ ΒΑ 
κύκλος γεγράφθω ὁ ΑΓΕ, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Γ σηµείου, καθ’ ὃ τέµνουσιν ἀλλήλους οἱ κύκλοι, ἐπὶ τὰ Α, 
Β σηµεῖα ἐπεζεύχθωσαν εὐθεῖαι αἱ ΓΑ, ΓΒ. Καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ Α σηµεῖον κέντρον ἐστὶ τοῦ ΓΔΒ κύκλου, ἴση 
ἐστὶν ἡ ΑΓ τῇ ΑΒ· πάλιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ Β σηµεῖον κέντρον ἐστὶ τοῦ ΓΑΕ κύκλου, ἴση ἐστὶν ἡ ΒΓ τῇ ΒΑ. 
ἐδείχθη δὲ καὶ ἡ ΓΑ τῇ ΑΒ ἴση· ἑκατέρα ἄρα τῶν ΓΑ, ΓΒ τῇ ΑΒ ἐστὶν ἴση. τὰ δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα καὶ 
ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἴσα· καὶ ἡ ΓΑ ἄρα τῇ ΓΒ ἐστὶν ἴση· αἱ τρεῖς ἄρα αἱ ΓΑ, ΑΒ, ΒΓ ἴσαι ἀλλήλαις εἰσίν. 
Ἰσόπλευρον ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ΑΒΓ τρίγωνον, καὶ συνέσταται ἐπὶ τῆς δοθείσης εὐθείας πεπερασµένης τῆς 
ΑΒ. [Ἐπὶ τῆς δοθείσης ἄρα εὐθείας πεπερασµένης τρίγωνον ἰσόπλευρον συνέσταται]· ὅπερ ἔδει 
ποιῆσαι.	140	Hintikka	makes	a	connection	between	ekthesis	and	the	modern	principle	of	instantiation:	‘The	prominent	 role	of	ekthesis	 in	 the	geometrical	proofs	of	ancient	mathematicians	may	 indeed	be	considered	as	an	acknowledgement	of	the	importance	of	instantiation	for	the	kind	of	logic	that	is	needed	 in	 elementary	 geometry	 –	which	 is	mainly	 first-order	 logic	 (quantification	 theory).’	 	 In	[Hintikka(2004),	p.147].	
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Euclidean	proof,	 ‘AB’	designates	an	individual	line.	But	then	one	may	ask	which	line	does	it	designate?	One	option	is	that	‘AB’	picks	out	the	line	in	the	geometer’s	diagram.	But	 there	are	 certain	 reasons	not	 to	 think	 so;	 apart	 from	 the	obvious	one	 that	 pertains	 to	 the	 imprecision	 problem	 that	 tantalises	 the	 perceptibles	there	 are	 also	 other	 reasons	 that	 have	 to	 do	with	 the	 role	 of	 the	 diagrams	 in	Greek	mathematical	thought.	As	Netz	in	his	groundbreaking	book	The	Shaping	of	
Deduction	 in	 Greek	 Mathematics:	 a	 Study	 in	 Cognitive	 History	 argues,	 Greek	diagrams	were	schematic	and	non-representational.141	Yet	another	option	is	for	‘AB’	 to	pick	out	a	Platonic	 ideal	 line.	 It	 seems	 that	Aristotle	 in	 the	M.3	passage	
concedes	that	the	mathematician	may	have	to	resort	to	separate	mathematicals,	merely	 for	 heuristic	 purposes	 however.	 Aristotle	 claims	 that	 ‘the	 best	 way	 to	investigate	each	thing	would	be	this:	to	separate	and	posit	what	is	not	separate’	(ἄριστα δ’ ἂν οὕτω θεωρηθείη ἕκαστον, εἴ τις τὸ µὴ κεχωρισµένον θείη χωρίσας).	What	 does	 he	mean?	 Perhaps	 something	 along	 these	 lines:	 it	 is	 indeed	mostly	
convenient	 to	 postulate	 mathematicals	 as	 separately	 existing	 entities–even	though	 in	 reality	 they	 are	 not	 separate	 (thus	 the	 ἄριστα	 here	 seems	 to	 be	 a	heuristic	 'best').	 Let	us	 try	 to	elucidate	 the	 sense	of	 separation	 in	 this	passage.	One	 possible	 interpretation	 is	 to	 take	 ‘separation’	 	 to	 mean	 ‘separation	 in	definition’.	 However,	 I	 do	 not	 think	 this	 is	 a	 plausible	 claim	 for	 this	 passage;	there	is	no	attempt	here	to	formulate	a	definition	for	mathematical	objects	nor	is	there	any	discussion	about	priority	in	definition.	Rather,	as	E.	Hussey	points	out,		
It seems that the threefold repetition of forms of the verb tithenai in the sense of 'posit' 
seems to show sufficiently (at least for a working hypothesis) that what happens in 
separation is this: one assumes the separated existence of something that does not in fact 
exist in separation. The account of 1078al7-28 shows that the arithmetician's separation 
consists of assuming the existence in separation of, for example, an indivisible unit which 
is not a man or any other sensible substance but a unit.’ [Hussey (2011), pp.116-117]  Accordingly,	 	 the	 geometer’s	 separation	 consists	 in	 assuming	 the	 existence	 in	separation	 of	 a	 solid.	 Since	 separation	 in	 definition	 seems	 irrelevant	 in	 this	context,	most	commentators	understand	that	this	separation	involves	a	fiction:	
1) <Separation>  purports to create or reveal a new type of object, the 'separated 																																																								141See	[Netz	(2003),	esp.	pp.54-57].	
		
84	
mathematical object', but this is in fact a fiction. [Hussey(2011), p.117] 
2) For Aristotle, abstraction amounts to no more than the separation of one predicate that 
belongs to an object and the postulation of an object that satisfies this predicate alone. 
[Lear (1982), p.186] The	 similarities	 between	 Hussey’s	 analysis	 of	 separation	 and	 Lear’s	 one	terminate	here,	however.	Hussey	is	quick	to	adopt	a	more	radical	approach	in	his	interpretation.	 According	 to	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	 M.3	 discussion,	 mathematical	objects	 for	 Aristotle	 are	 special	 sort	 of	 objects	 (what	 he	 calls	 ‘representative	objects’)	 which	 are	 distinct	 from	 any	 particular	 object;	 in	 advancing	 his	interpretation,	Hussey	 draws	 inspiration	 from	Kit	 Fine’s	arbitrary	objects.	 Fine	provides	the	following	characterisation	of	arbitrary	objects:			
In addition to individual objects, there are arbitrary objects: in addition to individual 
numbers, arbitrary number; in addition to individual men, arbitrary men. With each 
arbitrary object is asscociated an appropriate range of individual objects, its values: with 
each arbitrary number, the range of individual numbers; with each arbitrary man, the range 
of individual men. An arbitrary object has those properties common to the individual 
objects in its range. So an arbitrary number is odd or even, an arbitrary man is mortal, 
since each individual number is odd or even, each individual man is mortal. On the other 
hand, an arbitrary number fails to be prime, an arbitrary man fails to be a philosopher, 
since some individual number is not prime, some individual man is not a philosopher.142 
[Fine (1985), p.5] 																																																								142	In	 this	 Kit	 Fine	 draws	 inspiration	 from	 Locke	 and	 other	 older	 theories.	 Cellucci	 offers	 the	following	helpful	synopsis	of	Locke’s	theory:	
According to Locke, Euclid’s proofs of Proposition I.32 is carried out not on an individual triangle 
but on the ‘general triangle’, that is, “the general Idea of a Triangle”, which “must be neither 
Oblique, nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon; but all and none of these at 
once” [Locke (1975), p.596]. Once established that, in the general triangle, the three interior angles 
of the triangle are equal to two right angles, one may conclude that this holds for any triangle, since 
the properties of the general triangle are common to all triangles, so “he that hath got the” general 
“Idea of a Triangle” is “certain that its three Angles are equal to two right ones” (ibid., p. 651). 
General Ideas are obtained from particular objects “leaving out but those particulars wherein they 
differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree” (ibid., p. 412). This “is called Abstraction, 
whereby Ideas taken from particular Beings, become general Representatives of all of the same 
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	Thus,	for	example,	when	we	stipulate	that	AB	be	an	arbitrary	triangle,	we	fix	the	reference	of	 ‘AB’	 to	an	arbitrary	triangle,	which	is	an	entity	distinct	from	any	of	the	familiar	particular	triangles.	Hussey,	then,	proceeds	to	advance	the	following	interpretation	of	Aristotle’s	philosophy	of	mathematics:	mathematical	objects	for	Aristotle	 are	 unseparated	 arbitrary	 objects,	 in	 the	 sense	 outlined	 in	 the	 above	passage.143	The	geometer	proceeds	to	separate	such	objects	in	thought	in	order	to	facilitate	his	proofs.	Is	this	really	a	viable	interpretation?	Apart	from	the	lack	of	 textual	 evidence–something	 that	 Hussey	 himself	 acknowledges,144		 there	 is	also	 the	 fact	 that	 those	 objects	 are	 susceptible	 to	 serious	 logical	 objections:145	For	example,	 take	a	representative	number.	Then	 it	 is	odd	or	even,	since	every	individual	 number	 is	 odd	 or	 even.	 But	 it	 is	 not	 odd,	 since	 some	 individual	number	is	not	odd;	and	it	is	not	even,	since	some	individual	number	is	not	even.	Therefore,	a	representative	number	has	inconsistent	properties:	it	is	both	odd	or	even	 and	 neither	 odd	 nor	 even.146	Or	 take	 a	 representative	 triangle.	 Then	 it	 is	isosceles	or	not	isosceles.	But	it	 isn’t	 isosceles,	since	some	individual	triangle	is	not	isosceles;	and	it	isn’t	not-isosceles,	since	some	individual	triangle	is	isosceles.	 Therefore	it	is	isosceles	or	not-isosceles,	and	neither	isosceles	nor	not-isosceles.	Several	 other	 problems	 (besides	 the	 actual	 textual	 evidence)	 remain.	 As	 Fine	points	out,	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	think	that	arbitrary	objects	are	on	par	with	particulars,	for	then	‘one	can	say	the	same	sort	of	things	about	each.	So	one	is	led	to	the	absurd	conlusion	that	one	might	count	with	arbitrary	objects	or	have	tea	with	 an	arbitrary	man’.147	Consider	 an	arbitrary	natural	number.	The	arbitrary	number	 is	 not	 an	 individual	 number	 although	 it	 should	 be	 by	 definition	 given																																																																																																																																																															
kind” (ibid., p. 159). In [Cellucci (2009), p.4]. 
For	a	brief	overview	of	similar	theories	consult		[Santambrogio(1988),	pp.630-631].	143	‘…unseparated	representative	 objects,	which	 according	 to	 this	 interpretation	 are	 the	proper	objects	of	mathematics…’	in	[Hussey(2011),	p.128].		144	‘Neither	 here	 <i.e.	 in	 M.3>	 nor	 elsewhere	 does	 Aristotle	 state	 expressly	 that	 he	 takes	mathematical	objects	to	be	representative	objects.’	In	[Hussey(2011),	p.120].	145	Something	that	Hussey	also	acknowledges;	ibid.,	p.119.	146	This	is	an	objection	that	goes	back	to	Berkeley	as	Kit	Fine	himself	acknowledges.	In	[Fine	(1985),	p.9].	147	In	[Fine(1985),	p.8].	
		
86	
that	 all	 numbers	 share	 the	 property	 of	 ‘being	 an	 individual	 number’.148	Fine	solves	this	problem	by	distinguishing	between	generic	properties	(such	as	‘being	odd’	or	 ‘being	even’)	and	classical	 ones	 (such	as	 ‘being	an	 individual	number’).	‘Being	 an	 individual	 number’	 is	 thus	 not	 attributed	 to	 an	 arbitrary	 number,	because	 it	 is	 not	 a	 generic	 property.	 Could	 such	 an	 ad–hoc	 distinction	 be	attributed	to	Aristotle?	Hussey,	boldly	claims	yes.	He	also	seems	to	understand	that	 arbitrary	 (or	 ‘representative’,	 in	 his	 terminology)	 objects	 are	 on	par	 with	ordinary	particulars:		
Every actual triad is a triad of distinct actual individuals. And, again, that property seems 
to be essential to its being a triad. So then also must the representative triad be a triad of 
distinct 'representative' individuals, which are its 'matter'. [Hussey(2011), p.130] It	 seems	 then	 that	 the	property	 ‘consists	of	distinct	 individuals’	 is	according	 to	Hussey	 a	 generic	 property	 and	 thus	 it	 is	 properly	 attributed	 to	 the	 arbitrary	triad.	Consider	now	a	triangle.	In	every	triangle	the	sum	of	its	interior	angles	is	180o.	This	 is	an	essential	property	of	 triangles.	 If	we	 follow	Hussey’s	reasoning	then	 one	 should	 claim	 that	 the	 arbitrary	 triangle	 must	 have	 some	 arbitrary	interior	angles	whose	sum	is	180o.	But,	as	John	Macnamara	objects,	‘what	would	ground	the	belief	that	the	sum	of	the	three	arbitrary	angles	is	180?’149				Hussey’s	primary	reason	for	the	postulation	of	arbitrary	objects	is	the	same	one	Fine	 uses	 to	 develop	 his	 theory	 of	 arbitrary	 objects;	 namely	 that	 stipulations	such	as	‘let	ABC	be	a	triangle’,	or	‘let	n	be	a	number’	and	so	on,	are	involved	in	the	application	of	the	rule	of	universal	generalisation.	As	Fine	says,	‘we	may	establish	that	 all	 objects	 of	 a	 certain	 kind	 have	 a	 given	 property	 by	 showing	 that	 an	arbitrary	 object	 of	 that	 kind	 has	 that	 property.’150	Consider	 Euclid’s	 proof	 of	Proposition	I.32:	In	any	triangle,	the	interior	angles	are	equal	to	two	right	angles.	The	‘ektheis’	part	is	the	following:	Let	ABC	be	a	triangle.	Then	Euclid	proceeds	to	show	that	the	 interior	angles	of	ABC	are	equal	 to	two	right	angles.	He	can	then	conclude	that,	since	ABC	 is	an	arbitrary	triangle,	all	triangles	have	their	interior	
																																																								148	op.	cit.,	p.12.	149	In	[Macnamara(1988),	p.305].	150	See	[Fine(1985),	p.1].	See	also	[Hussey(2011),	pp.126-127].	
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angles	equal	to	two	right	angles.	There	is	however	the	following	problem	related	to	 this	rule,	 the	so-called	 ‘problem	of	universal	generalisation.	Celluci	offers	 the	following	formulation	of	the	problem:		‘Generally,	what	entitles	one	to	conclude	that	 a	 property,	 established	 for	 an	 individual	 object,	 holds	 for	 any	 individual	object	of	the	same	kind?’151	Burnyeat	explains	the	situation	for	Greek	logic:		
Greek logic does not command an explicit formulation of the rule of universal 
generalisation: from ‘fa’, where ‘a’ denotes any arbitrarily selected individual, infer 
‘(x)fx’. We may say that Euclid is relying implicitly on the rule when, after proving that 
Pythagoras’ theorem is true of the triangle ABC, he infers that it is a general truth. But this, 
with its caveat ‘implicitly’, does little more than record our conviction, in our own terms, 
that the inference is valid. Euclid simply does not tell us what he thinks it is about the 
triangle ABC which entitles the mathematician to his general conclusion. [Burnyeat 
(1987), pp.230-231] Burnyeat	invites	us	to	consider	the	following	passage	from	Proclus	in	which	he	seemingly	describes	such	rule	of	universal	generalisation: 
Furthermore, mathematicians are accustomed to draw what is in a way a double 
conclusion. For when they have shown something to be true of the given figure, they infer 
that it is true in general, going from the particular to the universal conclusion. Because 
they do not make use of the particular qualities of the subjects but draw the angle or the 
straight line in order to place what is given before our eyes, they consider that what they 
infer about the given angle or straight line can be identically asserted for every similar 
case. They pass therefore to the universal conclusion in order that we may not suppose that 
the result is confined to the particular instance. This procedure is justified, since for the 
demonstration they use the objects set out in the diagram not as these particular figures, 
but as figures resembling others of the same sort. It is not as having such-and-such a size 
that the angle before me is bisected, but as being rectilinear and nothing more. Its 
particular size is a character of the given angle, but its having rectilinear sides is a 
common feature of all rectilinear angles. Suppose the given angle is a right angle. If I used 
its rightness for my demonstration, I should not be able to infer anything about the whole 
class of rectilinear angles; but if I make no use of its rightness and consider only its 
rectilinear character, the proposition will apply equally to all angles with rectilinear sides. 
[In Euc. Elem. I 207.4–25; trans. Morrow]  																																																								151In	[Cellucci(2009),	p.4].	
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The	 terms	 ‘set	 out’	 in	 this	 passage	 are	 individual	 geometrical	 objects.152	How	could	 this	passage	make	 sense	 in	 conjuction	with	what	Aristotle	 tells	us	 about	the	need	for	separate	mathematicals	in	mathematical	practice?	Lear	tells	us	that	the	fiction	of	separate	mathematicals	allows	us	to	attain	generality:		
The postulation of separated geometrical objects enables us to attain knowledge that is 
more general. And it is through this general knowledge that one can discover the 
explanation (aitia) of why something is the case. For by abstracting one can see that the 
full explanation of a triangle’s having the 2R property is that it is a triangle and not, say, 
that it is bronze or isosceles (cf. Post. An. A.5). In a limited sense, though, the abstract 
proof is unnecessary. For of any particular physical triangle d we can prove that it has 
interior angles equal to two right angles without first proving this <for a separate triangle> 
c: we could prove that d has the property directly. The proof that a physical object 
possesses a geometrical property via a proof that a pure geometrical object possesses that 
property is a useful but unnecessary, detour. However, if we want to know why the object 
possesses the property, the abstract proof is of crucial importance. [Lear (1982), pp.174-
175; underlining mine]  
The reason that the ‘crossing’ is valuable though is that one thereby proves a general 
theorem applicable to all triangles rather than simply proving that a certain property holds 
of a particular triangle. [Lear(1982), pp.187-188; underlining mine] It	seems	then	that	Hussey’s	view	is	not	supported	by	the	available	evidence	on	the	problem	of	universal	generalisation.	But	let	us	return	to	the	discussion	of	the	M.3	 passage.	 One	 the	 one	 hand,	 Aristotle	 says,	 a	 man	 qua	 man	 is	 one	 and	indivisible.	But	the	arithmetician	first	posits	an	indivisible	one,	and	then	studies	whether	 anything	 follows,	 qua	 indivisible,	 for	man.	What	 does	 this	mean?	 The	arithmetician	 simply	posits	 an	 indivisible	unit	 (or	better,	 indivisible	units)	 and	he	 examines	 the	 attributes	 of	 those	 units	 (say,	 being	 an	 odd	 number	 of	 units)	which	are	the	same	as	the	attributes	of	men,	say,	qua	indivisible	units.	Aristotle	is	being	more	explicit	with	the	geometrical	example:	
For these which would belong to him even if in some way he was not indivisible - it is 
clear that they <=divisibility properties> may also belong to him without them <= without 
the presuppositions ‘man’, ‘indivisible’>. [Meta. M.3, 1078a26-28; Netz trans.] 																																																								152	See	[Barnes	(2007),	p.349].	
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Aristotle	 tries	 to	 express	 himself	 via	 a	 counterfactual	 conditional.	 The	 most	detailed	exposition	of	Aristotle’s	complex	argument	is	provided	by	Netz:	
1)We are given man as it is: indivisible. 2) We envisage another, counterfactual, not-
indivisible-man.  3) We derive a set of ‘a (counterfactually) not-indivisible-man’s 
properties’.  4) We assume that this set is a subset of ‘actual man properties’. (This is valid 
on these assumptions: that counterfactually not-indivisible-man differs from actual man by 
the lack of a defining property,  and that sets of properties are a direct, monotonic 
projection from sets of defining properties: add defining properties and you add some 
extra, derived properties, remove defining properties and you remove some extra, derived 
properties.)  5) We now go back to actual man. We know that we have a subset of his 
properties, discovered through the counterfactual route: we may simply attach to him this 
subset, and equate this with the subset of properties which belong to man qua not 
indivisible. [Netz (2006), p.34; his italics]  
Netz	concludes:		
In other words: there is no distinction between (i) studying a counterfactual divisible man, 
and (ii) studying man as he actually is, but without the assumption of divisibility. The two 
routes converge: there is no duty on counterfactuality. [Netz(2006), p.29]  Netz	in	a	way	expands	on	Lear’s	analysis:	Consider	a	spherical	body;	it	is	always	enmattered.	Aristotle	argues	that	whatever	holds	true	of	the	counterfactual,	non-enamattered	 sphere,	 the	 same	 holds	 true	 of	 the	 sphere	 qua	 not	 being	enmattered.	 Let	 us	 recap	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 M.3	 passage:	 Aristotle	acknowledges	 that	 in	a	geometrical	proof	we	 find	ourselves	uttering	sentences	that	seem	to	be	committed	to	separate	mathematicals;	sentences	that	could	not	be	 true	 unless	 separate	 mathematicals	 existed.	 But	 Aristotle	 does	 not	 believe	that	mathematical	proofs	are	really	about	entities	that	enjoy	separate	existence	from	 the	 sensibles.	 Aristotle	 presumably	 thinks	 that	 those	 sentences	 are	advanced	 in	 a	 fictional	 spirit.	We	make	as	 if	 there	 are	 separate	mathematicals	that	satisfy	 those	sentences	so	as	 to	draw	some	useful	results.	The	geometrical	propositions	are	really	about	actual/potential	mathematicals,	mathematicals	that	do	not	enjoy	separate	existence	from	the	sensibles.	Netz	encapsulates	brilliantly	the	above	points:			
There seem to be, for him, three kinds of objects in a mathematical proof: 1. The token 
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sign (A line in the diagram). 2. The token signified (A Platonic, ideal line). 3. The type of 
things for which the conclusion holds true. . . . neither of the tokens 1 and 2 belong to the 
type 3. The token sign does not belong to the type of things for which the conclusion 
holds, and this can be proved, I think, on the basis of a reconstruction of the nature of 
Greek diagrams, which were schematic and non-representational. As for the ideal Platonic 
object, we just saw that this is not one of the things of which the conclusion holds, for the 
reason that it does not exist and is merely a virtual object set up as a heuristic tool. 
[Netz(2006), pp.25-26] 	
[2.5.2]	The	metaphysical	priority	of	bodies			Aristotle’s	 argument	against	mathematical	objects	 in	 the	 sensibles	need	not	be	understood	 as	 an	 argument	 against	 the	 potential	 existence	 of	 mathematical	objects	within	sensible	ones.	Let	us	consider	again	the	following	crucial	passage	of	the	M.3:	
While the geometer does not <study> qua man or qua indivisible but qua <solid>. For 
these which would belong to him even if in some way he was not indivisible - it is clear 
that they may also belong to him without them <= without the presuppositions ‘man’, 
‘indivisible’>. So that, because of this, the geometers speak correctly, and they speak 
about beings, which really are; for being is double: 'entelechy'; and 'as matter'. [Meta. M.3, 
1078a25-31; Netz’ trans.] In	the	geometrical	case,	I	can	examine	Plato	only	in	virtue	of	being	solid.	For	this	is	a	property	that	he	actually	holds	(1078a25-26).	But	consider	what	can	follow	from	this	examination:	Plato	qua	solid	 is	divisible	 into	two	parts.	But	then,	 it	 is	not	clear	that	Plato	qua	solid	is	the	subject	matter	of	geometry	(for	it	 is	true	of	him	 that	 he	 is	 a	 solid	 and	 	 divisibility	 is	 an	 essential	 property	 of	 solids)	 or	 of	arithmetic	(since	one	might	say	that	what	follows	from	his	being	solid	is	that	he	is	 divisible	 into	 two	half-parts,	 or	 into	 three	 third-parts,	 etc.).	 But	 I	 do	 believe	this	is	precisely	the	point	Aristotle	wishes	to	make.	In	some	sense,	the	continuity	of	 the	 solid,	 grounds	 the	 potential	 existence	 both	 of	 other	 geometricals	 and	 of	numbers.		It	 is	 not	 bizarre	 to	 suggest	 that	Aristotle	 is	 laying	 in	M.3	 the	 foundations	 for	 a	geometry	of	 solids,	of	 three-dimensional	bodies.	The	discussion	of	 the	 relevant	
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M.2	 passages	 earlier	 in	 this	 essay	 revealed	 that	 Aristotle	 considers	 bodies	 to	have	much	greater	metaphysical	priority	when	compared	to	lower-dimensional	entities	 such	 as	 surfaces	 and	 points.	 In	 this	 section	we	will	 examine	 a	 certain	passage	from	the	first	chapter	of	the	first	book	of	De	Caelo	that	contains	a	rather	detailed	analysis	of	the	notion	of	body.	The	focal	point	for	our	analysis	will	be	a	very	helpful	paper	entitled	‘The	Perfection	of	Bodies:	Aristotle’s	De	Caelo	I.1’	by	Gábor	 Betegh,	 Francesca	 Pedriali,	 and	 Christian	 Pfeiffer	 (henceforth	 Betegh	 et	al.).	 In	 this	 article,	 the	 authors	 argue,	 Aristotle	 demonstrates	 ‘that	 bodies	 are	complete	and	perfect	in	virtue	of	being	extended	in	three	dimensions’.153	For	the	purposes	 of	 my	 inquiry	 I	 will	 follow	 closely	 the	 authors’	 argument	 as	 well	 as	their	 division	 of	 the	 chapter.	 In	 the	 first	 few	 lines	 of	 the	 chapter	 (268a1–6)	Aristotle	tells	us	that	the	subject	matter	of	physical	science	includes	bodies,	their	attributes	and	their	principles	(cf.	Physics	B.2,	193b22-194a15).	In	the	next	part	of	 the	chapter	 (268a6–268b5)	Aristotle	proceeds	 to	discuss	 the	notion	of	body	(focusing	specifically	on	the	perfection	or	completeness	of	bodies).154	The	most	relevant	 bit	 for	 my	 purposes	 is	 the	 following,	 where	 Aristotle	 gives	 us	 a	definition	of	body: 	
Hence continuous is that which is divisible into ever divisible parts, body is that which is 
divisible in every way. Of magnitude, that which is extended in one dimension is a line, 
that which is extended in two is a surface and that which is extended in three dimensions is 
a body. There is no other magnitude beyond these, since the three is all and the thrice is in 
every way.155  [De Caelo I.1, 268a6–10; trans. by Betegh et al.]  Aristotle’s	 definition	 of	 ‘body’	 is	 based	 on	 the	 notions	 of	 continuity	 and	divisibility.156	More	specifically,	Aristotle	first	defines	the	continuous	(συνεχές)	in	terms	 of	 which	 body	 and	 the	 other	 lower-dimensional	 magnitudes	 will	 be	defined;	 the	 continuous	 is	 that	 which	 is	 divisible	 into	 ever	 divisible	 parts	(συνεχὲς µὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά);	 the	 line	 is	 that	 which	 is																																																									153	In	[Betegh	et	al.	(2013),	p.30]. 154	See	[Betegh	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	pp.31-32].	
155 Συνεχὲς µὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά, σῶµα δὲ τὸ πάντῃ διαιρετόν. Μεγέθους δὲ τὸ 
µὲν ἐφ’ ἓν γραµµή, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ δύο ἐπίπεδον, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ τρία σῶµα· καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο 
µέγεθος διὰ τὸ τὰ τρία πάντα εἶναι καὶ τὸ τρὶς πάντῃ. 156	In	[Betegh	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	pp.38].	
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continuous	 in	 one	 dimension,	 a	 plane	 that	 which	 is	 continuous	 in	 two	dimensions,	 a	 body	 that	 which	 is	 continuous	 in	 all	 (three)	 dimensions.157	The	passage	 concludes	 with	 the	 enigmatic	 claim	 that	 there	 is	 no	 other	 magnitude	beyond	these	because	‘the	three	is	all	and	the	thrice	is	in	every	way’	(τὸ τὰ τρία 
πάντα εἶναι καὶ τὸ τρὶς πάντῃ).	 According	 to	 Betegh	 et	 al.,	 Aristotle’s	 elliptic	remark	 ought	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 ‘being	 extended	 in	 three	 dimensions	 and	being	 divisible	 in	 three	 ways	 is	 being	 extended	 in	 all	 dimensions	 and	 being	divisible	in	all	ways’.158 To	justify	their	claim,	the	authors	point	to	lines	268a10-20	where	 Aristotle	makes	 a	 connection	 between	 ‘three’	 and	 ‘all’	 by	 employing	peculiar	means;	as	 the	authors	note,	 ‘Aristotle	apparently	cannot	do	better	but	appeal	to	an	alleged	Pythagorean	doctrine,	to	a	set	of	cult	practices,	and	to	Greek	linguistic	 usage.’159	What	 is	 of	 crucial	 importance	 for	my	 interpretation	 is	 that	after	this	connection	has	been	established	Aristotle	invokes,	as	the	authors	point	out,	a	hierarchy	among	the	types	of	magnitude,	with	‘body’	being	on	top:	it	is	the	only	type	of	magnitude	which	can	be	considered	 ‘perfect’.	We	will	come	to	this	passage	after	an	examination	of	Aristotle’s	term	τέλειον .	The	 entry	 for	 the	 term τέλειον	 in	 Aristotle’s	 philosophical	 lexicon	 is	 the	following: 
We call complete: 1) in one sense, that outside which not even one part is to be found, as 
for instance the complete time of each thing is that outside which there is not time to be 
found which is part of that time. 2) Also, that which in respect of excellence and goodness 																																																								157	Betegh	 et	 al.	 note	 that	 certain	 commentators	 (the	 authors	 mention	 Wildberg	 (1988)	 as	 a	prominent	 example)	 have	 expressed	 their	 sheer	 puzzlement	 over	 Aristotle’s	 focus	 on	mathematical	characteristics	of	bodies	such	as	three-dimensionality	and	divisibility.	According	to	those	 commentators,	 Aristotle	 somehow	vacillates	 between	 a	 conception	 of	 bodies	 as	 physical	entities	 and	 a	 mere	 mathematical	 one	 (physical	 bodies/geometrical	 solids	 ?).	 Betegh	 et	 al.,	correctly–in	my	opinion–resist	such	interpretations:	they	point	out	that	Aristotle	is	not	switching	from	 physical	 project	 to	 a	 mathematical	 one	 but	 that	 he	 is	 merely	 highlighting	 certain	characteristics	 of	 perceptible	magnitudes	 that	 both	 the	 physicist	 and	 the	mathematician	 study	(continuity	 in	 three-dimensions,	 divisibility).	 See	 [Betegh	 et	 al.	 (2013),	 pp.	 35-36]	 for	 a	discussion.		158	In	[Betegh	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.37].	159	See	[Betegh	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.39	and	pp.39-44]	for	an	extensive	discussion.	
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cannot be surpassed relative to its genus, as for instance a doctor is complete and a flautist 
is complete when they are without deficiency in respect of the form of their own proper 
excellence. It is in this way that, transferring it to the case of bad things, we speak of a 
complete slanderer and a complete thief–as indeed we even call them good: a good thief 
and a good slanderer. And excellence is a kind of completion, for each thing is complete 
and every substance is complete when in respect of the form of its own proper excellence 
no portion of its natural magnitude is deficient. 3) Again, things which have reached their 
fulfillment, when it is worth while, are called complete, for they are complete by virtue of 
having attained their fulfillment; so that, since a fulfillment is something ultimate, we also 
say, transferring it to the case of worthless things, that a thing has been completely spoilt 
and completely destroyed when there is no deficiency in its destruction and badness but it 
has reached the ultimate. (That is why even life’s end is metaphorically called a 
fulfillment, because both are ultimate. A <thing’s> fulfillment, i.e. what is it for, is 
ultimate.) [Meta. Δ.16, 1021b12-30; Kirwan’s trans. mod.] Aristotle	 says,	 first,	 that	 in	 one	 sense	 a	 thing	 is	 said	 to	 be	 complete	 outside	 of	which	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 find	any	of	 its	parts.	For	example,	 a	period	of	 time	 (a	day,	say)	is	said	to	be	complete	when	none	of	its	parts	can	be	found	outside	of	it.	As	Betegh	et	al.	note,	their	translation	of	τέλειον	as	‘complete’	corresponds	to	the	first	 sense	 of	 	 the	 term	 in	Metaphysics	 Δ.16:	 ‘insofar	 as	 body	 is	 divisible	 and	extended	 in	 all	 the	 dimensions	 in	 which	 a	 magnitude	 can	 be	 extended	 and	divided,	body	is	a	complete	magnitude.’160	There	is	also	a	second	sense	of	τέλειον,	with	an	axiological	undertone.	According	to	this	second	sense,	perfect	is	said	that	‘which	which	in	respect	of	excellence	and	goodness	cannot	be	surpassed	relative	to	 its	 genus’	 (καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ εὖ µὴ ἔχον ὑπερβολὴν πρὸς τὸ γένος,	1021b14-15).	Thus	a	man	is	said	to	be	a	perfect	doctor	or	a	perfect	flautist	when	he	lacks	nothing	pertaining	to	the	particular	ability	in	virtue	of	which	he	is	said	to	be	a	good	physician	or	a	good	flute	player.	As	Betegh	et	al.	note,	‘insofar	as	no	further	magnitude	can	surpass	body,	body	is	the	perfect	magnitude	according	to	the	 second	meaning	 of	 τέλειον’.161	Yet	 another	 sense	 of	 τέλειον	 pertains	 to	 the	fulfilment	 of	 a	 goal.	 A	 special	 case	 pertains	 to	 a	 goal	 which	 is	 ‘worth	 seeking’	(σπουδαῖον).	Since	this	third	sense	of	τέλειον	concerns	things	that	have	reached	a																																																									160	In	[Betegh	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.44].	161	ibid.	
		
94	
final	state,	it	can	also	be	applied	in	a	secondary	manner	to	things	that	have	been	completely	 spoiled	 or	 destroyed.	 For	 example,	 a	 thing	 is	 said	 to	 be	 perfectly	spoiled	or	corrupted	when	‘there	is	no	deficiency	in	its	destruction	and	badness	but	it	has	reached	the	ultimate’	(ὅταν µηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ τῆς φθορᾶς καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀλλ’ 
ἐπὶ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ ᾖ,	 1021b27-28).	 And	 this	 is	 the	 reason	why	 death	 is,	 somewhat	metaphorically,	called	an	end,	because	it	is	something	final.162		In	 De	 Caelo	 I.1,	 268a20-28	 Aristotle	 argues	 that	 bodies	 possess	 a	 privileged	position	 when	 compared	 to	 lower-dimensional	 entities:	 it	 is	 the	 only	 type	 of	magnitude	which	can	be	considered	‘perfect’:	
Therefore, since ‘every’ and ‘all’ and ‘complete’ do not differ from one another in respect 
of form, but only, if at all, in their matter and in that to which they are applied, body alone 
among magnitudes can be complete. For it alone is determined by the three dimensions, 
that is, is an ‘all’. But if it is divisible in three dimensions it is every way divisible, while 
the other magnitudes are divisible in one dimension or in two; for the divisibility and 
continuity of magnitudes depend upon the number of the dimensions, one sort being 
continuous in one direction, another in two, another in all.163 [De Caelo, I.1, 268a20-28; 
Stock’s trans.] Betegh	et	al.	offer	the	following	reconstruction	of	Aristotle’s	argument:	
(1) Magnitudes are defined by the number of the dimensions in which they are extended 
and divisible.  (2)  Body is defined by ‘three’. (3)  ‘Three’ implies ‘all’.  (4)  ‘All’ implies 
‘complete and perfect’.  (5)  Hence, body is complete and perfect.  (6)  The other 
magnitudes, in contrast to body, are not complete and perfect, since they are  defined by 
‘one’ (line) or ‘two’ (surface) respectively.164   And	 based	 on	 the	M.3	 and	 the	De	Caelo	 passages	 we	 can,	 as	 Betegh	 et	 al.	 do,																																																									162	If	 we	 invoke	 the	 Platonic	 generation	 of	 solids	 in	Meta.	 M.2,	 1077a24-31,	 we	 may	 also	 call	bodies	‘complete’	in	this	third	sense.	They	have	also	attained	a	goal	‘worth	seeking’	in	that	they	can	become	animate	(1077a28-29).	
163 Ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὸ τέλειον οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, 
ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ ἐφ’ ὧν λέγονται, τὸ σῶµα µόνον ἂν εἴη τῶν µεγεθῶν τέλειον· µόνον γὰρ ὥρισται τοῖς 
τρισίν, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ πᾶν. Τριχῇ δὲ ὂν διαιρετὸν πάντῃ διαιρετόν ἐστιν· τῶν δ’ἄλλων τὸ µὲν ἐφ’ ἓν τὸ 
δ’ ἐπὶ δύο· ὡς γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθµοῦ τετυχήκασιν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς διαιρέσεως καὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς· τὸ µὲν γὰρ 
ἐφ’ ἓν συνεχές, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ δύο, τὸ δὲ πάντῃ τοιοῦτον. 164	In	[Betegh	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.48].	
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attribute	to	him	a	mathematical	realism	of	the	following	kind:		
The basic properties of being <three-dimensionally> extended and being infinitely 
divisible are properties that physical bodies have in a precise and realistic way.165  	
[2.5.3]	Ian	Mueller’s	interpretation	of	the	M.3	passage	and	its	background		The	 interpretation	I	would	 like	to	offer	 for	 the	crucial	Metaphysics	M.3	passage	allows	 for	 the	 potential	 existence	 (ὑλικῶς	 has	 the	 meaning	 of	 δυνάµει)	 of	mathematical	entities,	on	the	basis	of	the	fundamental	concept	of	the	solid.	Before	examining	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 interpretation,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 discuss	certain	 other	 views	 regarding	 Aristotle’s	 philosophy	 of	 mathematics.	 A	 very	influential	 interpretation	 with	 many	 followers	 is	 that	 of	 Ian	 Mueller;166	in	 his	article	 ‘Aristotle’s	doctrine	of	 abstraction	 in	 the	 commentators’	 he	 summarises	his	position	as	follows:		
Mathematical objects are embodied in pure extension underlying physical objects; the 
geometer’s abstraction of non-geometric properties enables him to apprehend these things 
which satisfy the mathematician’s definitions. [Mueller (1990), pp.464-465]	 According	 to	Mueller,	Aristotle	seems	 to	endorse	a	conception	of	mathematical	entities,	 ‘not	as	matter-less	properties,	but	as	 substance-like	 individuals	with	a	special	matter-intelligible	matter’.167	Mueller	attributes	the	former	view,	that	for	Aristotle	mathematical	entities	are	forms	that	can	be	separated	in	thought	from	matter,	to	the	interpretations	of	the	Physics	B.2	passage	advanced	by	Philoponus	and	 Simplicius.168	To	 properly	 understand	 Mueller’s	 claim	 that	 ‘mathematical	objects	are	embodied	in	pure	extension	underlying	physical	objects’	we	need	to	keep	 in	 mind	 that	 he	 identifies	 this	 ‘pure	 extension’	 with	 intelligible	 matter.	According	to	his	interpretation,	the	matter	of	geometrical	objects	is	the	matter	of																																																									165	In	[Betegh	et	al.,	op.	cit.,	p.61].	166	Mueller’s	 influence	 is	 prominent	 in	 [Modrak	 (1989)]	 and	 [Menn,	 ‘Ιγ3’].	 Annas	 is	 initially	sympathetic	 to	Mueller’s	account;	she	dismisses	 it,	however,	rather	briefly	as	a	 ‘reconstruction’	that	‘depends	fairly	heavily	on	the	later	Greek	commentators.	See	[Annas	(1975),	pp.30-31].	167	See	[Mueller	(1970),	p.164].		168	In	[Mueller,	op.	cit.,	p.162]. 
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physical	objects	with	some	of	its	properties	abstracted	away	and	only	extension	left.169	Intelligible	 matter	 is,	 in	 his	 view,	 pure	 and	 indeterminate	 extension,	‘potentially’	existent	in	physical	objects,	and	can	be	abstracted	from	any	sensible	body.	It	is	this	extension	that	constitutes	the	substratum	for	the	various	specific	mathematicals:	
For by abstraction one eliminates all sensible characteristics and arrives at the idea of pure 
extension. Pure extension does not seem to be sensible in the way that triangularity is, nor 
is it completely undifferentiated or purely potential in the way that prime matter seems to 
be. We cannot see a thing as just extended but only as extended so and so much with a 
certain shape. Simple extendedness we must grasp rationally. Geometric properties are 
imposed on this intelligible matter, but these properties are not the approximate properties 
of sensible substances precisely because they are imposed upon intelligible matter. The 
resultant objects are still intelligible rather than sensible. [Mueller (1970), pp.168-169; 
italics mine] One	 might	 follow	 Bostock	 in	 formulating	 the	 following,	 in	 my	 opinion	devastating,	 objection	 to	 Mueller’s	 view:	 if	 this	 so-called	 ‘pure	 extension’	 is	‘supposed	 to	 be	perfectly	square,	 spherical,	 and	 so	 on,	 in	 what	 sense	 does	 it	‘underlie’	 the	 material	 objects	 that	 are	 only	imperfect	examples	 of	 these	properties?’170	And	 if	 a	 perfect	 three-dimensional	 sphere	 somehow	underlies	 a	non-perfect	 sensible	 (a	 bronze,	 say)	 one,	 isn’t	 this	 susceptible	 to	 Aristotle’s	criticisms	that	no	two	solids	can	occupy	the	same	place	at	the	same	time?	What	is	 particularly	 problematic	 in	Mueller’s	 account	 is	 his	 talk	 of	 the	 imposition	 of	some	 determinate	 mathematical	 property	 on	 this	 indeterminate	 ‘pure	extension’:		
Thus it becomes necessary to distinguish two kinds of geometric object in Aristotle. First, 
there are the basic objects: points, lines, planes, solids. The last three are conceived of as 
indeterminate extension and, therefore, as matter on which geometric properties are 
imposed. The imposition of these properties produces the ordinary geometric figures, 
straight or curved lines, triangles, cubes; etc. The definition of such a figure will include 																																																								169	I	 follow	Menn’s	charitable	understanding	of	Mueller’s	account,	 in	 	[Menn,	 ‘Ιγ3’,	 fn.76,	pp.	28-29].	170	In	[Bostock	(2012),	p.477].		
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both the form, the properties imposed, and the matter; but in the definition this matter will 
also play the role of genus. A circle is a plane figure. [Mueller (1970), pp.167] It	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 Mueller's	 talk	 of	 ‘imposition’	 implies	 that	 mathematical	entities	 are	 somehow	mental	 entities,	 a	 conception	 which	 is	 hard	 to	 reconcile	with	Aristotle's	 realistic	 tendencies	expressed	 in	 the	crucial	M.3	passage.	What	does	 Mueller	 mean	 when	 he	 claims	 that	 the	 geometer	 ‘imposes’	 geometric	properties	on	some	indeterminate	extension	(what	Mueller	calls	 ‘basic	objects’,	i.e.	points,	lines,	planes,	solids)?	How	is	this	different	from	bringing	that	entity	to	actuality	 by	 the	 mind?	 Serious	 epistemic	 objections	 also	 arise:	 imposition	presupposes	 knowledge	 of	 what	 is	 to	 be	 imposed,	 	 that	 is,	 of	 the	 specific	geometrical	properties.	Mueller	in	his	article	does	not	elaborate	on	how	we	come	to	 have	 this	 knowledge:	 Is	 it	 perhaps	 the	 case	 that	we	 possess	 some	 previous	understanding	of	mathematical	 principles	 and	 concepts	which	 then	we	project	on	 this	 ‘indeterminate	 extension’?	 If	 so,	 then–as	 commentators	 have	 argued–it	seems	that	Mueller	does	not	offer	a	genuine	alternative	to	the	Platonic	account	of	mathematical	knowledge:	
Aristotle does accept Plato's mathematical epistemology: mathematicians treat objects 
which are different from all sensible things, perfectly fulfill given conditions, and are 
apprehensible by pure thought. [Mueller (1970), p.157]171  For	 the	 purposes	 of	 my	 interpretation	 I	 simply	 note	 that	 I	 espouse	 Lear’s	treatment	of	intelligible	matter,	namely	that	perceptible	objects		
…have intelligible matter insofar as they can be objects of thought rather than perception: 
that is, it is the object one is thinking about that has intelligible matter. The evidence for 
this is Aristotle's claim that intelligible matter is ‘the matter which exists in perceptible 
objects but not as perceptible, for example, mathematical objects’ (1036a11-12). [Lear 
(1982), pp.182-183] 
 Perhaps	the	invocation	of	intelligible	matter	as	the	matter	of	mathematicals	has																																																									171	Jonathan	Lear	offers	the	following	scathing	criticism	of	Mueller’s	account:	‘This	interpretation	must	 view	Aristotle	 as	 caught	 in	 the	middle	 of	 a	 conjuring	 trick:	 trying	 to	 offer	 an	 apparently	Platonic	 account	 of	 mathematical	 knowledge	 while	 refusing	 to	 allow	 the	 objects	 that	 the	knowledge	is	knowledge	of.’	In	[Lear	(1982),	p.161].	
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its	origins	in	certain	passages	from	De	Anima	Book	III	where	Aristotle	says	that	the	forms	of	sensible	things	are	only	potentially	intelligible	(ch.4,	430a6-7;	ch.8,	431b24-28).172	However,	what	Aristotle	says	there	need	not	be	interpreted	as	a	claim	 about	 the	 metaphysical	 status	 of	 mathematical	 entities.	 One	 can	 follow	Mignucci	in	arguing	that		
the forms of sensible things are potentially intelligible in the sense that they cannot be 
thought of if their representations are not brought to actuality. The process of actualisation 
therefore concerns the condition of forms with respect to a mind which thinks of them, but 
not their ontological status. To think of a dog does not imply that the form of the dog is 
contained only potentially in the dog and that it is brought to actuality by the thinker. The 
form of the dog is actually in the individual dog. [Mignucci (1987), p.183; underlining 
mine]  Or	 we	 can,	 perhaps,	 trace	 the	 origins	 of	 Mueller’s	 interpretation	 to	 Syrianus’	commentary	of	Aristotle’s	Metaphysics	M	and	N.	Regarding	the	views	of	Syrianus	Stephen	Menn	says	the	following:	
<There is a certain> interpretive tradition on M.3 1078a26-31, going back at least to 
Syrianus, and apparently to a text of the authentic Alexander that Syrianus is using, that 
takes Aristotle to mean that mathematical objects (whether geometrical or arithmetical) 
are potentially in sensible things, and are made actual by the intellect's act of 
contemplating them. [Menn, ‘Ιγ3’, fn.76, p.29, italics mine] 	The	key	texts	from	Syrianus’	commentary	are	the	following:	
1. <The mathematical objects> acquire whatever existence they possess in some other way 
– that is, they are generated in us by abstraction, which is in fact his own <i.e. Aristotle’s> 
view. 173 [Syrianus: On Aristotle Metaphysics M-N, 84.12-14; Dillon and O’Meara trans.] 
2. Having said in what way he does not think that the objects of mathematics exist, now he 
undertakes to tell us what sort of existence one might suppose them to have. His preferred 
view is that mathematical magnitudes and figures neither exist on their own nor in sense-
objects while being distinct from sense objects, but that they are derived  conceptually 
																																																								172	See	[Mignucci	(1987),	p.183].	
173 ἢ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ τὴν οἵαν ποτὲ ὑπόστασιν αὐτὰ λαµβάνειν, τουτέστιν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ἐν ἡµῖν 
γεννᾶσθαι, καθάπερ αὐτῷ καὶ δοκεῖ. 
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from sense objects by abstraction.174 [On Aristotle Metaphysics M-N, 94.30-34; Dillon and 
O’Meara trans.] 
3. <Aristotle’s> reply is that they <the mathematicians> are dealing with things that do not 
exist in actuality, but potentially.175 [On Aristotle Metaphysics M-N, 99.21-22; Dillon and 
O’Meara trans.] Syrianus	seems	to	be	opting	 for	a	mentalist	reading	of	 the	crucial	M.3	passage:	the	mathematical	 objects	 are	 the	product	 of	 our	 abstractive	 intellectual	 power	(84.12-13:	ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ἐν ἡµῖν γεννᾶσθαι),	derived	from	the	objects	of	sense	via	abstraction	 (94.33-34:	 ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ἐπινοεῖσθαι).	 Menn’s	helpful	 remarks	 shed	 some	 light	 on	 the	 Alexandrian	 origins	 of	 Syrianus’	interpretation:	
This tradition is connected with Alexander's theory of the νοῦς ποιητικός as abstracting 
from matter, and making what is potentially intelligible in a sensible thing (or in a 
phantasma) actually intelligible, whether as a universal form or as a mathematical, each of 
which would exist in the potential intellect; universals and mathematicals would thus have 
a foundation in bodies, but formally exist and be completed only in a soul. [Menn, ‘Ιγ3’, 
fn.76, p.29, italics mine] 
 Whether	 this	 anti-realistic	 interpretation	 of	 mathematical	 entities	 (and	universals	 in	 general)	 can	 be	 rightly	 attributed	 to	 Alexander	 or	 not,176	it	 is	 a	position	that	Syrianus	raises	a	barrage	of	objections	against:	
Our reply to this must be, first of all, to ask what it is that brings figure and magnitude 
from potentiality to actuality. For the geometrician does not cognise the potential by 
keeping it potential, but by making it actual; and if this is so, he does so by giving it shape 
and making it more exact and perfect. How, then, could he do this if he did not possess 
actualised entities within himself? For it is your principle, Aristotle, that the potential is 
only brought to perfection and actuality by the actual. And then again, geometry cannot 
take all its data from sensible objects; for it deals with many shapes and attributes of 																																																								
174 Εἰπὼν πῶς οὐκ οἴεται εἶναι τὰ µαθηµατικά, νῦν πειρᾶται λέγειν ποίαν ἄν τις αὐτὰ νοµίσειεν ἔχειν 
ὑπόστασιν. ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτῷ µήτε καθ’ αὑτὰ ὑφεστάναι τὰ µαθηµατικὰ µεγέθη καὶ σχήµατα µήτε ἐν 
τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἶναι ἄλλα ὄντα παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ἐπινοεῖσθαι· 
175 ὁ δέ φησι περὶ µὴ ὄντων µὲν ἐνεργείᾳ, δυνάµει δ’ ὄντων. 176	I	 am	 hesitant	 to	 ascribe	 this	 anti-realistic	 view	 of	mathematical	 objects	 to	 Alexander	 but	 I	cannot	develop	further	that	thought	here.	
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shapes which are not to be found in the sensible world. And again, if these things exist in 
actuality in the sensible realm (for it is in this sense that the Aphrodisian interprets the text 
here), while being studied in themselves only potentially, how can what is potential be 
more exact than what is actual?177 [On Aristotle Metaphysics M-N, 99.31-100.5; Dillon 
and O’Meara trans.] Syrianus	 reasonably	 complains	 that	 Aristotle	 does	 not	 elaborate	 on	 the	potentiality	he	has	 in	mind.	 If	 this	 is	 a	potentiality	akin	 to	 the	potentiality	of	 a	statue	of	Hermes	within	a	block	of	wood,	a	potentiality	ultimately	analysable	in	terms	of	actual	existence,	then	the	role	of	the	geometer	is	akin	to	the	that	of	the	sculptor	who	 can	 carve	 the	wood	 and	produce	 a	 separate	 statue	 of	Hermes.	 If	Aristotle’s	 position	 regarding	 mathematical	 entities	 is	 that	 they	 exist	 only	potentially	in	physical	objects	and	are	made	actual	by	the	mathematician’s	mind	then	 he	 has	 to	 provide	 an	 account	 of	what	 is	 the	 function	 of	 the	mind	 in	 this	process,	an	account	that	will	presumably	explain	the	source	of	the	‘perfection’	of	those	 objects.	 Could	 they	 be	 those	 entities	 that	 an	 Ideal	 Geometer	 could	construct?	Syrianus	seems	particularly	troubled	by	the	fact	that	sensible	objects	may	fail	to	have	the	required	precision,	i.e.	they	may	fail	to	completely	satisfy	the	geometer’s	definitions	 (100.1-3:	ἔπειτα δὲ οὐδὲ πάντα ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν δύναται 
λαµβάνειν ἡ γεωµετρία· πολλὰ γὰρ σχήµατα καὶ πάθη θεωρεῖ σχηµάτων, ἃ  
ὁ αἰσθητὸς κόσµος οὐχ ὑποδέδεκται.).	Syrianus	complains	that	one	cannot	confer	precision	to	mathematicals	enjoying	potential	existence	 in	 the	sensibles,	unless	one	already	possesses	an	adequate	understanding	of	what	is	for	a	mathematical	object	to	be	precise	(99.34-35: πῶς ἂν οὖν δύναιτο ταῦτα ποιεῖν µὴ ἔχων τὰ ἐνεργείᾳ 
ἐν ἑαυτῷ;).	This	is	made	clearer	in	the	following	passage:		
In general, in response to <Aristotle's> overall view it must be said that we also do not 
observe all shapes or all numbers as being inherent in sensible objects, that is to say, all 																																																								
177 πρὸς ἃ ῥητέον, ὅτι πρῶτον µὲν τί τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνάµει εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγον τὸ σχῆµα καὶ τὸ µέγεθος; 
οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ δυνάµει φυλάξας δυνάµει νοεῖ ὁ γεωµέτρης, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτὸ ποιήσας· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, 
µορφοῖ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀκριβέστερον ποιεῖ καὶ τελειοῖ. πῶς  ἂν οὖν δύναιτο ταῦτα ποιεῖν µὴ ἔχων τὰ ἐνεργείᾳ 
ἐν ἑαυτῷ; σὸν γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ Ἀριστότελες, ὅτι ὑπὸ µόνου τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ δυνάµει τελειοῦται καὶ εἰς 
ἐνέργειαν ἄγεται. ἔπειτα δὲ οὐδὲ πάντα ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν δύναται λαµβάνειν ἡ γεωµετρία· πολλὰ γὰρ 
σχήµατα καὶ πάθη θεωρεῖ σχηµάτων, ἃ ὁ αἰσθητὸς κόσµος οὐχ ὑποδέδεκται. εἶτα <εἰ> ἐνεργείᾳ µέν 
ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ταῦτα (οὕτω γὰρ ὁ Ἀφροδισιεὺς τοῦτο τὸ ῥητὸν ἐξηγεῖται), δυνάµει δὲ 
θεωρεῖται καθ’ ἑαυτά, πῶς ἀκριβέστερόν ἐστι τὸ δυνάµει τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ;  
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those with which the mathematical sciences concern themselves, nor is it possible that 
things that derive from sense-objects should enjoy such precision. And if he were to 
explain that we ourselves add to them what is lacking and thus make them more exact and 
then contemplate them as such, he will have to tell us first of all whence we are able to 
confer perfection on these; for we would not find any other truer cause of this than that 
propounded by the ancients, that the soul in its essence has prior possession of the reason-
principles of all things.178 [On Aristotle Metaphysics M-N, 95.29-36; Dillon and O’Meara 
trans.] 	The	last	sentence	of	the	previous	passage	reveals	Syrianus’	neo-Platonic	agenda.	Christian	 Widlberg	 has	 offered	 the	 following	 concise	 synopsis	 of	 Syrianus’	position	regarding	the	metaphysical	status	of	mathematicals:		
What in fact happens, according to Syrianus, is that the human intellect possesses an 
innate understanding of mathematical principles and concepts which it projects onto the 
plane of our imagination from above in order to grasp them rationally as the substances 
that they are: “… geometry aims to contemplate the soul's partless reason-principles 
(logoi) themselves but, being too feeble to employ these intellections, which are free of 
images, it extends these principles into imagined and extended shapes and magnitudes, and 
thus contemplates the former in the latter” (In Metaph. 13-14, 91.31–34; trans. 
Dillon/O'Meara, modified). The place of mathematical objects is in our imagination, 
Syrianus suggests (In Metaph. 186.17–23), and the case is comparable to matter receiving 
form, except that matter “does not know what it is receiving, nor can it hold on to it,” 
whereas the imagination, when it receives the mathematical blueprint from above, holds 
on to it to some extent and acquires an understanding of it.179 What	 would	 be	 an	 alternative	 to	 Mueller’s	 interpretation	 that	 mathematical	entities	exist	only	potentially	 in	sensible	 things	and	are	brought	 to	actuality	by	the	 mind?	 Instead	 of	 offering	 an	 interpretation	 that	 closely	 resembles	 a	 neo-Platonic	(or	a	Kantian)	one,	Mueller	could	have	adopted	a	more	empiricst	one	by																																																									
178 Ἁπλῶς δὲ πρὸς ἅπασαν αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν τοῦτο ῥητέον, ὅτι µήτε τεθεάµεθα πάντα τὰ σχήµατα ἢ 
πάντας τοὺς ἀριθµοὺς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, περὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅσους αἱ µαθηµατικαὶ διατρίβουσι, µήτε δυνατόν 
ἐστιν ἀκριβείᾳ τοσαύτῃ χρῆσθαι τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰληµµένα. εἰ δὲ ὅτι ἡµεῖς αὐτοῖς προστίθεµεν τὸ 
ἐνδέον καὶ ἀκριβέστερα ποιοῦµεν καὶ οὕτω θεωροῦµεν, ἀποφαίνοιτο, πρῶτον µὲν πόθεν δυνάµεθα 
αὐτὰ τελειοῦν, ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀληθεστέραν εὕροιµεν τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν 
εἰρηµένης, ὅτι κατ’ οὐσίαν ἡ ψυχὴ προείληφε πάντων τοὺς λόγους. 179	Wildberg	(2009).	
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arguing	 that	 ideal	 geometrical	 objects	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 the	 ‘constructive	output	of	an	ideal	subject’,	to	use	Philip	Kitcher’s	terms.	In	his	book	The	Nature	of	
Mathematical	Knowledge,	Philip	Kitcher	argues	that	mathematics	is	grounded	in	our	manipulations	of	physical	reality:	
I construe arithmetic as an idealising theory: the relation between arithmetic and the actual 
operations of human agents parallels that between the laws of ideal gases and the actual 
gases which exist in our world. We may personify the idealisation, by thinking of 
arithmetic as describing the constructive output of an ideal subject, whose status as an 
ideal subject resides in her freedom from certain accidental limitations imposed on 
us. [Kitcher (1984), p.109; his italics] 
 He	cautions	us	however	not	to	regard	his	approach	as	an	orthodox	constructivist	approach	 according	 to	 which	 we	 already	 possess	 knowledge	 of	 mathematical	properties;	 it	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 mathematical	 statements	 are	 about	 private	mental	entities	(pace	Mueller):	
 
To say that arithmetic in particular, or mathematics in general, is true in virtue of the 
constructive output of an ideal subject, does not commit me to the thesis that we can have 
intuitive knowledge of mathematical truths or to the thesis that there are (real or apparent) 
violations of the law of the excluded middle. I suggest that we have no way of knowing in 
advance what powers should be attributed to our ideal subject. Rather the description of 
that ideal subject and the conditions of her performance must be tested against our actual 
manipulations of reality. From Kant on, constructivist philosophies of mathematics have 
supposed that we can know a priori what constructions we can and cannot perform, or, to 
put it another way, what powers should be given to the ideal constructive subject. But 
there is no reason to bind this epistemological claim to the basic ontological thesis of 
constructivism. Instead, we can adopt a more pragmatic attitude to the question of which 
mathematical operations are possible or what powers the ideal subject has, adjusting our 
treatment of these issues to the manipulations of the world which we actually perform. 
[Kitcher (1984), pp.109-110; italics mine] 
 He	also	cautions	us	not	to	read	his	account	as	one	that	commits	us	to	the	existence	of	an	Ideal	Geometer:		
At this point, it is important to forestall a possible misunderstanding. In regarding 
mathematics as an idealising theory of our actual operations, I shall sometimes talk about 
the ideal operations of an ideal subject. That is not to suppose that there is a mysterious 
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being with superhuman powers. Rather, as I shall explain in the next section, mathematical 
truths are true in virtue of stipulations which we set down, specifying conditions on the 
extensions of predicates which actually are satisfied by nothing at all but are 
approximately satisfied by operations we perform (including physical operations). 
[Kitcher (1984), p.110; his italics] 	We	 may	 reapproach	 the	 precision	 problem	 about	 geometricals	 as	 follows:	 a	statement	of	stereometry	cannot	be	referring	to	sublunary	spheres	or	cubes	for	those	objects	are	approximately	 spherical	or	cubical.	We	might	claim,	however,	that	such	a	statement	applies	 to	 ideal	spheres,	cubes	and	so	on.	According	to	a	Kitcherian	 modification	 to	 Mueller’s	 interpretation	 we	 may	 say	 that	 a	 perfect	sphere	 exists	 potentially	 within	 a	 slab	 of	 marble	 in	 that	 it	 can	 be	 brought	 to	actuality	 by	 the	 acts	 of	 an	 Ideal	 Geometer,	 much	 like	 the	 Hermes	 inside	 the	marble	 slab	 can	 be	 brought	 to	 actuality	 by	 the	 sculptor.	 The	 acts	 of	 the	 Ideal	Geometer	are	merely	the	idealisation	of	the	acts	of	the	human	geometers.	As	we	shall	see,	however,	the	nature	of	the	sublunary	matter	is	such	that	even	if	there	was	an	Ideal	Geometer,	then	no	matter	how	spherical	he	could	make	the	sphere,	it	 could	 always	 be	 made	 into	 something	 a	 bit	 more	 spherical.	 Does	 Aristotle	really	 address	 the	 problem	 of	 precision	 that	 occupies	 such	 a	 central	 place	 in	Syrianus’	commentary?	It	is	time	to	offer	some	answers	on	Aristotle’s	behalf.	
 
[2.6]	The	potential	being	of	geometricals			
[2.6.1]	The	meaning	of	ὑλικῶς 	Jonathan	Barnes	claims	that	when	Aristotle	says	that	mathematical	objects	exist	
ὑλικῶς,	and	not	in	actuality,	he	means	not	that	they	exist	δυνάµει,	but	that		
… squares (say) exist in the same way that bronze (say) exists: bronze exists insofar as 
there are bronze statues, squares exist insofar as there are square areas. Bronze, evidently, 
is not an abstract stuff whose existence depends in some way on the mental exertions of 
the bronze-smith. Nor surely is there any implication in Aristotle's text that squares depend 
on geometers, or upon the mental activities of geometers, for their existence. [Barnes 
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(1985), p. 110]180  Although	I	agree	with	Barnes’	comments	against	mentalist	readings	of	ὑλικῶς,	 I	do	side	with	Menn	when	the	latter	complains	that	his	interpretation	is	especially	restrictive:	
[Barnes] has done nothing to get rid of the obvious implication of the text that when 
something is said to exist ὑλικῶς, as opposed to ἐντελεχείᾳ this means that it exists only 
δυνάµει. It is true that for Aristotle bronze, like whiteness, exists only in dependence on 
the things which are named paronymously from it but that gives no warrant at all for 
saying that these things do not exist ἐντελεχείᾳ: three-dimensional extension, and the 
particular shape that Socrates has at the present moment, exist actually and not merely 
potentially. They exist, of course, only as particular attributes of actual substances which 
may be considered apart from those substances and the other attributes of those 
substances-the same status that whiteness has in the white man, and that unity and 
indivisibility have as attributes of Socrates. [Menn, ‘Ιγ3’, fn.76, p.29]  When	Aristotle	says	that	mathematical	objects	exist	ὑλικῶς,	he	is	conceding	that,	in	 a	 sense,	 there	 are	 more	 mathematical	 objects	 than	 those	 that	 are	 actually	embodied.	 Perhaps	he	means	 that	 there	 are	 such	 things	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	have	a	potential	existence:	 it	 is	possible	 for	 them	 to	exist	 actually,	 (perhaps)	 to	exist	in	actual	physical	objects.	David	Bostock	offers	the	following	interpretation	of	the	M.3	passage	in	terms	of	the	above	notion	of	potentiality:	
One presumes that his thought here is that these objects, when considered as existing 
separately, can be said to exist potentially because it is possible for them to exist actually, 
i.e. to exist in actual physical objects. Thus a circle exists actually in a circular table-top, 
and the number 7 exists actually wherever there are (say) 7 cows. Then the idea would be 
that some rather complex geometrical figures, e.g. a regular icosahedron, may not actually 
exist anywhere in the physical world, but this figure still has a potential existence because 
it could do so. The same would apply to a very large number, too large to be exemplified. 
[Bostock (2009), p.21] 
 Before	we	proceed	any	 further,	 it	would	be	useful	 to	expand	Bostock’s	 thought	by	 introducing	 a	 distinction	 between	 those	 mathematical	 entities	 that	 exist																																																									180	A	similar	interpretation	can	be	found	in	[Mignucci	(1987),	pp.183-184].		
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actually,	and	those	that	do	not.	In	the	case	of	arithmetical	entities	it	is	reasonable	to	 assume	 that	 some	 of	 them	 have	 concrete	 (i.e.	 spatiotemporally–located)	instances,	for	example,	the	number	three	(e.g.	in	a	team	of	three	horses	in	a	field).		Let	 us	 call	 those	 mathematical	 entities	 that	 exist	 actually,	 basic	mathematical	
entities.	The	same	can	be	said	for	geometrical	entities,	for	example	solids	(recall	Aristotle’s	example	 in	Meta.	M.3,	of	a	man	qua	solid).	Then	there	are	some	that	do	not.	A	regular	 icosahedron	 is,	perhaps,	an	example	of	a	mathematical	entity	that	falls	 into	the	second	category.	Let	us	call	mathematical	entities	that	do	not	exist	actually	but	potentially,	secondary	entities.	The	aforementioned	distinction	between	 basic	 and	 secondary	 entities	 pertains	 to	 the	 metaphysical	 status	 of	mathematicals	 and	 it	 is	 crucial,	 I	 believe,	 for	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 M.3	passage,	 a	 place	 where	 Aristotle	 distinguishes	 between	 mathematical	 entities	existing	ἐντελεχείᾳ	and	those	that	exist	ὑλικῶς.	Where	should	one	draw	the	 line	between	basic	and	secondary	entities?	A	broad	conception	of	basic	mathematical	entities	 could	 be	 used,	 covering	 all	 such	 entities	 that	 are	 actually	 part	 of	 the	physical	world:	that	conception	is	endorsed	by	Lear,	who	claims	that	things	such	as	perfect	spheres,	perfect	circles	and	perfect	straight	edges	exist	actually	in	the	world. 181 	Alternatively	 a	 more	 narrow	 understanding	 of	 ‘basic’	 could	 be	employed,	which	pushes	more	entities	into	the	secondary	category.	I	believe	that	a	narrow	conception	of	basic	mathematical	 entities	 is	 closer	 to	Aristotle’s	own	views	than	a	broader	one.	
[2.6.2]	A	normal	understanding	of	potentiality		The	 sense	 of	 potentiality	 that	 is	 ascribed	 to	 certain	 mathematicals	 has	 to	 be	sufficiently	 explained.	 Normally	 when	 we	 say	 something	 is	 potentially	 Φ	 we	imply	that	it	is	possible	that	it	should	be	actually	Φ.	A	potentiality	so	understood,	as	 a	 possibility	 analysable	 in	 terms	 of	 actual	 occurrence	 is	 supported	 by	 the	following	passage	from	Meta.	Θ6:	
So then: energeia is a thing’s being around not in the way we say <something is around> 
in capacity. We say, for instance, that a herm in wood <is around> in capacity and a half 
line within a whole line <is around in capacity>, because it could be cut off, and even that 																																																								181In	[Lear	(1982)	pp.180-181].	
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someone who is not contemplating is <in capacity> a knower, if he is able to contemplate. 
And <all these things are around> in energeia too. 182 [Meta. Θ.6, 1048a30–5; Beere’s 
trans.]  A	statue	of	Hermes	in	a	block	of	wood	has	potential	existence	in	the	sense	that	the	sculptor	can	carve	the	wood	and	produce	a	separate	Hermes,	and,	similarly,	the	half-line	has	potential	existence	in	that	it	could	be	separated	out	of	the	whole	line.	In	both	cases	there	are	two	items,	A	(Hermes,	half	line),	and	B	(wood,	whole	line);	A	is	in	B,	and	A	could	be	separated	out	from	B.183 Given	this	proper	sense	of	potentiality,	one	might	say	that	a	slab	of	marble	can	be	carved	into	a	perfect	cube	(i.e.	 into	 a	 cube	 that	 perfectly	 satisfies	 the	 geometer’s	 definition);	 the	 latter	enjoys	potential	existence	within	the	slab.	We	can	also	claim	something	similar	about	lower-dimensional	or	limit	entities.	 A	 major	 deficit	 of	 Annas’	 commentary	 of	 the	 Metaphysics	 M.2-3	 is	 that	 she	eschews	any	reference	to	Aristotle’s	own	understanding	of	limit	entities	within	a	continuous	body	or	continuous	stretch	of	magnitude;	such	entities	at	most	they	exist	 within	 a	 body	 potentially,	 as	 loci	 where	 the	 body/stretch	 of	 magnitude	could	 actually	 be	 divided.184	Thus,	 Aristotle’s	 argument	 against	 mathematical	objects	 in	 the	 sensibles	 need	 not	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 argument	 against	 the	potential	existence	of	mathematical	objects	within	sensible	ones.	 In	 the	case	of	limit	 entities	 such	 as	 points,	 one	 might	 claim	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 a	 point–previously	 existing	 only	 potentially	 within	 a	 line	 segment–to	 become	 actual,	perhaps	as	the	terminus	of	one	of	the	two	resulting	line	segments	after	a	division	has	 occurred.	 This	 is	 indeed	 the	 view	 espoused	 by	 Richard	 Pettigrew	 in	 his	article	‘Aristotle	on	the	subject	matter	of	geometry’:	
Thus, when the solid is divided, it will not be divided at a point that actually exists. Rather, 
the point that is identified, and thus brought to actuality, by the act of dividing will belong 
to one of the two lines that result from the division. [Pettigrew (2009), p.252; italics mine.]  																																																								
182 ἔστι δὴ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγµα µὴ οὕτως ὥσπερ λέγοµεν δυνάµει· λέγοµεν δὲ δυνάµει οἷον 
ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ̔Ερµῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ τὴν ἡµίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθείη ἄν, καὶ ἐπιστήµονα καὶ τὸν µὴ 
θεωροῦντα, ἂν δυνατὸς ᾖ θεωρῆσαι· τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ.  183	See	[Makin	(2006),	p.136].	184	See,	e.g.,	[White	(1992),	p.204].	Cf.	Meta.	B.5,	1002a18-b11;	Phys.	Θ.8,	263a23-b9,	262a21-26.	
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Although	 this	 claim	 makes	 sense	 for	 someone	 with	 sufficient	 knowledge	 of	
modern	topology,	 it	cannot	be	attributed	to	Aristotle,	I	am	afraid,	on	the	pain	of	being	overly	anachronistic.	From	a	contemporary	perspective,	there	is	indeed	a	sense	in	which	a	line	is	divided	at	a	point:	One	simply	assigns	the	point	to	one	or	the	other	of	the	line	segments	resulting	from	the	division,	thus	leaving	the	other	line	 segment	 ‘open’	 at	 the	 end	 of	 division,	 that	 is,	without	 a	 terminal	 point.185	According	 to	 Pettigrew’s	 interpretation,	 if	 we	 employ	 the	 Aristotelian	potentiality–actuality	 distinction,	 we	 might	 claim	 that	 the	 point,	 previously	enjoying	potential	existence	within	the	line,	is	actualised	as	the	terminus	of	one	of	the	two	line	segments.	Modern	views	of	topology,	however,	involve	a	point-set	ontology	of	the	continuous.	A	continuous	magnitude	of	n	dimension	is	conceived	as	a	set	of	n-1	dimensional	elements;	thus	a	 line	is	conceived	as	a	set	of	points,	actually	 infinite	 in	number	 (non-denumerably	 infinite),	 linearly	ordered,	dense	(between	two	points	there	is	always	another	point)	and	continuous	in	the	sense	of	Dedekind	continuity:	a	line	is	Dedekind	continuous	iff	for	every	‘cut’	of	the	line	into	parts	either	the	first	linear	segment	has	a	last	point	and	the	second	one	does	not	have	a	first	one,	or	the	first	linear	segment	does	not	have	a	last	point	but	the	second	 one	 has	 a	 first	 one.	 Aristotle	 of	 course	 does	 not	 hold	 that	 a	 line	 is	conceived	 as	 a	 set	 of	 points;	 he	 argues	 against	 conceiving	 a	 continuous	magnitude	 of	 dimension	 n	 as	 being	 actually	 constituted	 out	 of	 geometrically	conceived	limit	entities	of	dimension	n–1,	e.g.	a	line	out	of	points,	a	surface	out	of	lines,	a	solid	out	of	planes	in	De	gen.	et.	cor.	I.2	and	Phys.	Z.1.186	Furthermore,	his	notion	of	density	is	fundamentally	different	from	the	modern	(Dedekind)	one	as	M.	White	has	argued:	
There is a sense in which Aristotle is quite willing to admit the ‘density’ of points in a 
(one-dimensional) continuous magnitude. Since a ‘line is always between points’ (Phys. 
Z.1, 231b9), it is always theoretically possible to divide this line and mark a third point 
between the two. I refer to this notion as ‘distributive density’. Note that distributive 																																																								185	Cf.	Pettigrew’s	confident	remark:	‘Indeed,	it	is	in	exactly	this	way	that	the	division	of	a	line	is	modelled	in	modern	analytic	geometry.’	In	[Pettigrew	(2009),	pp.252-253].	186	E.g.	 in	 Physics	 Z.1,	 231a24-26:	 ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀδιαιρέτων εἶναί τι συνεχές, οἷον γραµµὴν ἐκ  
στιγµῶν, εἴπερ ἡ γραµµὴ µὲν συνεχές, ἡ στιγµὴ δὲ ἀδιαίρετον. For this remark regarding Aristotle’s 
topology of the continuous see also [White (1993), pp.171-172].	
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density, as I am using the concept, does not postulate an ‘actually infinite’ collection of 
discrete elements, linearly ordered in such a way that between any two there is a third, 
distinct element (and hence an infinite number of distinct elements). I refer to a linear 
array of an actually infinite collection of intuitively ‘discrete’ elements, such that between 
any two elements there is a third element, as ‘collective density’. There is no indication 
that Aristotle ever conceives a (one-dimensional) continuous magnitude as constituted by 
a collectively dense array of points. [White (1992), p.22; his italics]  It	 is	 now	 time	 to	 address	 Pettigrew’s	 interpretation;	 let	 us	 consider	 a	 linear	segment	AB:	if	we	divide	it	in	half,	say	at	point	C,	then	it	is	hard	to	see	how	could	Aristotle	have	claimed	that	the	resulting	partitions	are	of	the	kind	AC,	CB	where	the	first	partition	includes	the	point	C	but	the	second	not	(or	vice-versa).187	The	following	account	from	Meta.	B.5	seems	to	be	Aristotle’s	first	stab	at	explaining	the	 division	 of	 a	 continuously	 extended	 body	 at	 a	 surface	 (with	 one	 added	caveat:	the	context	is	an	intensely	dialectical	discussion	of	whether	limit	entities	can	be	substantial	entities):	
But points and lines and surfaces cannot be in process of becoming nor of perishing, 
though they at one time exist and at another do not. For when bodies come into contact or 
are separated, their boundaries instantaneously become one at one time—when they touch, 
and two at another time—when they are separated; so that when they have been put 
together one boundary does not exist but has perished, and when they have been separated 
the boundaries exist which before did not exist. For it cannot be said that the point (which 
is indivisible) was divided into two. And if the boundaries come into being and cease to 																																																								187A	point	also	made	in	[White	(1992),	p.20].	It	is,	perhaps,	noteworthy	to	quote	Franz	Brentano’s	objections	to	an	earlier	version	of	the	modern	conception,	that	of	Bernard	Bolzano:	‘According	to	the	doctrine	here	considered,	in	contrast,	the	divisions	of	the	line	would	not	occur	in	points,	but	in	 some	absurd	way	behind	a	point	 and	before	all	 others	of	which	however	none	would	 stand	closest	 to	 the	 cut.	One	of	 the	 two	 lines	 into	which	 the	 line	would	be	 split	upon	division	would	therefore	 have	 an	 end	 point,	 but	 the	 other	 no	 beginning	 point.	 This	 inference	 has	 been	 quite	correctly	 drawn	 by	 Bolzano,	 who	was	 led	 thereby	 to	 his	monstrous	 doctrine	 that	 there	would	exist	 bodies	 with	 and	 without	 surfaces,	 the	 one	 class	 containing	 just	 so	 many	 as	 the	 other,	because	 contact	would	 be	 possible	 only	 between	 a	 body	with	 a	 surface	 and	 another	without.’	[Brentano	 (2010),	 p.105,	 italics	 mine]. Bolzano	 holds	 a	 conception	 of	 boundaries	 as	 ‘the	aggregate	of	all	the	extreme	ether-atoms	which	still	belong	to	it’	and	according	to	his	conception	of	contact	 two	bodies	can	only	be	 in	contact	when	one	 is	bounded	and	 the	other	one	 is	not.	 In	[Bolzano	(2014),	§66,	pp.167-168]. 
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be, from what do they come into being?188 [Meta. B.5, 1002a32-b4; Ross’ trans.]  This	aporetic	passage	contains	what	some	scholars	have	described	as	Aristotle’s	‘constructivist’	conception	of	a	point,	‘constructivist’	in	the	sense	that	points	and	other	 limit	 entities	 are	 always	 conceived	 in	 terms	 of	 other	 continuous	magnitudes	rather	than	vice	versa.	To	use	Fred	Miller’s	description:	the	point	is	‘an	 accidental	 feature	 of	 magnitudes	 undergoing	 operations’	 (p.100)189.	 When	bodies	 come	 into	 contact,	 their	 limits	which	were	 two	 before	 contact,	 become	one	 at	 contact.	 Regarding	 division,	 as	White	 puts	 it	 ‘where	 there	was	 a	 single	potential	surface	or	plane	at	what	was	to	be	the	locus	of	division,	there	are	now	two	distinct	planes	or	surfaces	of	the	resulting	parts	of	the	body.’190	Aristotle	is,	perhaps,	 arguing	 that	 there	 can	be	no	 complete	 process	 of	 generation	 for	 such	entities.	One	is	bound	to	wonder,	however,	whether	there	can	be	an	account	that	treats	 such	 limit	 entities	 as	 progressively	 actualised	 without	 ever	 reaching	 a	state	of	complete	being–I	will	examine	this	fascinating	alternative	shortly.			
	 	
																																																								
188 τὰς δὲ στιγµὰς καὶ τὰς γραµµὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιφανείας οὐκ ἐνδέχεται οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὔτε φθείρεσθαι, 
ὁτὲ µὲν οὔσας ὁτὲ δὲ οὐκ οὔσας. ὅταν γὰρ ἅπτηται ἢ διαιρῆται τὰ σώµατα, ἅµα ὁτὲ µὲν µία ἁπτοµένων 
ὁτὲ δὲ δύο διαιρουµένων γίγνονται· ὥστ’ οὔτε συγκειµένων ἔστιν ἀλλ’ ἔφθαρται, διῃρηµένων τε εἰσὶν 
αἱ πρότερον οὐκ οὖσαι (οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἥ γ’ ἀδιαίρετος στιγµὴ διῃρέθη εἰς δύο), εἴ τε γίγνονται καὶ 
φθείρονται, ἐκ τίνος γίγνονται; 189	In	[Miller	(1982),	p.100];	this	interpretation	can	also	be	found	in	[White	(1992),	pp.15-16].		190	In	[White	(1993),	p.174].	
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[2.7]	Towards	a	new	interpretation	of	the	M.3	passage		
[2.7.1]	A	radical	interpretation		Aristotle’s	schematic	account	 for	a	geometry	of	solids	 in	Metaphysics	M.3	can	be	further	 developed	 if	 we	 take	 into	 consideration	 his	 primary	 purpose	 in	 the	preceding	 chapters:	 to	 refute	 Platonist–based	 arguments	 regarding	 the	 prior	metaphysical	status	of	the	so–called	‘lower–dimensional’	or	‘limit	entities’,	i.e.	of	points,	 lines,	 and	 surfaces.	 One	 of	 the	 passages	 where	 Aristotle	 is	 more	informative	about	the	nature	of	such	limit	entities	is	the	following:		
	
But if we are to suppose lines or what comes after these (I mean the primary surfaces) to 
be principles, these at least are not separable substances, but sections and divisions – the 
former of surfaces, the latter of bodies (while points are sections and divisions of lines); 
and further they are limits of these same things; and all these are in other things and none 
is separable.191 [Meta. K.2, 1060b12-17, Ross’ trans.; italics mine] 	We	have	already	offered	an	account	 that	 is	based	on	what	 commentators	have	called	‘the	constructive	conception	of	a	point’:	according	to	that	account	whereas	before	the	division	of	a	line	there	was	one	potential	point,	after	the	division	we	get	two	points	actually	existing	as	limits	of	lines.	However,	I	would	like	to	focus	on	 a	 more	 radical	 interpretation	 according	 to	 which	 limit	 entities	 whether	bounding	a	body	or	lying	within	a	body	enjoy	the	potentiality	of	the	infinite/void,	that	 is	 the	potentiality	of	something	that	can	come	progressively	close	to	being	actualised,	without	ever	reaching	complete	actuality.	This	radical	interpretation	will	make	heavy	use	of	 the	potentiality	of	 the	 infinite	 and	what	Michael	White	has	called	‘Aristotle’s	intuitive	concept	of	a	limit’	(see	sections	2.7.2	and	2.7.3	for	some	 discussion):	 we	 can	 make	 sense,	 I	 suggest,	 of	 Aristotle’s	 peculiar	 term	
ὑλικῶς by	making	a	connection	with	the	way	the	infinite	is	ὑλικῶς:	Aristotle	in	his																																																									
191 εἴ γε µὴν γραµµὰς ἢ τὰ τούτων ἐχόµενα (λέγω δὲ ἐπιφανείας τὰς πρώτας) θήσει τις ἀρχάς, ταῦτά  
γ’ οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐσίαι χωρισταί, τοµαὶ δὲ καὶ διαιρέσεις αἱ µὲν ἐπιφανειῶν αἱ δὲ σωµάτων (αἱ δὲ στιγµαὶ 
γραµµῶν), ἔτι δὲ πέρατα τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων· πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ χωριστὸν οὐδέν 
ἐστιν. 
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discussion	 of	 the	 infinite	 in	 Physics	 Γ.6	 says	 that	 ‘the	 infinite	 is	 potentially	 as	matter	is’	(καὶ δυνάµει οὕτως ὡς ἡ ὕλη,	206b14-15):	insofar	as	limit	entities	enjoy	potential	 being	 in	 a	matter-like	way,	 they	 are	 incomplete	 just	 as	 the	 infinite	 is	(206b33-2017a15).			
[2.7.2]	A	more	‘exotic’	potentiality		Let	us	now	take	into	serious	consideration	another	kind	of	potentiality,	that	of	the	void	 and	 the	 infinite	 (henceforth,	 I	 will	 label	 this	 kind	 of	 potentiality	‘potentiality2’).	 That	 this	 potentiality	 has	 to	 be	 distinguished	 from	 the	 usual	sense	 of	 potentiality	 (enjoyed,	 for	 example,	 by	 the	 herm	 in	 the	 wood),	 is	something	that	can	be	seen	in	the	following	passages:  
 
‘Being potentially’ should not be understood in such a way that (just as if it is possible for 
this to be a statue, it will be a statue) so also there is an infinite that will be actually.192 
[Physics Γ.6, 206a18–21; Coope’s trans.]	 	
And the infinite and the void, and other such like things, are said to be potentially and 
actually in another way from many other things, for example what sees and what walks 
and what is seen. For these things can sometimes be truly said without qualification as 
well (for what is seen is on the one hand so called because it is seen, and on the other 
because it is capable of being seen); but the infinite is not potentially in this way, namely 
that it will be actually separate, but by coming into being. For it is the division’s not 
coming to an end which makes it the case that this actuality is potentially, and not the 
infinite being separated.193 [Meta. Θ.6, 1048b9-17; Makin’s trans.] 
																																																								
192 οὐ δεῖ δὲ τὸ δυνάµει ὂν λαµβάνειν, ὥσπερ εἰ δυνατὸν τοῦτ’ ἀνδριάντα εἶναι, ὡς καὶ ἔσται τοῦτ’ 
ἀνδριάς, οὕτω καὶ ἄπειρον ὃ ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ· 193	ἄλλως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ κενόν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, λέγεται δυνάµει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ <ἢ> πολλοῖς 
τῶν ὄντων, οἷον τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ βαδίζοντι καὶ ὁρωµένῳ. ταῦτα µὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἁπλῶς 
ἀληθεύεσθαί ποτε (τὸ µὲν γὰρ ὁρώµενον ὅτι ὁρᾶται, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὁρᾶσθαι δυνατόν)· τὸ δ’ ἄπειρον οὐχ 
οὕτω δυνάµει ἔστιν ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ ἐσόµενον χωριστόν, ἀλλὰ γνώσει. τὸ γὰρ µὴ ὑπολείπειν τὴν διαίρεσιν 
ἀποδίδωσι τὸ εἶναι δυνάµει ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν, τὸ δὲ χωρίζεσθαι οὔ.	Regarding	Aristotle’s	claim	in	lines	 1048b14-15	 that	 the	 infinite	 exists	 potentially	 γνώσει,	 I	 have	 adopted	 Burnyeat’s	interpretation	 according	 to	 which	 Aristotle’s	 point	 is	 that	 ‘we	 know	 that	 further	 division	 will	always	be	possible;	not	that	we	know	that	‘there	is	a	possibility	of	any	number	of	divisions’	but,	
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Aristotle	 claims	 that	 there	 is	 some	 sense	 in	which	 the	 infinite	 and	 the	 void	 is	potentially	 but	 not	 actually.	 What	 does	 he	 mean?	 The	 following	 discussion	follows	 closely	 Ursula	 Coope’s	 excellent	 article	 ‘Aristotle	 on	 the	 Infinite’.	Commentators	agree	that	Aristotle’s	claim	seems	a	bit	peculiar	because,	as	Coope	acknowledges,		 ‘it	is	hard	to	see	what	can	be	meant	by	saying	that	something	is	potentially	F,	if	this	does	not	imply	that	that	thing	could	be	actually	F’.194	Things	get	 more	 complicated	 because	 Aristotle	 after	 saying	 that	 the	 infinite	 is	 ‘in	 no	other	 way	 than	 this:	 potentially’	 (ἄλλως µὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὕτως δ’ ἔστι τὸ 
ἄπειρον, δυνάµει,	206b12-13),	he	adds	that		‘it	is	actually	too,	in	the	way	that	we	say	that	the	day	and	the	contest	are’	(καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ ἔστιν, ὡς τὴν ἡµέραν εἶναι 
λέγοµεν καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα,	 206b13–14).	 Why	 does	 Aristotle	 compare	 the	 way	 in	which	the	infinite	is	to	the	way	in	which	the	day	or	the	contest	is?	The	following	passage	elucidates	a	bit	the	way	the	day	and	the	contest	are:			
But since being is in many ways, just as the day or the contest is by the constant occurring 
of other and other, in this way too the infinite is. (For in these cases also there is 
‘potentially’ and ‘actually’. The Olympic games are both in virtue of the contest's being 
able to occur and in virtue of the contest's occurring).195 [Physics Γ.6, 206a21–25; Coope’s 
trans.] 	In	 her	 article,	 Coope	 offers	 a	 helpful	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 two	major–albeit	contrasting–interpretations	of	Aristotle’s	notion	of	infinity,	that	of	Jaako	Hintikka	and	 that	 of	 Jonathan	 Lear.	Whereas	 Hintikka’s	 interpretation	 relies	 heavily	 on	lines	206b13-14	to	argue	that	the	infinite	is	something	enjoying	actual	existence	(its	 being	 is	 like	 the	 being	 of	 a	 day	 or	 a	 contest),	 Lear	 argues	 instead	 that	 the	infinite	 is	 only	 potential,	 by	 emphasising	 that	 the	 infinite,	 unlike	 a	 day	 or	 a	contest,	 is	 always	 incomplete,	 something	 without	 limit	 or	 boundary.	 Coope,																																																																																																																																																															rather	that	we	know	that	‘for	any	number	of	divisions,	there	is	always	a	possibility	of	more’	–	and	presumably	for	better	reasons	than	that	we	have	always	found	so	in	practise	up	to	the	point	we	have	now	reached	in	the	dividing	process.’	See	[Burnyeat	(1984),	p.127].		194	For	Coope’s	comment,	see	[Coope	(2012),	p.271].	A	similar	claim	is	made	in	[Bostock	(1972),	p.117].	195	ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἡ ἡµέρα ἔστι καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν τῷ ἀεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο γίγνεσθαι, οὕτω 
καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον (καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ἔστι καὶ δυνάµει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· Ὀλύµπια γὰρ ἔστι καὶ τῷ δύνασθαι 
τὸν ἀγῶνα γίγνεσθαι καὶ τῷ γίγνεσθαι)·  	
		
113	
however,	 complains	 that	 neither	 of	 these	 two	 interpretations	 can	 explain	 the	crucial	fact	that	Aristotle	‘says	all	of	these	things	together’.196	Thus,	she	provides	her	 own–in	 my	 opinion	 very	 persuasive–interpretation	 which	 will	 form	 the	bedrock	 for	 much	 of	 my	 argument	 regarding	 the	 potential	 status	 of	 lower-dimensional	geometricals.			Jaakko	Hintikka	is	one	of	the	most	prominent	supporters	of	the	view	that	every	(genuine)	 possibility	 is	 at	 some	 time	 actualised	 (the	 so-called	 principle	 of	
plenitude).	 Hintikka	 invokes	 this	 principle	 with	 respect	 to	 infinity	 as	 follows:	magnitudes	 have	 a	 potential	 for	 undergoing	 an	 infinite	 process	 (a	 process	 of	being	infinitely	divided)	and	this	potential	can	be	actualised	or,	in	Coope’s	words,		‘according	 to	 his	 interpretation	 the	 actuality	 of	 the	 infinite	 consists	 in	 the	actuality	of	an	infinite	process	of	division’.197	As	Coope	notes,	this	interpretation	can	make	sense	of	Aristotle’s	claim	that	the	infinite	is	actual	in	the	way	in	which	a	day	or	a	contest	is,	that	is,	 ‘the	sense	in	which	the	infinite	is	actual	is	that	it	is	going	on’.198	It	cannot	account,	she	notes,	for	the	fact	that	the	infinite	is	unlike	a	whole	 day	 or	 contest	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 Aristotle	 goes	 to	 great	 lengths	 to	emphasise	 that	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	which	 the	 infinite	 is	 only	potentially.199	She	cites	 David	 Bostock’s	 solution,	 who	 argues	 that	 Aristotle’s	 point	 is	 that	 the	process	 of	 dividing	 a	 line	 into	 infinitely	 many	 parts	 is	 ‘one	 that	 cannot	be	completed.’ 200 	Nevertheless,	 she	 argues,	 this	 explanation	 is	 inadequate,	because	 it	 does	 not	 account	 for	 what	 she	 calls	 ‘the	 connection	 between	 the	uncompleteability	 of	 this	 process	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 unfufillable	potential’.201 	Let	 us	 examine	 the	 two	 crucial	 passages	 where	 Aristotle	 distinguishes	 the	potentiality	ascribed	to	infinity	from	the	usual	sense	of	potentiality	more	closely.	It	 seems	 that,	 according	 to	 Aristotle,	 not	 every	 potentiality	 has	 to	 be																																																									196		In	[Coope	(2012),	p.274].	197	See	[Hintikka	(1966)]	and	[Coope,	op.cit.,	p.276].	198	In	[Coope,	op.	cit.,	p.275].	199	ibid.	200	ibid.	She	refers	to	[Bostock	(1972),	p.39].	201	ibid.	
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accompanied	 by	 the	 corresponding	 actuality.202 	Things	 that	 enjoy	 potential	existence,	 such	 as	 the	 Hermes	 in	 the	 wood	 can	 (assuming	 normal	 conditions)	eventually	be	actual.	By	contrast,	infinite	things	are	not	potential	in	this	sense;	it	is	not	the	case	that	there	will	ever	be	an	actual,	separate,	infinite	thing.	In	Physics	206a18-21	Aristotle	contrasts	the	potentiality	of	the	infinite	with	the	potentiality	(as	 discussed	 in	 Metaphysics	 Θ.6)	 of	 a	 statue:	 in	 the	 latter	 case,	 once	 the	sculptor’s	work	is	complete,	the	statue	will	enjoy	actual	existence.	In	the	former	case,	the	unlimited	divisibility	of	a	magnitude,	in	which	its	infinity	consists,	does	not	mean	that	there	will	ever	be	an	end	to	this	process,	something	that	will	enjoy	actual	 existence,	 an	 infinite	 in	 actuality.	 Thus,	 Jonathan	 Lear’s	 objection	 to	Hintikka’s	 interpretation	 (that	 the	 actuality	 of	 the	 infinite	 consists	 in	 the	actuality	 of	 an	 infinite	 process	 of	 division)	 is	 that	 ‘there	 is	 no	 process	 which	could	correctly	be	considered	the	actualisation	of	an	infinite	division	of	a	line’.203	The	 simple	 reason	 is	 that	 ‘any	 such	 process	will	 terminate	 after	 finitely	many	divisions’:204		
To see this more clearly, what sort of process might be considered the actualisation of an 
infinite division. It could not be a physical process of actually cutting a finite physical 
magnitude, for, obviously, any physical cut we make in such a magnitude will have finite 
size and thus the magnitude will be completely destroyed after only finitely many cuts. 
Nor could it be a process of theoretical division: i.e. a mental operation which 
distinguishes parts of the magnitude. For no mortal could carry out more than a finite 
number of theoretical divisions.205			Coope	 remarks	 that	 Lear’s	 account	 does	 indeed	 explain	 the	way	 the	 infinite	 is	potentially	 in	 a	 way	 that	 it	 is	 not	 actually:	 ‘For	 a	 magnitude	 to	 be	 infinitely	divisible	 is	 for	 it	 to	have	potentials	 that	 could	never	be	 fully	 actualised	by	any	process	 of	 dividing.’206	However,	 she	 complains,	 ‘Lear's	 interpretation	 leaves	 it																																																									202	Richard	Sorabji	has	pointed	out	 that	Aristotle	 reserves	 the	principle	of	plenitude	 for	special	cases,	such	as	the	everlasting	properties	of	everlasting	objects.	See	[Sorabji	(1980),	pp.128–35].		203	See	 [Lear	 (1982),	 p.190].	 Extensive	 bits	 from	 Lear’s	 paper	 are	 discussed	 in	 [Coope,	 op.cit,	p.276].	204	In	[Lear,	op.cit.,	p.190].	205	In	[Lear,	ibid].	206	In	[Coope,	op.cit.,	p.276].	
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mysterious	how	Aristotle	can	claim	that	the	infinite	is	actually	‘in	the	way	that	a	day	 or	 a	 contest	 is’207.	 Coope	 refines	 Lear’s	 reading	 by	 distinguishing	 between	two	senses	according	to	which	it	is	impossible	for	there	to	be	an	infinite	process	of	division	for	a	continuous	stretch	of	magnitude:	i)	such	a	process	cannot	occur,	ii)	 such	 a	 process	 cannot	be	occurring.208	She	 argues	 that	 Lear’s	 interpretation	employs	 the	 first	 sense,	 because	 of	 certain	 considerations	 that	 pertain	 to	Aristotle’s	conception	of	processes:	
 
… a process occurs only if the whole of it occurs, but in the case of an infinite process 
there is no such thing as the whole of it. A finite process, such as a contest, occurs over a 
certain length of time; what this means is that the whole process is spread out over a 
certain length of time. But this is not true of an infinite process. On Aristotle's view, the 
whole of such a process could not occur even over infinitely much time, for as we have 
seen, he holds that being infinite implies not being whole (206b33ff.)209 
 She	 thinks	however	 that	 these	 considerations	are	not	 sufficient	 to	 claim	 that	 a	process	of	 division	 ad	 infinitum	cannot	be	occurring.	 This	 allows	her	 to	offer	 a	defence	of	Hintikka’s	interpretation	against	Lear:		
 
Hintikka should say that infinite divisibility is the potential for a certain process to be 
occurring. This potential is completely fulfilled when a magnitude is being divided ad 
infinitum. Of course, the whole of such a process can never occur, but that (he might say) 
does not imply that the magnitude has some potential that cannot be fulfilled. The 
magnitude cannot undergo a whole process of division ad infinitum, but then it does not 
have the potential to undergo such a process; on the other hand, the magnitude does have 
the potential to be undergoing a process of division ad infinitum, and this potential can be 
fulfilled.210 	But	 still	 this	 does	 not	 ‘make	 sense	 of	 Aristotle's	 claim	 that	 the	 infinite	 is	potentially	in	a	way	in	which	it	is	not	actually.	Coope	will	go	on	to	investigate	the	way	in	which	a	process	is	the	actualisation	of	a	potential.	Coope’s	main	argument	relies	 on	 a	 distinction	 between	 an	 activity	 (energeia)	 and	 a	 process	 (kinêsis)																																																									207	ibid.	208	In	[Coope,	op.cit,	p.277].	209	ibid.	210	In	[Coope,	op.	cit.,	p.278].	
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based	 on	Metaphysics	Θ.6	 1048b18–35.	 The	 gist	 of	 her	 analysis	 is	 contained	 in	the	following	passage:			
Undergoing a process essentially involves having some potential that is not fully realised, 
whereas engaging in an activity does not essentially involve having an unrealised 
potential. Of course, when I am engaged in an activity (such as seeing), I will have all 
sorts of unrealised potentials. (Perhaps I am not using my sense of smell.) The point is that 
having such unrealised potentials is not essential to what it is to be engaged in the activity 
of seeing, whereas there will always be a certain unrealised potential that is essential to the 
undergoing of a process.211 
 Thus,	according	to	Coope’s	account,	one	cannot	claim	–alongside	Hintikka-	that	a	magnitude	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 be	 undergoing	 the	 process	 of	 being	 infinitely	divided	which	is	a	potential	that	can	be	completely	fulfilled	‘at	any	moment	when	the	magnitude	is	undergoing	such	a	process’.212	Rather,	the	potential	in	question	must	be	a	potential	which	 is	 ‘only	 incompletely	 fulfilled	while	the	magnitude	 is	undergoing	 that	 process’. 213 	More	 specifically,	 it	 is	 a	 potential	 that	‘has	no	complete	 fulfilment’.214	Coope	 acknowledges	 that	 this	 is	 a	 deviation	 from	 the	standard	reading	of	potentiality:		
If a potential has no complete fulfilment, then how can we specify what potential it is? The 
answer is that we have to define this potential in a non-standard way: we have to specify 
what would count as fulfilling it as completely as possible. When we say that a magnitude 
is infinitely divisible, the potential we attribute to it should be defined as follows. It is a 
potential that has no complete fulfilment but that is fulfilled as completely as it can be in 
the process by which the line is being divided ad infinitum. There is thus a sense in which 
it, like other potentials, is defined by its maximal fulfilment, but the maximal fulfilment 
that defines it is not a complete fulfilment, merely a fulfilment that is as complete as 
possible.215 
 
																																																								211	In	[Coope,	op.	cit.,	p.279].	212	In	[Coope,	op.	cit.,	p.280].	213	In	[Coope,	op.	cit.,	p.280].	214	In	[Coope,	op.	cit.,	p.281].	215	ibid.	
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Coope’s	 account	 provides	 us	with	 a	 brilliant	way	 to	 reconcile	 the	 two	peculiar	claims	by	Aristotle:	that	1)	the	infinite	is	in	no	other	way	than	potentially	and	2)	that	it	is	actually	too	in	the	way	that	the	day	and	the	games	are:	
 
The potential that we ascribe to something when we say that it is infinitely divisible is a 
potential that can be fulfilled in a way: it can be incompletely fulfilled. It is incompletely 
fulfilled while the magnitude is being divided ad infinitum, just as the potential for a day 
to occur is incompletely fulfilled while the day is going on, or the potential for a game to 
occur is incompletely fulfilled while the game is taking place. The difference is that in the 
case of these potentials (for the day or the game to occur), there is a corresponding 
complete fulfilment (the occurrence of the day or of the game), whereas the potential we 
ascribe to something when we say it is infinitely divisible is a potential that has no 
complete fulfilment. It is thus ‘only potential’, in that it has no complete fulfilment, but 
also ‘actual’ in a way, in that it does (like the potential involved in the day or the games) 
have an incomplete fulfilment.216 	
[2.7.3]	Aristotle’s	‘intuitive	concept	of	a	limit’	
	Coope’s	account	can	be	 further	enhanced,	 I	suggest,	by	examining	more	closely	Aristotle’s	 two	 notions	 of	 potential	 infinity,	 the	 infinity	 of	 magnitudes	 ‘by	division’	and	that	‘by	addition’.	In	Phys.	Γ.6	Aristotle	discusses	those	two	senses	of	potential	infinity	for	magnitudes:		
 
The infinite by addition, too, is potentially in this way; this infinite, we say, is in a way the 
same as the infinite by division. For it will always be possible to obtain something beyond 
but it will not exceed any magnitude, as it does in the division where it will always be less 
than any assigned magnitude.217 [Phys. Γ.6, 206b16-20; Hussey’s trans. mod.] 
 Infinity	 by	 addition	 and	 infinity	 by	 division	 seem	 to	 be	 closely	 interrelated,	Aristotle,	however,	opts	for	a	detailed	exposition	of	the	former:		
																																																								216	In	[Coope,	op.	cit.,	p.282].	
217 καὶ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν δὴ οὕτως ἄπειρον δυνάµει ἔστιν, ὃ ταὐτὸ λέγοµεν τρόπον τινὰ εἶναι τῷ κατὰ 
διαίρεσιν· ἀεὶ µὲν γάρ τι ἔξω ἔσται λαµβάνειν, οὐ µέντοι ὑπερβαλεῖ παντὸς µεγέθους, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τὴν 
διαίρεσιν ὑπερβάλλει παντὸς ὡρισµένου καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται ἔλαττον. 
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The infinite by way of addition is in a sense the same as the infinite by way of division. 
Within a finite magnitude the infinite by way of addition occurs in a way inverse to that by 
division; for, as we see the magnitude being divided to infinity, the sum of the parts taken 
appears to tend toward something definite. For if, in a finite magnitude, one takes a 
definite part and then from what remains keeps on taking a part, not equal to the first part 
but always using the same ratio, he will not traverse the original finite magnitude; but if he 
is to so increase the ratio that the parts taken are always equal, he will traverse it, because 
every finite magnitude is exhausted by any definite magnitude. Thus it is in this and not in 
any other way that the infinite exists, namely, potentially and by way of diminution.218 
[Physics Γ.6, 206b3–13; Apostle’s trans. mod.] 
 Aristotle’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 infinity	 of	 addition	 seems	 to	 require	 a	 prior	understanding	of	 the	(more	familiar	perhaps)	notion	of	 the	 infinity	by	division.	He	 claims	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 infinity	 by	 addition	 for	 magnitudes	 involves	 a	process	 which	 is	 ‘in	 a	 way’	 (πως)	 the	 inverse	 of	 the	 process	 of	 division	(ἀντεστραµµένως;	cf.	τὴν ἀντεστραµµένην πρόσθεσιν,	207a23).	Suppose	we	have	a	magnitude	 AB	 and	we	 divide	 it	 by	means	 of	 a	 geometrical	 progression,	 as	 for	example	 is	 	 prescribed	 in	 the	Zenonian	Dichotomy:	we	 first	 take	 away	 its	 half,	then	the	half	of	 that,	and	so	on.	We	then	have	 	 the	sequence:	!!AB,	!!	AB,	!!AB	 .	 .	 .	The	 Zenonian	 Dichotomy	 is	 an	 instant	 of	 the	 more	 general	 case	 of	 division	described	in	 lines	206b7-12.	One	can	then	use	this	division	to	form	the	inverse	process	 of	 addition	!!	AB+!!	AB+!!AB	 .	 .	 .	 Such	 a	 sum	 tends	 toward	 ‘something	definite’	(πρὸς τὸ ὡρισµένον,	206b6),	namely	the	whole	AB.	Thus,	whereas	in	the	process	of	division	we	move	towards	the	complete	‘exhaustion’	of	a	magnitude,	in	 the	 process	 of	 addition	we	move	 towards	 reaching	 a	 finite	magnitude.	 That	there	is	always	one	bit	of	magnitude	that	can	be	added	or	taken	away	underlines	
																																																								
218 τὸ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν τὸ αὐτό ἐστί πως καὶ τὸ κατὰ διαίρεσιν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ πεπερασµένῳ κατὰ 
πρόσθεσιν γίγνεται ἀντεστραµµένως· ᾗ γὰρ διαιρούµενον ὁρᾶται εἰς ἄπειρον, ταύτῃ προστιθέµενον 
φανεῖται πρὸς τὸ ὡρισµένον. ἐν γὰρ τῷ πεπερασµένῳ µεγέθει ἂν λαβών τις ὡρισµένον προσλαµβάνῃ 
τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ, µὴ τὸ αὐτό τι τοῦ ὅλου µέγεθος περιλαµβάνων, οὐ διέξεισι τὸ πεπερασµένον· ἐὰν δ’ 
οὕτως αὔξῃ τὸν λόγον ὥστε ἀεί τι τὸ αὐτὸ περιλαµβάνειν µέγεθος, διέξεισι, διὰ τὸ πᾶν πεπερασµένον 
ἀναιρεῖσθαι ὁτῳοῦν ὡρισµένῳ. ἄλλως µὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὕτως δ’ ἔστι τὸ ἄπειρον, δυνάµει τε καὶ ἐπὶ 
καθαιρέσει. 	
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the	fact	that	the	 infinite	by	addition	and	division	are	two	instances	of	potential	infinity;	the	processes	themselves	are	inverse.		Michael	 White	 offers	 a	 helpful	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 Aristotle’s	 notion	 of	potential	 infinity	and	modern	 treatments	of	 infinity.	Using	modern	algebra	one	
identifies	the	sum	S	of	a	denumerably	infinite	series	of	addenda	(i.e.	a	series	the	members	of	which	can	be	put	 into	one-to-one	correspondence	with	the	natural	numbers),	s1	+	s2	+…+	sn	+…,	with	the	limit	of	the	denumerably	infinite	sequence	{tn},	where	each	term	tn	in	the	sequence	is	the	sum	of	the	first	n	si	s.	To	take	the	example	 of	 the	 linear	magnitude	 AB	 above,	 the	 sum	 S	 =	 ½	 AB	 +	¼	 AB	 +	 1/8	AB…will	be	 identified	with	 the	 limit	of	 the	 infinite	 sequence	 {(2n	 –	1)/2n	AB}	=	!! AB,	 !! 	AB,	 !! AB,	 !"!" 	AB,…,	 which	 is	 AB. 219 	But	 does	 Aristotle	 allow	 this	identification?	 Αccording	 to	 Aristotle	 the	 sum	 will	 approach	 a	 definite	 limit,	namely	 AB.	 As	 White	 notes,	 Aristotle	 allows	 the	 processes	 of	 division	 and	addition	 be	 ‘infinitely	 extendable’	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 ‘one	 can	 always	 take	 the	division	 and	 correlative	 summation	 a	 step	 beyond	 any	 finite	division/summation’.220	Thus,	Aristotle,	as	White	points	out,			
does have an ‘intuitive concept’ of a limit of a process of summation-a process that can be 
indefinitely extended in the Aristotelian sense of being extendable beyond any finite 
number of stages. We here mean by ‘limit’ a least finite magnitude (i) which the process 
of summation never (i.e. at any finite stage) exceeds and (ii) to which the process of 
summation approaches closer at each successive stage but never (i.e. at any finite stage) 
reaches. There is no evidence, however, that Aristotle moves from this conception of limit 
(which obviously grounds the mathematical notion of a limit) to what I shall call the 
mathematical sum/union notion of a limit, which by definition serves as the sum or union 
of an infinite series. [White (1992), p.141]221  	Aristotle’s	core	conception	of	infinity	as	‘that	which	with	respect	to	quantity,	it	is	always	 possible	 to	 take	 something	 beyond	 what	 has	 been	 taken’	 (Phys.	 Γ.6.	
																																																								219	In	[White	(1992),	p.9].		220	In	[White,	op.	cit.,	p.11].	221	In	[White,	op.	cit.,	p.141].	
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207a7–8),	prevents	him	 from	 identifying	 the	 sum	of	 an	 indefinitely	 extendable	series	of	addenda	with	the	limit	that	such	a	series	converge	to:		
Aristotle's notion of the infinite is tied to a process that can be thought of as consisting in a 
series of discrete ‘stages’ or ‘steps’—either a process of addition (prosthesis) of a unit or 
quantity to other such units/quantities or a process of the division (diairesis) of some 
original, fixed quantity into subquantities. Such a process can, in principle, always be 
carried a step beyond any determinate (i.e. finite) number of steps. ‘The infinite’, in this 
sense, Aristotle contrasts with what is ‘complete and whole’ (teleion kai holon) (207a10). 
[White (1992), p.11]  How	should	one	then	understand	the	corresponding	claim	about	the	potentiality	of	 the	 void	 in	Metaphysics	 Θ.6,	 1048b9-17?	 Picking	 up	 a	 suggestion	 made	 by	Burnyeat,	we	may	say	that	‘we	can	always	(at	least	in	theory)	reduce	the	amount	of	air	 in	a	container	beyond	the	point	to	which	we	have	already	reduced	it,	but	never	produce	a	perfect	void.’	222			
[2.7.4]	Menn’s	interpretation	and	its	problems	
	The	potentiality	of	the	infinite	may	also	be	applied	to	more	complex	or	derivative	geometrical	objects	(triangles,	straight	lines,	tetrahedra,	etc.)	as	follows.	We	may	claim,	 for	 example,	 that	 a	 perfect	 marble	 sphere	 exists	 potentially	 within	 a	marble	 block,	 without	 this	 potentiality	 ever	 being	 actualised	 in	 the	 sense	 of	resulting	in	a	separate,	perfectly	spherical,	marble	object.	This	is	not	due	to	our	human	limitations	but	due	to	the	nature	of	the	sublunary	matter.	The	nature	of	the	sublunary	matter	is	such	that	even	if	there	were	an	Ideal	Geometer	who	was	unhampered	 by	 human	 physical	 and	 mental	 limitations,	 then	 no	 matter	 how	spherical	he	could	make	the	artifact,	it	could	always	be	made	into	something	a	bit	more	 spherical.	 The	 sphere	 however	 can	 come	 progressively	 closer	 to	 being	actualised,	 beyond	 any	 given	 limit,	 and	 this	 is	 enough	 to	 claim	 that	 is	 has	potential	 existence.	 Stephen	 Menn	 attributes	 this	 kind	 of	 potentiality	 to	 such	complex	geometrical	objects:																																																										222	Burnyeat	(1984),	p.127.		
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If no actual bodies are bounded by perfectly flat planes, then the potentiality for being 
divided along a perfectly flat plane will never be actualised, but this does not disqualify it 
from counting as a potentiality: it will be like the potentialities for the void and for the 
infinite which Aristotle discusses at Θ.6 1048b9-17, which can never be entirely 
actualised, but which can come progressively closer to being actualised, beyond any given 
limit, and this is enough to say that ‘this ἐνέργεια [sc. the void or the infinite] exists 
δυνάµει, but is not separated’. . . [Geometrical objects], existing potentially within the 
matter of sensible things not qua sensible, are, as potentialities, as eternal and unchanging 
as a Platonist could wish, without any need for separate existence. [Menn,	‘Ιγ3’,	p.28] 	And	again	he	makes	his	thesis	more	explicit	when	he	claims:		
I take Aristotle to think, not that geometrical objects are physical objects with some of 
their properties abstracted away (since at least sublunar physical objects are not perfectly 
straight, circular etc.), but rather that the matter of geometrical objects is the matter of 
physical objects with some of its properties abstracted away (and only extension left), and 
that geometrical objects exist potentially in that matter. I suppose it is not possible for a 
physical object ever to become perfectly straight, but the straightness is still potentially in 
the object, in the same way that infinity is potentially in the objects–it can be 
asymptotically approached. These potentialities will be actualised (so far as they ever are) 
either by human acts of thought or by artificial acts of construction (drawing 
approximately straight lines etc.) caused by those acts of thought. [Menn, ‘ΙΙΙα3᾽, p.26] 	Menn’s	 focus	 is	 on	 sublunary	 geometrical	 objects;	 his	 view	 is	 that	 we	 have	sublunary	physical	objects	that	do	not	perfectly	satisfy	the	geometers’	definitions	(for	 example,	 a	 marble	 sphere	 that	 has	 some	 indentations,	 an	 approximately	straight	drawn	line	that	has	some	curviness,	a	drawn	triangle	with	jagged	sides)	but	 we	 can	 ‘asymptotically	 approach’	 the	 more	 perfect	 versions	 of	 these	 (a	marble	 sphere	 with	 no	 indentations,	 a	 perfectly	 straight	 line	 and	 a	 perfect	triangle).	The	following	passage	from	De	Caelo	may	be	cited	in	support	of	Menn’s	claim	about	the	nature	of	the	sublunary	matter:			
It is plain from the foregoing that the universe is spherical. It is plain, further, that it is so 
accurately turned that no manufactured thing nor anything else within the range of our 
observation can even approach it. For the matter of which these are composed does not 
admit of anything like the same regularity and finish as the substance of the enveloping 
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body.223 [De Caelo II.4, 287b14-287b20; mod. Stocks’ trans.] Unlike	 the	 heavenly	 sphere	 (κόσµος),	 which	 is	 perfectly	 spherical,	 no	 artifact	(χειρόκµητον)	or	sensible	object	(τῶν ἡµῖν ἐν ὀφθαλµοῖς φαινοµένων)	enjoys	such	kind	of	(geometrical)	perfection.	For	the	matter	of	those	artifacts	does	not	admit	of	 anything	 like	 the	 evenness	 (ὁµαλότητα)	 or	 the	 precision	 (ἀκρίβειαν)	 as	 the	nature	 of	 the	 encompassing	 body.	 As	 Theokritos	 Kouremenos	 notes,	 lines	287b14-18	can	be	understood	 in	 two	ways:	1)	 either	 that,	unlike	 the	heavenly	sphere,	no	sphere	made	or	perceived	by	us	enjoys	such	kind	of	precision,	or	2)	no	artifact	 or	 perceivable	 object	 enjoys	 such	 kind	 of	 precision	 as	 the	 heavenly	sphere.224	The	second	construal	entails	the	stronger	claim	that	sphericity	 is	not	the	only	geometric	property	that	sublunary	objects	fail	to	instantiate	perfectly.225	One,	however,	need	not	follow	Kouremenos	in	attributing	to	Aristotle	the	utterly	skeptical	view	that	physical	objects	do	not	perfectly	instantiate	any	geometrical	property.226	For,	Aristotle	can	ground	his	realism	about	geometricals	(as	well	as	about	 arithmeticals)	 on	 the	 commonsensical	 notion	 of	 the	 solid,	 perfectly	exemplified	 in	 physical	 objects	 around	 us.	 Thus,	 if	 we	 endorse	 the	 second	reading	 of	 lines	 287b14-18,	 we	 may	 simply	 infer	 that	 there	 are	 no	 perfect	instantiations	of	the	various	specific	geometrical	objects	(spheres,	straight	lines,	circles,	etc.)	in	the	sublunary	world.			But	why	does	Menn	place	such	a	great	emphasis	on	the	objects	of	the	sublunary	world?	I	am	not	so	sure	that	Aristotle	means	to	exclude	them	from	his	discussion	in	the	M.3	passage.	After	all,	in	the	analogy	from	astronomy	(Meta.	M.3,	1077b22-3)	he	 tells	about	 theorems	 that	are	 just	about	moving	bodies	 (οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 
κινουµένων),	 not	 qua	 moving	 but	 only	 qua	 bodies	 (οὐχ ᾗ κινούµενα δὲ ἀλλ’ ᾗ 																																																								
223 Ὅτι µὲν οὖν σφαιροειδής ἐστιν ὁ κόσµος, δῆλον ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι κατ’ ἀκρίβειαν ἔντορνος οὕτως 
ὥστε µηθὲν µήτε χειρόκµητον ἔχειν παραπλησίως µήτ’ ἄλλο µηθὲν τῶν ἡµῖν ἐν ὀφθαλµοῖς 
φαινοµένων. Ἐξ ὧν γὰρ τὴν σύστασιν εἴληφεν, οὐδὲν οὕτω δυνατὸν ὁµαλότητα δέξασθαι καὶ 
ἀκρίβειαν ὡς ἡ τοῦ πέριξ σώµατος φύσις·  224	In	[Kouremenos	(2003),	fn.28,	p.476].	225	ibid.	226	A	claim	constantly	made	throughout	his	article.	See	esp.	the	abstract	in	[Kouremenos	(2003),	p.463].	
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σώµατα µόνον),	and	again	only	qua	surfaces	(πάλιν ᾗ ἐπίπεδα µόνον),	and	only	qua	lengths	 (ᾗ µήκη µόνον);	 and	qua	divisibles	 (i.e.	 just	 as	 continuous	quantities,	ᾗ 
διαιρετά);	 and	 qua	 indivisibles	 having	 position	 (i.e.	 just	 as	 points,	 ᾗ ἀδιαίρετα 
ἔχοντα δὲ θέσιν);	and	qua	indivisibles	alone	(i.e.	just	as	units,	ᾗ ἀδιαίρετα µόνον).	Αs	 the	 analogy	 makes	 clear,	 there	 can	 be	 statements	 about	 celestial	 bodies	regarding	their	volume,	their	shape,	their	delineations,	and	so	on,	without	having	to	postulate	separately	existing	planes,	lines,	and	solids.	Furthermore,	it	is	clear	from	 the	De	 Caelo	 that	 the	 celestial	 bodies	 do	 possess	 perfect	 sphericity.	 The	ideal	spheres	are	simply	the	spheres	of	the	superlunary	world.	As	for	the	other	solids,	they	may	be	thought	of	as	existing	potentially	within	those	spheres	in	the	
normal	sense	of	potentiality	(see	discussion	in	section	2.6.2).	Menn	points	to	the	right	direction	when	he	claims	that	in	the	M.3	passage,				
Aristotle does not introduce a potentiality-actuality opposition in talking about the white 
or about unity, but only in talking about geometricals such as tetrahedron, which are not 
attributes of any actual substance, since no actual substance is perfectly tetrahedral. 
[Menn, ‘Ιγ3’, p.27] 	According	 to	 his	 interpretation,	 however,	 geometricals	 are	 constituted	 of	intelligible	 matter;	 he	 claims	 that	 the	 ὑλικῶς in	 the	 M.3	 passage	 refers	 to	intelligible	matter:			
The ‘matter’ of which Aristotle speaks here is not Socrates' flesh and blood, but what he in 
some texts calls ‘intelligible matter’, the matter of geometrical things (‘some matter is 
sensible, some intelligible, sensible like bronze and wood and whatever matter is movable, 
intelligible what is present in the sensibles not qua sensibles, like the mathematicals’, 
Z.10, 1036a9-12). This will be bare extension--in the present case, three-dimensional 
extension--existing not separately from the sensibles, like the matter of Platonic or 
Speusippean mathematicals, but ‘in the sensibles not qua sensibles’; and this matter 
(unlike the matter of Platonic or Speusippean mathematicals, which is not potentially 
anything) is potentially divided along planes, spherical surfaces, or any other possible 
bounding surfaces. [Menn,	‘Ιγ3’,	pp.27-28]  	I	do	not	think	this	is	right.	The	M.3	passage	does	not	warrant	any	such	reference	to	 intelligible	matter.	 How	 should	 one	 then	 understand	 the	 role	 of	 intelligible	
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matter	 that	Menn	 is	 so	willing	 to	 identify	as	 the	 substratum	of	mathematicals?	One	ought	 to	distinguish	between	 the	mode	of	 existence	of	mathematicals	 and	the	way	the	mathematicians	study	them.	On	the	one	hand	we	have	a	claim	about	the	 metaphysical	 status	 of	 the	 mathematicals:	 they	 do	 not	 enjoy	 independent	existence	over	and	above	their	(actual	or	possible)	material	exemplifications;	on	the	 other	 hand	 we	 have	 a	 cognitive	 one:	 the	 mathematicians	 can	 acquire	 a	conception	of	mathematicals	without		invoking	the	matter	in	which	they	are	(or	can	 be)	 exemplified.	 The	 latter	 is	 a	 claim	 about	 how	 the	 mind	 thinks	 of	 the	mathematical	 entities	 and	 not	 about	 their	 metaphysical	 status;	 when	 they	become	the	objects	of	a	mathematician’s	consideration	they	do	have	intelligible	matter.227		When	 I	 claim	 that	 a	 perfect	 tetrahedron	 exists	 potentially	 within	 a	perfect	 celestial	 sphere,	 I	 am	not	making	a	 claim	about	 intelligible	matter.	The	matter	of	the	sphere	in	question	is	superlunary	matter.	The	potentially	existing	tetrahedron	can	simply	be	considered	qua	tetrahedron,	qua	a	solid	determinant.	When	the	potentially	existing	tetrahedron	is	considered	in	this	way	it	is	an	object	of	the	geometrician’s	consideration,	and	we	may	say	it	has	intelligible	matter.228			
[2.7.5]	My	interpretation	and	a	modern	analogue		Let	me	summarise	my	interpretation	thus	far:	the	physical	world	is	essentially	a	world	 of	 solids.	 Aristotle’s	 realism	 about	 geometrical	 entities	 is	 essentially	 a	realism	 about	 solids:	 either	 the	 complex	 solids	 around	 us,	 the	 not-so-easy-to-analyse	solids	of	the	sublunary	world,	or	the	solids	of	the	supelunary	world,	the	perfect	celestial	spheres	or	the	potentially	existing	solids	in	them.	I	see	no	reason	to	 deny	 that	 the	 latter,	 potentially	 in	 the	 proper	 sense	 of	 potentiality,	 do	 not	exhibit	 the	 requisite	 precision:	 that	 a	 tetrahedron,	 for	 example,	 existing	potentially	within	a	superlunary	sphere	is	not	perfectly	tetrahedral;	that	it	does	not	 have	 perfectly	 planar	 surfaces	 or	 that	 its	 edges	 are	 not	 perfectly	 straight.	Aristotle’s	 realism	with	 regard	 to	 solids	 is	 the	 answer	 to	 someone	who	argues	that	 there	 are	 no	 geometrical	 objects	 that	 perfectly	 satisfy	 the	 geometers’	definitions.	 Certain	 questions	 arise,	 however,	 when	 one	 focuses	 on	 the																																																									227	A	point	also	made	in	[Mignucci	(1987),	p.183].		228	For	this	understanding	of	the	role	of	intelligible	matter	see	also	[Lear	(1982),	p.182].		
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metaphysical	 status	of	 limit	 entities	 that	bound	or	 lie	within	a	body.	 	We	have	already	 discussed	 White’s	 account	 according	 to	 which	 limit	 entities	 within	 a	continuous	 body	 enjoy	 some	 kind	 of	 potential	 existence,	 as	 loci	 where	 the	body/stretch	 of	 magnitude	 could	 be	 divided.229	White,	 however,	 distinguishes	between	 the	 aforementioned	 limit	 entities,	 and	 those	 that	 bound	 a	 continuous	body.	 What	 can	 be	 said	 about	 the	 latter?	 Do	 they	 enjoy	 actual	 or	 potential	existence?	Michael	J.	White	thinks	the	former:		
On the other hand, the Aristotelian conception would seem to commit us to the actual (as 
opposed to the merely potential) existence of some limit entities, e.g. the surface of a body, 
the terminus of a line inscribed in a wax tablet. There is no indication that Aristotle 
conceives of such entities as somehow spatially indeterminate or extended: they are true 
limits in the sense that they possess zero measure (are not extended) in at least one 
dimension; but there is an obvious sense in which they are ‘objectively out there’, a real 
feature of the physical world. Aristotelian entities of this sort are assumable, I believe, to 
what Avrum Stroll, in a recent book on surfaces calls the ‘DS’ conception of surfaces. DS 
surfaces are geometrical or ‘abstractions’ in the sense that they possess zero measure or 
are unextended in-at least-one dimension. In other words, they are not corporeal in so far 
as ‘corporeality’ connotes possession of three dimensions. Yet DS surfaces are regarded as 
belonging to (and indeed as circumscribing and hence helping to define) the bodies or 
continuous stretches of magnitudes that they demarcate. [White (1992), pp.204-205; italics 
mine]  
	I	am	not	sure	that	White	succeds	in	illuminating	his	position	by	invoking	Avrum	Stroll’s	account.	The	key	passage	from	Stroll’s	book	is	the	following:	
The intuitive idea is that one wishes to say that a marble has a surface or that a lake has a 
surface and yet that this surface is not a physical part of the marble or the lake. We arrive 
at such a conception by a process that consists of the progressive thinning out of a 
physical surface until we are left with a kind of logical limit or conceptual limit to the 
object. But it is still the object’s surface that we are speaking about, not an interface that 
doesn’t belong to the object. [Stroll (1988), pp.46-47; italics mine] 
																																																								229		See,	e.g.,	[White	(1992),	p.204].	
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Stroll’s	 ‘DS’230	conception	 of	 surfaces	 is	 an	 attempt	 for	 reconciling	 a	 purely	geometric	 conception	 (two-dimensional	 surfaces)	 with	 physical	 reality:	 he	provides	us	with	an	account	of	how	we	can	get	 from	three–dimensional	bodies	found	 in	 nature	 to	 geometric	 skins,	 or	 limit	 entities.	 It	 seems	 that	 Stroll’s	conception	of	surfaces	is	consistent	with	the	commonsensical	claim	that	surfaces	are	‘parts	of’,	or	‘belong	to’	the	things	of	which	they	are	surfaces	of.	In	the	above	passage,	 Stroll	 seems	 to	 allude	 to	 a	Whiteheadian	 solution	 of	 the	 problem,	 by	invoking	the	idea	of	ever	thinner	layers	of	a	physical	object	‘until	we	are	left	with	a	kind	of	logical	limit	or	conceptual	limit	to	the	object’.231	A	detailed	exposition	of	the	 method–termed	 ‘extensive	 abstraction’	 by	 Whitehead–is	 provided	 in	 the	latter’s	‘La	théorie	relationniste	de	l'espace’,	an	essay	that	includes	an	application	of	 extensive	 abstraction	 to	 three-dimensional	 physical	 objects	 at	 various	distances	 from	one	another.232	The	general	 idea	 is	 to	 identify	points,	 lines,	 and	planes	 in	 a	 continuum	 with	 ‘abstractive	 sets’,	 sets	 containing	 infinitely	 many	converging,	 nested,	 extended	 entities.	 Consider	 for	 example	 a	 cone–shaped	physical	object.	Then,	in	Whiteheadian	fashion,	its	tip	is	
… identifiable for all practical or theoretical purposes with an abstractive set  of extended 
parts of the cone which form an infinite nested series honing in on the place where the 
cone ends - and likewise for every other inner or outer boundary of a part of the cone, or of 
																																																								230	Where	 ‘DS’	 according	 to	 Stroll	 stands	 ‘for	 the	 conception	 that	 holds	 that	 surfaces	 belong	 to	their	corresponding	bodies’.	See	[Stroll	(1988),	pp.50-51]	231	ibid.	232	For	a	succinct	exposition	of	Whitehead’s	method	and	its	place	within	the	history	of	topology	consult	 [Zimmerman	 (1996)].	 In	 this	 article,	W.D.	 Zimmerman	notes	 that	Whitehead's	method	was	‘very	well-received,	quickly	adopted	by	the	likes	of	Bertrand	Russell,	Jean	Nicod,	and	Alfred	Tarski’	 [Zimmerman	 (1966),	 p.162].	 Interestingly	 enough,	 Zimmerman	 cites	 a	 passage	 from	[Tarski	 (1956)]	 where	 Tarski	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 Lesniewski	 had	 at	 least	 been	 thinking	 of	something	 along	 the	 lines	 of	Whitehead's	method	 independently:	 ‘Some	 years	 ago	 Lesniewski	suggested	the	problem	of	establishing	the	foundations	of	a	geometry	of	solids,	understanding	by	this	term	a	system	of	geometry	destitute	of	such	geometrical	figures	as	points,	lines,	and	surfaces,	and	admitting	as	figures	only	solids...’	(In	[Tarski	(1956),	p.24],	included	in	[Zimmerman	(1996,	p.174],	underlining	mine).	
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any other extended body. [Zimmerman (1996), p.162]233  In	 such	 a	 Whiteheadian	 account,	 however,	 the	 abstractive	 set	 is	 an	 unending	sequence	of	solids.	As	Laguna	explains,	 ‘there	can	not	be	a	smallest	solid	of	the	set;	because,	if	there	were,	any	such	solid	which	it	contained	would	be	contained	by	all	 the	solids	of	 the	set.’234	Thus,	 I	 think	White	 is	mistaken	 in	explaining	 the	actual	existence	of	the	limit	entities	that	bound	or	demarcate	a	physical	object–such	as	the	tip	of	the	cone–by	invoking	Stroll’s	(or	rather	Whitehead’s	account).	On	 Stroll’s	 (or	 better	 Whitehead’s)	 account	 it	 seems	 that	 those	 limit	 entities	enjoy	the	kind	of	potentiality	that	Aristotle	attributes	to	infinity	and	the	void,235																																																										233	The	 example	 can	 be	 found	 in	 [Zimmerman	 (1996),	 p.162].	 According	 to	 Jean	 Nicod	 an	abstractive	 class	 is	 ‘defined	 by	 a	 class	 of	 volumes	 such	 that	 any	 one	 of	 two	 of	 its	members	 is	either	included	in	the	other	or	includes	it,	and	no	volume	is	included	in	all	its	members.’	[Nicod	(1930),	p.40].	As	Nicod	cautions,	however,	 ‘these	conditions	are	not	sufficient	to	guarantee	that	all	 volumes	of	 an	abstractive	 class	would	have	only	one	point	 in	 common.	They	might	have	as	their	common	nucleus	not	a	volume	but	a	line	or	a	surface.	Thus	an	abstractive	class	formed	from	discs	of	a	constant	diameter	and	diminishing	thickness	converges	to	a	circle;	an	abstractive	class	generated	by	a	series	of	cylinders	of	constant	height	and	decreasing	diameter	would	reduced	it	to	a	line	segment	(the	altitude).’	In	[Nicod	(1930),	pp.40-41].	234	In	[Laguna	(1922),	p.453].	Laguna	provides	a	much	clearer	exposition	of	Whitehead’s	method	of	extensive	abstraction	in	[Laguna	(1922)].	235	It	seems	that	an	account	of	the	metaphysical	status	of	limit	entities	bounding	a	physical	body	or	a	continuous	stretch	of	magnitude	can	be	reformulated	as	an	account	of	limit	entities	within	a	magnitude,	 if	we	take	into	consideration	two	things:	1)	the	fact	that	for	Aristotle	the	world	is	a	massive	continuous	magnitude	and	2)	Aristotle’s	notion	of	potentiality	pertaining	to	the	infinite	and	 the	 void.	 In	 fact,	 even	 though	White	 attributes	 actual	 being	 to	 lower-dimensional	 entities	bounding	a	body,	he–somewhat	surprisingly–offers	an	account	of	such	entities	that	can	better	be	understood	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 my	 interpretation,	 namely	 as	 entities	 enjoying	 potential2	 being	within	a	continuous	stretch	of	magnitude:	‘Consider	a	three-dimensional	body	A,	surrounded	by	its	 spatial	 environment	 B.	 We	 consider	 a	 three-dimensional	 region	 i	 of	 spatial	 extension	 that	clearly	contains	some	of	A	and	some	of	B	and	increasingly	small	regions	i′	nested	in	i.	According	to	 the	 doctrine	 of	 geometrical	 realism	 advanced	 by	 Aristotle,	 there	 can	 be	 constructed	 a	monotonic	non-increasing	sequence	of	such	regions	which	converges	to	a	two-dimensional	limit	entity,	 i.e.	 the	 (geometrical)	 surface	 of	 A	 or	 interface	 between	 A	 and	 its	 surrounding	 spatial	environment.’	 In	 [White	 (1992),	 p.287].	 If,	 however,	White	 is	 alluding	 to	 Stroll’s	 conception	 of	surfaces,	then	there	cannot	be	a	smallest	region	such	that	it	is	identical	to	the	interface	between	A	 and	 its	 surroundings.	 At	 the	 very	 best,	 this	 two–dimensional	 entity	 enjoys	 the	 potentiality	
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that	is,	they	can	progressively	come	close	to	being	actualised,	beyond	any	given	limit.		This	 account	 can	 also	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 claim	 in	 Meta.	 M.2.	 that	 lower–dimensional	entities	ought	not	to	be	understood	as	(the	actual)	form	or	shape	of	bodies:	
Again, body is a sort of substance; for it already has in a sense completeness. But how can 
lines be substances? Neither as a form or shape, as the soul perhaps is, nor as matter, like 
body; for we have no experience of anything that can be put together out of lines or planes 
or points, while if these had been a sort of material substance, we should have observed 
things which could be put together out of them.	[Meta. M.2, 1077a31-36; Ross’ trans.]	 A	 similar	 account	 can	 be	 provided	 for	 the	metaphysical	 status	 of	 limit	 entities	within	 a	 body:	 one	 can,	 for	 example,	 begin	 from	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 sphere	 and	replace	the	notion	of	an	actually	existing	point	in	the	centre	of	that	sphere	with	a	sequence	of	enclosed	spheres	that	gradually	converge	to	that	point.	If	we	 are	 to	 consider	 the	M.3	passage	 as	Aristotle’s	 final	word	on	 the	mode	of	existence	 of	 mathematicals,	 then	 his	 curious	 example	 about	 the	 geometer	studying	a	man	qua	solid,	points	towards	a	conception	of	geometry	that	is	based	on	 the	 commonsensical	 and	 readily	 available	 notion	 of	 the	 solid.	 Such	 a	geometry,	 combined	 with	 the	 claim	 that	 Aristotle	 attributes	 some	 kind	 of	potential	(in	terms	of	potentiality2)	existence	to	the	limit	entities	bounding	and	within	 a	 physical	 body,	 combined	 with	 ‘his	 intuitive	 sense	 of	 a	 limit’236	has	 a	closer	 affinity	 to	 modern	Whiteheadian	 or	 Tarskian	 geometries	 than	 it	 has	 to	Euclidean	ones.	 In	a	sense,	 this	peculiar	kind	of	potentiality	ascribed	to	 lower–dimensional	 entities	 has	 not	 so	 much	 eliminated	 them	 but	 analysed	 them	 in	terms	of	more	fundamental	geometrical	entities,	namely	(sets	of	)	solids.	The	fact	that	no	human	possesses	any	of	the	many	determinate	solid	shapes	need	not	be	a	problem	 for	 the	modern	 geometer	with	 Aristotelian	 inspirations.	 Theodore	 de	Laguna	developed	such	a	geometry,	beginning	with	 ‘solid’	and	the	relation	 ‘can																																																																																																																																																															Aristotle	 ascribes	 to	 the	 infinite	 and	 the	 void:	 it	 can	 become	 as	 ‘thin’	 as	 possible	without	 ever	becoming	an	actually	existing	surface.			236	See	discussion	in	section	[2.7.3].	
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connect’	 as	 the	 fundamental	 notions	 and	 utilising	 (a	 modified	 form	 of)	Whitehead’s	 method	 of	 ‘extensive	 abstraction’	 to	 give	 an	 account	 of	 points	 in	terms	 of	 an	 unending	 sequence	 of	 solids.	 The	 key	 idea	 that	 lies	 in	 utilising	Aristotle’s	notion	of	potentiality2	with	respect	to	lower-dimensional	geometrical	objects	 is	 that	 the	 geometrical	 formulas	 about	 them	 are	 descriptive	 not	 of	actually	existing	2-dimensional,	1-dimensional,	or	0-dimensional	entities,	but	of		sets	or	sequences	of	3-dimensional	objects	that	converge	to	the	aforementioned	entities	asymptotically.			
[2.7.6]	Further	suggestions		Although	the	above	interpretation	of	Aristotelian	limit	entities	was	described	as	a	Whiteheadian	one,	it	has	roots	that	go	back	at	least	to	the	scholastic	tradition	and	 the	 discussions	 regarding	 the	 problem	of	 contact	 between	 a	 sphere	 and	 a	plane	 (which	 in	 turn	 is	 based	 on	 Aristotle’s	 comment	 that	 a	 bronze	 sphere	touches	 a	 line	 at	 a	 point	 in	 De	 Anima	 I.1,	 403a10-16).	 The	 complicated	discussions	 that	 arose	 around	 this	 problem	 took	 either	 a	 straightforwardly	realist	 stance	 towards	 limit	 entities	 (because	 they	 were	 deemed	 necessary	 to	explain	contact)	or	a	more	anti–realist	approach	(based	on	Ockham’s	account	of	contact).	 If	 one	were	 to	 save	White’s	 interpretation	 of	 limit	 entities	 as	 entities	that	actually	determine	and	help	to	define	more	complex	ones,	then	one	should	look	perhaps	to	the	positions	of		Francisco	Suarez	and	Franz	Brentano	who	rely	extensively	 on	 Aristotle’s	 ‘constructivist	 conception	 of	 point’	 in	Meta.	 B.5.	 As	Zimmerman	notes,	they	both	advocate	the	following:		
(i) Extended objects have indivisible parts, (ii) every extended object (including each of 
the infinitely many proper parts of a solid body) is surrounded by a ‘skin’ of point-sized 
parts which constitutes its two-dimensional surface, (iii) distinct extended objects touch 
when two such indivisible boundaries coincide, and (iv) the three-dimensionally extended 
parts of a thing are not made up out of indivisibles alone but also contain some ‘atomless 
gunk’, a substance all of whose parts have proper parts.’ [Zimmerman (1996), p.158]  According	to	this	reading,	continuous	stretches	of	magnitudes	are	surrounded	by	determinate	 lower–dimensional	 entities	which	 enjoy	 actual	 existence:	 a	 three–dimensional	 sphere,	 for	 example,	 is	 surrounded	 by	 an	 actually	 existing	 two–
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dimensional	 surface,	 an	 one–dimensional	 line	 by	 two	 actually	 exisitng	 zero–dimensional	 points,	 and	 so	 on.	 This	 interpretation	 has	 to	 accommodate,	however,	Aristotle’s	claim	in	Meta	M.2	that	mathematicals	cannot	actually	exist	as	 forms	 or	 shapes	 of	 substances:	 is	 that	 Brentanian	 view	 compatible	 with	Aristotle’s	 claim	 that	 lower-dimensional	 entities	 cannot	 exist	 in	 the	 sensibles?	For,	I	understand	that	the	claim	that	every	body	is	surrounded	by	an	actual	two-dimensional	surface	is	equivalent	to	the	claim	that	this	surface	is	in	the	body	as	some	sort	of	an	actual	constituent	of	 it	 (that	 is,	 in	 the	 first	 sense	of	 ‘in-ness’	 in	
Physics	Δ.3,	210a14-24,	where	‘in-ness’	is	understood	as	parthood).237 But	even	if	one	 does	 accommodate	 this	 clain	 one	 has	 to	 provide	 the	 reader	 with	 a	satisfactory	 analysis	 of	 Aristotle’s	 notion	 of	 contact. 238 	According	 to	 my–Ockhamist	if	you	like–preferences,	contact	does	not	require	the	actual	existence	of	limit	entities.	I	cannot	argue	for	this	claim	here	but	I	can	point	to	a	tradition	of	followers	of	Ockham	such	as	Adam	Wodeham	and	John	Buridan,	both	of	whom	relied	on	methods	of	proportional	division	ad	infinitum	to	explain	how	the	parts	of	divisible	bodies	can	be	said	to	touch	each	other.239		Moreover,	 one	 can	 argue	 that	 the	 interpretation	 I	 am	 advancing	 was	conceptually	 available	 to	 Aristotle	 not	 only	 because	 it	makes	 heavy	 use	 of	 his	
																																																								237	See,	 for	 example	 Chisholm’s	 understanding	 of	 Brentanian	 boundaries	 in	 [Chisholm	 (1983),	pp.90-91].	238	I	 find	 the	 contemporary	 attempts	 to	 explain	 Aristotle’s	 understanding	 of	 contact	 extremely	disappointing,	not	least	because	they	do	not	take	into	account	the	vast	scholastic	tradition	on	the	matter.	For	a	contemporary	contribution	that		is	based	on	Bolzano’s	‘monstrous	neighbors’	but	is	nevertheless	adequate	enough	as	an	introduction	to	the	problem	of	contact	in	Aristotle,	consult	[Bartha	(2001)].			239	Cf.	the	following	passage	from	Wodeham:		
For example, <a sphere would touch a plane> by means of its <lower> half, constructed traversely; 
and by means of a half of that same <half> constructed in parallel - <that is>, the lower half 
similarly reaching the plane, and so on ad infinitum, as can be proven by argument and also using 
the examples introduced above here. [Wodeham: De indiv. 2.3.14; Wood’s trans.]  For	a	helpful	discussion	on	the	Ockhamist	tradition	on	contact	consult	[Zupko	(1993)],	where	the	above	and	other	passages	are	discussed	extensively.	
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notion	 of	 potential	 infinity240	but	 also	 because	 Aristotle	 was	 acquainted	 with	Eudoxus’	 astronomical	 model	 of	 concentic	 spheres.	 According	 to	 Eudoxus	 the	complex,	 apparent	 paths	 of	 the	 various	 celestial	 bodies	 are	 the	 result	 of	 the	circular	motions	of	 a	 certain	number	of	 concentric	 spheres:	 the	 spheres	 are	of		different	size,	one	inside	another,	they	move	about	a	diameter	as	axis	in	different	though	 uniform	 speeds	 with	 the	 earth	 at	 rest	 at	 the	 common	 centre	 of	 those	spheres.	 Aristotle	 transformed	 this	 purely	 geometrical	 theory	 into	 a	 more	mechanical	 one,	 by	 arguing	 that	 the	 spheres	 need	 to	 be	 in	 contact	 with	 one	another	 so	 that	 they	 would	 consitute	 a	 continuous	 system	 of	 spheres.241	As	 a	concluding	 remark,	 there	 is	 a	 suggestion	 by	 Sambursky	 according	 to	 which	Aristotle’s	 account	 of	 the	 potential	 existence	 of	 limit	 entities	 bounding	 a	continuous	 stretch	 of	 magnitude	 might	 have	 been	 picked	 up	 by	 the	 Stoics,	 in	their	attempt	to	remove	limit	entities	from	reality.242						 	
																																																								240	Which,	as	White	points	out,	was	merely	a	 layman’s	guide	to	Eudoxus’	method	of	exhuastion.	[White	(1992),	p.144]	241	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	theory	of	concentric	spheres	in	Eudoxus	and	Aristotle	one	can	consult	[Heath	(2013)].	Aristotle	describes	the	Eudoxean	system	of	concetric	spheres	in	Meta.	Λ.8	1073b17-1074a14;	 a	more	 detailed	 source	 of	 information	 is	 the	 commentaty	 of	 Simplicius	 on	Book	II	of	De	Caelo.		242	Aristotle’s	conception	of	limit	entities	had	a	major	influence	on	the	Stoic	conception	of	spatial	magnitude.	 Both	 Aristotle	 and	 the	 Stoics	 shared	 a	 view	 of	 	 spatial	 magnitude	 as	 something	infinitely	 divisible	 (see	 [White	 (1992)]	 for	 a	 detailed	 discussion,	 esp.	 ch.7).	 According	 to	Sambursky,	the	Stoics	‘discarded	the	conception	of	the	discrete	surface	of	a	body,	or	generally	a	distinct	boundary	of	n-1	 dimensions	 forming	 the	 surface	of	 a	 figure	of	n	 dimensions	 (n=1,2,3),	and	 replaced	 it	 by	 an	 infinite	 sequence	 of	 boundaries	 defining	 the	 surfaces	 of	 inscribed	 and	circumscribed	figures	which	converge	from	both	sides	to	the	figure	in	question		and	thus	define	it	as	a	dynamic	entity.’	 In	[Sambursky	(1959),	p.96].	White	rightfully	complains	that	Sambursky’s	replacing	of	the	‘distinct	boundary’	of	a	body	by	an	‘infinite	sequence	of	boundaries	converging	to	that	 boundary’	 seems	 entirely	 Pickwickian;	 however,	 Sambursky’s	 account	 can	 be	 saved	 if	instead	 of	 sequence	 of	 boundaries	 we	 speak	 of	 sequences	 of	 three-dimensional	 parts	 that	converge	to	the	boundary	in	question	(à	la	Whitehead).			
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Chapter	 3:	 Aristotle	 on	 the	 metaphysical	 status	 of	 numbers:	 An	
exploration			
	Number	is	the	easiest	of	all	things	to	remember.	(Rhetoric	Γ.9,	1409b5-6)	
	
[3.1]	Introduction:	A	Fregean	Aristotle?	 	
 It	 seems	 that	 in	 ordinary	 language,	 number-words	 function	 primarily	 as	adjectives.243	We	say	that	my	desk	has	wooden	legs,	but	equally	well	that	it	has	four	 legs.	Frege	acknowledges	 this	as	he	 sets	out	 to	 introduce	his	own	view	of	number:	
In language, numbers most commonly appear in adjectival form and attributive 
construction in the same sort of way as the words hard or heavy or red, which have for 
their meanings properties of external things. It is natural to ask whether we must think of 
the individual numbers too as such properties, and whether, accordingly, the concept of 
Number can be classed along with that, say, of colour. [Foundations, §21, p.27]244  If	 number-words	 play	 an	 adjectival	 role	 in	 ascriptions	 of	 number,	 it	 is	 quite	natural	 to	 follow	 Frege	 in	 asking	 the	 following	 question:	 Should	 we	 think	 of	numbers	 as	 properties	 of	 things?245	The	 adjectival	 function	 of	 number-words	encourages	 a	 view	 of	 number-words	 as	 first-level	 predicates,	 and	 hence	 as	standing	 for	 properties	 of	 things.	 However,	 this	 account	 of	 number	 has	 been	neglected	 (at	 best)	 in	 view	 of	 the	 supposedly	 decisive	 arguments	 against	 it	formulated	by	Frege	in	the	Foundations	of	Arithmetic.	Most	of	Frege’s	arguments	are	designed	to	show	that	attributions	of	number	cannot	have	the	same	logical	form	as,	for	example,	the	attributions	of	colour.	The	following	passage	from	the	
Foundations	encapsulates	Frege’s	position:		
																																																								243	I	say	‘primarily’	because	number-words	occur	in	two	forms:	1)	as	adjectives,	as	in	ascriptions	of	numbers	(sentences	that	begin	with	‘There	are’	followed	by	a	number-adjective,	e.g.	‘There	are	four	 books	 on	 my	 desk’),	 and	 2)	 as	 nouns,	 as	 in	 most	 number-theoretic	 propositions	 (e.g.	‘2+2=4’).	244	The	 failure	 to	distinguish	between	use	and	mention	appears	 in	 the	original.	All	excerpts	are	from	Austin’s	translation	of	Frege’s	Die	Grundlagen	der	Arithmetik.	245	Notice	that	Frege	speaks	of	‘external’	(=perceptible?)	things.	
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[T]he content of a statement of number is an assertion about a concept. This is perhaps 
clearest with the number 0. If I say ‘Venus has 0 moons’, there simply does not exist any 
moon or agglomeration of moons for anything to be asserted of; but what happens is that a 
property is assigned to the concept ‘moon of Venus’, namely that of including nothing 
under it. If I say ‘the King’s carriage is drawn by four horses’, then I assign the number 
four to the concept ‘horse that draws the King’s carriage’. [Foundations, §46, p.59; 
underlining mine] 
 The	Fregean	rejection	of	numbers	as	first-order	properties	of	things	is	taken	for	granted	 without	 much	 justification	 by	 two	 of	 the	 foremost	 commentators	 of	Aristotle’s	 philosophy	 of	 number,	Mignucci	 and	 Lear.246	Mignucci	 in	 particular,	who	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 most	 detailed	 account	 of	 Aristotle’s	 philosophy	 of	number	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	 scholarship,	 is	 clearly	 inspired	 by	 Fregean-style	arguments	in	his	analysis	when	he	writes:	 
Even if one limits oneself to natural numbers – as Aristotle does – it is difficult, since 
Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic to think, that numbers are affections of objects. What is 
the object to which 12 applies? Of course, we can say that the Apostles were wise and that 
the Apostles were 12. But it is only a likeness of surface grammar247 that could lead one to 
think that 12 is a predicate of the Apostles in the same way as wise is. From the fact that 
the Apostles were wise we can infer that John was wise if we know that John was an 
Apostle. The parallel inference of John was 12 from the Apostles were 12 is nonsense. 
Shall we dismiss Aristotle’s view without further ado? [Mignucci (1987), p.188; 
underlining mine] Mignucci’s	 interpretation	 can	be	 summarised	as	 follows:	numbers	 for	Aristotle	are	 not	 first-level,	 but	 second-level	 concepts,248	since	 they	 are	 supposed	 to	 be	
																																																								246	In	 [Lear	 (1982)]	 and	 [Mignucci	 (1987)].	 Lear	 writes:	 ‘The	 main	 obstacle	 from	 giving	 a	successful	account	of	arithmetic	 is	 that	number	 is	not	a	property	of	an	object.’	He	 immediately	points	 to	 Frege’s	 Foundations	 of	 Arithmetic	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 substantiate	 his	 claim.	 See	 [Lear	(1982),	p.183].	247	Mr	Denyer	has	pointed	out	to	me	that	the	expression	‘the	Apostles	are	twelve’	is	not	idiomatic	English.	So	there	might	be	no	likeness	of	surface	grammar	after	all!	248	The	term	‘concept’	is	a	convenient	term	that	covers	both	properties	and	relations.		
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involved	in	expressing	a	property	of	a	sortal	concept,249	the	property	of	having	so	
many	 instances.	 What	 goes	 on	 when	 we	 ascribe	 a	 number	 to	 something	 -	 as	when,	for	example,	we	say	‘the	Apostles	are	12’?	According	to	Mignucci’s	Fregean	analysis,	this	is	an	assertion	of	second-level,	ascribing	a	property	to	a	first-level	concept.	 The	 subject	 of	 the	 assertion	 is	 the	 concept	 is	 an	 Apostle,	 and	 the	predicate	 is,	 in	 effect,	 is	 a	 concept	with	 12	 instances.	 In	 what	 follows,	 I	 would	proceed	 to	unearth	 the	Fregean	presuppositions	 that	guide	Mignucci’s	 analysis	and	try	to	show	two	things:	first,	that	not	all	Fregean	arguments	against	numbers	as	first-order	predicates	are	sound,	and,	second,	that	there	are	serious	textual	as	well	as	contextual	reasons	against	the	view	that	Aristotle	held	a	Fregean	account	of	number.			 	
																																																								249	In	 speaking	 about	 sortals	 I	 follow	 P.F.	 Strawson;	 in	 his	 work	 Individuals:	 An	 Essay	 in	
Descriptive	Metaphysics,	 Strawson	 espouses	 a	 view	 of	 sortals	 as	 universals:	 ‘A	 sortal	 universal	supplies	 a	 principle	 for	 distinguishing	 and	 counting	 individual	 particulars	which	 it	 collects.’	 In	[Strawson	(1964),	p.168].	Some	familiar	examples	of	sortals:	horse,	apple	and	man.	
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[3.2]	Frege’s	arguments	against	numbers	as	properties	of	perceptibles	
 
[3.2.1]	A	first	argument		In	the	first	of	these	passages,	Frege	argues	against	the	classification	of		numbers	alongside	 colours	 as	 attributes	 of	 perceptible	 things, 250 	because	 numerical	predication	is	different	from	colour	predication:		
 
Is it not in a totally different sense that we speak of a tree as having 1000 leaves and again 
as having green leaves? The green colour we ascribe to each leaf, but not the number 
1000. If we call all the leaves of a tree taken together its foliage, then the foliage too is 
green, but it is not 1000. To what then does the property 1000 belong? It almost looks as 
though it belongs neither to any single one of the leaves, nor to the totality of them all; is it 
possible that it does not really belong to things in the external world at all? [Foundations, 
§22, p.28] 
 To	understand	this	argument	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	two	kinds	of	predicates,	distributive	 ones	 and	 collective	 ones.	 A	 predicate	 like	 ‘…is	 green’	 is	distributive	in	that	it	holds	of	some	objects	only	if	it	holds	individually	for	each	one	 of	 them.	 In	 a	 sentence	 like	 ‘The	 leaves	 are	 green’,	 the	 predicate	 ‘green’	applies	 distributively,	 that	 is,	 any	 leave	 is	 green.	 Non-distributive	 or	 collective	predicates,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 are	possessed	by	 two	or	more	 objects	 together,	but	 by	 none	 of	 them	 individually:	 e.g.	 Russell	 and	Whitehead	 wrote	 Principia	
Mathematica	 (together);	 Castor	 and	 Pollux	 were	 twins.	 Consider	 the	 sentence	‘The	 leaves	of	 the	tree	are	1000’.	Although	we	ascribe	the	green	colour	to	each	single	 leaf	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case,	 according	 to	 Frege,	 with	 the	 number	 1000.	 If	‘1000’	 were	 a	 proper	 predicate,	 then	 it	 would	 function	 similarly	 to	 other	predicates,	 that	 is	 distributively.	 Since	 the	 predicate	 ‘1000’	 displays	 quite	different	 behaviour	 from	 ordinary	 predicates,	 like	 colour	 ones,	 it	 cannot	 be	 a	predicate	of	‘things	in	the	external	world’,	Frege	tells	us.	As	many	scholars	have	
																																																								250	We	also	count	non-perceptible	things	such	as	ideas	and	unicorns.	
		
136	
observed,251	‘Frege's	 error	 here	 is	 that	 he	 glosses	 over	 the	 familiar	 distinction	between	 distributive	 and	 collective	 predicates.	 But	 why	 is	 it	 a	 mistake	 if	 one	takes	number-terms	 to	 function	as	collective	predicates?	And	we	can	push	 this	question	 a	 bit	 further:	 Is	 it	 true	 that	 there	 can	 be	 no	 account	 whatsoever	 of	numerical	 predicates	 which	 analyses	 them	 as	 ordinary	 (level-1)	 collective	predicates,	that	is	as	being	true	of	objects?	If	there	is	such	an	account,	then	Frege	is	 not	 justified	 in	 asserting	 that	numerical	 predicates	 cannot	be	of	 level-1,	 and	that	the	sentence	‘The	leaves	of	the	tree	are	1000’	must	be	analysed	as	a	level-2	predication,	that	is,	as	asserting	of	the	concept	‘…is	a	leaf	of	the	tree’	that	it	has	1000	instances.252	As	we	shall	see,	such	an	account	is	provided	by	Socrates	in	the	
Hippias	Major.																																																									251	For	a	more	detailed	discussion	one	can	consult	the	following	works:	[Lambros	(1976),	pp.381-383],	[Oliver&Smiley	(2013),	pp.71-72],	[Ganeri	(1996),	pp.114-115].	252	As,	 for	 example,	 Jonardon	Ganeri	 remarks	 in	 [Ganeri	 (1996),	 p.115].	 According	 to	 a	 certain	reading	 of	 Frege’s	 semantics	 of	 plural	 terms	 advanced	 by	 Dummett,	 the	 latter	 function	predicatively.	Thus,	Dummett	 says:	 ‘A	plural	noun	phrase,	 even	when	preceded	by	 the	definite	article,	 cannot	 be	 functioning	 analogously	 to	 a	 singular	 term.	 There	 are,	 of	 course,	 complex	objects;	 but	 their	 continued	 existence	 depends	 on	 the	maintenance	 of	 some	 relation	 between	their	components	[....]	But	a	plural	subject	of	predication	or	ascription	cannot	stand	for	any	such	composite	object,	 both	because	 it	presupposes	no	 relation	between	 the	objects	 alluded	 to,	 and	because	it	determines	which	those	objects	are,	in	a	way	in	which	no	composite	object	is	uniquely	articulable	 into	 components.	 There	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 a	 'plurality',	 which	 is	 the	 misbegotten	invention	 of	 a	 faulty	 logic:	 it	 is	 only	 as	 referring	 to	 a	 concept	 that	 a	 plural	 phrase	 can	 be	understood,	because	only	a	concept-word	admits	a	plural.	But	to	say	that	it	refers	to	a	concept	is	to	say	that,	under	a	correct	analysis,	the	phrase	is	seen	to	figure	predicatively.	Thus	'All	whales	are	mammals',	correctly	analysed,	has	the	form	'If	anything	is	a	whale,	it	is	a	mammal',	and	'The	Kaiser's	 carriage	 is	 drawn	 by	 four	 horses'	 the	 form	 'There	 are	 four	 objects	 each	 of	which	 is	a	
horse	that	draws	the	Kaiser's	carriage'.’	 In	[Dummett	(1991),	p.93;	his	 italics].	But	there	is	some	tension	in	Frege’s	semantics	of	plural	terms	that	has	been	brought	into	light	in	a	paper	by	Alex	Oliver.	Oliver–while	discussing	Dummett’s	analysis	of	Frege’s	semantics	of	plural	terms–brings	to	our	attention	Fregean	passages	like	the	following:	'on	the	other	hand,	the	phrase	"the	Romans"	in	the	sentence	"the	Romans	conquered	Gaul"	is	to	be	regarded	as	a	proper	name,	for	here	we	are	not	 saying	 of	 each	Roman	 that	 he	 has	 conquered	Gaul;	we	 are	 speaking	 of	 the	Roman	people,	which	is	to	be	regarded	logically	as	an	object'	[Oliver	(1994),	pp.75-76].	It	seems	that	in	passages	like	 the	 above	 Frege’s	 thesis	 is	 that	 when	 a	 plural	 description	 is	 combined	 with	 a	 collective	predicate	 like	 ‘conquered	Gaul’	 the	description	 is	 a	proper	name	 standing	 for	 a	whole!	 [op.cit.,	p.76].	Thus,	 applied	 to	 the	above	example,	 the	phrase	 ‘the	 leaves	of	 the	 tree’	 is	 a	proper	name	
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[3.2.2]	A	second	argument	
	Another	well	known	argument	of	Frege	is	the	following:	
 
If I give someone a stone with the words: Find the weight of this, I have given him 
precisely the object he is to investigate. But if I place a pile of playing cards in his hands 
with the words: Find the number of these, this does not tell him whether I wish to know 
the number of cards, or of complete packs of cards, or even say of honour cards at skat. To 
have given him the pile in his hands is not yet to have given him completely the object he 
is to investigate; I must add some further word - cards, or packs, or honours. Nor can we 
say that in this case the number words exist in the same thing side by side, as different 
colours do. I can point to the patch of each individual colour without saying a word, but I 
cannot in the same way point to the individual members. If I can call the same object red 
and green with equal right, it is a sure sign that the object named is not what really has the 
green colour; for that we must first get a surface which is green only. Similarly, an object 
to which I can ascribe different numbers with equal right is not what really has a number. 
[Foundations, §22, pp.28-29]  
 
 Frege’s	argument	seems	to	be	 the	 following:	 from	the	 fact	 that	an	ascription	of	number	 ‘involves’	a	concept,	 it	 follows	that	an	ascription	of	number	is	 ‘about’	a	concept	 –	 or	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 concept	 itself	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 numerical	predication.	 Is	 Frege	 right?	 It	 seems	 that	 Frege’s	 conclusion,	 namely	 that	 the	bearers	 of	 numerical	 properties	 cannot	 be	 objects,	 does	 not	 follow.	 I	 do	 not	disagree	that	we	often	have	to	supply	a	concept	to	clarify	which	entities	we	are	counting;	 in	many	cases	using	a	bare	demonstrative	will	not	 suffice.	Thus,	Kris	McDaniel	offers	a	first	response	to	Frege’s	argument	above:			
If I hand you some cards and merely ask you, ‘how many of them are there?’, you will 
probably say ‘fifty-four’ since the natural interpretation of ‘them’ is one in which ‘them’ 
refers to the cards. But if I tell you then that the answer is not ‘fifty-four’ you will struggle 
to answer correctly unless I clue you in on what the ‘them’ referred to in the context of my 																																																																																																																																																														standing	for	a	whole	when	it	is	combined	with	the	numerical	collective	predicate	‘…is	1000’;	on	a	certain	reading	then,	Frege’s	thesis	is	dangerously	close	to	that	of	Mill,	who	asserts	that	numbers	are	properties	of	complex	wholes.	[op.cit.,	p.77].	I	say	more	on	Mill’s	view	of	number	later	in	this	chapter.	
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utterance. (Perhaps ‘them’ referred in that context to the suits, in which case the correct 
answer was ‘four’.) [McDaniel (2013), p.218] 
 Kris	McDaniel	quickly	points	out	that	the	case	is	similar	with	colours.	If	I	ask	you	‘What	colour	is	this?’,	you	will	not	be	in	a	position	to	answer	my	question	unless	you	know	which	object	I	am	pointing	at.	I	can	give	you	a	hint	by	telling	you	that	‘this’	 referred’	 to	my	 sweater.	 Shall	 we	 infer	 from	 this	 that	 colours	 should	 be	attributed	not	to	sweaters	but	to	concepts	of	sweaters?253			 	
																																																								253See	[McDaniel	(2013),	p.219].	
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[3.3]	A	Fregean	reading	of	Phys.	Δ.12,	220b10-12 	Let	us	consider	the	following	passage	from	the	Physics:	
The number of a hundred horses and that of a hundred men is one and the same, but the 
things of which it is the number are different-the horses are different from the men.254 
[Phys. Δ.12, 220b10-12; Hussey’s trans.] What	goes	on	when	we	ascribe	a	number	to	something	-	as	when,	 for	example,	we	say	‘there	are	100	horses	in	the	field’?	As	we	have	already	seen,	according	to	Mignucci’s	 Fregean	 analysis,	 this	 is	 an	 assertion	 of	 second-level,	 ascribing	 a	property	 to	 a	 first-level	 concept.	 The	 subject	 of	 the	 assertion	 is	 the	 concept	 a	
horse	in	the	field,	and	the	predicate	is,	is	a	concept	with	100	instances:	
If a Fregean terminology were allowed, Aristotle’s view could be clarified by saying that 
mathematical numbers are not first-level, but second-level concepts, since they are 
supposed to be involved in expressing a property of a sortal concept. If ‘a hundred horses’ 
means that the concept horse has a hundred instances, the mathematical number 100 
contributes essentially to express such a property. [Mignucci (1987), p.198]	 To	 properly	 understand	 Mignucci’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 passage,	 the	 reader	needs	to	follow	closely	Frege’s	arguments	such	as	the	ones	discussed	previously	in	this	chapter.	Mignucci	perhaps	wishes	to	say	something	along	these	lines:	no	individual	horse	(an	entity	of	level-0)	can	be	said	to	be	100;	each	horse	is	a	single	thing.	 Or	 he	might	 be	 opting	 for	 the	 stronger	 claim,	 that	 there	 cannot	 be	 any	entity	 of	 level-0	 to	 which	 the	 numerical	 property	 100	 can	 plausibly	 be	ascribed.255	Since	there	are	no	suitable	bearers	of	numerical	properties	at	level-0,	Mignucci	insists	that	we	have	to	go	a	level	up	in	the	type	hierarchy.	In	this	he	follows	Frege;	 for	the	 latter–as	Bell	comments–offers	either	 i)	a	single	entity	of	level-0,	or	ii)	a	single	entity	of	level-1	(a	concept)	as	the	only	possible	bearer	of	a																																																									
254 ἔστι δὲ ὁ ἀριθµὸς εἷς µὲν καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὁ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἵππων καὶ ὁ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἀνθρώπων, ὧν δ’ 
ἀριθµός, ἕτερα, οἱ ἵπποι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. 255	That	Mignucci	 seems	 to	 opt	 for	 the	 stronger	 claim	 can	be	 seen	 later	 in	 his	 article,	when	he	argues	against	the	Millian	view	of	numbers	as	properties	of	complex	objects	(or	aggregates).	See	section	3.8.1	in	this	chapter.	
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number	 property,	 and	 by	 ‘suggesting	 that	 because	 there	 cannot	 be	 any	appropriate	 candidates	 of	 the	 first	 sort,	 an	 ascription	 of	 number	 must	 be	 an	assertion	about	an	item	of	the	second	kind	-	a	concept’.256			 	
																																																								256	In	[Bell	(1990),	p.66].	
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[3.4]	Two	senses	of	number			Passages	that	shed	some	light	on	the	metaphysical	status	of	numbers	in	Aristotle	are	rare;	some	of	 the	most	 important	of	 them	are	to	be	found	in	his	account	of	time.	There,	Aristotle	constantly	emphasises	that	number	is	said	in	two	ways:	
Hence time is a kind of number. But number is so called in two ways: we call number both 
that which is counted and countable, and that by which we count. Time is that which is 
counted and not that by which we count.257 [Phys. Δ.11, 219b5-8; Hussey’s trans.] The	distinction	is	also	made	in	the	following	passage:	
Time is not the number by which we count but the number which is counted, and this 
number turns out to be always different before and after, because the nows are different. 
The number of a hundred horses and that of a hundred men is one and the same, but the 
things of which it is the number are different-the horses are different from the men.258 
[Phys. Δ.12, 220b8-12; Hussey’s trans., italics mine] Let	us	try	to	explicate	these	two	senses	of	number:		
[3.4.1]	A	first	sense	of	number		The	 first	 sense	 of	 number	 is	 number	 as	 ‘that	which	 is	 counted	 and	 countable’	(τὸ ἀριθµούµενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθµητόν),	i.e.	number	as	a	plurality	of	units.	This	is	the	standard	 sense	 of	 number	 as	 employed	 by	 the	mathematicians	 of	 the	 time.259	Across	the	Aristotelian	corpus,	we	find	various	definitions	of	number	all	of	which	come	to	the	same	thing:	number	is	‘a	plurality	of	indivisibles’	(πλῆθος ἀδιαιρέτων,	
Meta.	 M.9,	 1085b22),	 or	 ‘a	 plurality	 of	 units’	 (πλῆθος µονάδων,	 Meta.	 I.1,	
																																																								
257 ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀριθµός ἐστι διχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθµούµενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθµητὸν ἀριθµὸν λέγοµεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀριθ
µοῦµεν), ὁ δὴ χρόνος ἐστὶν τὸ ἀριθµούµενον καὶ οὐχ ᾧ ἀριθµοῦµεν.  
258ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἀριθµός ἐστιν οὐχ ᾧ ἀριθµοῦµεν ἀλλ’ ὁ ἀριθµούµενος, οὗτος δὲ συµβαίνει πρότερον καὶ
 ὕστερον ἀεὶ ἕτερος· τὰ γὰρ νῦν ἕτερα. ἔστι δὲ ὁ ἀριθµὸς εἷς µὲν καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὁ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἵππων καὶ ὁ 
τῶν ἑκατὸν ἀνθρώπων, ὧν δ’ ἀριθµός, ἕτερα, οἱ ἵπποι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. 259	For	 a	 detailed	 list	 of	 pre-Euclidean	 passages	 regarding	 the	 concept	 of	 arithmos	 consult	[Pritchard	(1995),	pp.27-30].	
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1053a30).260	The	 origins	 of	 these	 definitions	 are	 to	 be	 found	 perhaps	 in	 the	wider	Pythagorean	tradition,	where	units	are	represented	by	pebbles	and	each	number	 has	 some	 characteristic	 shape	 (e.g.	 triangular,	 square,	 etc.).	 Neo-Pythagoreans,	such	as	Iamblichus	and	Nicomachus,	define	number	variously	as	a	‘compound	 of	 units’	 or	 as	 a	 ‘definite	 plurality’.	 Nicomachus,	 specifically,	combines	 several	 definitions	 into	 one	when	 he	 says	 that	 ‘number	 is	 a	 definite	plurality	 or	 a	 compound	 of	 units	 or	 a	 flow	 of	 quantity	 composed	 of	 units’	(Ἀριθµός ἐστι πλῆθος ὡρισµένον ἢ µονάδων σύστηµα ἢ ποσότητος χύµα ἐκ µονάδων 
συγκείµενον, Introd.	Arithm.	Book	1,	ch.7,	1.1-2).	Commenting	on	this,	Iamblichus	ascribes	to	Thales	the	description	of	number	as	a	‘compound	of	units’	(µονάδων 
σύστηµα),	 who	 ‘follows	 the	 Egyptian	 view’	 (κατὰ τὸ Αἰγυπτιακὸν ἀρέσκον).	 He	ascribes	to	 ‘Eudoxus	the	Pythagorean’	 the	definition	 ‘definite	multitude’(πλῆθος 
ὡρισµένον). 261 As	 for	 the	 expression	 ‘flow	 of	 quantity	 composed	 of	 units’,	Pritchard	notes	that	the	first	part	is	rather	opaque,	while	the	last	three	words	are	taken	 from	 the	 Euclidean	 definition	 of	 number:	 Ἀριθµὸς δὲ τὸ ἐκ µονάδων 
συγκείµενον πλῆθος	(Elements,	Book	VII,	def.	2).262																																																											260		What	is	for	something	to	be	indivisible?	What	is	for	something	to	be	a	unit?	Aristotle’s	report	of	 a	 certain	 Pythagorean	 (according	 to	 Proclus’	 comm.	 on	 the	 First	 Book	 of	 Euclid’s	 Elements:	95.21-22)	 definition	 of	 the	 unit	 is	 not	 really	 helpful;	 for	 the	 latter	 essentially	 depends	 on	 the	notion	of	the	point	and	its	negative	character	does	not	really	help	us	to	grasp	what	is	to	be	a	unit:	‘that	which	is	indivisible	with	respect	to	quantity	in	all	dimensions	and	has	no	position	is	called	‘unit’’	 (τὸ µὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον, τὸ µὲν πάντῃ καὶ ἄθετον λέγεται µονάς,	 Meta.	 Δ.6,	1016b24-25);	‘a	unit	is	a	position-less	substance’	(µονὰς οὐσία ἄθετος,	An.	Post.	A.27,	87a36;	also	
An.	Post.	 A.32,	 88a33-34);	 ‘a	 unit	 is	 a	 point	without	 position’	 (ἡ γὰρ µονὰς στιγµὴ ἄθετός ἐστιν,	
Meta.	M.8,	1084b26-27).	In	some	cases	Aristotle	considers		the	term	‘indivisible’	in	the	sense	of	‘cannot	be	divided’	to	be	equivalent	to	‘one’:	‘The	one	and	the	many	are	opposed	in	several	ways,	of	which	one	is	the	opposition	of	the	one	and	plurality	as	indivisible	and	divisible;	for	that	which	is	either	divided	or	divisible	 is	called	a	plurality,	and	 that	which	 is	 indivisible	or	not	divided	 is	called	one.’	(Ἀντίκειται δὲ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ πλείους τρόπους, ὧν ἕνα τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὡς 
ἀδιαίρετον καὶ διαιρετόν· τὸ µὲν γὰρ ἢ διῃρηµένον ἢ διαιρετὸν πλῆθός τι λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ἀδιαίρετον ἢ 
µὴ διῃρηµένον ἕν,	 Meta.	 I.3,	 	 1054a20-23,	 cf.	 I.6,	 1057a12-17).	 Recall	 also	 the	 discussion	 in	
Republic	Book	VII	where	Plato	argues	that	the	‘ones’	and	the	‘numbers’	grasped	by	the	senses	are	not	truly	ones	and	numbers,	since	‘we	do	see	the	same	thing	as	one	and	as	an	unlimited	number	at	the	same	time’	(525a4-5). 261	In	Nicom.	arithm.	introduc.,	p.10,	ln.8-10	and	ln.17-20,	respectively.	262	In	[Pritchard	(1995),	pp.25-26].	
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[3.4.2]	An	Aristotelian	response	to	Frege		Consider	 the	 following	 passage	 from	 Metaphysics	 N.1	 passage	 1087b33-1088a14:		
The measure must always be some one and the same thing applying to all cases; for 
example, if there are horses the measure is horse, if men it is man. If there are a man, a 
horse, and a god, the measure will perhaps be living thing, and their number will be a 
number of living things. If there are a man, white, and walking, they will hardly have a 
number, because they all belong to the same thing which is numerically one. Still, they 
will have a number of categories or some such term.263 [Meta. N.1, 1088a8-1088a14; 
Annas’ trans.] The	pluralities	that	Aristotle	mentions	 in	this	passage	can	be	classified	 into	the	following	 three	 categories:	 a)	Pluralities	 that	 are	 composed	of	members	of	 the	same	 kind,	 i.e.	 horses,	 men	 (1088a9);	 b)	 Pluralities	 composed	 of	 members	 of	different	kinds	but	of	the	same	genus,	i.e.	a	man,	a	horse,	and	a	god	(1088a10);	c)	Pluralities	composed	of	members	of	different	Aristotelian	categories,	 i.e.	a	man,	white,	walking	(1088a11-12).	If	for	cases	a)	and	b)	Aristotle	accepts	that	we	can	count	 them	without	 particular	 effort,	 case	 c)	 is	 more	 problematic.	 Aristotle	 is	circumspect:	 ‘If	 there	 are	 a	 man,	 white,	 and	 walking,	 they	 will	 hardly	 have	 a	number,	because	they	all	belong	to	the	same	thing	which	is	numerically	one;	still	they	 will	 have	 a	 number	 of	 categories	 or	 some	 such	 term’	 (1088a11-14).	Aristotle	in	effects	tells	us	that	were	one	to	ask	‘what	is	the	number	of	them’	the	most	natural	 response	would	be	 ‘three	 categories’	because	 the	 ‘them’	 refers	 to	the	categories	or	 to	something	similar.	What	 the	above	passage	makes	clear,	 is	that	 counting	 presupposes	 agreement	 upon	 some	 unit	 concept.	 This,	 however,	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	number	is	predicated	of	the	concept	(à	la	Frege).	Certain	 pluralities	 of	 the	 passage	 (such	 as	 the	 plurality	whose	members	 are	 a	man,	a	horse,	and	a	god)	can	be	specified	either	by	listing	their	members	one	by																																																									
263 δεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτό τι ὑπάρχειν πᾶσι τὸ µέτρον, οἷον εἰ ἵπποι, τὸ µέτρον ἵππος, καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωποι, 
ἄνθρωπος. εἰ δ’ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος καὶ θεός, ζῷον ἴσως, καὶ ὁ ἀριθµὸς αὐτῶν ἔσται ζῷα. εἰ δ’ 
ἄνθρωπος καὶ λευκὸν καὶ βαδίζον, ἥκιστα µὲν ἀριθµὸς τούτων διὰ τὸ ταὐτῷ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἑνὶ 
κατὰ ἀριθµόν, ὅµως δὲ γενῶν ἔσται ὁ ἀριθµὸς ὁ τούτων, ἤ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύτης προσηγορίας. 
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one	or	by	identifying	them	as	instances	of	a	certain	concept	(the	concept	‘living	thing’).	Aristotle	with	his	notion	of	measure	 explicates	 the	 sense	of	number	 as	
that	which	is	countable,	 i.e.	a	plurality	of	objects	of	a	certain	kind.	The	members	of	this	plurality	are	also	in	a	trivial	sense	indivisible	(in	the	sense	of	undivided).	What	 is	one	man	 is	not	also	divisible	 into	many	men,	what	 is	one	horse,	 is	not	also	divisible	into	many	horses:264	
Reasonable, too, it is that while in number there is a limit at the minimum, but in the 
direction of ‘more’ number always exceeds any multitude…The reason for this is that one 
is indivisible, whatever may be one (e.g. a man is one man and not many), but number is a 
plurality of ones, a certain ‘many’ of them. So there must be a halt at the indivisible. 
[Phys. Γ.7, 207b1-8; Hussey’s trans.]  	
[3.4.3]	Aristotle’s	criticisms	of	Platonic	Form	numbers	in	Meta.	M.6-8		This	is	not	however	the	only	sense	of	number	that	we	find	in	Aristotle.	Mignucci	invites	 us	 to	 consider	 the	 following	 difficulty	 that	 stems	 from	 the	 view	 that	numbers	are	certain	collections	of	objects:	If	numbers	have	to	be	identified	with	collections	of	objects	(3,	say,	with	a	collection	of	three	men),	then	collections	of	objects	 which	 differ	 simply	 because	 they	 have	 different	 members	 must	 be	
different	numbers:		
Not only do three men differ from four cats, they also differ from three dogs, as everyone 
will admit. But if three men is a number, say 3, then three dogs is a different number 3; it 
is a different number, i.e. a different 3. According to this view there can be as many 3s as 
there are possible collections of these objects. It is not difficult to recognise that Aristotle 
could be charged with such a criticism. [Mignucci (1987), p.196; italics mine]  	Is	Mignucci	right?	Could	Aristotle	be	charged	with	such	a	criticism?	Or	is	this	an	objection	that	Aristotle	raises	against	a	certain	view	of	numbers?	And	if	so	why	is	this	 view	problematic?	To	 answer	 these	questions,	 let	 us	 turn	our	 attention	 to	the	constitutive	units	of	the	numbers.	One	might,	perhaps,	claim	that	the	units	of																																																									264	See	 also	 [Wedberg	 (1955),	 pp.72-74].	 We	 leave	 aside	 here	 problematic	 cases	 such	 as	 the	raindrops:	raindrops	can	coalesce,	resulting	in	claims	such	as	1	+	1	=	1.	I	owe	this	remark	to	Mr	Denyer. 
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the	number	3	(the	three	men),	cannot	be	added	to	the	units	of	the	3*	(the	three	dogs),	given	that	they	differ	in	kind.	Or,	if	number	3	is	to	be	identified	arbitrarily	with	a	collection	of	three	men,	say,	and	number	4	with	a	collection	of	four	cats,	say,	then	we	cannot	claim	that	3	is	part	of	4.	Thus,	numbers	in	this	sense	fail	to	account	 for	 (at	 least	 some	 of)	 the	 operations	 and	 relations	 of	 arithmetic.265	Mignucci,	however,	does	not	provide	much	justification	for	the	claims	he	makes	here;	 in	 order	 to	 address	 them	 properly	 we	 need	 to	 turn	 our	 attention	 to	
Metaphysics	M.6-8	and	Aristotle’s	discussion	of	the	various	Academic	theories	of	number	there.			Much	 of	 Aristotle’s	 argumentation	 in	Metaphysics	 M.6-8	 seems	 to	 be	 centered	around	the	fact	that	Platonic	Form	numbers	cannot	account	for	some	of	the	more	mundane	 operations	 of	 arithmetic.	 In	 those	 passages	 Aristotle	 assumes	 from	beginning	 to	 end	 that	 Platonic	 Form	 numbers	 are	 collections	 of	 units,	 the	Platonic	number	Four,	 for	example,	 is	a	collection	of	four	units.	There	seems	to	be	 quite	 a	 disagreement	 among	 scholars	 about	whether	 Plato	 held	 a	 different	conception	of	 Form	numbers,	 a	 conception	which	was	not	 fully	 understood	by	his	 followers	 in	 the	 Academy,	 and	 which	 was	 therefore	 wrongly	 criticised	 by																																																									265	Mignucci’s	objections	remind	me	of	Benacerraf’s	ones	against	numbers	conceived	as	sets.	 In	his	 paper	 ‘What	 Numbers	 Could	 Not	 Be’,	 Benacerraf	 argues	 that	 numbers	 cannot	 be	 sets.	 The	essence	of	his	argument	is	that	there	are	many	different	ways	to	represent	numbers	as	sets,	and	that	we	cannot	give	proper	reasons	for	preferring	one	way	over	the	others.	Thus,	Benacerraf:	‘If	numbers	are	sets,	then	they	must	be	particular	sets,	for	each	set	is	some	particular	set.	But	if	the	number	3	is	really	one	set	rather	than	another,	it	must	be	possible	to	give	some	cogent	reason	for	thinking	 so;	 for	 the	 position	 that	 this	 is	 an	 unknowable	 truth	 is	 hardly	 tenable.’	 [Benacerraf	(1965),p.62].	Benacerraf	concludes	that	numbers	cannot	be	sets.	Thus	Mignucci	seems	to	adopt	the	following	Benacerraf-inspired	argument:	1)There	are	many	different	ways	to	represent	3	as	collections	of	 objects,	 e.g.	 3	 as	 a	 collection	of	 three	men	or	3	 as	 a	 collection	of	3	 cats.	 2)Either	none	of	 these	accounts	 is	correct,	or	one	of	 them	is,	or	both	are	correct.	3)If	both	accounts	are	collect	the	set	of	three	men	is	identical	to	the	set	of	three	dogs,	which	is	clearly	wrong.	Thus	the	accounts	cannot	both	be	correct.	4)If	one	of	them	is	correct,	say	3	is	three	men,	then	why	is	it	so?	We	ought	to	give	some	proper	reason	to	explain	our	choice.	It	seems,	however,	that	our	choice	is	completely	arbitrary.	Thus,	5)	none	of	the	accounts	is	the	correct	one,	so	that	numbers	cannot	be	collections	 of	 objects.	 (Following	 the	 exposition	 of	 Bencarraf’s	 argument	 in	 [Wetzel	 (1989),	pp.273-274].)	
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Aristotle.	 Scholars	 such	 as	 Cherniss	 and	 Tarán	 rely	 primarily	 on	 an	 influential	article	 by	 Cook	Wilson	 in	 order	 to	 reject	 the	 criticisms	 offered	 by	 Aristotle	 as	based	 largely	 on	 an	 incorrect	 interpretation	 of	 Platonic	 Form	 numbers,266	whereas	others	such	as	Burnyeat	and	Pritchard	think	that	Aristotle	has	correctly	understood	 the	 Platonic	 theory	 of	 Form	Numbers.267	But	what	 is	 this	 different	conception?	 According	 to	 the	 ‘Cook	 Wilson	 camp’,	 Form	 numbers	 are	 not	collections	 of	 units	 but	 they	 are–just	 like	 other	 Platonic	 Forms–fundamentally	unique	 and	 part-less.	 As	 Tarán	 puts	 it:	 ‘These	 numbers,	 however,	 are	 not	congeries	of	units,	as	Aristotle	thinks	they	are,	but	merely	the	hypostatisation	of	the	 universals	 which	 constitute	 the	 series	 of	 natural	 numbers.’268	I	 will	 not	discuss	the	dispute	in	detail	but,	in	the	course	of	this	essay,	I	will	point	to	several	places	in	Plato’s	dialogues	that	support	both	readings	of	Form	numbers.	What	is	important	for	my	essay	is	that	Aristotle	interprets	Platonic	Form	numbers	(Two,	Three,	Four,…)	as	collections	of	two	units,	three	units,	four	units,	and	so	on.269		Platonic	 Form	 numbers,	 according	 to	 Aristotle,	 enjoy	 substantial	 existence	(1080a15-16),	 they	 are	 ordered,	 and	 they	 differ	 in	 kind	 from	 one	 another	(1080a17-18).	270	In	the	following	lines	(1080a18-30)	Aristotle	tells	us	that	there	are	the	following	possibilities	for	the	units	of	which	they	are	composed:		(i)	the	units	are	also	different	 in	kind	so	that	the	units	are	all	 incomparable	with	each	other;	(ii)	the	units	do	not	differ	in	kind	and	are	all	comparable	with	each	other,	as	 is	 the	 case	 with	 the	 units	 of	 the	 mathematical	 number;	 (iii)	 each	 unit	 is	comparable	with	the	other	units	within	each	number,	but	incomparable	with	the	units	 of	 the	 other	 numbers	 (for	 example,	 each	 unit	 in	 the	 triad	 is	 comparable																																																									266	In	[Wilson	(1904)],	[Tarán	(1978)],	and	[Cherniss	(1944),	pp.513-524].	267	In	[Burnyeat	(1987)	pp.234-235]	and	[Pritchard(1995)	pp.33-38].	268	Tarán	(1978),	p.83.	I	am	not	entirely	sure	as	to	what	Tarán	means	when	he	writes	about	‘the	hypostatisation	of	the	universals	which	constitute	the	series	of	natural	numbers’;	does	he	refer	to	the	natural	number	series:	1,2,3,…?		269	Given,	however,	that	the	Forms	are	self-predicable,	then,	for	example,	the	Form	of	three	would	have	to	be	unqualifiedly	three,	which	means	it	must	consist	of	three	units.		270	εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθµὸς φύσις τις καὶ µὴ ἄλλη τίς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ αὐτό, ὥσπερ φασί 
τινες, ἤτοι εἶναι τὸ µὲν πρῶτόν τι αὐτοῦ τὸ δ’ ἐχόµενον, ἕτερον ὂν τῷ εἴδει ἕκαστον.	 	 (Meta.	 M.6,	1080a15-18).	
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with	the	other	unit	in	the	triad	but	not	with	any	of	the	units	in	the	pentad)	.	The	term	συµβλητός	 is	usually	translated	 ‘comparable’;	according	to	Ross	things	are	comparable	if	and	only	if	they	are	members	of	the	same	kind	(he	points	to	Phys.	248b8,	 249a3,	 Top.	 107b17,	 Meta.	 I.	 1055a6).	 Its	 negation,	 άσύµβλητος,	 is	equivalent	 in	 meaning	 with	 ‘specifically	 different’	 (ἕτερον ὂν τῷ εἴδει)	 and	elsewhere	συµβλητός	 is	 taken	 as	 equivalent	 in	meaning	with	 ‘undifferentiated’	(ἀδιάφορος,	  1081a5-6).271 How	 are	we	 supposed	 to	 understand	mathematical	numbers	which	 consist	 	 of	 ‘undifferentiated’	units	 (option	 (ii)	 above)?	Perhaps	like	this:	we	are	given	an	(infinite)	pool	of	ideal	units,	all	of	them	are	of	the	same	type,	and	each	mathematical	number	is	a	collection	of	such	units;	since	any	two	units	make	a	 two	 there	will	be	many	 two’s	 and	 the	Form	number	Two	will	no	longer	 be	 unique;	 so	 on	 this	 option	 numbers	 cannot	 be	 Forms	 (1081a5-17).	Regarding	 option	 (i)	 above,	 it	 seems	 that	 there	 exist	many	 (actually,	 infinitely	many)	 distinct	 units	 a,b,c,d,…,	 each	 unit	 unique	 in	 kind,	 and	 each	 number	 is	 a	collection	of	such	units:	take	2	to	be	(b,c)	and	4	to	be	(d,e,f,g);	one	cannot	then	argue	 that	 2	 is	 part	 of	 4.	 Option	 (iii)	 above	 is	 introduced	 in	 the	 following	passage:272																																																									271	Ross	(1924),	vol.	II,	p.427.	272	Commentators	have	struggled	connecting	Aristotle’s	classification	of	the	units	that	constitute	each	number	in	lines	1080a17-35	and	his	classification	of	number	in	1080a35-37.	To	the	best	of	my	knowledge	Tarán	offers	the	best	explanation	of	what	is	happening	there;	there	seem	to	be	the	following	 three	 kinds	 of	 numbers:	 (a)	 incomparable	 numbers	with	 units	 all	 incomparable,	 (b)	mathematical	numbers	with	units	all	comparable,	and	(c)	incomparable	numbers	with	the	units	of	 each	 number	 comparable	 with	 each	 other	 but	 incomparable	 with	 those	 of	 other	 numbers.	What	has	then	become	of	the	view	of	the	units	that	are	all	comparable	with	each	other,	as	is	the	case	 with	 the	 units	 of	 the	 mathematical	 number	 introduced	 in	 (ii)	 above?	 Aristotle	 seems	 to	argue	as	follows:	if	the	units	in	each	Form	number	are	fully	comparable	with	the	units	of	another	Form	number	then	those	numbers	are	not	one-per-type	anymore	but	they	become	mathematical	numbers,	 i.e.	 collections	 of	 units	 which	 are	 many-per-type	 (cf.	 1081a5-6:	 εἰ µὲν οὖν πᾶσαι 
συµβληταὶ καὶ ἀδιάφοροι αἱ µονάδες, ὁ µαθηµατικὸς γίγνεται ἀριθµὸς καὶ εἷς µόνος)	[Tarán	(1978),	p.87]. Aristotle	 tells	us	 that	no	one	has	ever	held	view	(a)	(cf.	Metaph.	1080b8-9	and	1081a35-36),	 	some	have	held	view	(b)	(these	are	Speusippus	and	the	Pythagoreans,	cf.	1080bl4-21;	 the	difference	being	that	the	Pythagoreans	endorse	this	view	of	number	without	 further	supposing	that	it	is	separate	from	perceptible	objects,	but	that	perceptible	objects	are	composed	out	of	such	numbers,	 cf.	 1080b16-20),	 someone	 held	 view	 (c)	 (this	 is	 the	 anonymous	 Platonist	 of	Metaph.	
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Or some units must be comparable and some not, e.g. Two is first after One, and then 
comes Three and then the other numbers, and the units in each number are comparable, 
e.g. those in the first Two with one another, and those in the first Three with one another, 
and so with the other numbers; but the units in the Two itself are not comparable with 
those in the Three itself; and similarly in the case of the other successive numbers. 
Therefore while mathematical number is counted thus—after one, two (which consists of 
another one besides the former one), and three (which consists of another one besides 
these two), and the other numbers similarly, ideal number is counted thus—after One, a 
distinct Two which does not include the first One, and a Three which does not include the 
Two, and the other numbers similarly.273 [Meta. M.6, 1080a23-35; Ross’ trans. mod.] This	 view	 of	 Form	 numbers	 is	 examined	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 lines	 1081b35-1083a17;	 one	 of	 the	 problems	 that	 stem	 from	 this	 view	 is	 discussed	 in	 the		following	passage:		
For example, in the original Ten there are ten units, and Ten is composed both of these and 
of two Fives. Since the original Ten is not just any number and is not composed of just any 
Fives (or just any units) the units in this Ten must differ. If they do not differ, the Fives of 
which the Ten consists will not differ either, but since they do differ, the units will differ 
too. But if they do differ, will there be no other Fives in <the Ten> but only these two, or 
will there be? It is absurd if there are not; but if there are, what kind of Ten will be 
composed of them? There is no other Ten in the Ten over and above itself.274 [Meta. M.7, 																																																																																																																																																														1080b21-22	),	others	(b)	and	(c)	(this	is	the	view	Aristotle	ascribes	to	Plato,	cf.	Metaph.	1080b11-14	 with	 987bl4-18),	and	 certain	 others	 have	 identified	 (b)	 and	 (c)	 (this	 view	 is	 implicitly	attributed	to	Xenocrates;	on	Xenocrates'	 identification	of	 the	 ideas	with	mathematical	numbers	
cf.	Metaph.	1080b22-23	and	28-30,	1028b24-27,	1069a35,	and	1076a20-21).	The	main	source	for	the	attributions	above	is	[Tarán	(1978)];	consult	also	Menn[‘Ιγ3’]	for	extensive	discussion.	273 	ἢ τὰς µὲν συµβλητὰς τὰς δὲ µή (οἷον εἰ ἔστι µετὰ τὸ ἓν πρώτη ἡ δυάς, ἔπειτα ἡ τριὰς καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὁ  
ἄλλος ἀριθµός, εἰσὶ δὲ συµβληταὶ αἱ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἀριθµῷ µονάδες, οἷον αἱ ἐν τῇ δυάδι τῇ πρώτῃ αὑταῖς, 
καὶ αἱ ἐν τῇ τριάδι τῇ πρώτῃ αὑταῖς, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθµῶν· αἱ δ’ ἐν τῇ δυάδι αὐτῇ πρὸς τ
ὰς ἐν τῇ τριάδι αὐτῇ ἀσύµβλητοι, ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐφεξῆς ἀριθµῶν· διὸ καὶ ὁ µὲν µαθ
ηµατικὸς ἀριθµεῖται µετὰ τὸ ἓν δύο, πρὸς τῷ ἔµπροσθεν ἑνὶ ἄλλο ἕν, καὶ τὰ τρία πρὸς τοῖς δυσὶ τούτοις
 ἄλλο ἕν, καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς δὲ ὡσαύτως· οὗτος δὲ µετὰ τὸ ἓν δύο ἕτερα ἄνευ τοῦ ἑνὸς τοῦ 
πρώτου, καὶ ἡ τριὰς ἄνευ τῆς δυάδος, ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ἀριθµός)· 
274 οἷον γὰρ ἐν τῇ δεκάδι αὐτῇ ἔνεισι δέκα µονάδες, σύγκειται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἐκ δύο πεντάδων ἡ 
δεκάς. ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐχ ὁ τυχὼν ἀριθµὸς αὐτὴ ἡ δεκὰς οὐδὲ σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν τυχουσῶν πεντάδων, ὥσπερ 
οὐδὲ µονάδων, ἀνάγκη διαφέρειν τὰς µονάδας τὰς ἐν τῇ δεκάδι ταύτῃ. ἂν γὰρ µὴ διαφέρωσιν, οὐδ’ αἱ 
πεντάδες διοίσουσιν ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶν ἡ δεκάς·ἐπεὶ δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ αἱ µονάδες διοίσουσιν. εἰ δὲ 
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1082a1-11, Annas’ trans. mod.] Aristotle’s	 objections	 highlight	 the	 difficulties	 that	 arise	 from	 the	 counter-intuitive	result	that	the	ordinary	operations	of	arithmetic	(such	as	the	addition)	cannot	be	applied	consistently	to	this	particular	version	of	Form	numbers.	One	wishes	 to	 say	 that	 	 Form	number	Ten	 is	made	up	of	 ten	units	 and	 also	of	 two	Fives	 (σύγκειται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἐκ δύο πεντάδων ἡ δεκάς).	 If	 the	 first	 Five	consists	of	units	of	a	certain	kind	then	the	second	Five,	being	a	different	one,	will	necessarily	consist	of	units	of	another	kind	(call	 the	second	one,	 ‘Five*’).	Hence	the	Ten	consists	of	Five	and	Five*,	that	is,	the	units	in	the	Ten	do	not	all	belong	to	the	same	kind,	which	runs	contrary	to	the	Platonist	belief	that	units	in	the	same	Number	 are	 undifferentiated	 from	 one	 another	 (αἱ δ’ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀριθµῷ 
ἀδιάφοροι ἀλλήλαις,		1081b35-37).	Another	argument	is	the	following:	
Besides, if every unit and another unit make two there will be a two made up of a unit 
from the original Two and another from the original Three, which will thus be made of 
differentiated units. Also will it be before or after it? It seems rather as if it must be before, 
since one of the units comes about together with three, and the other together with two. 
We suppose that in general one and one make two, whether they are equal or unequal-
good and bad, for instance, or man and horse; but people with these views suppose that not 
every two units make two.275 [Meta. M.7, 1082b11-19, Annas’ trans. mod.] In	 this	 passage,	 Aristotle	 complains	 that	 on	 this	 view	 of	 Form	 numbers	 one	cannot	add	two	units	(however	heterogeneous	these	units	are),	something	that	offends	 common	 sense.	 He	 asks:	 Can	 you	make	 a	 two	 from	 one	 unit	 from	 the	original	Two	and	one	 from	the	original	Three?	Recall	 that	 the	units	 in	 the	Two	
																																																																																																																																																														
διαφέρουσι, πότερον οὐκ ἐνέσονται πεντάδες ἄλλαι ἀλλὰ µόνον αὗται αἱ δύο, ἢ ἔσονται; εἴτε δὲ µὴ 
ἐνέσονται, ἄτοπον· εἴτ’ ἐνέσονται, ποία ἔσται δεκὰς ἐξ ἐκείνων; οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἑτέρα δεκὰς ἐν τῇ δεκάδι 
παρ’ αὐτήν. 
275 ἔτι εἰ ἅπασα µονὰς καὶ µονὰς ἄλλη δύο, ἡ ἐκ τῆς δυάδος αὐτῆς µονὰς καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῆς τριάδος αὐτῆς 
δυὰς ἔσται ἐκ διαφερουσῶν τε, καὶ πότερον προτέρα τῆς τριάδος ἢ ὑστέρα; µᾶλλον γὰρ ἔοικε 
προτέραν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· ἡ µὲν γὰρ ἅµα τῇ τριάδι ἡ δ’ ἅµα τῇ δυάδι τῶν µονάδων. καὶ ἡµεῖς µὲν 
ὑπολαµβάνοµεν ὅλως ἓν καὶ ἕν, καὶ ἐὰν ᾖ ἴσα ἢ ἄνισα, δύο εἶναι, οἷον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, καὶ 
ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἵππον· οἱ δ’ οὕτως λέγοντες οὐδὲ τὰς µονάδας. 
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are	of	one	kind	and	 the	units	 in	 the	Three	are	of	a	different	one.	The	resulting	two	is	obviously	different	from	the	original	Two,	since	its	members	are	different;	call	 it	 ‘Two*’.	 Following	 this	 line	 of	 thought	 and	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 serial	ordering	 of	 	 Form	 numbers	 (1080a17-18)	 Aristotle	 asks:	 what	 would	 be	 the	place	of	this	Two*	in	the	order?	It	seems	that	it	should	be	before	Three	since	it	consists	of	a	unit	of	Two	and	a	unit	of	Three.	But	this	is	absurd	because	there	are	no	 numbers	 between	 Two	 and	 Three.	 Hence	 on	 this	 view	we	 cannot	 say	 that	‘every	two	units	make	two’.		It	 is	 time,	 however,	 we	 turned	 our	 attention	 to	 some	 of	 the	 more	 positive	evidence	Aristotle	has	to	offer	us.	
[3.4.4]	A	second	sense	of	number	
	Number	 as	 ‘that	 by	 which	 we	 count’.	 The	 Physics	 passages	 previously	 cited	indicate	 that	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 of	 number	 different	 from	 that	 of	 number	 as	 a	plurality	 of	 units/measures.	 Three	 men,	 four	 horses,	 five	 cows	 are	 countable	numbers,	arithmoi.	They	are	collections	of	objects,	 from	which	the	numbers	we	count	 with	 have	 to	 be	 distinguished.	 The	 latter	 are	 normally	 identified	 in	 the	scholarship	 with	 abstract	 or	 abstracted	 numbers. 276 	What	 does	 this	 claim	amount	 to?	 Could	we,	 perhaps,	 tentatively	 suggest	 that	 an	 abstract	 number	 is	what	all	the	collections	with	the	same	amount	of	instances	have	in	common?	To	answer	 this	 question	 let	 us	 return	 to	 Aristotle’s	 account	 of	 time;	 many	commentators	have	complained	that	there	are	certain	problems	with	it.	What	is	particularly	problematic	 is	that	Aristotle	does	not	seem	to	remain	consistent	to	the	view	that	time	is	‘that	which	is	counted	and	not	that	by	which	we	count’.			It	 is	 not,	 of	 course,	 my	 intention	 to	 offer	 here	 a	 full	 explication	 of	 Aristotle’s	conception	of	 time	and	 to	discuss	 alternative	 interpretations.	Rather,	 I	wish	 to	focus	on	Bostock’s	analysis,	which,	in	my	opinion,	is	one	of	the	few	that	takes	into	account	that	time	is	something	that	is	predicated	of	the	various	movements	that	have	some	time:		
																																																								37	 In	 [Gaukroger	 (1982),	 pp.312-313];	 [Mignucci	 (1987),	 pp.197-198],	 [Hussey	 (1983),	 p.161].	For	an	alternative	interpretation	see	[Coope	(2005)].		
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But one of the striking features of Aristotle’s discussion of time is his failure to mention 
that the word ‘time’ has many senses. Some of these are well illustrated by the way the 
phrase ‘a particular time’ (χρόνος τις or χρόνος τις ὡρισµένος) is quite ambiguous 
between a date pure and simple (yesterday noon), a dated temporal stretch (from noon 
yesterday to noon today), and a quantity of temporal stretch (24 hours). There are also 
other senses of this phrase. For example, when one says ‘dinner is always at 7.30 sharp’ 
one may properly be said to be giving a particular time as the time of dinner, but this time 
is what one might call a recurring date (and similarly with recurring periods). If Aristotle 
had paused to point out these ambiguities explicitly he would have saved himself from the 
appearance of outright contradiction on several occasions. (For example, ‘earlier and later 
times are always different’ (220b9–10), and only three lines later ‘one and the same time 
may occur again and again, e.g. a year’ (220b13–l4).) 277  [Bostock (2006), p.143; his 
italics] 																																																								277	Bostock	 adds	 that	 when	 Aristotle	 provides	 an	 explanation	 for	 his	 point	 that	 simultaneous	movements	have	exactly	the	same	time	he	once	again	considers	time	as	a	number:	‘Of	equal	and	simultaneous	movements’,	he	says,	 ‘the	number	is	one	and	the	same,	wherever	they	may	occur’	(223b11–12),	 and	he	adds	 in	 comparison	 that	7	dogs	and	7	horses	have	 the	 same	number.	On	this	occasion,	however,	 it	seems	that	time	answers	to	the	number	7	 ‘with	which	we	number’.	 It	seems	to	me	that	Bostock	 is	correct	 in	complaining	that	 ‘earlier	he	has	used	the	point	that	100	horses	 is	 not	 the	 same	 thing	 as	 100	 men	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 saying	 that	 non-simultaneous	occurrences	 do	 not	 have	 the	 same	 time,	 explicitly	 comparing	 the	 times	 to	 the	 different	 things	numbered.’	In	[Bostock	(2006),	p.142;	his	translations].		Bostock	helpfully	lists	other	problematic	places	 such	as	 lines	220b4-5,	where	Aristotle	 is	 trying	 to	explain	why	 time	cannot	be	quick	or	slow,	 and	 says	 simply	 that	 no	 ‘number	 with	 which	 we	 number’	 is	 quick	 or	 slow,	 evidently	implying	 that	 time	 is	 a	 number	 with	 which	 we	 number.	 [ibid,	 p.143].	 According	 to	 Coope’s	analysis,	to	say	that	the	7	dogs	and	the	7	horses	are	the	same	number	is	not	to	imply	that	there	is	some	one	thing,	some	abstract	number,	that	is	the	number	of	each	[Coope	(2005),	p.120].	What	Coope	perhaps	means	is	that	the	fact	that	the	7	horses	are	the	same	in	number	with	the	7	dogs	ought	not	 to	be	 interpreted	as	an	 identity	statement	between	two	abstract	particulars,	 i.e.	7=7.	Rather,	 we	 ought	 to	 say	 that	 ‘=’	 is	 not	 a	 symbol	 of	 identity	 but	 of	 equinomerosity	 between	countable	numbers.	She	is	surely	right	in	that.	But	she	still	does	not	take	into	account	that	those	arithmoi	(of	horses	and	dogs)	not	only	are	equinumerous	but	that	they	also	belong	to	the	same	species	 of	 number,	 that	 they	 are	 each,	 a	 7.	 She	 is	 then	 hard-pressed	 to	 explain	 that	 ‘time	 is	 a	number	 of	 continuous	 change	 simpliciter,	 not	 of	 one	 particular	 type’	 (223a33–	 223b1;	 her	trans.).	It	seems	that	time,	understood	in	a	more	universal	manner,	corresponds	to	the	common	kind	to	which	7	dogs	and	7	horses	belong,	namely	 to	 the	kind	of	7-membered	pluralities,	or	 to	number	7	simpliciter.	
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David	Bostock	offers	the	following	plausible	explanation	as	to	why	Aristotle	does	not	seem	to	remain	consistent	to	the	view	that	time	is	‘that	which	is	counted	and	not	that	by	which	we	count’:	
 
The source of the trouble is that Aristotle has two quite different reasons for calling time a 
number, the first is that a time always has an amount of duration, i.e. it is a subject of 
which amounts of duration are predicated, and the second is that a time is itself predicated 
of the various movements that have that time. The second reason really amounts to no 
more than the point that a time is a universal, and is a very thin ground for regarding it as 
some kind of ‘number’. [Bostock (2006), p.142] 	Especially	 illuminating	 about	 this	 second	 sense	 of	 number	 is	 Aristotle’s	treatment	of	the	now	in	the	following	passage:		
In so far as the now is a limit it is not time, but belongs to it. But in so far as it numbers, it 
is a number. For limits pertain only to that of which they are limits, whereas the number of 
these horses—ten—may hold elsewhere too.278 [Phys. Δ.11, 220a21–4; Bostock’s trans.]  What	this	passage	shows	is	that	there	is	a	certain	contrast	between	the	limiting	function	 	 of	 the	 now	 and	 its	 numbering	 function.	 The	 difference	 is	 this:	 ‘limits	pertain	 only	 to	 that	 of	 which	 they	 are	 limits,	 whereas	 the	 number	 of	 these	horses—	ten—may	hold	elsewhere	too’.	It	seems	then	that	the	crucial	feature	of	a	number	is	just	that	it	is	universal,	and	the	now	‘in	so	far	as	it	numbers’	may	be	treated	 as	 universal	 as	 well,	 namely	 as	 a	 date	 holding	 of	 all	 the	 momentary	events	which	have	that	date.279	As	Bostock	explains:	
It is this which entitles us to call the now a number (and perhaps also what entitles us to 
regard it as a time). The boundary of a particular movement is not a number, since it is the 																																																								
278 ᾗ µὲν οὖν πέρας τὸ νῦν, οὐ χρόνος, ἀλλὰ συµβέβηκεν· ᾗ δ’ ἀριθµεῖ, ἀριθµός· τὰ µὲν γὰρ πέρατα 
ἐκείνου µόνον ἐστὶν οὗ ἐστιν πέρατα, ὁ δ’ ἀριθµὸς ὁ τῶνδε τῶν ἵππων, ἡ δεκάς, καὶ ἄλλοθι. 279	It	 is	 this	 passage	 where	 Coope	 seems	 particularly	 troubled	 to	 accommodate	 it	 in	 her	interpretation:	‘My	interpretation	does	not	solve	all	the	difficulties	about	this	passage.	It	is	odd	to	find	 Aristotle	 saying	 that	 the	 now	 (as	 opposed	 to	 a	 series	 of	 counted	 nows)	 is	 a	 number.	Moreover,	 it	 is	not	clear	quite	what	he	means	when	he	says	that	the	ten	of	these	horses	is	 ‘also	elsewhere’.	On	my	 interpretation,	what	one	would	expect	him	 to	 say	 is	 that	 the	 ten	 that	 is	 the	number	we	use	to	count	these	horses	could	also	be	used	to	count	ten	things	of	some	other	kind	(for	instance,	ten	dogs).’	In	[Coope	(2005),	fn.18	in	p.124].			
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boundary merely of that movement and not of anything else. The boundary even of a 
stretch of time is not a number simply by being a boundary. What makes it a number is 
that the boundary of a stretch of time is also the boundary of all movements that have that 
time, i.e. it is a universal. [Bostock (2006), p.149] 
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[3.5]	The	beginnings	of	a	non-Fregean	account		Is	 it	 somehow	possible	 to	 retain	 the	 intuitive	 idea	 that	 number-predicates	 are	first-level	 predicates,	 applicable	 to	 things	 of	 the	world?	Consider	 the	 following	passage:	
Reasonable, too, it is that while in number there is a limit at the minimum, but in the 
direction of ‘more’ number always exceeds any multitude, yet in the case of magnitudes, 
on the contrary, they exceed any magnitude in the direction of ‘less’ but in that of ‘more’ 
there is no infinite magnitude. The reason for this is that one is indivisible, whatever may 
be one (e.g. a man is one man and not many), but number is a plurality of ones, a certain 
‘many’ of them. So there must be a halt at the indivisible. (‘Three’ and ‘two’ are 
paronymous names, and similarly each of the other numbers.)280 [Phys. Γ.7, 207b1-10; 
Hussey’s trans. mod., italics mine] Let	us	have	a	closer	look	at	the	last	 line	from	the	Physics	passage	above,	where	Aristotle	 claims	 that	 says	 that	 ‘three	and	 two	are	paronymous	names	–	 and	 so	too	 is	each	of	 the	other	numbers’	 (τὸ γὰρ τρία καὶ δύο παρώνυµα ὀνόµατά ἐστιν, 
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθµῶν ἕκαστος,	 Physics,	 Γ.7,	 207b8-10).	 Perhaps,	 he	means	 that	 number	 nouns	 are	 in	 some	 way	 derivative	 from	 the	 number	adjectives.	 According	 to	Mignucci	 from	 this	 last	 sentence	we	may	 even	 extract	some	useful	information	about	numbers	in	the	second	sense:	
… the substantives ‘two’, ‘three’, and so on are said to be paronymous nouns in the sense 
that they are derivative from the corresponding adjectives. This does not mean that the 
nouns ‘two’, ‘three’, and so on are etymologically derived from the corresponding 
adjectives but that they have their ontological ground in the adjectives. Now the numbers 
which are said to be pluralities of ones are obviously countable numbers, while the nouns 																																																								
280 εὐλόγως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν µὲν τῷ ἀριθµῷ εἶναι ἐπὶ µὲν τὸ ἐλάχιστον πέρας ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ πλεῖον ἀεὶ παντὸς 
ὑπερβάλλειν πλήθους, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν µεγεθῶν τοὐναντίον ἐπὶ µὲν τὸ ἔλαττον παντὸς ὑπερβάλλειν 
µεγέθους ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ µεῖζον µὴ εἶναι µέγεθος ἄπειρον. αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι τὸ ἕν ἐστιν ἀδιαίρετον, ὅ τι περ ἂν ἓν 
ᾖ (οἷον ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐ πολλοί), ὁ δ’ ἀριθµός ἐστιν ἕνα πλείω καὶ πόσ’ ἄττα, ὥστ’ 
ἀνάγκη στῆναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον (τὸ γὰρ τρία καὶ δύο παρώνυµα ὀνόµατά ἐστιν, ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων ἀριθµῶν ἕκαστος). 		
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‘two’, ‘three’ and so on stand for mathematical numbers. Therefore the point that Aristotle 
makes here is probably that mathematical numbers are considered properties of groups of 
objects.’ [Mignucci (1987), p.199; italics mine] Why	is	this	important?	Well,	number-words	occur	in	two	forms:	1)	as	adjectives,	as	in	ascriptions	of	numbers	(sentences	that	begin	with	‘There	are’	followed	by	a	number-adjective,	e.g.	 ‘There	are	four	cows	in	the	field’),	and	2)	as	nouns,	as	 in	most	number-theoretic	propositions	(e.g.	 ‘2+2=4’).	However,	as	Dummett	in	his	commentary	 of	 Frege’s	 Grundlagen	 notes,	 it	 is	 crucial	 that	 any	 analysis	 must	display	 some	 sort	 of	 connection	 between	 the	 two	 uses	 of	 number-terms	mentioned	 previously.	 It	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 give	 separate	 explanations	 of	number-adjectives	 and	 of	 number-nouns,	 without	 providing	 for	 an	 explicit	relation	 between	 them:	 ‘otherwise,	 we	 should	 be	 unable	 to	 appeal	 to	 the	equation	‘5+2+0=7’	to	justify	inferring	that	there	are	were	seven	animals	in	the	field	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 there	were	 five	 sheep,	 two	 cows	 and	 no	 other	 animals	there.’281	Dummett	 points	 to	 some	 of	 the	 available	 strategies:	 1)	We	may	 first	explain	 the	 adjectival	 use	 of	 number,	 and	 then	 explain	 the	 corresponding	numerical	terms	by	reference	to	it	–	Dummett	calls	this	‘the	adjectival	strategy’.	2)	Conversely,	we	may	explain	the	use	of	numerals	as	singular	terms,	and	then	explain	 the	 corresponding	 number-adjectives	 by	 reference	 to	 it	 –	 ‘the	substantival	strategy’.282	Mignucci	in	effect	claims	that	Aristotle	here	opts	for	the	first	 strategy,	 the	 adjectival	 one.	 However,	 while	 much	 of	 what	 Mignucci	 says	here	 seems	 to	me	 correct,	 	 later	 in	 his	 article	 he	 shifts	 from	a	 straightforward	reading	of	numbers	as	properties	of	objects	to	numbers	as	properties	of	concepts,	by	presupposing	a	Fregean	analysis	of	number.		A	much	more	 informative	account	of	number	 is	 given	 in	 the	 following	passage	from	the	Physics:	
It is correct, too, to say that the number of the sheep and of the dogs is the same, if each 
number is equal, but that the ten is not the same <ten> nor are they the same ten, just as 
the equilateral and the scalene are not the same triangles, though they are the same figure, 
since both are triangles. Things are said to be the same X if they do not differ by the 																																																								281In	[Dummett	(1991),	p.99].	282	ibid.	
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difference of an X, but <not the same X> if they do, for example, a triangle differs from a 
triangle by the difference of a triangle, and therefore they are different triangles; but they 
do not <differ by the difference> of a figure, but are in one and the same division [of 
figure]. For one kind of figure is a circle, another a triangle, and one kind of triangle is 
equilateral, another is scalene. So they are the same figure, that is a triangle, but not the 
same triangle; and so it is the same number, since the number of them does not differ by 
the difference of a number, but not the same ten, since the things it is said of are different: 
dogs in the one case, horses in the other.283 [Phys. Δ.14, 224a2-15; Hussey’s trans. mod.]		In	which	sense	the	number	of	 the	 ten	sheep	and	the	number	of	 ten	dogs	 is	 the	same?	To	properly	answer	this	question,	Aristotle	supplies	us	with	the	following	principle:	two	things	are	the	same	if	they	do	not	differ	by	the	‘difference	of	an	X’	.	‘To	 differ	 by	 the	 difference	 of	 an	 X’	means	 ‘to	 differ	 in	 respect	 of	 a	 differentia	falling	 immediately	 under	 X’.	 Scalene	 and	 equilateral	 triangles	 are	 the	 same	figure	because	they	both	belong	in	the	species	triangle	of	the	genus	figure;	they	are	figures	that	‘do	not	differ	by	the	difference	of	a	figure’.	They	are	not	the	same	triangle,	however,	because	they	do	not	belong	in	the	same	species	of	the	genus	
triangle;	‘they	differ	by	the	difference	of	a	triangle’.	Similarly	with	ten	sheep	and	ten	dogs.		It	seems	that	in	Aristotle’s	view	number	is	like	a	genus.	We	may	divide	this	genus	into	the	species	two,	three,	four,	and	so	on.	Ten	sheep	and	ten	dogs	are	the	same	number	in	that	they	both	fall	under	the	same	species	of	the	genus	number,	ten;	‘they	 do	 not	 differ	 by	 the	 difference	 of	 	 number’.	 They	 are	 the	 same	 kind	 of	number,	but	they	are	not	the	same	ten;	‘they	differ	by	the	difference	of	a	ten’.	The	analogy	between	triangles	and	numbers	suggests	a	notion	of	number	as	genus,	with	 species	 two,	 three,	 etc…,	 each	 species	 having	 as	 its	 particular	 members																																																									
283λέγεται δὲ ὀρθῶς καὶ ὅτι ἀριθµὸς µὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ὁ τῶν προβάτων καὶ τῶν κυνῶν, εἰ ἴσος ἑκάτερος, 
δεκὰς δὲ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐδὲ δέκα τὰ αὐτά, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τρίγωνα τὰ αὐτὰ τὸ ἰσόπλευρον καὶ τὸ σκαληνές, 
καίτοι σχῆµά γε ταὐτό, ὅτι τρίγωνα ἄµφω· ταὐτὸ γὰρ λέγεται οὗ µὴ διαφέρει διαφορᾷ, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ οὗ 
διαφέρει, οἷον τρίγωνον τριγώνου <τριγώνου> διαφορᾷ διαφέρει· τοιγαροῦν ἕτερα τρίγωνα· σχήµατος 
δὲ οὔ,ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ διαιρέσει καὶ µιᾷ. σχῆµα γὰρ τὸ µὲν τοιόνδε κύκλος, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε τρίγωνον, 
τούτου δὲ τὸ µὲν τοιόνδε ἰσόπλευρον, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε σκαληνές. σχῆµα µὲν οὖν τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τοῦτο 
τρίγωνον, τρίγωνον δ’ οὐ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ἀριθµὸς δὴ ὁ αὐτός (οὐ γὰρ διαφέρει ἀριθµοῦ διαφορᾷ ὁ 
ἀριθµὸς αὐτῶν), δεκὰς δ’ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή· ἐφ’ ὧν γὰρ λέγεται, διαφέρει· τὰ µὲν γὰρ κύνες, τὰ δ’ ἵπποι. 
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(e.g.)	 these	 two	 books,	 these	 two	 horses,	 …	 etc.284	We	 might	 claim	 then	 that	numbers	 in	 this	 sense	 are	 universals—kinds—rather	 than	 particulars:	 indeed,	that	they	are	kinds	of	collections,	that	is,	that	they	are	kinds	whose	instances	are	collections	of	objects.	For	example,	the	number	2	is,	by	this	account,	the	kind	of	two-membered	 collections.	 Hence,	 on	 this	 view,	 numbers	 are	 certainly	 not	themselves	collections,	any	more	than	the	kind	triangle	is	itself	a	triangle.285	This	 passage	 can	 form	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 Aristotelian	 account	 of	 numerical	predication.	As	Laura	Castelli	points	out,	 it	seems	that	Aristotle	is	claiming	that	when	we	say	‘ten	dogs’	and	when	we	say	‘ten	sheep’	the	numerical	predicate	‘ten’	means	 the	 same	 in	 both	 cases,	 even	 though	 it	 is	 ascribed	 to	 two	 different	collections.286	It	might	 be	 of	 some	 help	 to	 compare	Aristotle’s	 view	with	 other	non-Fregean	views	such	as	G.E.	Moore’s	conception	of	number.	In	his	work	Some	
Main	Problems	of	Philosophy,	G.E.	Moore	 endorses	 a	 conception	 of	 numbers	 as	universals.	He	argues	 that,	 for	 instance,	any	pair	of	 things,	 irrespectively	of	 the	nature	of	its	members,	possesses	the	property	of	being	two:	‘Every	pair	or	couple	of	things,	no	matter	what	the	things	may	be,	obviously	has	some	property	which	belongs	to	all	other	pairs	or	couples	and	to	nothing	else	-	the	property	which	we	express	by	saying	that	each	of	them	is	a	pair	or	a	couple.’287	And	similarly	for	all	the	 other	 numbers.288		 Thus,	 Moore	 writes,	 ‘the	 number	 two,	 therefore,	 does	seem	to	me	as	good	an	instance	as	can	be	given	of	a	universal’.289		If	our	 interpretation	of	Aristotle’s	numbers	as	universals	(kinds)	 is	sound,	then	those	 numbers	 are	 certainly	 different	 from	 the	 Platonic	 Form	 numbers	 he																																																									284	See	also	[Hussey	(1983),	p.161]	for	this	reading	of	the	text.	285	For	 this	 last	 remark,	 see,	 e.g.	 [Lowe	 (2001),	 p.220].	 It	 may	 be	 of	 some	 value	 to	 compare	Aristotle’s	 view	 of	 numbers	 as	 kinds	 with	 Cantor’s	 own	 conception	 of	 numbers:	 as	 Stefania	Centrone	 informs	 us,	 Cantor	 wrote	 the	 following	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 Giuseppe	 Peano:	 ‘I	 conceive	 of	numbers	as	‘forms’	or	‘species’	(general	concepts)	of	sets.’	In	[Centrone	(2010),	p.12;	her	trans.].	E.J.	Lowe	has	also	presented	similar	views	about	numbers	as	kinds	of	sets	in	his	[Lowe	(2001)]	and	in	a	series	of	articles.	See	also	the	treatment	in	[Mayberry	(2000),	esp.	ch.2].	286	See	[Castelli	(2010),	p.201].	287	In	[Moore	(1953),	p.366;	his	italics].	288	Op.	cit.,	p.368.	289	Op.	cit.,	p.366.	Moore’s	passages	are	discussed	extensively	in	[O’Connor	(1982),	pp.151-154].	
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criticises	 in	much	 of	Metaphysics	M	 and	N;	 the	 latter	 are	 certain	 collections	 of	ideal	units.	This	view	of	Platonic	Form	numbers	is	perhaps	not	unexpected:	it	is	what	someone	gets	by	combining	the	theory	of	Form	numbers	as	universals	with	the	 idea	 that	 universals	 are	 self-predicable.	 Let	 us	 leave	 aside	 the	 problematic	principle	of	 self-predication	and	 try	 to	 trace	 the	origins	of	Aristotle’s	 theory	of	numbers	as	universals.		
[3.6]	A	surprising	Platonic	account		In	 Plato’s	 dialogue	Hippias	 Major,	the	 sophist	 Hippias,	 in	 his	 exchange	 with	Socrates,	 acknowledges	 only	 one	 legitimate	 kind	 of	 predication,	 namely	 the	
distributive	one:290	
	
[Hip.:] If both of us were just, wouldn't each of us be too? Or if each of us were unjust, 
wouldn't both of us? Or if we were healthy, wouldn't each be? Or if each of us had some 
sickness or were wounded or stricken or had any other tribulation, again, wouldn't both of 
us have that attribute? Similarly, if we happened to be gold or silver or ivory, or, if you 
like, noble or wise or honoured or even old or young or anything you like that goes with 
human beings, isn't it really necessary that each of us be that as well? [Soc.:] Of course. 
[Hippias Major 300e8-301b1; Scaltsas’ trans.]  
 For	Hippias	 the	 only	 legitimate	 kind	 of	 predication	 is	 distributive	 predication:		things	are	F	 if	and	only	 if	each	one	of	 them	 is	F.	Socrates	agrees	 that	 there	are	cases	 like	 the	 ones	 that	 Hippias	 mentions.	 But,	 additionally,	 Socrates	 puts	forward	 counterexamples	 to	Hippias’s	 theory;	 in	 certain	 cases	what	we	 say	 of	things	is	true	if	the	things	jointly	satisfy	the	predicate:	
[Soc.:] We were so foolish, my friend, before you [Hippias] said what you did, that we had 
an opinion about me and you that each of us is one, but that we would not both be one 
(which is what each of us would be) because we are not one but two. But now, we have 
been instructed by you that if two is what we both are, two is what each of us must be as 
well; and if each is one, then both must be one as well.… 
																																																								290	Much	like	Frege	does.	
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Then it’s not entirely necessary, as you [Hipppias] said it was a moment ago, that 
whatever is true of both is also true of each, and that whatever is true of each is also true of 
both. [Hippias Major, 301d5- 302b3; Scaltsas’ trans.]  
 Socrates’	counterexample	to	Hippias’s	assumption	about	distributive	predication	that	 pertains	 to	 our	 discussion	 is	 an	 instant	 of	 numerical	 predication.	 Each	 of	Socrates	 and	 Hippias	 is	 one,	 while	they,	 collectively,	are	 two.	 The	 attribute	 of	‘being	 two’	 belongs	 to	 them,	 but	 not	 to	 each	 of	 them;	 it	 is	 instantiated	 only	 in	Socrates	 and	 Hippias	 together.	 Plato	 presents	 us	 here	 with	 an	 	 ingenious	metaphysical	 account	 of	 plural	 predication,	 an	 account	 that	 allows	 the	predicated	attribute–the	property	2–to	belong	to	all	the	subjects	together.	291				According	 to	 the	 Platonic	 view	 of	 plural	 predication	 advanced	 in	 the	 Hippias	
Major,	 a	 single	 instance	 of	 a	 property	 is	 jointly	 owned	 by	 several	 subjects.	Scaltsas	invites	us	to	consider	the	example	of	a	book	being	commonly	owned	by	two	siblings:	‘the	book	is	not	divided	between	the	two	siblings	so	that	the	one	of	them	owns	the	first	half	of	the	book	and	the	other	the	second	half.	Rather,	each	of	the	siblings	owns	the	whole	book	together	with	the	other	sibling;	but	neither	of	them	owns	the	book	 fully	by	himself	or	herself.’292	Does	 it	make	sense	to	claim	that	the	two	siblings	become	something	one,	metaphysically,	when	they	co-own	the	book?	Should	we	perhaps	look	for	a	new	object	(an	abstract	entity	like	the	set	of	the	siblings,	or	even	a	concrete	one	like	the	mereological	fusion	of	them)	that	will	 act	 as	 a	unitary	bearer	 for	 this	 property?	 I	 do	 not	 think	 so.	 One	 need	 not	pursuit	the	metaphysically	extravagant	unification	of	the	subjects	into	one	entity	in	such	cases.293	Socrates	then	does	not	seem	to	endorse	Mignucci’s	(or	Frege’s)	insistence	on	single	bearers	 for	number	properties	(whether	these	are	Fregean																																																									291	See	Scaltsas	(2017)	for	an	extensive	discussion.	292	In	[Scaltsas	(2017),	p.12].	293	Cf.	 Scaltsas,	 ibid:	 ‘The	 unification	 of	 the	 subjects	 into	 one	 entity	 is	 precisely	what	 does	 not	occur	 in	 the	 case	of	plural	belonging	of	 the	 collective	 type.	The	 subjects	do	not	become	one	 in	order	 to	manage	 co-possession,	 any	more	 than	 the	 two	 pillars	 become	 one	when	 they	 hold	 a	statue,	 or	 the	 wheels	 of	 a	 car	 become	 one	 when	 they	 sustain	 the	 car.	 When	 we	 say	 that	 the	siblings	are	two,	 it	would	undermine	the	truth	conditions	of	 this	statement	 if	 the	attribution	of	twoness	to	the	siblings	turned	them	into	one	entity,	or	even	one	subject.’	
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concepts,	 sets,	 mereological	 fusions).	 Socrates	 espouses	 a	 view	 of	 numbers	 as	non-distributive	properties	of	multitudes.294 	
[3.7]	Platonic	complications	and	interim	conclusions	
 
	A	similar	 treatment	of	numbers	as	attributes	of	objects	can	be	 found	 in	certain	passages	in	the	Phaedo.	Consider,	for	example,	the	following	passage:		
And again, wouldn’t you beware of saying that when one is added to one, the addition is 
the reason for their coming to be two, or when one is divided, that division is the reason? 
You’d shout loudly that you know no other way in which each thing comes to be, except 
by participating in the peculiar Being of any given thing in which it does participate; and 
in these cases you own no other reason for their coming to be two, save participation in 
twoness: things that are going to be must participate in that, and whatever is going to be 
one must participate in oneness. [Phaedo, 101c1-7;  Gallop’s trans. mod.] Plato	 uses	 a	 series	 of	 words	 ending	 in	 -ας	 for	 Form	 numbers	 in	 this	 passage:	
µονάς, δυάς.	 These	 are	 translated	 in	 English	 as	 ‘Oneness’,	 and	 ‘Twoness’,	respectively.	 While	 rejecting	 addition	 and	 division	 as	 reasons	 for	 the	 things’	
																																																								294	‘Multitude’	here	is	a	technical	term	borrowed	from	Simons	(1982):	it	is	a	collective	noun	much	like	 ‘audience’	 and	 ‘congregation’.	 In	 his	 later	 article	 ‘On	 Multitudes’	 Simons	 distinguishes	between	multitudes,	sets,	and	mereological	sums	or	fusions.	According	to	Simons,	the	identity	of	a	multitude	 is	determined	 solely	 and	 completely	by	what	members	 it	 has:	multitudes	with	 the	same	members	are	identical.	Just	like	multitudes,	sets	with	the	same	members	are	identical.	But	he	also	points	to	some	crucial	differences:	a	set	is	a	single	thing	whereas	a	multitude	is	essentially	many	 things.	Furthermore	he	maintains	 that,	while	a	multitude	of	 concrete	 individuals	 such	as	the	books	on	my	table	is	concrete	(in	the	sense	that	it	occupies	a	volume	which	is	the	sum	of	the	volumes	 occupied	 by	 the	 individual	 members),	 a	 set	 is	 something	 rather	 abstract,	 outside	 of	space	 and	 time.	Whereas	 a	multitude	 is	 essentially	 its	members,	 a	 set	 something	 additional,	 a	new	 individual.	 Lastly,	 while	 there	 can	 be	 no	 empty	 multitude,	 there	 is	 an	 empty	 set.	Mereological	sums	or	fusions	are	complex	individuals	and	just	like	multitudes	they	can	be	said	to	be	 concrete	 if	 their	 members	 are	 concrete;	 a	 fusion	 is	 nothing	 over	 and	 above	 its	 parts.	 In	[Simons	(2011)	,	pp.4-6].				
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coming	to	be	one	and	two,	Plato	offers	the	alternative	that	they	participate	in	the	Forms	Oneness	and	Twoness,	respectively.	But	why	does	Socrates	reject	addition	(πρόσθεσις)	and	division	(σχίσις)	as	reasons	for	things’	coming	to	be	two	or	one?	An	 answer	 may	 be	 found	 earlier	 in	 the	 text.	 In	 lines	 (97a1-b3)	 it	 seems	 that	Socrates	 understands	 ‘addition’	 as	 ‘juxtaposition’	 (ἡ σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον 
ἀλλήλων)	and	‘division’	as	‘dispersion’	(ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ’ ἑτέρου),	and	then	he	claims	that	 it	 is	not	 the	 juxtaposition	of	 two	 items	that	constitutes	their	 being	 two,	 but	 something	 else.	 His	 reason	 is	 that	 juxtaposition	 and	dispersion	are	opposites	 to	one	another,	and	 it	 cannot	be	right	 to	say	 that	 two	opposite	 causes	may	 equally	 be	 the	 reason	 for	 the	 same	 result.295	Or	 Socrates	may	acknowledge	that	it	is	not	necessary	for	two	things	to	be	close	to	each	other	for	them	to	be	two.	We	may	draw	a	useful	comparison,	as	Gallop	does,	with	what	Frege	says	about	predications	of	number:	‘Must	we	literally	hold	a	rally	of	blind	in	 Germany	 before	we	 can	 attach	 any	 sense	 to	 the	 expression	 “the	 number	 of	blind	in	Germany?”’	(The	Foundations	of	Arithmetic,	p.30)	296 Number	 Forms,	 much	 like	 other	 Forms	 in	 the	 Phaedo,	 have	 to	 be	 single	 and	partless.	 In	one	of	his	attempts	in	that	dialogue	to	prove	the	immortality	of	the	soul	Socrates	claims	that	if	anything	at	all	is	going	to	be	constant	and	unchanging	then	incomposite	things	will	be:	
Now is it not that which is compounded and composite naturally liable to be decomposed, 
in the same way in which it was compounded? And if anything is uncompounded, is not 
that, if anything, naturally unlikely to be decomposed?...Then it is most probable that 
things which are always the same and unchanging are the uncompounded things and the 
things that are changing and never the same are the composite things? [Phaedo, 78c1-8; 
Gallop’s trans. mod.] The	 above	 passage	 is	 part	 of	 the	 Affinity	 Argument	 (78c-79e).	 The	 argument	provides	 us	 with	 some	more	 information	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 forms:	 they	 are	incomposite	 and	 one-per-type	 (µονοειδές,	 78d5),	 and	 for	 this	 reason	 they	 are	unchanging	 and	 eternal.	 It	 seems	 that	 in	 lines	 101c1-7	 Plato	 advocates	 a																																																									295	In	[Bostock	(1986),	p.137].	296	In	[Gallop	(1975),	p.173].			
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conception	of	numbers	as	Forms,	attributes	or	properties	of	things,	e.g.	the	Form	of	F	seems	to	be	just	the	attribute	F	itself,	so	that	to	‘participate’	(µετέχειν)	in	F	is	like	having	 that	attribute.	We	predicate	 ‘three’	of	various	 triplets	of	 things	 in	a	way	similar	to	that	 in	which	we	predicate	 ‘man’	of	various	men;	thus,	 it	 is	only	natural	to	assume	that	the	number	3	is	a	Form	on	par	with	the	Form	of	man.	The	Platonic	picture	presented	above	shares	certain	features	with	the	Hippias	Major	analysis,	namely	the	treatment	of	number	Forms	as	properties.		Plato	 maintains	 a	 distinction	 between	 numbers	 as	 collections	 of	 objects	 and	Form	numbers	in	the	Final	Argument	for	the	immortality	of	the	soul.	Plato,	from	a	metaphysical	 point	 of	 view,	 seems	 to	 be	 concerned	with	 two	 levels,	 namely	Forms	 and	 the	 exemplification	 of	 Forms.	 Let	 us	 have	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	numerical	example	in	Phaedo’s	Final	Argument:		
‘Take a good look then at what I want to show. It's this. Apparently not only do the 
opposites we spoke of not accept each other. In addition, whatever things are not opposite 
to each other but always have the opposites, these too it seems will not accept the 
character, whatever it may be, that is opposite to the character that is in them. When this 
opposite character advances towards them, they either perish or get out of the way. (1) We 
will in fact admit, won't we, that three will sooner perish, sooner put up with anything, 
than stay behind and while it is still three become even ?' (104c1-3) 'Yes, indeed,' said 
Cebes.  'Further, twoness is not opposite to threeness.' 'No, it isn't.' 'Not only therefore will 
the opposite forms not stay behind when one of them advances upon the other. In addition 
there are certain other things that will not stay behind at the advance of an opposite.' 'Yes, 
you're quite right.' 'Will you agree then to our defining, if we can, what sort of things these 
are ?' 'By all means.' (2) 'Is this what they would be then: they are what compel whatever 
thing they possess to have not only their own character, but the character of some opposite 
as well, as a character which will belong to it for good?' (104d1-3) 'What do you mean 
quite?' 'I mean just what we said before. (3) You appreciate presumably that whatever the 
form of three possesses must of necessity be not only three but odd as well.' (104d5-7) 
'Quite.' 'Well, we maintain that the form opposite to the character which brings this about 
could never come to such an object.' 'No, it couldn't.' 'And what brought it about was in 
this case the form odd? ' 'Yes.' 'Opposite to this is the form of even ?' 'Yes.' 'So the form of 
even will never come to three?' 'No, it won't.' (4) 'Three then has no share in the even?' 
(104e3) 'No, it hasn't.'  'Threeness therefore is not-even?' 'Yes.' 'So what I was suggesting 
we define, what sort of things are not opposite to something and yet will not accept it, the 
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opposite—the example we have had just now is threeness which is not opposite to the 
even and yet all the same will not accept it, for the reason that threeness always brings 
along the opposite of the even, and in the same way twoness brings along the opposite of 
the odd, and fire brings along the opposite of the cold, and so on and so forth—: well see 
whether you would define them in this way. Not only will the opposite not accept its 
opposite. There is in addition that which brings along a certain opposite into whatever 
object it comes to. The thing that brings along the opposite will never accept the opposite 
of what is brought along.' [Phaedo, 104b6-105a5; O’Brien’s trans; underlining mine] The	passage	is	extremely	complex	and	admits	of	various	interpretations	but	for	my	purposes	 I	have	numbered	and	highlighted	certain	places	where	one	might	recognise	a	distinction	between	Form	numbers	and	the	things	that	are	‘occupied’	by	them:	a	characteristic	example	is	the	distinction	between	'the	Form	of	Three'	(ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα),	and	a	particular	three	(τὰ τρία).	O’Brien	(1967)	notes	that	this	distinction	is	kept	up	throughout	the	passage	but	I	am	making	the	weaker	claim	that	there	is	such	distinction	in	the	passage:	At	lines	104c1-3	(see	place	(1)	in	the	text)	the	three	(τὰ τρία)	that	will	 'sooner	perish'	must	be	particular	three,	since	only	the	(sensible)	particulars	can	perish,	not	the	Form.	Furthermore,	Socrates'	preliminary	definition	at	104d1-3	(place	(2)	in	the	text)	is	cast	in	terms	of	Form	and	 particular.	 It	 will	 be	 Forms	 which	 'occupy'	 particulars	 and	 impress	 their	character	(ἰδέαν),	upon	them;	the	definition	is	applied	to	 'the	Form	of	Three'	(ἡ 
τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα),	which	occupies		a	(particular)	three	(τρισίν)	(104d5-7,	place	(3)	in	 the	 text).297	At	104e3	 (place	 (4)	 in	 the	 text)	 the	 three	 (τὰ τρία),	that	 'has	no	share	in	even',	104e3,	must	be	a	particular	three.	Thus	the	claim	is	that	whatever	the	Form	of	Three	occupies	must	be	odd	(d5-8,	place	(3)	in	the	text);	hence	any	triad	will	not	have	part	in	the	Form	opposite	to	Odd,	the	Form	Even	(d9-e4,	place	(4)	 in	 the	 text).	 Although	 the	 Platonic	 picture	 presented	 above	 shares	 certain	features	with	the	Hippias	Major	analysis,	namely	the	treatment	of	Form	numbers	as	properties,	Plato	often	speaks	of	the	Form	as	an	archetype	(or	ideal	standard)	
																																																								297	What	 is	 it	 that	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 possessed	 by	 the	 Form	of	 Three	 and	 compelled	 not	 to	 be	three	 but	 also	 odd	 (104d5-7)?	O’Brien	 (p.212	 and	 217)	 strangely	 claims	 that	 it	 is	 the	 number	three	(three	not	as	set,	but	rather	as	a	mereological	simple?),	but	I	agree	with	Gallop	(p.206)	that	it	can	very	well	be	a	numbered	collection,	of	books	say.	
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which	is	copied	or	imitated	by	the	participants.298		It	 seems	 to	me	 that	we	need	 to	 look	no	 further	 beyond	Hippias	Major	 and	 the	discussion	in	the	Phaedo,	 if	we	really	wish	to	understand	Aristotle’s	conception	of	 number	 as	 species	 that	 is	 presented	 in	 the	 Physics	 passage. 299 	Certain	provision	must	 be	made	 to	 strip	 the	 philosophy	 of	 number	 presented	 there	 of	any	extravagant	Platonic	features,	first	and	foremost,	the	fact	that	Platonic	Form	numbers	 are	 ‘over	 and	above’	 the	 things	 that	have	 those	numbers.	Aristotle	 in	
Metaphysics	 M.6-8	 argues	 against	 a	 certain	 view	 of	 Platonic	 numbers,	 that	conceives	 them	 as	 certain	 sets	 of	 ideal	 units.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 notice	 that	 the	main	objection	Aristotle	raises	against	a	possible	identification	of	numbers	with	such	collections	of	units	has	to	do	with	the	inability	of	such	collections	to	account	for	many	 arithmetical	 operations.	 Let	 us	 now	 revisit	 passage	 220b8-12	 of	 the	
Physics:	What	 goes	 on	when	we	 ascribe	 a	 number	 to	 something	 -	 as	when,	 for	example,	we	say	‘The	horses	in	the	field	are	5’?	It	is	certainly	true,	of	course,	that	no	 one	 thing	 can	 as	 such	 be	 that	 which	 is	 5.	 Aristotle	 points	 to	 a	 reasonable	answer,	however:	the	sentence	is	equivalent	to	‘There	is	a	pentad	of	horses	in	the	field’	 or	 ‘the	 horses	 in	 the	 field	 are	 a	 five’.	 In	 the	 number-as-species	interpretation	 that	 means	 that	 the	 horses	 in	 the	 field	 (a	 countable																																																									298	In	 much	 of	 the	 discussion	 in	 the	 Recollection	 Argument	 and	 the	 Final	 Argument	 Plato	compares	 the	 Forms	 to	 sensible	 particulars	 which	 are	 F,	 and	 he	 notes	 that	 those	 particulars	always	combine	being	F	with	being	not-F,	while	 the	Form	of	F-ness	 is	unqualifiedly	F.	 It	seems	that	in	the	Phaedo	we	have	two	quite	different	views	of	what	the	forms	are:	on	the	one	hand	they	are	perfect	examples	of	properties,	and	on	the	other	hand	they	are	the	properties	themselves.	See	[Bostock	(1986),	pp.198-201].	299	In	fact,	Hippias	Major	may	be	considered	the	proper	dialogue	that	supports	both	Platonic	and	Aristotelian	readings.	Paul	Woodruff	 	 in	his	article	 ‘Socrates	and	Ontology:	The	Evidence	of	 the	
Hippias	Major’	has	argued–in	my	opinion	convincingly–that	early	dialogues	such	as	 the	Hippias	
Major	 are	 ‘ontologically	 neutral	 in	 that	 there	 is	 no	 particular	 ontology	 that	 they	 require,	 and,	though	they	tempt	one	to	provide	them	an	ontology,	the	proof	of	their	neutrality	is	that	Plato	and	Aristotle	 respond	 differently,	 but	 with	 equal	 respect,	 to	 the	 temptation.	 Socrates'	 exercises	 in	definition	are	at	the	same	time	a	rich	breeding	ground	for	Plato's	lavish	ontology	and	assimilable	gracefully	 to	 Aristotle's	 more	 austere	 one’.	 [Woodruff	 (1978),	 p.102]	 Aristotle	 tells	 us	 that	Socrates	 takes	 the	 objects	 of	 definition	 to	 be	 universals	 and	 he	 constantly	 complains	 that	Socrates	did	not	 ‘separate’	 the	universals	as	the	Platonist	did	(cf.	Meta.	M.4,	1078b12-32,	Meta.	M.9,	1086a32-b13).	
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number/arithmos–or	number	 in	the	 first	sense)	belongs	to	the	number	species	(or	number	in	the	second	sense)	five;	we	may	say	that	the	five	is	the	kind	of	five-membered	 collections.	How	 can	we	 analyse	 a	 simple	 arithmetical	 statement	 of	addition—such	as	‘2+2=4’	according	to	this	interpretation?	Perhaps	like	this:	for	any	collections	of	objects	x,	y,	z,	if	x	is	a	2,	y	is	a	2,	and	z	is	a	4,	and	if	x	and	y	are	disjoint	 (i.e.	 they	 have	 no	members	 in	 common),	 then	 the	 union	 of	 x	 and	 y	 is	equinumerous	to	z.300				
[3.8]	The	thesis	that	composition	is	identity			
[3.8.1]	Frege	against	Mill		Part	 of	 Mignucci’s	 Fregean	 baggage	 is	 his	 hostile	 attitude	 to	 Mill	 and	 his	philosophy	of	number: 
	
If our interpretation is sound, Aristotle is far from a view such as Mill’s, according to 
which a number is a physical property of an agglomerate of things and expresses the 
characteristic manner in which the agglomerate is made up. Without a loss of realism, 
Aristotle is not committed to such an empiricist position. [Mignucci (1987), p.201]  It	does	seem	a	bit	odd	 to	deny	Aristotle	a	place	 in	 the	empiricist	 tradition.	But	why	does	Mignucci	so	straightforwardly	deny	any	similarity	between	Aristotle’s	and	Mill’s	views	on	number?	After	all,	 for	 J.	S.	Mill	 (as	well	as	 for	Aristotle),	all	numbers	must	be	numbers	of	something:		
All numbers must be numbers of something: there are no such things as numbers in the 
abstract. Ten must mean ten bodies, or ten sounds, or ten beatings of the pulse. But though 
numbers must be numbers of something, they may be numbers of anything. Propositions, 
therefore, concerning numbers, have the remarkable peculiarity that they are propositions 
concerning all things whatever, all objects, all existences of every kind, known to our 
experience. [System of Logic, Book 2, ch.6, §2] A	 similar	 view	 to	Mill	 can	 be	 traced	 in	 the	Aristotelian	 corpus;	 for	 example	 in	
Meta.	1092b19-20	Aristotle	states	clearly:	‘A	number,	whatever	it	is,	is	always	a																																																									300	A	similar	analysis	can	be	found	in	[Lowe	(2001),	pp.224-225].	
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number	 of	 certain	 things,	 of	 fire	 or	 of	 earth	 or	 of	 units’	 (ἀεὶ ὁ ἀριθµὸς ὃς ἂν ᾖ 
τινῶν ἐστιν, ἢ πύρινος ἢ γήϊνος ἢ µοναδικός).301	According	 to	Mill,	number	 terms	denote	 agglomerations	 of	 things	 (complex	 wholes)	 and	 connote	 properties	 of	those	agglomerations.	Thus,	he	writes:	
Each of the numbers two, three, four, etc., denotes physical phenomena, and connotes a 
physical property of those phenomena. Two, for instance, denotes all pairs of things, and 
twelve all dozens of things, connoting what makes them pairs, or dozens…What, then, is 
that which is connoted by a name of number? Of course, some property belonging to the 
agglomeration of things which we call by the name; and that the property is, the 
characteristic manner in which the agglomeration is made up of, and may be separated 
into, parts. [System of Logic, Book 3, ch.24, §5] 
 Frege	quotes	 the	 last	sentence302	and	objects	 to	 it	on	a	number	of	grounds.	His	criticism	 is	 that	an	agglomeration	may	be	separated	 into	parts	 in	various	ways	and	thus	we	cannot	talk	about	the	number	of	parts	 in	an	agglomeration.	Let	us	examine	more	carefully	the	relevant	passage:		
And it is quite true that, while I am not in a position, simply by thinking of it differently, 
to alter the colour  or hardness of a thing in the slightest, I am able to think of the Iliad, 
either as one poem, or as 24 books, or as some large number of verses. […] Nor can we 
say in this case that the different numbers exist in the same thing side by side, as different 
colours do. I can point to the patch of each individual colour without saying a word, but I 
cannot in the same way point to the individual numbers. If I can call the same object red 
and green with equal right, it is a sure sign that the object named is not what really has the 
green colour; for that we must first get a surface which is green only. Similarly an object 
to which I can ascribe different numbers with equal right is not what really has a number. 
[Foundations, §22, pp.28-29] Frege	seems	to	argue	that	there	is	no	unique	way	by	which	a	whole	(such	as	the	
Iliad)	can	be	divided	into	parts:	the	Iliad	may	be	considered	as	one	poem,	or	as																																																									301	Furthermore,	Aristotle	sometimes	places	number	in	the	category	of	relatives,	because	number	is	 always	 a	 number	 of	 things	 (cf.	 the	 discussion	 in	Meta.	 I.6,	 1056b8-1057a7).	 Number	 is	 a	relative	(for	every	number	is	a	number	of	something)	and	the	defining	mark	of	a	relative	is	that	its	 linguistic	 expression	 requires	 completion	by	 a	 genitive;	 it	 is	 always	 ‘of’	 or	 ‘than’	 something	else	(cf.	Cat.	6a36-b11;	Meta.	Δ.15).	302	In	[Foundations,	§23,	pp.29-30].	
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24	books,	or	as	 some	 large	number	of	verses.	 If	 the	 Iliad	was	uniquely	divided	into	 parts	 (say,	 into	 24	 books)	 then	 one	 could	 not	 claim	 that	 it	 is	 also	 15,693	lines.	It	seems	then	that	there	are	multiple	ways	of	dividing	a	whole	into	parts;	but	 that,	 as	 Frege	 argues,	would	 entail	 that	 incompatible	 numerical	 properties	are	 attributed	 to	 the	 same	 thing:	much	 like	 the	 colours	 red	 and	 green	 cannot	both	be	truly	ascribed	of	a	single	thing	at	the	same	time,	the	Iliad	cannot	both	be	24	and	15,693.	It	seems	then	that	the	object	at	hand,	the	Iliad	for	example,	is	not	that	which	 ‘really	 has	 a	 number’.	 Thus	 Frege	 concludes:	 ‘If	 I	 can	 call	 the	 same	object	red	and	green	with	equal	right,	 it	 is	a	sure	sign	that	 the	object	named	is	not	what	really	has	the	green	colour;	for	that	we	must	first	get	a	surface	which	is	green	 only.	 Similarly	 an	 object	 to	 which	 I	 can	 ascribe	 different	 numbers	 with	equal	right	is	not	what	really	has	a	number.’303			What	 is	 exactly	 is	 Frege’s	 argument	 here?	 Is	 his	 position	 that	 numerical	attributions	 are	 subjective,	 that	 the	 object	 in	 question	 does	 not	 in	 any	 way	determine	whether	 or	 not	 certain	 numbers	 are	 being	 ascribed	 to	 it?	Dummett	understands	Frege	in	this	way:		
When we regarded it [i.e. number] as ascribed to a complex, an aggregate, it seemed that 
the number to be ascribed depended on our subjective way of regarding it; as one copse, or 
as five trees; as four companies, or as five hundred men. But there is nothing subjective 
about it: it is the concept copse or tree, company or man which we invoke in the ascription 																																																								303	Frege	argues	similarly	elsewhere	in	the	Foundations:	a	pile	of	playing	cards	can	considered	as	a	 number	 of	 cards,	 or	 as	 a	 number	 of	 complete	packs	 of	 cards	 (Foundations,	 §22,	 pp.28-29);	 a	bundle	of	straw	may	be	thought	of	as	100	straws	or	as	some	huge	number	of	cells	or	molecules	(§23,	p.30);	a	copse	of	trees	may	be	considered	as	a	single	thing	or	as	five	trees	(§46,	p.59);	four	companies	 may	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 500	 men	 (§46,	 p.59).	 The	 reader	 who	 wishes	 for	 a	 more	extensive	discussion	of	Frege’s	arguments	against	Mill’s	view	of	number	properties	can	consult	Andrew	 D.	 Irvine’s	 article	 ‘Frege	 on	 Number	 Properties’.	 E.	 J.	 Lowe	 remarks	 that	 Frege’s	arguments	are	part	of	a	wider	reductio	ad	absurdum	of	 the	view	that	numbers	are	attributes	of	objects	 [Lowe	 (2005),	 p.84].	 He	 points	 to	 what	 Frege	 says	 later	 in	 the	 Foundations:	 ‘Several	examples	given	earlier	gave	the	false	impression	that	different	numbers	may	belong	to	the	same	thing.	 This	 is	 to	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 we	 were	 there	 taking	 objects	 to	 be	 what	 has	number.	 As	 soon	 as	we	 restore	 possession	 to	 the	 rightful	 owner,	 the	 concept,	 numbers	 reveal	themselves	 as	 no	 less	 mutually	 exclusive	 in	 their	 own	 sphere	 than	 colours	 are	 in	 theirs.’	[Foundations,	§48,	p.61].	
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of number, that determines objectively which number it must be. [Dummett (1991), p.88; 
his italics] One	 could	 respond	 to	 Frege	 that	 the	 number	 of	 parts	 in	 the	 Iliad	 is	 fixed	independently	of	the	concepts	one	employs	to	count	them.	A	whole	such	as	the	
Iliad	may	turn	out	to	be	composed	of	a	plethora	of	different	parts,	each	of	which	have	 different	 numbers	 associated	 with	 them.	 Let	 us	 try	 to	 summarise	 our	response	to	Frege:	the	Iliad	is	one	thing	and	no	other	numerical	predicate	should	be	applied	to	the	Iliad	as	such.	It	is	true,	however,	that	the	Iliad	is	composed	of	24	books	and	that	 those	books	contain	many	pages	of	verses.	We	should	not	 infer	from	the	fact	that	those	books	are	24	that	the	Iliad	is	24	in	number.	Thus	we	can	always	distinguish	between	composition	 and	 identity.304	No	contradiction	arises	when	 one	 says	 of	 the	 books	 that	 compose	 the	 Iliad	 that	 they	 are	 twenty-four,	even	though	the	Iliad	is	one;	the	relation	between	the	Iliad	and	the	books	is	one	of	composition,	not	one	of	identity.			Is	 Mill’s	 view	 susceptible	 to	 Frege’s	 objections?	 It	 seems	 that	 Mill	 can	 escape	Frege’s	objections;	for	he	proceeds	to	explain	what	he	means	as	follows:			
What we call a collection of objects two, three, or four, they are not two, three, or four, in 
the abstract; they are two, three, or four things of some particular kind; pebbles, horses, 
inches, pounds weight. What the name of the number connotes is, the manner in which 
single objects of the given kind must be put together, in order to produce that particular 
aggregate. [System of Logic, Book 3, ch.24, §5] 
 As	Glenn	Kessler	 has	 argued,	what	Mill	 says	 here	 is	 that	when	we	 say	 that	 an	aggregate	has	the	number	2,	what	we	really	mean	is	that	‘an	aggregate	composed	in	a	certain	way	from	a	certain	kind	of	part	has	the	number	2.	Any	aggregate	that																																																									304	See	Kris	McDaniel	 (2013)	 for	 an	 extensive	 argument.	McDaniel	 also	points	out	 that	 	 even	 if	composition	 is	 identity,	 the	answer	 to	 the	puzzles	 raised	by	Frege	 is	 that	numerical	properties	are	not	contraries:	‘In	short,	something	can	be	both	one	and	many.	And	if	this	is	so,	why	couldn’t	a	 thing	be	both	one	 in	number	and	 twenty-four	 in	number?	 Just	 as	 the	 friend	of	 the	view	 that	composition	 is	 identity	gives	up	 the	 intuition	 that	one	 thing	cannot	be	many	 things,	 so	 too	she	should	abandon	the	intuition	that	something	cannot	be	both	one	in	number	and	twenty-four	in	number.’	In	[McDaniel	(2013),	pp.217-218].	
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differs	in	number	from	this	aggregate	will,	of	necessity,	be	composed	of	different	parts,	 and	 hence,	will	 be	 a	 different	 object.’305	And	we	 can	 perhaps	 attribute	 a	similar	view	 to	Aristotle:	 recall	 that	 for	Aristotle	a	number	 in	 the	 first	 sense	 is	something	 composed	 of	 things	 of	 a	 certain	 kind;	 an	 arithmos	 of	 syllables	(number	in	the	first	sense)	has	a	determinate	number,	or,	equivalently,	belongs	to	 a	 certain	 number	 species	 (number	 in	 the	 second	 sense).	 In	 an	 arithmos	 in	Aristotle’s	first	sense	the	units	are	already	determined:	an	arithmos	of	syllables	is	not	also	an	arithmos	of	letters.		Frege	raises	a	much	more	interesting	objection	against	Mill’s	view	that	numbers	are	properties	of	‘external	objects’.	Frege	argues	that	number	‘is	applicable	over	a	far	wider	range’.	[Foundations,	§24,	p.30].	Frege	is	surely	right	in	this:	as	well	as	being	 able	 to	 count	 dogs	 and	 apples,	 we	 can	 also	 count	 the	 figures	 of	 the	syllogism,	the	Muses	and	other	non-sensible	things.306	Aristotle	would	agree	that	number	 ascriptions	 need	 not	 involve	 only	 perceptibles.	 An	 objection	 that	Aristotle	raises	 in	Meta.	N.3	against	Academic	theories	of	number,	 is	 that	 those	theories	cannot	account	for	the	application	of	numbers	to	perceptible	things	(see	esp.1090a30-1090b5);	 he	 does	 not	 say	 that	 numbers	 are	 properties	 of	perceptibles.		Were	Aristotle	to	uphold	such	a	Millian	position	his	conception	of																																																									305	See	[Kessler(1980),	p.67].	As	Kessler	explains:	‘If	we	want	to	put	this	in	a	more	modern	setting	we	could	do	so	by	noting	that	Frege-style	aggregates	are	 individuated	 in	 terms	of	 their	 ‘atomic	parts’.	That	 is,	 they	are	 individuated	 in	 terms	of	 those	parts	which	 themselves	have	no	proper	parts.	…	On	 the	alternative	 reading	 I	have	 just	 considered,	a	given	aggregate	can	have	as	parts	only	certain	kinds	of	things.	Anything	that	is	not	of	the	appropriate	kind	will	not	be	a	part	of	the	aggregate	and	will	therefore	not	figure	into	the	identity	conditions	of	the	aggregate.	In	a	sense,	it	is	still	true	that	aggregates	are	individuated	in	terms	of	their	parts.	However,	the	parts	in	terms	of	which	the	aggregate	 is	 individuated	may	themselves	have	(proper)	parts.’	 In	[Kessler(1980),	pp.67-68].	306	Bell	points	out	 that	Frege’s	objection	can	be	directed	 towards	his	conception	of	number:	 ‘If,	with	Frege,	we	take	the	analysis	of	ascriptions	of	number	to	involve	objectual	quantification	.	 .	 .	then	it	becomes	impossible	to	provide	a	plausible	analysis	of	many	actual	ascriptions	of	number	that	we	make,	apparently	unproblematically,	in	everyday	life.	For	instance,	we	have	no	difficulty	in	understanding,	and	if	we	have	the	appropriate	knowledge	we	have	no	difficulty	in	answering,	questions	like	the	following:	‘How	many	years	was	Robinson	Crusoe	marooned	on	his	island?’	.	.	.		‘How	 many	 daughters	 had	 King	 Lear?’	 .	 .	 .	 	 On	 Frege’s	 theory	 the	 only	 true	 answer	 to	 these	questions	is:	zero.	And	intuitively	that	seems	to	be	the	wrong	answer.	See	[Bell	(1990),	p.76].	
		
170	
arithmetic	 would	 be	 more	 or	 less	 identical	 to	 logistiké	 (λογιστική),	 the	 art	 of	calculation,	 considered	 as	 a	 subsidiary	 of	 Arithmetic	 by	 most	 mathematicians	and	philosophers	in	antiquity.	The	distinction	between	ἀριθµητική	(the	theory	of	number)	and	λογιστική	(the	art	of	calculation)	was	of	some	importance	in	Greek	mathematics.	A	passage	from	Proclus’	commentary	on	the	first	book	of	Euclid’s	
Elements	sheds	some	light	on	the	subject	matter	of	logistiké:		
Nor does the student of calculation consider the properties of number as such, but of 
numbers as present in sensible objects; and hence he gives them names from the things 
being numbered, calling them sheep numbers or cup numbers.307 [Comm. on the First 
Book of Euclid’s Elements,  40.2-5; Morrow’s trans.] It	 is	quite	odd	that	Aristotle	not	only	fails	to	 identify	anywhere	arithmetic	with	
logistikê,	but	also	he	does	not	even	discuss	the	latter	even	though	the	distinction	was	of	particular	importance	to	Plato.308	
[3.8.2]	Frege	and	Plato		Frege	of	course	postulates	concepts	as	those	things	that	do	not	admit	of	multiple	numbers.	 It	 is	 perhaps	worthwhile	 comparing	 his	 arguments	 against	Mill	with	those	of	Plato:	much	like	Frege,	Plato	opts	for	things	other	than	perceptibles,	so	as	to	avoid	what	he	understands	to	be	their	major	deficiency,	their	quantitative	
indeterminacy.	Thus,	in	Republic	Book	VII,	Plato	seems	to	argue	that	perceptible	objects	are	not	really	suitable	candidates	for	ascriptions	of	number,	since	‘we	do	see	the	same	thing	as	one	and	as	an	unlimited	number	at	the	same	time’	(525a4-5).	 Plato’s	 argument	 is	 strikingly	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 Frege	 above.	 We	 can	supplement	 Republic’s	 account	 with	 excerpts	 from	 the	 Phaedo,	 where	 Plato	expounds	his	position	through	the	example	of	the	concept	of	equality.	In	order	to	understand	what	it	is	for	something	to	‘be	equal’	one	cannot	rely	on	perceptible	things.	Equal	perceptible	things	like	sticks	and	stones	are	not	equal	in	the	same	
																																																								307	οἶδ’ αὖ ὁ λογιστικὸς αὐτὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ θεωρεῖ τὰ πάθη τῶν ἀριθµῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ὅθεν 
καὶ τὴν ἐπωνυµίαν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν µετρουµένων τίθεται, µηλίτας καλῶν τινας καὶ φιαλίτας. 	308		 In	 the	 Republic	 Book	 VII,	 522c,	 525a-c,	 526b;	 Gorgias	 451b-c	 and	 Theatet.	 198c.	 For	 a	discussion	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 distinction	 see	 [Heath	 (1921),	 pp.13-16].	 Far	 more	authoritative	is	the	account	given	in	Klein	(1968).			
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way	 as	 the	 Form	 of	 Equality	 is	 (Phaedo,	74d-e,	 75a),	they	 are	 deficiently	 so,	whereas	 the	 Form	 is	 paradigmatically	 so	 (74e).	 	 Also	 in	 the	Parmenides,	 Plato	argues	 that	 Socrates	 ‘is	 one’,	e.g.,	 because	 he	 is	 one	man	 among	 a	 company	 of	seven	men,	and	we	can	equally	say	 that	he	 is	 ‘many’	 in	virtue	of	his	upper	and	lower,	front	and	back,	and	left	and	right	parts	(Parm.	129c–d).	There	is,	however,	a	proper	way	in	which	something	can	be	one	or	many,	which,	according	to	Plato,	is	grasped	by	reasoning	(129d–e),	thus	independently	of	sense	perception.		The	things	that	do	for	Plato	the	job	that	concepts	do	for	Frege,	i.e	the	entities	to	which	numbers	apply	without	any	others’	applying,	are	mathematical	numbers. As	we	saw	in	the	Hippias	Major	and	the	Phaedo,	there	are	Forms	of	number,	viz.	the	 Forms	 of	 Oneness,	 Twoness,	 Threeness	 and	 so	 on.	 The	 statements	 of	arithmetic,	 however,	 are	 not	 about	 them	 but	 about	 mathematical	 numbers.	Mathematical	 numbers	 are	 intermediate	 between	 the	 Form	 numbers	 and	collections	 of	 sensible	 things.	 The	 Academics’	 reasons	 for	 postulating	 such	entities	 are	 two:	 1)	 The	 problem	 of	 precision,	 namely	 the	 fact	 that	 physical	objects	 might	 fail	 to	 have	 the	 mathematical	 properties	 we	 study,	 and	 2)	 the	uniqueness	problem,	the	fact	that	mathematical	statements	need	more	than	one	objects.	 Aristotle	 tells	 us	 that	 the	 intermediates	 differ	 from	 sensible	 things	 in	being	eternal	and	unchangeable	(ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα),	and	from	Forms	in	that	there	are	many	alike	 (πόλλ’ ἄττα ὅµοια),	while	 the	Form	 itself	 is	 in	each	 case	unique	(ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ µαθηµατικὰ τῶν πραγµάτων εἶναί φησι 
µεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν µὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ’ εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ 
µὲν πόλλ’ ἄττα ὅµοια εἶναι τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἓν ἕκαστον µόνον,	Meta.	A.6,	987b14-18).309		
[3.8.3]	Plato	and	Aristotle	on	composition	as	identity		Plato	 in	 Socrates’	Dream	 in	 the	Theatetus	 (201e-206b)	discusses	 the	 view	 that	composition	 is	 identity,	 i.e.	 that	 a	 whole	 is	 merely	 the	 sum	 of	 its	 parts.	 The	context	of	the	discussion	is	the	third	definition	of	knowledge	as	true	judgement	with	 an	 account.	 Socrates	 reports	 a	 dream	which	 involves	 the	 crucial	 premise	that	 there	 is	 a	 certain	 epistemological	 asymmetry	 between	 parts	 and	 complex																																																									309	Cf.	Meta.	N.3	1090a35-b1.	
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wholes,	 namely	 parts	 are	 unknowable,	whereas	 complex	wholes	 are	 knowable	(by	the	account	of	 their	parts).310	Letters	and	syllables	are	used	as	examples	of	parts	 and	 wholes,	 respectively.	 Socrates	 proceeds	 to	 give	 two	 different	refutations	 of	 this	 epistemological	 asymmetry.	 The	 first	 refutation	 results	 in	epistemological	 symmetry	 between	 parts	 and	 wholes	 (it	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 a	dilemma	 in	 which	 Socrates	 argues	 that	 parts	 and	 wholes	 are	 either	 just	 as	knowable	as	each	other	or	just	as	unknowable	as	each	other):311			
[Soc.:] Well now, if the complex is both many elements and a whole, with them as its 
parts, then complexes and elements are equally capable of being known and expressed, 
since all the parts turn out to be the same thing as the whole.  [Theaet.:] Yes, surely. 
[Soc.:] But if, on the other hand, the complex is single and without parts, then complexes 
and elements are equally unaccountable and unknowable—both of them for the same 
reason. [Theat., 205d7-e4; Levett’s trans.]  
Socrates	begins	his	enquiry	as	follows:	
[Soc.:] Look here, what do we mean by “the syllable”? The two letters (or if there are 
more, all the letters)? Or do we mean some single form produced by their combination? 
[Theat., 203c4–6; Levett’s trans.] He	then	invites	us	to	consider	the	first	horn	of	the	above	question.	If	we	assume	that	a	syllable	is	all	its	letters	and	we	know	the	syllable	‘SO’,	then,	since	‘SO’	is	the	same	as	the	two	letters	‘S’	and	‘O’,	we	know	the	letters	also.	Thus,	the	letters	are	just	 as	 knowable	 as	 the	 syllable,	 something	 that	 refutes	 the	 epistemological	asymmetry	hypothesis:		
[Soc.:] Then take the case of the two letters, S and O; these two are the first syllable of my 
name. If a man knows the syllable, he must know both the letters? [Theaet.:] Of course. 
[Soc.:] So he knows S and O. [Theat., 203c8-d2; Levett’s trans.]  The	crucial	premise	 that	Socrates’	argumentative	strategy	depends	on	 is	 that	a	whole	 is	 identical	 with	 its	 parts.	 However,	 this	 should	 not	 be	 taken	 as	 an	
																																																								310	Verity	Harte	calls	this	‘the	Asymmetry	Thesis’.	In	[Harte	(2002),	p.33].	311	Ibid.	
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indication	that	Plato	endorses	such	a	view.312			As	Harte	helpfully	comments,	‘since	the	identification	of	a	whole	with	its	parts	is	the	(sole)	shared	premiss	on	which	both	horns	of	the	dilemma	depend,	if	there	is	something	 at	 fault	 in	 the	 arguments	 of	 the	 dilemma,	 which	 Plato	 intends	 to	highlight,	 this	 identification	 is	 the	 most	 likely	 candidate.	 […]	 Reasons	 to	 be	suspicious	 of	 this	 identification	 are	 also	 provided	 by	 the	 lengths	 to	 which	Socrates	 goes	 to	 defend	 it	 and	 the	 lengths	 to	which	 Theaetetus	 goes	 to	 try	 to	resist	it.’313	In	the	following	passage	Socrates	gives	us	an	argument	for	the	thesis	that	composition	is	identity:	
[Soc.:] Well now, is there any difference between all of them and all of it? For instance, 
when we say ‘one, two, three, four, five, six’; or, ‘twice three’, or ‘three times two’, ‘four 
and two’, ‘three and two and one’; are we speaking of the same thing in all these cases or 
different things? [Theaet.:] The same thing.  [Soc.:] That is, six?  [Theaet.:] Precisely.  
[Soc.:] Then with each expression have we not spoken of all the six? [Theat.:] Yes. [Soc.:] 
And when we speak of all of them, aren't we speaking of all of it? [Theat.:] We must be.  
[Soc.:] That is, six?  [Theat.:] Precisely. [Soc.:] Then in all things made up of number, at 
any rate, by ‘the sum’ and ‘all of them’ we mean the same thing? [Theat.] So it seems.  
[Theat., 204b10-d3; Levett’s trans.] The	 passage	 is	 of	 particular	 importance	 since	 it	 was	 perhaps	 the	 one	 that	prodded	 Aristotle	 to	 inquire	 about	 the	 unity	 of	 number	 and	 to	 accuse	 the	Platonists	of	not	providing	a	principle	of	unity	for	number,	as	we	shall	see	later	in	 this	 chapter.	We	have	become	accustomed	 to	 think	of	 the	numbers	as	 those	unique	 abstract	 particulars	 1,2,3,4,	 .	 .	 .	 This	 conception	 of	 number,	 however,	stands	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	 the	 ancient	 one.	 As	 I	 have	 said	many	 times	 in	 this																																																									312	This	 is	 essentially	 Scaltsas’	 reading	 of	 the	 Platonic	 position.	 [Scaltsas	 (1994),	 pp.59-61]		According	to	Burnyeat,	Plato	rejects	the	thesis	that	composition	is	identity	and	subscribes	to	the	Aristotelian	position	of	substantial	or	substantial-like	composition	(even	in	the	case	of	numbers).	[Burnyeat	(1990),	pp.206-209].	According	to	Verity	Harte	in	certain	passages	in	the	Theaetetus,	the	 Parmenides,	 and	 the	 Sophist,	 Plato	 discusses	 a	 notion	 of	 composition	 as	 identity	 without	endorsing	such	a	view,	whereas	in	other	texts	from	the	Parmenides,	the	Sophist,	the	Philebus	and	the	Timaeus,	he	endorses	a	view	of	wholes	as	 things	genuinely	unified,	as	an	alternative	 to	 the	rejected	composition-as-identity	view	[Harte	(2002),	pp.2-3].	313	See	[Harte	(2002),	p.39].	
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chapter,	 an	 arithmos	 (number	 in	 the	 first	 sense)	 is	 a	 collection	 of	 units,	something	 that	 corresponds	 also	 to	 Euclid’s	 definition:	 ‘number	 is	 a	 collection	composed	of	units	(Ἀριθµὸς δὲ τὸ ἐκ µονάδων συγκείµενον πλῆθος,	Elem.,	Book	VII,	def.	2).	Thus,	 it	 is	better	 to	understand	number	 three,	 for	 instance,	 as	 a	 trio	of	units.	And	one	is	not	an	arithmos,	by	definition.	Harte,	on	the	contrary,	does	not	seem	 to	 employ	 that	 conception	 of	 number.	 Rather,	 she	 understands	 that	 an	arithmos	 is	 a	 collection	 in	 the	plural,	 i.e.	 something	 that	 lacks	unity,	 or,	 to	 use	Aristotle’s	 term,	 something	 that	 is	 like	 a	 ‘heap’.	 As	 she	 writes:	 	 ‘The	 term	‘collection’,	 of	 course,	 is	 grammatically	 singular.	 However,	 here	 and	 in	 what	follows,	 I	use	the	term	‘collection’	as	a	convenient	way	in	which	to	refer,	 in	the	plural,	to	many	things.	A	collection	is	a	plurality,	or,	better,	many	things,	plurally	quantified.’314	For	Harte,	number	terms	like	‘3’	are	plural	terms	denoting	what	I	have	called	elsewhere	multitudes.315	She	also	claims	that	this	conception	is	 ‘the	conception	of	ordinary	Greek	mathematics’	.	I	am	not	so	sure	about	this.	Euclid’s	definition	of	number	point	to	number	as	some	one	thing	composed	out	of	parts.	According	to	Burnyeat,	Plato	rejects	the	thesis	that	composition	is	identity	in	the	case	 of	 numbers	 and	 subscribes	 to	 the	 Aristotelian	 position	 of	 substantial	 or	substantial-like	 composition.316	I	will	 discuss	Aristotle’s	 position	 on	 the	matter	shortly.	Let	us	return	to	the	above	passage.	How	should	we	read	the	arithmetical	propositions	‘6=4+2’	and	‘6=3+2+1’?	Burnyeat	points	out	that	someone	who	has	been	influenced	by	Frege	might	invoke	a	distinction	between	sense/reference	to	better	understand	the	expressions	‘twice	three’,	‘three	times	two’,	‘four	and	two’,	‘three	 and	 two	 and	 one’,	 (204c):	 perhaps	 all	 those	 expressions	 designate	 the	same	thing,	the	number	6,	but	they	differ	in	their	sense.	Thus	a	Fregean-inspired	reader	 would	 take	 ‘=’	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 identity.	 However,	 this	 view	 is	mistaken.	Given	the	ancient	conception	of	arithmos,	the	symbol	‘=’,		as	Burnyeat	correctly	 points	 out,	 should	 be	 taken	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	 equinomerosity.	 Thus,	instead	of	self-identity	when	we	write	‘3=3’	(the	number	3	is	identical	to	itself),	we	mean	that	a	triplet	has	the	same	number	of	units	as	another	a	triplet,	i.e.	any	triplet	 is	 equinumerous	 with	 any	 other.	 Then	 ‘3+2=5’,	 as	 Burnyeat	 explains,																																																									314	Harte,	op.cit.,	p.27.	315	See	fn.295.	316	In	[Burnyeat	(1990),	pp.207-208].	
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means	not	that	the	number	5	is	identical	with	the	number	which	is	the	sum	of	3	and	2,	but	that	there	are	exactly	as	many	units	in	a	pentad	as	in	a	triplet	together	with	a	pair.317		Aristotle	discusses	 the	problem	of	 the	unity	of	 substance	and	 its	 relation	 to	 its	parts	 in	Meta.	Z.17	 	 (1041b11-31).	According	to	Aristotle	a	whole	 is	something	more	than	the	sum	of	its	parts:	
As regards that which is compounded out of something so that the whole is one — not like 
a heap, however, but like a syllable, — the syllable is not its elements, ‘‘ba’’ is not the 
same as ‘‘b’’ and ‘‘a’’, nor is flesh fire and earth; for when they are dissolved the wholes, 
i.e., the flesh and the syllable, no longer exist, but the elements of the syllable exist, and so 
do fire and earth. The syllable, then, is something—not only its elements (the vowel and 
the consonant) but also something else, and the flesh is not only fire and earth or the hot 
and the cold, but also something else. Since, then, that something must be either an 
element or composed of elements, (1) if it is an element the same argument will again 
apply; for flesh will consist of this and fire and earth and something still further, so that 
the process will go on to infinity; while (2) if it is a compound, clearly it will be a 
compound not of one but of many (or else it will itself be that one), so that again in this 
case we can use the same argument as in the case of flesh or of the syllable. But it would 
seem that this is something, and not an element, and that is the cause which makes this 
thing flesh and that a syllable. And similarly in all other cases. And this is the substance of 
each thing; for this is the primary cause of its being; and since, while some things are not 
substances, as many as are substances are formed naturally and by nature, their substance 
would seem to be this nature, which is not an element but a principle. An element is that 
into which a thing is divided and which is present in it as matter; e.g. ‘‘a’’ and ‘‘b’’ are the 
elements of the syllable.318 [Met. Z.17, 1041b11–33; Ross’ trans.; his italics]  
																																																								317	op.	cit.,	pp.205-207.	
318 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἔκ τινος σύνθετον οὕτως ὥστε ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, µὴ ὡς σωρὸς ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡ συλλαβή—ἡ δὲ 
συλλαβὴ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ στοιχεῖα, οὐδὲ τῷ βα ταὐτὸ τὸ β καὶ α, οὐδ’ ἡ σὰρξ πῦρ καὶ γῆ (διαλυθέντων γὰρ 
τὰ µὲν οὐκέτι ἔστιν, οἷον ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ συλλαβή, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἔστι, καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἡ γῆ)· ἔστιν ἄρα τι 
ἡ συλλαβή, οὐ µόνον τὰ στοιχεῖα τὸ φωνῆεν καὶ ἄφωνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι, καὶ ἡ σὰρξ οὐ µόνον πῦρ 
καὶ γῆ ἢ τὸ θερµὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι—εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη κἀκεῖνο ἢ στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ 
στοιχείων εἶναι, εἰ µὲν στοιχεῖον, πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται λόγος (ἐκ τούτου γὰρ καὶ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς ἔσται ἡ 
σὰρξ καὶ ἔτι ἄλλου, ὥστ’ εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται)· εἰ δὲ ἐκ στοιχείου, δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ πλειόνων, 
ἢ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ ἔσται, ὥστε πάλιν ἐπὶ τούτου τὸν αὐτὸν ἐροῦµεν λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς σαρκὸς ἢ συλλαβῆς. 
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Aristotle	invites	us	to	consider	a	complex	whole,	a	syllable,	and	its	elements,	its	letters.	He	 then	tells	us	 that	 the	syllable	 is	something	more	 than	the	sum	of	 its	letters.	The	 reason,	Aristotle	 tells	us,	 is	 that	 if	 the	 syllable	 is	dissolved,	we	still	have	 the	 letters	 but	 not	 the	 whole	 any	 more.	 This	 shows	 that	 the	 syllable	 is	something	 more	 than	 its	 letters.	 Perhaps	 there	 is	 an	 extra	 element,	 X,	 in	 the	syllable	in	addition	to	its	letters.	But	then	one	might	argue	that	all	we	have	now	is	a	new	sum	of	the	letters	plus	X.	So	either	we	should	concede	that	the	syllable	is	after	all	the	sum	of	its	elements	(letters+X)	or	the	same	argument	applies:	if	the	syllable	 is	 dissolved	 we	 still	 have	 the	 elements	 (letters,	 X)	 but	 not	 the	 whole	anymore.	 In	 the	 latter	 case	 regress	 threatens:	 the	 syllable	 is	 something	 more	than	(letters+X)	by	virtue	of	a	new	element,	Y,	and	so	on.	Thus	Aristotle	argues:	‘It	would	seem	that	this	 is	something	and	not	an	element,	and	that	 is	the	cause	which	makes	this	thing	flesh	and	that	a	syllable.	And	similarly	in	all	other	cases.	And	this	is	the	substance	of	each	thing;	for	this	is	the	primary	cause	of	its	being	…	which	is	not	an	element	but	a	principle.’	(1041b25-31).	Just	like	the	arrangement	of	 the	 letters	 in	 the	 syllable	 (something	which	 is	 not	 a	 letter	 nor	 composed	 of	letters)	 is	 the	 solution	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 letters	 into	 a	 single	whole,	 the	ousia	 of	a	particular	 substance	 is	 the	solution	of	 the	problem	of	 the	unity	of	the	elements	of	the	substance	into	a	single	whole.319		
	 	
																																																																																																																																																														
δόξειε δ’ ἂν εἶναι τὶ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ στοιχεῖον, καὶ αἴτιόν γε τοῦ εἶναι τοδὶ µὲν σάρκα τοδὶ δὲ συλλαβήν· 
ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐσία δὲ ἑκάστου µὲν τοῦτο (τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον πρῶτον τοῦ εἶναι)—ἐπεὶ 
δ’ ἔνια οὐκ οὐσίαι τῶν πραγµάτων, ἀλλ’ ὅσαι οὐσίαι, κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φύσει συνεστήκασι, φανείη ἂν 
[καὶ] αὕτη ἡ φύσις οὐσία, ἥ ἐστιν οὐ στοιχεῖον ἀλλ’ ἀρχή—· στοιχεῖον δ’ ἐστὶν εἰς ὃ διαιρεῖται 
ἐνυπάρχον ὡς ὕλην, οἷον τῆς συλλαβῆς τὸ α καὶ τὸ β. 319	I	 am	 thus	 in	 agreement	with	Scaltsas’	 reading	of	 the	argument.	 See	 [Scaltsas	 (1994),	pp.64-65].	
		
177	
	
[3.9]	Aristotelian	complications	
	
[3.9.1]	A	hylomorphic	account	of	number?		In	 certain	 places	 in	 the	Metaphysics	 Aristotle	 advocates,	 rather	 surprisingly,	 a	
hylomorphic	 account	 of	 number.	 In	 those	 places	 (most	 notably	 in	 chapters	H.3	and	H.6)	Aristotle	asks	what	is	it	that	makes	number	one:	
Let us now consider the problem we have already mentioned concerning both definitions 
and numbers, namely: what is the cause of their unity?320 [Meta. H.6, 1045a7-8; Bostock’s 
trans.] In	trying	to	determine	Aristotle’s	own	solution	to	the	problem	about	the	unity	of	number	 Cleary	 helpfully	 presents	 us	 with	 the	 following	 possibilities:	 (a)	 that	there	is	some	internal	form	that		unifies	the	matter	of	number,	which	consists	of	indivisible	units;	 (b)	 that	 some	external	 form	 is	 imposed	on	 these	units	by	 the	mathematician;	(c)	that	number	does	not	have	any	unifying	form	but	is	merely	a	heap	or	multitude	of	units.321	The	available	edvidence,	however,	is	not	adequate	enough	 to	 supply	 us	 with	 a	 definite	 answer.	 Cleary	 himself	 opts	 for	 the	 3rd	option:	 ‘Aristotle	 seems	 to	 hold	 that	 number	 is	 not	 something	 unified	 like	 a	substance	but	 rather	more	 like	 a	 heap	 (σωρός),	 since	number	 consists	 of	 units	that	 differ	 from	 each	 other,	 and	 each	 number	 is	 counted	 simply	 by	 adding	units.’322	In	this	Cleary	seems	to	follow	Jacob	Klein’s	influential	view.	Klein	claims	that	on	the	Aristotelian	account	 ‘number	 is	simply	not	one	thing	but	a	 ‘heap’	of	things	or	monads.’	He	continues:	‘‘Being	a	number’	is	not	a	koinon	to	be	taken	as	a	 ‘whole’	above	and	alongside,	 as	 it	were,	 the	parts	of	 the	 ‘heap’’(his	 italics).323	Klein	points	 to	Meta.	M.7,	1082a22-24	 for	 justification:	 ‘two	men	are	not	 some																																																									
320 Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς εἰρηµένης περί τε τοὺς ὁρισµοὺς καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθµούς, τί αἴτιον τοῦ ἓν 
εἶναι; 321	See	[Cleary	(2013),	p.431].		322	ibid.	p.437.	In	his	earlier	[Cleary	(1995)]	Cleary	endorses	option	b),	where	an	ordinal	form	is	imposed	by	the	counter	to	the	units	he	counts.	See	[Cleary	(1995),	pp.373-375].	323	Both	in	Klein	[(1968),	p.220].	
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one	thing	over	and	above	both	of	them,	and	this	must	be	so	with	units	too’	(ἀλλ’ 
ὥσπερ οἱ δύο ἄνθρωποι οὐχ ἕν τι παρ’ ἀµφοτέρους, οὕτως ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς µονάδας).	From	 this,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 Aristotle	 attributes	 no	 unity	 to	 number	whatsoever.	 However,	 Klein’s	 claim	 that	 number	 is	 a	 heap	 need	 not	 represent	Aristotle’s	own	view	on	the	matter.	Rather,	Aristotle’s	understanding	of	number	as	a	heap	is	the	conclusion	that	follows	naturally	where	one	to	admit	that	there	is	not	any	principle	of	unity	by	which	a	number	is	made	to	be	something	more	than	its	parts.	For	Aristotle	 formulates	 the	matter	as	 follows:	 ‘For	either	 it	 is	not	<a	unity>,	but	is	like	a	heap,	or	it	is,	and	then	it	should	be	explained	what	it	is	that	makes	it	one	out	of	many’	(ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ’ οἷον σωρός, ἢ εἴπερ ἐστί, λεκτέον 
τί τὸ ποιοῦν ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν,	Meta.	H.3,1044a4-5).	The	absence	of	such	a	principle	of	unity	 is	 attributed	 to	 the	 Platonists	 in	 Meta.	 M.7	 1082a15–22.	 I	 discuss	 the	passage	later	in	this	chapter.	We	 can,	 however,	 develop	 a	 bit	 further	 the	 view	of	 number	 as	 something	 that	lacks	 unity.	 What	 happens	 then	 when	 we	 ascribe	 a	 number	 to	 something–as	when,	for	example,	we	say	‘The	horses	are	5’?	If	one	were	to	endorse	that	view,	then	 something	 like	 the	 Socratic	 position	 in	 the	 Hippias	 Major	 seems	 like	 a	promising	 start:	 One	 could	 say	 of	 the	 horses	 (where	 ‘horses’	 is	 a	 plural	 term	referring	 to	 an	 irreducibly	 plural	 entity,	 namely	 the	 horses)	 that	 they	 are,	collectively,	5.	In	other	words,	one	needs	to	substantiate	this	claim	by	providing	an	account	of	plural	predication	in	Aristotle.		There	 is	 some	 evidence	 that	 Aristotle	 was	 aware	 of	 the	 distributive-collective	distinction:		1)There	is	a	passage	in	the	Politics	(Book	II,	chapter	3)	where	he	points	out	that	‘all’	 may	 be	 used	 in	 two	 senses—	 collectively	 as	 in	 ‘all	 together’	 and	distributively	 as	 in	 ‘each	 separately’.324	As	Oliver	 and	 Smiley	 remark:	 ‘Aristotle																																																									324	The	passage	is	the	following:	 
Again, even if it is best that the association should as far as possible be one, this does not seem to have been 
shown to be so by the argument, 'if all say "mine" and "not mine" at the same time' (Socrates thinks this is an 
indication of the state's being completely one)-because 'all' is used in two senses. If all individually is meant, 
then this may perhaps be nearer to what Socrates wants to bring about; for each man will always refer to the 
same person as his son, and to the same woman as his wife; and he will speak in the same way of his 
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makes	use	of	this	distinction		against	Plato	‘by	detecting	an	elementary	fallacy	in	the	 political	 vision	 of	 the	 Republic.	 [.	 .	 .]	 A	 Platonic	 commune	 of	 wives	 and	children	is	one	where	all	together	say	‘mine’,	not	each	separately.	And	he	argues	against	Socrates	that	while	the	‘each	separately’	sense	may	be	desirable,	the	‘all	together’	sense	is	not.’325			2)	Aristotle	draws	a	distinction	between	distributive	and	collective	predication	in	order	 to	 resolve	 the	 fallacies	of	 composition	and	division.	Aristotle	presents	the	 fallacy	 of	 division	 after	 the	 fallacy	 of	 combination	 has	 been	discussed,	 and	provides	 us	 with	 an	 example.	 In	 the	 Sοphistical	 Refutations	 4,	 166a33–35,	 he	says:	 ‘Upon	division	depend	 the	 fallacies	 that	 two	and	 three	are	 five,	 and	even	and	 odd,	 and	 the	 greater	 is	 equal	 (for	 it	 is	 that	 amount	 and	 more	 besides).’	According	to	Schiaparelli’s	analysis	of	the	argument,	there	are	two	sentences		in	this	 passage	 (‘two	 and	 three	 are	 five,	 and	 even	 and	 odd’)	 that	 are	 in	 need	 of	explanation	and	an	obviously	 false	sentence	(‘the	greater	 is	equal’)	 that	should	be	read	as	a	conclusion	of	the	previous	sentences.	The	sentence	 ‘two	and	three	are	 five’	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 ‘two	 is	 five’	 and	 ‘three	 is	 five’.	 These	 premises	together	with	the	background	assumptions	‘two	is	even’	and	‘three	is	odd’	lead	to	the	 conclusions	 ‘five	 is	 even’	 and	 ‘five	 is	 odd’,	 which	 is	 absurd.	 The	 absurd	conclusion	 is	 a	 result	 of	 a	 distributive	 application	 of	 the	 numerical	 predicate	‘five’.326		The	 above	 passages	 could,	 perhaps,	 form	 part	 of	 a	 bigger	 account	 where	 one	could	argue	 that	Aristotle	understands	numerical	predication	as	an	 instance	of																																																																																																																																																															
possessions, and each thing that befalls him. But that is not in fact how people will speak who hold wives and 
children in common. They will all speak, but not individually, and the same with regard to possessions: all, but 
not individually. So then, 'all say' is clearly some sort of fallacy; for 'all' and 'both', and 'odd' and 'even', owing 
to their double senses, generate contentious syllogisms even in discussion. So, while in one way it is 
admirable, but impossible, that all should say the same thing, in another way it is not at all conducive to 
concord. [Pol. II.3, 1261b16-32; Saunders’ trans.; his italics] 325	Oliver	and	Smiley	(2013),	p.17.	326	Translations	 are	 Schiaparelli’s.	 As	 for	 the	 second	 argument,	 Schiaparelli	 argues	 that	 an	analogous	reading	is	possible:	the	sentence	‘two	and	three	are	five’	is	taken	as	if	there	were	two	sentences,	 i.e.	 ‘two	 is	 five’	 and	 ‘three	 is	 five’,	whence	one	concludes	 that	 five	 is	both	equal	and	greater	 then	 two	 and	 three,	 i.e.	 ‘the	 greater	 is	 equal’,	 something	 absurd.	 Consult	 [Schiaparelli	(2003),	pp.123-125]	for	a	detailed	reconstruction	of	the	argument.	
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plural	predication.	
[3.9.2]	Discussing	Meta.	H.3		A	suitable	answer	to	the	problem	of	the	unity	of	numbers	would	require	a	close	investigation	 of	 the	 discussion	 in	 H.3.	 In	 this	 chapter	 Aristotle	 offers	 another	argument	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 the	 argument	 in	 Z.17	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	section;	 there	 is	 something	 in	 a	 substance	 that	 is	 not	 one	 of	 its	 parts,	 but	 a	different	sort	of	entity,	which	is	the	cause	of	being	and	the	ousia	of	a	particular	substance:		
Nor then is man an animal and two-footed. If these are matter, then there must also be 
something over and above them, something which is not an element and not composed of 
elements but is the substance; and this they eliminate when they state only the matter. So if 
this is the cause of man’s being, and this is the substance, they will be failing to state the 
substance itself!327 [Meta. H.3, 1043b11-14; Bostock’s trans.] Aristotle	begins	his	argument	by	claiming	that	a	syllable	is	not	just	its	letters	plus	an	arrangement:	
Now, on investigation it is evident that a syllable is not composed of the letters and their 
combination, and a house is not bricks and a combination.328 [Meta. H.3, 1043b4-6; 
Bostock’s trans.]   Aristotle’s	examples	serve	to	remind	us	the	Z.17	lessons:	that	the	substance	does	not	depend	on	the	form	in	the	way	it	depends	on	its	material	parts:	a	substance	is	not	 a	mere	aggregate	of	matter	 and	 form,	much	 like	a	 syllable	 is	not	 just	 its	letters	plus	combination,	and	a	house	is	not	merely	bricks	plus	combination.	In	H.3	Aristotle	tell	us	that	‘if	substances	are	in	a	certain	way	numbers,	it	is	in	this	way,	not	as	some	say	as	collections	of	units’	(φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι, εἴπερ εἰσί πως 
ἀριθµοὶ αἱ οὐσίαι, οὕτως εἰσὶ καὶ οὐχ ὥς τινες λέγουσι µονάδων·,	 1043b32-34).	What	is	the	distinction	at	hand?	One	suggestion	is	that	the	distinction	is	between																																																									
327 οὐδὲ δὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τὸ ζῷον καὶ δίπουν, ἀλλά τι δεῖ εἶναι ὃ παρὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν, εἰ ταῦθ’ ὕλη, 
οὔτε δὲ στοιχεῖον οὔτ’ ἐκ στοιχείου, ἀλλ’ ἡ οὐσία· ὃ ἐξαιροῦντες τὴν ὕλην λέγουσιν. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ’ 
αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ οὐσία τοῦτο, αὐτὴν ἂν τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ λέγοιεν. 
328 οὐ φαίνεται δὴ ζητοῦσιν ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων οὖσα καὶ συνθέσεως, οὐδ’ ἡ οἰκία πλίνθοι τε 
καὶ σύνθεσις. 
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a	number	in	Aristotle’s	 first	sense,	 i.e.	a	collection	composed	of	units,	such	as	a	trio	of	horses,	and	a	number	of	abstract	units,	 each	exactly	 like	one	another	 in	every	 respect. 329 	This	 understanding	 of	 the	 distinction	 points	 to	 the	 right	direction,	 since	 by	 ἀριθµὸς µονάδων	 Aristotle	 probably	 has	 in	 mind	 a	 Platonic	notion	of	number,	which	has	no	principle	of	unity	and	is	more	like	a	heap	(cf.	the	discussion	in	Meta.	M.7	1082a15–22).	Bostock	offers	yet	another	suggestion:	the	distinction	is	between	a	number	that	is	akin	to	a	syllable	(recall	that	the	letters	have	to	be	arranged	in	a	certain	manner	to	make	the	syllable)	and	a	number	of	abstract	units.	 I	will	 discuss	his	 suggestion	 in	detail	 shortly.	Beyond	 those	 two	suggestions	 it	 seems	 that	 Aristotle	 understands	 the	 former	 kind	 of	 number	 as	some	 kind	 of	 whole,	 a	 compound,	 perhaps,	 of	 form	 and	 matter.	 In	 1043b34-1044a1	 Aristotle	 tells	 us	 that	 both	 numbers	 and	 definitions	 are	 similar	 in	 the	following	 ways:	 (1)	 both	 are	 divisible	 into	 indivisibles	 (the	 ‘units’	 of	 the	definition	 are	 those	 that	 are	 ‘indivisible’	 in	 the	 sense	of	 being	 ‘indefinable’);330		(2)	 neither	 the	 definition	 nor	 the	 number	 will	 survive	 addition/subtraction	without	losing	their	identity.331	The	discussion	continues	as	follows: 
Further, a number must be something in virtue of which it is a unity, though people cannot 
now say what it is that makes it so, if indeed it is. (For either it is not, but is like a heap, or 
it is, and then it should be explained what it is that makes it one out of many.) Similarly, a 
definition is a unity, and again people cannot explain this either. Nor is this surprising, for 
the explanation is in each case the same; substances are one in this way, not by being a 
kind of unit or point, but because each substance is an actuality and a certain nature.332 
[Meta. H.3,1044a2-9; Bostock’s trans.]  
																																																								329	A	suggestion	made	by	Burnyeat	in	[Burnyeat	et	al.	(1984),	p.21].	330	As	Bostock	helpfully	remarks	in	[Bostock	(1994),	p.268].	
331 ὅ τε γὰρ ὁρισµὸς ἀριθµός τις· διαιρετός τε γὰρ καὶ εἰς ἀδιαίρετα (οὐ γὰρ ἄπειροι οἱ λόγοι), καὶ ὁ 
ἀριθµὸς δὲ τοιοῦτον. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἀπ’ ἀριθµοῦ ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἢ προστεθέντος ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἀριθµός 
ἐστιν, οὐκέτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀριθµός ἐστιν ἀλλ’ ἕτερος, κἂν τοὐλάχιστον ἀφαιρεθῇ ἢ προστεθῇ, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ 
ὁρισµὸς οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκέτι ἔσται ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἢ προστεθέντος. 
332 καὶ τὸν ἀριθµὸν δεῖ εἶναί τι ᾧ εἷς, ὃ νῦν οὐκ ἔχουσι λέγειν τίνι εἷς, εἴπερ ἐστὶν εἷς (ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν 
ἀλλ’ οἷον σωρός, ἢ εἴπερ ἐστί, λεκτέον τί τὸ ποιοῦν ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν)· καὶ ὁ ὁρισµὸς εἷς ἐστίν, ὁµοίως δὲ 
οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἔχουσι λέγειν. καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως συµβαίνει· τοῦ αὐτοῦ γὰρ λόγου, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἓν οὕτως, 
ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς λέγουσί τινες οἷον µονάς τις οὖσα ἢ στιγµή, ἀλλ’ ἐντελέχεια καὶ φύσις τις ἑκάστη. 
		
182	
Aristotle	 in	 this	passage	claims	that	a	number	 is	a	unity,	a	definition	 is	a	unity,	and	that	the	explanation	in	each	case	is	the	same;	a	substance	is	a	unity	because	it	is	‘an	actuality	and	a	certain	nature’	(1044a9).	The	term	‘actuality’	(ἐντελέχεια)	indicates	form	(cf.	Z.13,	1038b6)	as	does		the	expression	‘a	certain	nature’	(φύσις	τις)	 (the	 form	 of	 a	 natural	 object	 was	 identified	 with	 its	 ‘nature’	 at	 Z.17,	1041b28-30).333	Aristotle’s	 	 substance,	 then,	 is	 a	 unity	 because	 it	 consists	 of	certain	 materials	 with	 a	 certain	 form.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 paradigmatic	 substances	such	as	Socrates,	 the	 form	is	 its	soul	 (cf.	 the	discussion	 in	Z.16,	1040b5-16);	 in	the	 case	of	 the	 syllable,	 the	 form	 is	 the	arrangement	 (σύνθεσις)	of	 the	material	components	 (the	 letters)	which	 prevents	 the	 syllable	 from	 being	 considered	 a	mere	 heap	 (Z.17,	 1041b11-17).	 But	what	 about	 the	 unity	 of	 number?	Drawing	some	 analogies	 with	 the	 example	 of	 the	 syllable,	 Bostock	 tentatively	 suggests	that	Aristotle	thinks	of	number	as	an	arrangement,	structure	or	pattern	of	units:	for	instance,	three	is	a	triangular	number,	four	is	a	square	number,	and	so	on.	We	may	even	generalise	this	idea	as	Bostock	does:		‘If	we	tone	down	this	suggestion	a	bit,	but	still	without	losing	its	basic	idea,	we	may	perhaps	think	of	Aristotle	as	holding	 that	 we	 have	 three	 horses	 only	 where	 the	 three	 form	 a	 group,	 not	necessarily	 in	 any	 particular	 pattern,	 but	 at	 least	 so	 situated	 that	 they	 are	 all	close	to	one	another.	For	this	too	is	an	arrangement	of	a	kind	though	not	such	a	specific	 kind	as	 suggested	previously.’334	(underlining	mine).	Despite	 the	 initial	plausibility	 of	 the	 idea	which	 stems	 from	 the	 Pythagorean	 tradition	 of	 figured	numbers,	 one	 cannot	 be	 utterly	 satisfied	 with	 it;	 as	 Bostock	 himself	acknowledges:	‘…of	course	such	view	is	mistaken,	for	three	horses	remain	three	however	 they	may	be	 scattered,	 but	 it	would	not	 be	 too	 surprising	 if	 Aristotle	had	 failed	 to	 grasp	 this	 point.’335	Now	 it	 seems	 rather	 implausible	 to	 me	 that	Aristotle	would	have	failed	to	grasp	the	crucial	lesson	of	the	Phaedo,	namely	that	the	units	of	a	number	need	not	be	juxtaposed	or	otherwise	physically	related	in	order	to	form	a	number.		
 Yet	 another	 passage	 that	 points	 towards	 an	 interpretation	 of	 number	 as	 some	
																																																								333	In	[Bostock	(1994),	p.268].	334	ibid.	335	ibid.	
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sort	of	composite	is	the	following:	 
The cause of the mistake they made was the fact that they were making their search at one 
and the same time from the side of mathematics and from that of definitions of universals. 
From the former side they regarded one, their principle, as a point. (A unit is a point 
without position. So they put things together from minimum parts, as others have done, 
and the unit becomes the matter of numbers, and at the same time prior to Two-though 
also subsequent, in fact, because two is a whole and a unity and form.) But because they 
were looking for the universal they treated the one that is predicated as also being a part 
even so. But it is impossible for both of these things to apply simultaneously to the same 
thing.336 [Meta. M.8, 1084b23-32; Annas’ trans.]	Aristotle	complains	that	the	Platonists	conflate	the	mathematical	and	dialectical	modes	of	 inquiry.	In	the	passage	above	(as	well	as	 in	the	preceding	discussion)	Aristotle	endorses	a	hylomorphic	account	of	number	to	explain	the	error	 in	 the	Platonists’	thinking:		
Insofar as number is composite, it is one that comes first, but insofar as the universal and 
form are prior, it is number that comes first; each of the units is part of number as matter, 
but the number is their form.337 [Meta. M.8,1084b4-6; Annas’ trans.]	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 the	 Platonists	 as	mathematicians	 gave	 certain	 priority	 to	 the	elements	 of	 the	 (composite)	 number,	 i.e.	 to	 the	 units,	 thereby	 subscribing,	we	may	add,	to	the	thesis	that	composition	is	identity:	a	whole	is	merely	the	sum	of	its	parts.	This	means	that	number	three,	for	instance,	is	merely	three	units,	or	in	Aristotle’s	terminology	a	‘heap’	of	three	units.	On	the	other	hand	the	Platonists	as	philosophers	 were	 concerned	 with	 the	 formal	 unity	 of	 number,	 thereby	acknowledging	that	number	is	something	more	than	the	sum	of	its	elements,	its	units,	by	something	extra,	the	form	of	number.	However–and	this	takes	us	back																																																									336	αἴτιον δὲ τῆς συµβαινούσης ἁµαρτίας ὅτι ἅµα ἐκ τῶν µαθηµάτων ἐθήρευον καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων τῶν 
καθόλου, ὥστ’ ἐξ ἐκείνων µὲν ὡς στιγµὴν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔθηκαν (ἡ γὰρ µονὰς στιγµὴ ἄθετός 
ἐστιν· καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἐκ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τὰ ὄντα συνετίθεσαν, καὶ οὗτοι, ὥστε γίγνεται ἡ 
µονὰς ὕλη τῶν ἀριθµῶν, καὶ ἅµα προτέρα τῆς δυάδος, πάλιν δ’ ὑστέρα ὡς ὅλου τινὸς καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ 
εἴδους τῆς δυάδος οὔσης)· διὰ δὲ τὸ καθόλου ζητεῖν τὸ κατηγορούµενον ἓν καὶ οὕτως ὡς µέρος 
ἔλεγον. ταῦτα δ’ ἅµα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν. 
337 ᾗ µὲν δὴ σύνθετος ὁ ἀριθµός, τὸ ἕν, ᾗ δὲ τὸ καθόλου πρότερον καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ὁ ἀριθµός· ἑκάστη γὰρ 
τῶν µονάδων µόριον τοῦ ἀριθµοῦ ὡς ὕλη, ὁ δ’ ὡς εἶδος. 
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to	 the	 Z.17	 lesson–they	 treated	 the	 form	as	part	 of	 this	 composite	number,	 on	equal	footing	with	the	material	part,	i.e.	the	units	(ὡς µέρος ἔλεγον,	1084b31-32).	This,	 Aristotle	 claims,	 does	 not	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	 unity	 for	 this	 composite	number,	since	it	leads	to	regress.	It	is	pretty	obvious	that	one	cannot	apply	both	the	principle	that	composition-is-identity	and	its	negation	to	the	same	thing,	i.e.	to	number	as	something	composite	(1084b32).	Now,	I	take	it,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	number	has	some	principle	of	unity,	a	 formal	aspect,	which	 is	not	also	a	part	of	number,	unlike	 its	units.	A	certain	account	that	sheds	some	light	on	the	matter	is	Syrianus’	one.	
[3.9.3]	Syrianus’	helpful	account		A	 much	 more	 detailed	 insight	 into	 such	 a	 hylomorphic	 account	 of	 number	 is	given	 by	 Syrianus	 in	 his	 commentary	 of	 Aristotle’s	Metaphysics	 M	 and	 N.	 It	 is	worthy	 of	 special	 remark,	 since	 Syrianus	 addresses	 the	 problem	 regarding	 the	unity	of	number	by	adopting	a	hylomorphic	approach:	
So then, neither is it the case that five is constituted from substance and accident, as with 
‘white man’, nor yet from genus and differentia, as is ‘man’ from ‘animal’ and ‘two-
footed’, nor by five units being in contact with each other, as in the case of a bundle of 
sticks, nor by being mixed together, like honey-wine, nor by having a certain placing, as in 
the case of stones going to make up a house. However, it is not so, as in the case of 
countable objects, that there is nothing over and above the individual objects; for let us 
grant him for the moment that the conjunction of two men is nothing over and above each 
of them (although it is in fact Plato’s view that all these combinations themselves receive 
the different numbers by virtue of participation in some Form, as is written in the Phaedo; 
but let this not be attributed to countable objects just for the moment); but it is not because 
numbers are composed of indivisible units that they have something other than those units 
(for the many points are indivisible, but nonetheless they are not considered to make up 
something else besides themselves as subjects), but because there is something in them 
analogous respectively to matter and form. For instance, when we add three to four and 
make seven, we express what we are doing in these terms, but our statement actually is not 
true; for the units when joined together with the other units make up the substratum  of the 
number seven, but the actual seven is made up of this number of units and the Form of 
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Seven.338 [On Aristotle Metaphysics M-N,132.29-133.7; Dillon and O’Meara trans. mod.] What	 is	 the	 context	 of	 Syrianus’	 remarks?	 In	 the	 above	 passage	 Syrianus	expresses	 his	 own	 position	 when	 commenting	 on	 the	 Aristotelian	 passage	1082a20–26.	In	this	passage	Aristotle	asks	‘How	is	it	possible	that	a	number	like	two	 be	 a	 unity?’.	 He	 states	 that	 some	 things	 are	 one	 by	 contact,	 others	 by	mixture,	and	others	by	position,	but	none	of	these	alternatives	can	possibly	apply	to	the	units	of	which	two	and	three	consist.		
Besides, some things are one by contact, some by mixture, some by position but none of 
these can apply to the units of which Two and Three are made up. Two men are not some 
one thing over and above both of them, and this must be so with units too. Their being 
indivisible will make no difference; points are indivisible too, but still two of them do not 
make anything over and above the two.339 [Meta. M.7, 1082a20-26; Annas’ trans. mod.] If	one	were	to	raise	the	issue	of	the	unity	of	number	Two,	say,	one	cannot	claim,	for	example,	that	the	units	are	next	to	each	other	in	any	way	(1082a20-22).	 	As	Bostock	remarks,	 ‘the	only	 thing	 that	 the	Platonist	 can	say	 to	distinguish	 these	units	 from	 any	 other	 pair	 of	 units	 is	 that	 they	 are	 the	 ones	 that	make	 up	 the	number	 two.’	 (his	 italics)	 But,	 of	 course,	 he	 continues,	 ‘this	 reply	 is	 evidently																																																									
338 οὔτ’ οὖν ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ συµβεβηκότος ὑφέστηκεν ὁ πέντε, ὡς ὁ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε ἐκ γένους 
καὶ διαφορᾶς, ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκ ζῴου καὶ δίποδος, οὔτε τῶν πέντε µονάδων ἁπτοµένων ἀλλήλων,  
ὡς ἡ δέσµη τῶν ξύλων, οὔτε µιγνυµένων, ὡς τὸ οἰνόµελι, οὔτε θέσιν ὑποµεινασῶν, ὡς οἱ λίθοι τὴν 
οἰκίαν ἀποτελοῦσιν. οὐ µὴν οὐδ’ ὡς τὰ ἀριθµητὰ οὐδέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα· συγκεχωρήσθω γὰρ 
αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν τοὺς δύο ἀνθρώπους µηδὲν εἶναι παρ’ ἑκάτερον (καίτοι Πλάτωνι πάντα ταῦτα 
µεθέξει τινὸς εἴδους δοκεῖ τοὺς διαφόρους ἀριθµοὺς καὶ αὐτὰ δέχεσθαι, ὡς ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι γέγραπται· 
ἀλλ’ οὖν µὴ ὑπαρχέτω τοῦτο τοῖς ἀριθµητοῖς πρὸς τὸ παρόν)· ἀλλ’ οἵ γε ἀριθµοὶ οὐχ ὅτι ἐξ ἀδιαιρέτων 
σύγκεινται τῶν µονάδων, διὰ τοῦτο ἕτερόν τι ἔχουσι παρὰ τὰς µονάδας (καὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ σηµεῖα 
ἀδιαίρετα, ἀλλ’ ὅµως οὐ δοκεῖ τι αὐτά γε συµπληροῦν ἄλλο παρ’ αὐτὰ τὰ ὑποκείµενα), ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἔστι τι 
ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ µὲν ὕλῃ τὸ δὲ εἴδει ἀναλογοῦν. ἀµέλει ὅταν τὸν τρία τῷ τέσσαρα συντιθῶµεν 
καὶ ποιῶµεν τὸν ἑπτά, λέγοµεν µὲν οὕτως, οὐ µήν ἐστι τὸ λεγόµενον ἀληθές· ἀλλὰ γὰρ αἱ µονάδες ταῖς 
µονάσι συµπλακεῖσαι τὸ ὑποκείµενον ποιοῦσι τοῦ ἑπτὰ ἀριθµοῦ, γίγνεται δὲ ὁ ἑπτὰ ἐκ µονάδων 
τοσῶνδε καὶ τῆς ἑπτάδος. 
339 ἔτι τὰ µὲν ἁφῇ ἐστὶν ἓν τὰ δὲ µίξει τὰ δὲ θέσει· ὧν οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν ταῖς µονάσιν ἐξ ὧν ἡ 
δυὰς καὶ ἡ τριάς· ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ δύο ἄνθρωποι οὐχ ἕν τι παρ’ ἀµφοτέρους, οὕτως ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς 
µονάδας. καὶ οὐχ ὅτι ἀδιαίρετοι, διοίσουσι διὰ τοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ αἱ στιγµαὶ ἀδιαίρετοι, ἀλλ’ ὅµως παρὰ 
τὰς δύο οὐθὲν ἕτερον ἡ δυὰς αὐτῶν. 
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circular,	and	the	truth	is	that	if	there	were	such	abstract	units	then	none	of	them	would	be	distinguished	 from	any	others,	so	 there	could	be	no	saying	what	 it	 is	that	 ‘unifies’	 or	 ‘holds	 together’	 those	 particular	 units	 that	 are	 supposed	 to	constitute	 the	 number	 two,	 i.e.	 what	 it	 is	 that	 distinguishes	 them	 from	 other	units.’340	It	 seems	 that	 the	 Platonists	 cannot	 offer	 an	 appropriate	 principle	 of	 unity	 for	number	 such	 that	 its	 parts	 (i.e.	 the	 units)	 actually	 constitute	 something	 of	 a	whole,	 and	 not	 simply	 a	 heap.	 Aristotle	 in	 the	 passage	 above	 offers	 several	principles	 of	 unity	 and	 his	 strategy	 consists	 in	 showing	 that	 Platonic	 number	cannot	 share	 in	 any	 of	 them	 and	 so	 cannot	 be	 anything	more	 than	 a	 heap,	 an	irreducibly	plural	entity.	The	types	of	unity	offered	are	the	following:	(a)	unity	by	contact	(ἁφῇ);	(b)	unity	by	mixture	(µίξει);	(c)	unity	by	position	(θέσει).	A	more	detailed	 account	 of	 those	 types	 of	 unity	 is	 offered	 in	Metaphysics	 Δ.6.	Aristotle	there	offers	as	an	example	of	unity	of	contact,	a	collection	of	planks	glued	or	tied	together	 (1015b36ff.).	 Unity	 by	 contact	 is	 not,	 of	 course,	 appropriate	 for	numbers:	 for	some	horses	to	be	three	 it	 is	not	necessary	that	they	are	 in	touch	with	one	another	(a	generalisation	of	this	observation	is	that	the	horses	need	not	even	be	close	to	each	other).	Finally,	unity	by	blending	is	not	of	relevance	here	since	it	belongs	to	such	things	as	the	mixture	of	honey	with	wine	that	constitutes	honey-wine	 (οἰνόµελι	 in	 Syrianus’	 account).	Unity	by	position	pertains	 to	 some	slabs	 that	are	positioned	 in	a	certain	way	 to	 form	a	 threshold,	or	 to	 the	 letters	that	make	up	a	syllable.	Therefore	Aristotle	reaches	the	conclusion	that	none	of	
these	 types	of	unity	can	account	 for	 the	unity	of	Form	numbers.	Thus,	 in	Form	Number	two,	for	instance,	there	seems	to	be	no	unity	apart	from	the	two	units.	Furthermore,	the	indivisibility	of	the	units	is	not	sufficient	to	explain	the	unity	of	Form	numbers:	drawing	on	a	parallel	with	points,	he	argues	 that	 they	are	also	indivisible,	yet	a	pair	of	them	does	not	constitute	a	separate	entity	beyond	them	(1082a23-26).	Aristotle	 in	effect	claims	that	 in	a	number	of	 two	points	 the	 fact	that	 the	units	 are	of	 the	 same	 type–i.e.	 that	 they	are	points–is	not	 sufficient	 to	establish	the	unity	of	 the	number	 in	question:	 the	common	type	does	not	unify	the	points	into	a	whole	(much	like	the	fact	that	the	elements	of	the	syllable	are																																																									340	In	[Bostock	(1994),	p.269].	
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both	 of	 the	 same	 type–letters–is	 not	 enough	 for	 them	 to	 constitute	 a	 single	whole).341		 According	to	Syrianus,	number	five	is	a	unified	whole,	but	the	unity	of	five	is	not	due	 to	 the	 conditions	 Aristotle	 accepts	 for	 the	 unity	 of	 a	 thing	 in	 the	 passage	1082a20–26:	 Five	 is	 not	 constituted	 by	 five	 units	 being	 in	 contact	 with	 each	other,	nor	by	being	mixed	together,	nor	by	having	a	certain	placing.	His	answer	is	that	they	are	somehow	composites	of	form	and	matter	(132.7-8).342 According	to	Syrianus,	when	we	add	three	to	 four	and	make	seven,	we	express	what	we	are	doing	 in	 these	 terms,	 but	 our	 statement	 is	 actually	 not	 true.	 It	 is	 not	 that	 the	seven	 is	 identical	 to	 the	 sum	 of	 three	 and	 four,	 but	 that	 the	 seven	 consists	 of	seven	 units,	 which	 are	 equinumerous	 with	 the	 totality	 of	 units	 in	 the	 three	together	with	the	units	of	the	four.	Syrianus’	interpretation	falls	under	option	b)	in	Cleary’s	list	of	possible	solutions	regarding	the	unity	of	number;	we	have	some	external	form	that	is	imposed	on	these	units	by	the	mathematician:	
What is it, then, that applies the Form of Seven to the units? What is it, after all, that 
applies the Form of Bed to such and such a combination of pieces of wood? Surely it is 
plain that it is the soul of the carpenter that, in virtue of possessing the appropriate art, 
imposes forms on bits of wood for the making of a bed; and it is the soul of the 
mathematician that, by possessing within itself the originative Monad, imposes form upon, 
and generates all numbers. 343  [On Aristotle Metaphysics M-N,133.8-12; Dillon and 
O’Meara trans.] 	Syrianus’	answer	is	based	on	a	parallel	between	the	soul	of	the	carpenter	and	the	soul	of	the	mathematician:	 just	as	the	soul	of	the	carpenter	applies	the	Form	of	Bed	to	such	and	such	a	combination	of	pieces	of	wood	because	he	possesses	the	appropriate	 art,	 the	 soul	 of	 the	 mathematician	 by	 possessing	 the	 appropriate	
																																																								341	This	 is	 a	 point	 that	 has	 not	 been	 generally	 appreciated	 by	 commentators.	 An	 exception	 is	Edward	Halper	in	[Halper	(1989),	p.259].	342	[Mouzala	(2015)]	contains	a	useful	discussion	of	Syrianus’	arguments.	343	τίς οὖν ὁ τὴν ἑπτάδα ταῖς µονάσιν ἐπιφέρων; τίς δὲ ὁ τὸ εἶδος τῆς κλίνης τῇ τοιᾷδε συνθέσει τῶν 
ξύλων; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ψυχὴ µὲν τεκτονικὴ τῷ ἔχειν τὴν τέχνην εἰδοποιεῖ τὰ ξύλα πρὸς κλίνης 
ἀπογέννησιν· ψυχὴ δὲ ἀριθµητικὴ τῷ ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἀρχηγικὴν µονάδα πάντας εἰδοποιεῖ καὶ 
ὑφίστησι τοὺς ἀριθµούς.	
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knowledge	of	the	Numbers	imposes	numerical	form	upon	the	units.344		
[3.9.4]	Further	refinements		Although	the	discussion	 in	H.3	draws	certain	parallels	between	substances	and	numbers,	 	 it	would	be	of	some	significance	to	highlight	the	differences	between	number	forms	and	substantial	forms.	Recall	that	the	syllable,	Aristotle	tells,	is	not	just	its	elements	(its	letters)	but	it	is	the	letters	in	a	certain	arrangement.	Much	like	 the	 arrangement	 is	 something	 that	 is	 not	 an	 element	 nor	 composed	 of	elements,	the	substance	(form)	is	of	a	different	type	than	the	(material)	elements	it	 unifies,	 and	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 being	 of	 a	 substance	 by	 combining	 these	elements	 into	 a	 unified	 whole.	 Scaltsas	 cautions	 us	 not	 to	 read	 Aristotle’s	position	 about	 the	 unifying	 role	 of	 the	 substantial	 form	 over	 the	 material	elements	as	a	claim	that	the	substantial	form	is	some	kind	of	relation:	
But now, his claim that the substantial form  unites the various elements (out of which the 
substance is made up) into  a single whole seems to clash with his claim that the 
substantial form is  not a relation. It would appear that what the substantial form needs to 
do  is precisely to interconnect the various elements of a substance to each  other so as to 
make up a single whole. Hence, it must be a relation. … The difference is that a substantial 
form unites elements into a whole by tying their identity to  the identity of the whole, 
while a relation leaves the identity of the  relata intact. Thus, given a related whole of ten 
juxtaposed books, each of the books is identifiable independently of its relation to the 
other books. The identity of the relata is not determined by the relation they bear to  each 
other. But in the case of a substance, something comes to be a component of the substance 
by being identified in terms of the relation it bears to the whole, for example the skin, 
liver, or brain, of a human being. The unity that is achieved in a substance is achieved by 
the identity-interdependence of all the constituents in it, as determined by the substantial 
form. The constituents that emerge from the incorporation of the elements into the whole 
are what they are because of their role in the  whole. [Scaltsas (1990), p.588] Apart	 from	 the	 example	 of	 the	 ten	 juxtaposed	 books,	 Scaltsas	 notes	 that	Aristotle's	 example	 of	 the	 syllable,	 is	 not	 a	 substantial	whole.	 His	 argument	 is	that	each	of	 the	 letters	 is	 identifiable	 independently	of	 its	relation	to	the	other.																																																									344	See	also	[Mouzala	(2015),	p.180].	For	a	similar	to	Syrianus’	interpretation	according	to	which	the	counter	imposes	the	ordinal	form	to	the	units	he	counts	see	[Cleary	(1995),	pp.373-375].	
		
189	
This	shows	that	the	syllable	is	not	an	Aristotelian	substance	but	rather,	a	related	whole.345	We	may	 say	 something	 similar	 for	 the	 composite	 numbers.	 If,	 e.g.,	 a	triplet	 of	 birds	 were	 a	 substance	 then	 the	 incorporation	 of	 the	 birds	 into	 the	whole	would	 involve	 the	 reidentification	 of	 them.	However,	 the	 identity	 of	 the	birds	is	not	determined	by	the	relation	they	hold	to	each	other.			Although	Aristotle	asks	about	the	cause	of	unity	in	numbers	at	the	beginning	of	H.6,	the	issue	is	not	further	addressed	in	this	chapter.	However,	it	is	possible	to	draw	 some	 useful	 conclusions	 from	 the	 discussion	 there.	 Aristotle’s	 	 primary	example	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 a	 composite,	 a	 bronze	 sphere,	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	unity	of	which	takes	up	almost	all	of	 lines	1045a25-35.	For	the	purposes	of	my	interpretation,	I	endorse	Verity	Harte’s	reading	of	the	H.6	discussion,	according	to	which	what	makes	a	bronze	sphere	one	 is	 that	 it	 is	a	unified	realisation	of	a	form,	the	form	of	sphericity.	Thus,	according	to	Harte’s	account,	 ‘a	composite	is	one	because	there	 is	a	unitary	 form	which	 it	exemplifies’	or	 	 in	other	words,	 ‘a	composite	is	one	because	it	is	one	something:	that	is,	the	unity	of	a	composite	is	parasitic	 on	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 something	 it	 is,	 its	 form.’346	What	 could	 be	 the	composite	 in	 the	 case	 of	 number?	 One	 proposal	 is	 that	 the	 composite	 is	 a	particular	collection	of	objects,	a	pentad	of	horses,	a	trio	of	musicians,	the	twelve	gods	 of	 Olympus.	 If	 we	 take	 into	 account	 Syrianus’	 hylomorphic	 analysis	 of	number	as	well	as	Aristotle’s	comments	in	H.3	and	in	H.6	and	elsewhere,	then	we	can	say	that	any	such	collection	is	a	composite	of	matter	(units)	in	a	certain	form	(cardinal	structure).	Perhaps	looking	into	the	philosophy	of	mathematics	known	as	 structuralism	 might	 supplement	 this	 picture;	 Shapiro	 provides	 us	 with	 the	following	examples	of	cardinal	structures:	
For each natural number n, there is a structure exemplified by all systems that consist of 
exactly n objects. For example, the 4 pattern is the structure common to all collections of 
four objects. The 4 pattern is exemplified by the starting infielders on a baseball team (not 
counting the battery), the corners of my desk, and two pairs of shoes. We define the 2 
pattern, 3 pattern, and so on, similarly. Let us call these ‘cardinal structures’, or ‘finite 
cardinal structures’. [Shapiro (1997), p.115; his italics] 																																																								345	In	[Scaltsas	(1990),	p.590,	fn.33].	346	In	[Harte	(1996),	pp.292-293].	
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He	defines	 system	as	a	 related	whole	and	 structure	 as	 the	 ‘abstract	 form	of	 the	system’:		
I define a system to be a collection of objects with certain relations. An extended family is 
a system of people with blood and marital relationships, a chess configuration is a system 
of pieces under spatial and ‘possible-move’ relationships, a symphony is a system of tones 
under temporal and harmonic relationships, and a baseball defense is a collection of people 
with on-field spatial and ‘defensive-role’ relations. A structure is the abstract form of a 
system, highlighting the interrelationships among the objects, and ignoring any features of 
them that do not affect how they relate to other objects in the system. [Shapiro (1997), 
pp.73-74] I	 am	 not	 sure	 that	 Shapiro’s	 conception	 of	 cardinal	 structures	 gives	 us	 lots	 of	information	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relations	 in	 that	 structure.	 Most	 of	 his	examples	take	the	relations	between	the	objects	of	the	system	to	be	of	a	spatio-temporal	 character,	 something	 that	 could	 invoke	 a	 criticism	 akin	 to	 Frege’s	against	Mill	 regarding	 the	 applicability	 of	 number	 to	 non-perceptible	 things.	 A	much	more	 promising	 account	 is	 provided	 by	 Stanley	 Jevons	 in	 his	 work	 The	
Principles	 of	 Sciences	 where	 he	 tells	 us	 that	 ‘number	 is	 but	 another	 name	 for	
diversity’.347	A	 bit	 later	 he	 expands	 on	 what	 he	 understands	 as	 the	 ‘abstract	number’:	‘if	they	are	really	three	men	and	not	one	and	the	same	…	in	speaking	of	them	I	imply	the	existence	of	the	requisite	differences.	Abstract	number	then	is	the	 empty	 form	 of	 difference.’348	A	modern	 advocate	 of	 Jevon’s	 thought	 is	 John	Bigelow.	Bigelow	invites	us	to	consider	the	equivalence	between	(a)	The	number	of	F’s	is	at	least	three,	and	(b)	∃	x	∃	y	∃	z.	(x	≠	y	&	x	≠	z	&	y	≠	z	&	Fx	&	Fy	&	Fz).	We	 can	 observe	 that	 (b)	 does	 contain	 the	 following	 open	 sentence,	with	 three	variables	x,	y,	 and	z:	 (x	≠	y	&	 x	≠	z	&	 y	≠	z).	Any	open	sentence	 like	 this,	with	three	free	variable	will	be	true	of	various	triples	of	things.	This	open	sentence,	in	particular,	will	be	true	of	any	triple	of	things	that	are	distinct	from	one	another.	It	seems	then	that	 there	 is	 indeed	something,	a	universal,	which	 is	 instantiated	by	 each	 triple	 of	 numerically	 distinct	 things.	 Bigelow	 calls	 it	 ‘the	 relation	 of	threefold	mutual	distinctness’,	or	‘the	form	of	threeness’.	The	source	of	numbers,	
																																																								347	See	[Jevons	(1913),	p.156;	his	italics].	348	In	[Jevons	(1913),	p.158;	his	italics].	
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then,	 is	 the	 relation	 of	 non-identity,	 or	 the	 form	 of	 twoness.	 On	 this	 account,	natural	 numbers	 begin	 at	 two:	 the	 number	 two	 being	 simple	 the	 dyad,	 the	relation	of	mutual	distinctness	expressed	by	the	open	sentence	(x	≠	y).349		Yet	another	suggestion	for	a	composite	number	stems	from	the	fact	that	number	is	 something	 essentially	 ordered.	 For	 this	 understanding	 of	 number	 it	 may	 be	helpful	to	invoke	Aristotle's	treatise	on	time	at	Physics	Δ.l0-14	where	he	defines	it	as	kind	of	number,	 'a	number	of	change	with	respect	to	the	before	and	after'	(τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθµὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον,	219b1-2).	Number	 in	the	sense	of	an	ordered	group	(a	row	of	houses,	a	row	of	dots,	a	stack	 of	 coins,	 etc.)	 can	 be	 very	 well	 considered	 as	 a	 composite	 of	 form	 and	matter.	As	in	the	case	of	a	particular	syllable,	Aristotle’s	point	is,	perhaps,	that	we	have	a	row	of	three	houses	when	the	houses	are	considered	in	a	particular	order,	namely	 a	 first	 house	 followed	 by	 a	 second	 one	 and	 the	 latter	 by	 a	 third	 one;	otherwise	 the	 houses	 are	 a	 mere	 heap,	 something	 with	 no	 unity	 whatsoever.	According	to	this	interpretation,	numbers	in	the	sense	of	linearly	ordered	groups	are		compounds	of	matter	(units	of	a	certain	kind)	and	form	(ordinal	patterns,	for	example,	 the	 ordinal	 3	 pattern,	 the	 structure	 of	 any	 group	 of	 three	 objects	
considered	in	a	particular	order—a	first,	 a	 second,	and	a	 third).350	What	are	 the	(material)	parts	or	members	of	this	composite?	The	houses	apparently.	What	is	it,	then,	that	provides	the	unity	for	the	composite?	Is	the	composite	one	in	virtue	of	 some	 one	 common	 kind	 to	 which	 each	 of	 the	 houses	 belongs?	 One	 might	respond	that	the	common	kind	provides	some	kind	of	unity	but	it	cannot	account	for	the	unity	in	question.	It	 is	true	that	the	things	numbered	are	all	houses,	but	there	is	no	particular	reason	why	there	are	three	houses	and	not	five	houses	as	far	 as	 the	 nature	 of	 house	 goes.	 Thus,	 it	 cannot	 be	 the	 common	measure	 that	accounts	 for	 the	unity	of	 the	 composite.	Rather,	what	accounts	 for	 the	unity	of	this	compound	is	the	form	of	threeness,	the	specific	type	of	ordinal	structure	the	compound	is	a	realisation	of.351																																																										349	In	[Bigelow	(1988),	pp.48-54].	350	Shapiro	also	talks	about	ordinal	structures.	In	[Shapiro	(1997),	pp.115-116]	351	A	much	more	 satisfactory	 analysis	 of	 form	 number	 (something	 that	 Aristotle	 unfortunately	does	not	provide	us	with)	would	include	an	epistemic	account	of	how	do	we	get	from	a	sequence	
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Several	 problems	 remain:	 more	 specifically,	 what	 can	 be	 said	 about	 infinite	sequences?	Aristotle	argues	 in	the	Physics	204a8-206a8	that	the	 infinite	cannot	be	 actually,	 and	 that	 it	 must	 exist	 potentially	 if	 it	 exists	 at	 all.	 However,	 the	problem	is	that	it	seems	that	something	can	only	have	potential	existence	if	it	is	possible	for	it	to	exist	actually,	like	in	the	case	of	a	statue	in	a		marble	slab.	The	infinite,	however,	does	not	have	potential	existence	in	that	way;	there	can	be	no	infinitely	 extended	magnitude	or	 an	 infinite	 aggregate	of	 things.	The	 infinite	 is	not	‘whole’	or	‘complete’.		Let	us	now	have	a	closer	look	at	Aristotle’s	concept	of	
potential	infinity	that	pertains	to	numbers.		
But in the direction of more it is always possible to conceive of <more>-since the halvings 
of magnitude are infinite. Hence [the infinite in number] is potentially, but not in actual 
operation, though what is taken always exceeds any definite multitude. But this number is 
not separable, and the infinity does not stay still but comes to be, in the same way as time 																																																																																																																																																														of	 dots,	 a	 stack	 of	 coins,	 etc.	 to	 the	 formal	 structure	 of	 such	 a	 sequence.	 In	 his	 paper	‘Mathematical	 Knowledge	 and	 Pattern	 Cognition’	 Resnik	 gives	 us	 the	 archetype	 of	 such	 an	account;	 Resnik	 invites	 us	 to	 consider	 this	 sequence	 of	 dots	 	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 	 and	 try	 to	understand	it	from	a	mathematical	perspective:			
If we were impressed by the immediate succession of one dot after another we might make 
statements such as 1) no dot has more than one immediate successor; 2) if one dot succeeds another 
then the latter does not succeed the former; 3) there is a dot which succeeds no dot and every dot 
but it succeeds a dot; 4) there is no dot between a dot and its successor. Or if we were impressed by 
the ordering of the dots we might come up with these other statements: 5) if one dot comes before a 
second and the second before a third then the  first comes before the third; 6) if one dot comes 
before another then the second does not come before  the first; 7) given two distinct dots one comes 
before the other; 8) given any sub-sequence of dots there will be one in the sub-sequence  which 
comes before the others. … What is the epistemology of this situation? How do we arrive at these 
beliefs and what justification do we have for making these claims? I think that the claims are simply 
obvious to anyone who has sufficient mathematical experience to understand them and who attends 
to the diagram. I think that neither deduction nor introspection is needed to verify these claims; they 
are in a sense read off the drawing. So long as we are taking our perceptual faculties for granted, 
they need no further justification. …[N]otice that it is also evident that (1) - (8) continue to hold 
when the talk of dots is replaced by talk of a sequence of squares, stars, a row of houses, a stack of 
coins, etc. and, furthermore, the claims remain valid if several dots are taken away from or added to 
the original sequence. These additional assertions are as evident or almost as evident as the original 
ones. We have thus arrived at knowledge of an abstract pattern or structure.  [Resnik (1975), pp. 
33-34; italics mine]  
		
193	
and the number of time [Physics Γ.7, 207b10-15; Hussey’s trans. mod.] Aristotle	asserts	that	it	is	always	possible	to	think	of	a	larger	number	because	the	divisions	of	a	length	are	infinite	(207b10-11);	Aristotle	explicitly	states	later	that	it	 is	 the	 structure	 of	 the	magnitude	 (i.e.	 its	 continuity)	 that	 entails	 the	 infinite	divisibility	of	it	(‘it	is	clear	that	everything	that	is	continuous	is	divisible	to	what	is	 itself	always	divisible’,	Phys.	Z.1,	231b15-16).	 If	numbers	are	to	be	conceived	as	 sequences	of	 things,	 then	what	 could	be	 said	 about	 the	notion	of	 an	 infinite	
sequence?	 According	 to	 Aristotle	 one	 cannot	 claim	 that	 an	 infinite	 sequence	 of	divisions	enjoys	potential	being	in	that	it	is	possible	for	it	to	be	actual.	Aristotle	explicitly	rejects	this	sort	of	potentiality	for	the	infinite	in	206a18-21.	Instead	it	seems	that	he	opts	for	the	weaker	statement	to	the	effect	that	any	finite	sequence	of	things	can	be	extended.352 
[3.10]	Conclusion				In	this	chapter	I	offered	an	exploration	of	Aristotle’s	philosophy	of	number	that	is	 fundamentally	different	 from	the	standard	Fregean	 interpretation.	Beginning	from	 the	 standard	 Greek	 notion	 of	 number	 as	 a	 collection	 of	 units,	 I	 tried	 to																																																									352	Thus	Aristotle’s	view	is	fundamentally	different	from	Hellman’s	modal	treatment	of	sequences.	One	 of	 the	 most	 influential	 forms	 of	 structuralism	 is	 the	 modal	 structuralism	 developed	 in	Geoffrey	 Hellman’s	 Mathematics	 Without	 Numbers.	 According	 to	 Berry’s	 definition,	 modal	structuralism	 ‘is	a	nominalist	philosophy	of	mathematics	which	maintains	 that	mathematicians	can	 systematically	 express	 truths	 even	 if	 there	 are	 no	 mathematical	 objects,	 by	 interpreting	statements	about	mathematical	objects	as	modal	claims	about	what	is	logically	possible.’	[Berry	(2018),	p.1].	A	useful	summary	of	Hellman’s	modal	structuralism	is	provided	by	Owen	Griffiths:	‘Consider	 some	 arithmetic	 sentence	 S;	 then	 according	 to	 Hellman	 one	 might	 paraphrase	 S	 as	follows:	necessarily,	 if	 there	 is	an	ω-sequence,	 then	S	 is	 true	 	in	that	sequence.	He	calls	 this	the	
hypothetical	 component	 of	 his	 view.	 	However,	 this	 paraphrase	 faces	 an	 immediate	 vacuity	problem:	 our	 universe	 might	 not	 contain	 that	 many	 objects	 so	 there	 might	 not	 be	 any	 ω-sequences	after	all.	For	this	reason,	Hellman	introduces	the	categorical	component:	it	is	possible	that	 an	 ω-sequence	 exists.	 The	 categorical	 component	 guarantees	 that,	 if	 the	 hypothetical	component	 is	 true,	 it	 is	non-vacuously	 true.’	 [Griffiths(2015)].	 	However,	 as	Owen	Griffiths	has	noticed,	 Hellman’s	 categorical	 component	 seems	 to	 state	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	 actual	 infinity	(since	 both	 components	 are	 expressed	 in	 second-order	 S5	 with	 the	 Barcan	 Formula)	 [Owen	Griffiths	(2015)].		
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explicate	 the	 second	 sense	 of	 number	 that	 occurs	 in	 the	Physics	 texts.	While	 it	seems	 that	 Aristotle	 understands	 numbers	 in	 this	 second	 sense	 as	 species	 of	collections,	things	get	a	lot	more	complicated	when	the	discussion	comes	to	the	issue	of	the	unity	of	number.	Aristotle’s	discussion	of	the	issue	leaves	much	to	be	desired;	 however,	 some	 light	 may	 be	 shed	 if	 we	 also	 take	 into	 account	 the	
Theatetus	 and	 invoke	 the	 Euclidean	 definition	 of	 number	 as	 a	 composition	 of	units.	My	analysis	of	the	issue	of	the	unity	of	this	composite	number	pointed	to	a	conception	of	number	as	a	related	whole,	with	two	sub-conceptions	emerging:	a)	a	 cardinal	 conception	of	 composite	number,	where	number	 is	 understood	 as	 a	related	whole	 of	mutually	 distinct	 units,	 and,	 b)	 an	 ordinal	 conception,	 where	number	 is	 understood	 a	 sequence	 of	 units.	 I	 have	 also	 briefly	 explored	 an	account	 that	 treats	 numerical	 predication	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 plural	 predication,	where	 no	 such	 unity	 is	 required.	 One	might,	 however,	 be	 disappointed	 in	 that	Aristotle	does	not	seem	to	provide	a	clear	answer	to	the	question	‘How	are	these	conceptions	 of	 number	 interrelated?’	 But	 if	 there	 is	 any	 consolation	 to	 the	reader,	 he	 was	 not	 alone	 in	 this;	 as	 Dummett	 complains,	 even	 Frege	 failed	 to	understand	the	importance	of	ordinal	numbers	and	to	provide	an	account	of	the	relation	between	the	ordinal	and	the	cardinal	conception:	
<Frege’s> definition of the natural numbers did not achieve the generality for which he 
aimed. He assumed, as virtually everyone else at the time would have done, that the most 
general application of the natural numbers is to give the cardinality of finite sets. The 
procedure of counting does not merely establish the cardinality of the set counted: it 
imposes a particular ordering on it. It is natural to think this ordering irrelevant, since any 
two orderings of a finite set will have the same order type; but, if Frege had paid more 
attention to Cantor’s work, he would have understood what it revealed, that the notion of 
ordinal number is more fundamental than that of cardinal number. This is true even in the 
finite case; after all, when we count the strokes of a clock, we are assigning an ordinal 
number rather than a cardinal. If Frege had understood this, he would therefore have 
characterised the natural numbers as finite ordinals rather than a cardinal. He was well 
aware that Cantor was concerned with ordinal rather than cardinal numbers; but . . . he 
dismissed the difference as a mere divergence of interest, and never perceived its 
significance. [Dummett (1991), p.293] 
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